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Joseph P. Cermatori 
 
Between 1880 and 1930, European and American modernists connected to the theater became 
fascinated with the subject of the baroque. Among the first, Friedrich Nietzsche argued that the 
baroque style recurs throughout western history, tending in every artistic medium toward the 
theatricality of strong emotions and exciting gestures. His writings reflect a larger trend during 
this period, imagining the baroque as a spectral presence of sorts, a force both haunted by theater 
and haunting western history repeatedly. “Traditions of the Baroque” takes up these various 
hauntings, pursuing two simultaneous claims. It argues that the memory of the baroque stages of 
seventeenth-century Europe helped produce new forms of theater, space, and experience around 
the turn of the twentieth century. At the same time, it also argues that modern theater has played 
a key role in the baroque’s development into a modern philosophical concept, both for the 
analysis of art, and for a self-reflexive inquiry into the nature of philosophical discourse itself. 
These two reciprocal developments amount to what I term a “modernist baroque” paradigm in 
theory and theater alike: a pattern of having to look back to the past in order to pursue the new.  
Tracing this pattern, “Traditions of the Baroque” focuses on avant-gardists whose thought 
and writing takes place between theory and performance: philosophical theater-makers and 
theatrical philosophers from Nietzsche and Stéphane Mallarmé to Walter Benjamin and Gertrude 
Stein. Moving between the page and the stage, it tracks citations of seventeenth-century theater 
through modernist aesthetic theory across an array of otherwise disparate materials: Nietzsche’s 
  
writings on Wagnerian opera; Mallarmé’s hermetic and unstageable theatricals; Benjamin’s 
analyses of Expressionism and Epic Theater; and Stein’s saintly miracle plays. At each step, it 
uncovers a notion of historical unfolding based not on narrative progress, but on the citability 
and iterability of the past, making clear that the idea of the baroque spurred modernist thinkers to 
reimagine both western history and modernity altogether. Far from perpetuating age-old anti-
theatrical prejudices based in transcendental metaphysics, Nietzsche, Mallarmé, Benjamin, and 
Stein all adopt baroque forms of theatricality precisely to subvert the ideological regimes of the 
past. The baroque becomes, for these authors, a means to disrupt norms of representation across 
a wide array of registers: aesthetic, economic, sexual, historiographic, and metaphysical. These 
modernists take up the baroque vision of the world as a grand theater organized around a divine 
center, and radically transform it to suit a modern awareness of performance’s pervasiveness in 
everyday life. Their modernist baroque functions not as an official style of hegemonic power—
such as the absolutist state or counterreformation church—but as a deconstructive force, one that 
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From the OED: 
baroque, adj. and n. 
 
Pronunciation: /bəˈrəʊk/ 
Etymology:  French baroque adjective, Portuguese barroco, Spanish barrueco, rough or 
imperfect pearl; of uncertain origin. 
 
A. adj. 
Irregularly shaped; whimsical, grotesque, odd. (‘Originally a jeweller's term, soon much 
extended in sense.’ Brachet.) Applied spec. to a florid style of architectural decoration which 
arose in Italy in the late Renaissance and became prevalent in Europe during the 18th century. 
Also absol. as n. and transf. in reference to other arts. 
This term and rococo are not infrequently used without distinction for styles of ornament 
characterized by profusion, oddity of combinations, or abnormal features generally. 
 
1765 H. Fuseli tr. J. J. Winckelmann Refl. on Painting & Sculpt. Greeks 122   This style in 
decorations got the epithet of Barroque taste, derived from a word signifying pearls and 
teeth of unequal size. 
1846 Athenaeum 17 Jan. 58/2   Sometimes baroque, Mr. Browning is never ignoble: pushing 
versification to the extremity of all rational allowances, and sometimes beyond it, with a 
hardihood of rhythm and cadence little short of Hudibrastic. 
1867 W. D. Howells Ital. Journeys 77   The building..coldly classic or frantically baroque. 
1877    Baedeker's Central Italy & Rome (ed. 5) p. lix,   The authors of the degenerated 
Renaissance known as Baroque were really Vignola (1507–73) and Fontana's nephew 
Carlo Maderna (1556–1639)... An undoubted vigour in the disposition of detail, a feeling 
for vastness and pomp, together with an internal decoration which spared neither colour 
nor costly material to secure an effect of dazzling splendour: such are the distinguishing 
attributes of the Baroque style. 
1882 A. Beresford-Hope Brandreths I. i. 3   Studded with baroque pearls. 
1921    B. F. Fletcher Hist. Archit. (ed. 6) i. 546   In the fullness of time the Renaissance..passed 
into the Baroque, which at the beginning of the seventeenth century gave expression once 
again to the human side in architecture, for it was a spontaneous breaking away from 
orthodoxy in plan, design, and treatment. 
1928 Times Lit. Suppl. 15 Mar. 188/2   French-Canadian art..is being recognized..as a baroque 
style which is other than the European baroques. 
1938 W. S. Maugham Summing Up 28   The sonorous periods and the baroque massiveness of 
Jacobean language. 
1938 Mod. Lang. Notes Oct. 547   The period of literature..described as ‘baroque’ ends about 
1690, when German baroque architecture..is beginning to develop. 
 
B. n. 
Grotesque or whimsical ornamentation. 
1879 S. Baring-Gould Germany II. 358   French baroque was too much under Palladian  
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“On the day when I know all the emblems,” he asked Marco, “shall I be able  
to possess my empire, at last?” And the Venetian answered, “Sire, do not  
believe it. On that day you will be an emblem among emblems.” 
- Italo Calvino, Invisible Cities 
 
 
“Has not a ‘structural poetics’ ‘founded on a rhetoric’ been mentioned in  
relation to the baroque? But has not a ‘burst structure’ also been spoken of,  
a ‘rent poem whose structure appears as it bursts apart’?” 
- Jacques Derrida, “Force and Signification” 
 
 
“Literature often departs from its current path to seek for the aspirations  
of an epoch of the past, and modernize them for its own purpose.” 
- Stéphane Mallarmé, “The Impressionists and Édouard Manet” 
 
-  
“To name a sensibility, to draw its contours and to recount its  
history, requires a deep sympathy modified by revulsion.” 
- Susan Sontag, “Notes on Camp” 
 
 
“We are rescued by the essential theatricality of art.” 
- Paul de Man, Allegories of Reading 
 
 
“…all previous decadence is still residual, i.e. survives.” 



















Toward a Baroque Vision of Modernism 
 
 
In the years between 1870 and 1935, the word “baroque” began to exert a powerful fascination 
over a diverse range of philosophers, artists, historians, and critics, developing from a casual 
term of abuse into a positive category for the stylistic conventions of early modern European 
literature and art, developing gradually into the historical and stylistic concept we know today. 
Not coincidentally, this baroque concept came to prominence during an era marked by an 
astounding transvaluation of aesthetic norms in modern literature, art, and performance, giving 
rise to the first self-identified avant-garde theaters in Europe and the United States, and to a 
greater discourse of modernism across the arts in general. These two contemporaneous 
emergences have more to do with each other than scholars have previously recognized; indeed, 
this dissertation is premised on the central claim that the two developments substantively 
contributed to each other in dynamic, unexpected ways. Artists and writers associated with 
theater in the decades immediately surrounding the turn of the twentieth century not only helped 
to fuel interest and speculation about the baroque on the part of aesthetic theorists, they also 
actively participated in this concept’s development in and through the medium of theater, giving 
rise to a modernist theater aesthetics imbued with baroque conventions and concerns. With 
varying degrees of awareness and volition, these modernists drew inspiration from the baroque 
as a concept in its own right—that is, as an idea with a richness and a density unto itself, opening 
up a constellation of networked associations, cultural histories, forms, and structures—and by 
citing aspects of early modern history, culture, and theater, they used this concept as basic 
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material for avant-garde experiments in theatrical form. Meanwhile, philosophers interested in 
the baroque were basing their claims about it—and particularly about the period’s stylistic 
tendencies toward forms of theatricality—in practices of contemporary theatergoing. These 
philosophers attended the theater of their times, and used it as a reference point to help formulate 
the idea of baroque then in its earliest phases of development.  
During this strange and tumultuous period, Friedrich Nietzsche described the composer-
director Richard Wagner as fulfilling a new baroque aesthetics in theater, while Stéphane 
Mallarmé scribbled obscure, poetic tragedies based on baroque theater conventions. The German 
Expressionists were hailed as a revival of baroque feeling on the modern stage, and Walter 
Benjamin discovered baroque elements in the work of Bertolt Brecht. And as an American 
expatriate in Paris during this period, Gertrude Stein set out to create a new form of opera, based 
counterintuitively upon the lives of baroque saints. In sum, at this crucial and originary moment, 
the two concepts—baroque and modernism—mediated each other mutually in theater and 
aesthetic theory alike: the modernist theater reflected the emerging concept of the baroque, and 
the concept of the baroque reflected an emerging modernist theater. This reciprocal mediation 
amounts to a paradigm of baroque modernism (or alternatively, a modernist-baroque paradigm) 
in the theater, a dialectical pattern of modernist thinkers coming to inherit ideas and formal 
conventions of the historical baroque within the content of the fin-de-siècle and the early 
twentieth century.  
 In my view, this paradigm effectively unsettles some of literary and theater studies’ most 
familiar and trustworthy narratives of modernism as a discrete historical phenomenon. Regularly, 
and for good reason, when the name modernism is still invoked, it is often to describe an 
aesthetic reaction to specific, local, and historically unique sets of sociological dynamics and 
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material conditions, such as those following upon the industrial revolutions of the nineteenth 
century, for example (Levenson 4; Latham and Rogers 12–13).1 Amid the revolutionary tumult 
of these conditions—so these narratives go—modernism emerged as a demand for novelty and 
futurity against the moribund ways of the past. One thinks immediately of Pound’s famous 
insistence that artists “Make it new,” or of Artaud’s desire for a radical break with the history of 
Western literature—for “No More Masterpieces,” in short—or of the willingness of Marinetti 
and his ilk to consign the past to violent oblivion through an enthusiastic embrace of 
acceleration, technology, and the future. Indeed, the rhetoric of the avant-garde that so frequently 
circulates in modernist circles of the time carries this demand for futurity implicitly in its name: 
literally, the “advance” or “forward guard,” blazing an uncharted path into the new. How could 
the concept of the baroque hope to enter into any such vision of modernism, predicated as it is on 
the socio-historical specificity of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century modernity, and 
taking at face value the modernist rejection of the past? In theater studies, meanwhile, modern 
drama is typically considered to commence with the later naturalist plays of Ibsen (Columbia 
Encyclopedia 915), which depart in numerous significant ways from the expansively Romantic 
dramaturgies of the nineteenth century, while a contemporaneous tradition of “modernist drama” 
can be traced in the works of Maurice Maeterlinck, T. S. Eliot, W. H. Auden, and others, all of 
whom sought to part ways with the naturalist dramaturgical conventions of Ibsen’s time (916–
17; see also: Innes).2 Here again, modernism and the modern come to be defined as historically 
unique moments of total (or near total) rupture from the nineteenth-century past. 
Although these characterizations of modernism are useful and instructive, none makes 
sufficient space for the possibility of modernist anachronism, or for a curious bleed between 
modernism and the cultural legacy of the pre-modern or early modern in aesthetic history. In this 
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dissertation, I show that the concept and cultural memory of the baroque past acted as a 
significant, constitutive influence over the emergence of modernism around the turn of the 
century, and so invites us to reconsider the explanatory power of these familiar claims for 
futurity, newness, originality, and rupture. I thus aim to help enlarge and complicate our 
understanding of modernism as a historical phenomenon, a project that can be traced to 
Raymond Williams’s 1987 lecture at the University of Bristol, entitled “When Was 
Modernism?” There, Williams took aim at the conscription of modernism’s largely anti-
bourgeois politics to the market demands of a new, international capitalism, calling for the need 
“to break out of the non-historical fixity of post-modernism” through an effort to “search out and 
counterpose an alternative tradition [i.e. of modernism] taken from the neglected works left in 
the wide margin of the century” (Williams 35). This project forms a response to Williams’s call 
for new and alternative traditions that can adjust our normative conceptions of the field, 
beginning with the conception of modernism as an unmitigated break from the past.3 Although 
the figures it focuses on could hardly be deemed marginal, they are certainly underrepresented in 
our standard narratives of modern drama, which tend to privilege masterworks of the realist 
tradition by Ibsen, Strindberg, Chekhov, O’Neill, and others. 
Furthermore, by accommodating under-considered works and neglected theoretical 
perspectives, the paradigm of baroque modernism I describe here responds critically to the same 
claims about “post-modernism” that Williams had sought to dislodge. In recent decades, a robust 
critical literature has foregrounded a number of apparent relationships between baroque style and 
late twentieth-century “postmodernism,” often by yoking the two together under the category of 
the so-called “neobaroque,” a term most frequently claimed for—or applied to—cultural 
production in the Global South.4  But this dissertation will demonstrate that a formative, 
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conceptual preoccupation with the baroque already exists—decades before the emergence of 
discourses on the postmodern or the Latin American neobarocco movements—among some of 
the most central thinkers of modernism in the theater and culture alike in the Global North: 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Stéphane Mallarmé and the French Symbolists, Walter Benjamin, the 
German Expressionists, Bertolt Brecht, and Gertrude Stein, centrally among them. (By this I 
mean simply that a modern aesthetics of the baroque cannot so easily be quarantined to the 
South, however desirable such a quarantine might seem to those who regard the concept of 
baroque with no small measure of distrust in the North.) Among these thinkers, the concept and 
the cultural memory of the baroque past comes to take on a determining power, amounting to a 
point of origin, as of yet largely unacknowledged, for avant-garde thought and theater.5 
Specifically, the baroque becomes for these authors a means of conceiving new and modernist 
forms of theatricality that can contest the dominance of bourgeois realism on stage.6  
And yet, there are still other narratives of modernism I hope to unsettle here. In many 
cases, our kneejerk concepts of modernism are still dictated by a set of architecture-theoretical 
parameters that framed “the modern” as synonymous with a certain pared-down and 
unornamented functionalism.7 Still to this day, theatrical modernism continues to be 
characterized either as “purist, rationalist, and neo-classical in temper,” or else culminating in an 
epochal drive toward minimalism or anti-theatricality (Wollen, qtd. in Witt 11). By proposing the 
idea of a modernist baroque, I hope to query all these various trajectories. I do not presume to 
advance yet another grand theory of modernism that can be applied and in all cases: rather, I 
hope to add another layer to our current understandings of modernism as a cultural phenomenon, 
and to challenge some of our more familiar critical commonplaces. Where modernism is often 
considered a forward-looking, progressivist, or futurist cultural development, the baroque 
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modernists I consider here all take up, in different ways and with varying degrees of self-
consciousness or volition, the paradoxical practice of looking back to the past in order to advance 
the pursuit of the new. All draw upon the tradition of baroque art as a prior historical precedent 
for the establishment of new forms of modernist and avant-garde culture in their late nineteenth- 
and early twentieth-century context. As such, they ask us to reconsider not only modernism as a 
specific cultural formation, but the meaning of “the modern” altogether, predicated such as it is 
upon a progressive notion of historical development in which the unprecedented newness of the 
present continually eclipses the obsolescent past. Through this baroque paradigm and this 
collection of thinkers, it is possible to account for the past’s persistence and its untimely 
reappearance, along with its unusual givenness to citation, repetition, reiteration, in ways that 
effectively call into question modernist claims to absolute originality and historical progress.8   
Here, I wish to clarify my historiographic standpoint with a brief digression. In the Italian 
language, there is an evocative proverb—“Tradurre è tradire”—“To translate is to betray”—that 
offers these investigations an initial methodological starting point. As one whose approach to 
literary and theatrical material has been forged by the discipline of comparative literature and 
drama, my insights into the past inevitably take shape in and through translations (my own, and 
others) that, as such, cannot be anything other than partial or tendentious. While it may never be 
possible in the act of translation to render fully or with absolute fidelity the ‘true meaning’ of a 
source text (presuming we still believe true meaning exists as such), translation nevertheless 
forms a laboratory for the relative vicissitudes of fidelity and infidelity that acts of reading 
necessarily involve. Interestingly enough, however, the Italian word for betrayal, “tradire,” 
shares an etymological root with the English word tradition, pointing us to the closeness of 
translating, inheritance, and treachery—boundary crossing, passing down, and handing over. It is 
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in this multifarious sense of the word that this dissertation’s title invokes the concept of tradition. 
The phrase “Traditions of the Baroque” designates not only the enduring cultural legacy of the 
seventeenth-century past into the time of the modern—its various cultural inheritances it could 
be said to bequeath—but also its translation across borders of geographic space and chronologic 
time, and finally, above all, its repurposements and its faithless transformations in new contexts 
and into the service of new ends. In this view, a tradition is never a seamless and uninterrupted 
act of transhistoric transfer—as an act it can never be fully secure in either its origin or its 
aims—but rather, it amounts to something altogether more uncertain, precarious, or treacherous. 
I thus also have in mind the sense of historical tradition invoked by T. S. Eliot in his 1921 
essay “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” Like the figures in this dissertation, Eliot also 
engaged in the modernist project of recuperating and drawing artistic legitimation from 
seventeenth-century materials—in his case, the English Metaphysical poets—and could thus also 
be described as a participant in the modernist baroque paradigm charted here.9 In this 1921 essay, 
Eliot argues that tradition is never a simple matter of being ensnared by the past or enslaved to 
intergenerational anxieties of influence: “If the only form of tradition, of handing down, 
consisted in following the ways of the immediate generation before us in a blind or timid 
adherence to its successes, ‘tradition’ should positively be discouraged,” he argues (Eliot Sacred 
Wood 48–9). Here, and elsewhere in his poetry and criticism, Eliot thus discerns a modernist 
relation to the past that privileges repurposement and reinvention (even re/appropriation). Today, 
we might supplement Eliot’s observations by observing that the past may serve as a repository of 
cultural inheritances, but even still, the uninterrupted and successful legation or “delivery” of 
these inheritances to their latter-day “recipients” can never be fully assured (as contemporary 
historiographers and metahistorians like Hayden White have reminded us). Likewise, the texts of 
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the past offer no unambiguous key to their own interpretation; and in this way, every act of 
historical transmission entails the possibility of transformation. So too with the tradition of the 
baroque, if one can even speak of a tradition in the singular, rather than multiple, increasingly 
discontinuous acts of tradition.10 
The modernists who came to act as inheritors to the baroque and who form the subject of 
this study—Nietzsche, Mallarmé, Benjamin, and Stein—all hail from different national, 
linguistic, and historical contexts. Each encountered the concept of the baroque differently, some 
consciously, others more distantly, and engaged it according to his or her own artistic and 
philosophical ends, although the correspondences to be drawn among all four are many and 
significant. All four possessed a feeling for the porousness of the modern, for its uncanny 
temporal untimeliness. Eliot calls this feeling the “historical sense,” which permits an artist to be 
capable of perceiving “not only the pastness of the past, but also its presence. [. . . It involves] a 
sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and temporal together” 
(Sacred Wood 49). Although Eliot’s rhetoric carries clearly idealistic overtones, it can be 
interpreted (perhaps against the grain) according to a materialist perspective by observing that he 
offers us here something like an archaeological view of history, a view on which the modernist 
tradition of the baroque depends. Baroque modernism glimpses history not as an arrow, not a 
straightforward triumphal march into what Walter Benjamin terms “homogeneous empty time,” 
but rather as a field or site, or in Benjamin’s terms, a setting (or Schauplatz), in which the 
remains of the past are still somehow materially available to be grasped within the time of the 
now.11 History thus encountered appears less like a narrative or dramaturgical plot—as Aristotle 
conceived the ordering of temporal incidents into dramatic action, with a beginning, middle, and 
end—but instead as what Stein might consider a plot of land, an immanently spatial domain. 
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Benjamin, Eliot, and Stein’s various views of temporal and historical unfolding—which 
all permit the materials of the past to be accessed through moments of reappropriation, repetition, 
repurposement, and reenactment—have recently been bolstered by a cadre of feminist and queer 
critics seeking to reconceive historical temporality as other than strictly and normatively 
progressive.12 In theater and performance studies, the argument for such new historiographies has 
been given its most recent and robust articulation by Rebecca Schneider, whose writings on 
reenactment effectively elaborate the many unsettling ways in which “the past can 
simultaneously be past—genuine pastness—and on the move, co-present, not ‘left behind.’”13 In 
Performing Remains: Art and War in Times of Theatrical Reenactment, Schneider draws also on 
Benjamin’s idea of historical porousness—alongside Gertrude Stein’s notion of temporal 
syncopation (Schneider 6), to be discussed in Chapter 4 below—in order to espouse this 
nonlinear view of time. The past may seem to fully disappear into historical obsolescence and 
oblivion, but there is always the possibility that some part of it may continue to remain, to linger 
queasily in the interstices between here/now and there/then. In proposing this view of history, 
Schneider herself and the discourse of queer temporality owe clear debts to two of the theorists I 
will characterize in the following as paradigmatic baroque modernists, Benjamin and Stein. (As a 
result, we might wonder if perhaps the queer temporality that has attracted the attention of these 
new historiographers is at its basis a phenomenon of the baroque, unfurling itself in irregular, 
convoluted, spiraling folds that circle back on each other repeatedly. Suggesting as much, the 
Foreword to Performing Remains closes with an epigraph citation to Nietzsche—yet another of 
the baroque modernists surveyed in this dissertation: “Everything straight lies … All truth is 
crooked, time itself is a circle.”14)  
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The queer sense of temporal non-progressivity invoked by all these various thinkers 
(Eliot, Benjamin, Stein, Schneider, Nietzsche)—in which the past can seem at once 
paradoxically both past and co-present, a doubleness that Schneider describes in terms of the 
“both/and [that] is the beloved and often discussed conundrum of theatricality” (41)—figures 
centrally into my analysis of theatrical modernism’s preoccupation with the baroque.15 This 
doubleness speaks directly to the baroque’s history as a concept that I will advance in this 
dissertation. Already in his 1946 study of “The Concept of Baroque in Literary Scholarship,” 
René Wellek had drawn the distinction between two competing understandings of this word, one 
being  “a term for a specific phenomenon in the historical process, fixed in time and place,” 
while the second was “a term for a recurrent phenomenon in all history” (86). In brief, Wellek 
sought to distinguish between the baroque as something either fixed in the past or perpetually 
recurrent. This seemingly irreconcilable distinction between the “chronological” and 
“typological” senses of this word can be mediated by Eliot’s “not only/but also” and Schneider’s 
theatrical “both/and.” This mediated view suggests we could consider the baroque both 
chronologically and typologically, both as a complex of formal and stylistic attributes with 
substantially rooted in early modern Europe, but one whose typological conventions also have 
the potential for appearing elsewhere in time.  
Some terminological clarifications are now necessary, although I cannot claim to posit 
any essential, exclusive, or structural definitions. It nowadays would seem foolish to try to offer 
a predicate or unified field theory for a phenomenon as historically distended and complex as the 
baroque is necessarily. I am furthermore wary of any efforts at considering it as a substantial 
essence in itself after the manner of medieval realism16; that is, it would be wrong to attempt to 
approach the baroque from an ontological or metaphysical treatment17—though the topic has a 
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clear relationship to the history of metaphysics and many of the thinkers most concerned with it 
are preoccupied with metaphysical questions as well. I should make clear, instead, that I 
recognize the baroque primarily as an abstract conceptual category, one with a thickness and a 
specific discursive history all its own.18 Like Nietzsche’s notion of the Dionysian (with which it 
is crucially and historically linked, as I show in Chapter 1), the baroque regularly entails some 
notional tendency toward excess or surplus, a bursting-out-of-form; as such, it appears as that 
sort of concept that can effectively resist being subsumed under the controlling parameters of the 
concept form itself. Paradoxically, it can be said to unfold as a concept in ways that effectively 
escape the grasp of conceptualization at every instance.19 (Though if “baroque” would thereby 
seem to amount to a floating signifier par excellence, it also suggests a vision of things in which 
all signifiers have taken on this peculiar floating quality, as I will explain further below in this 
introduction.) I do not seek to ask, “What is the baroque?” and in so doing to offer a static, one-
size-fits-all, theory of its concept: such a procedure seems wrongheaded and reductionist at best, 
and to miss the point of the baroque altogether, based as it so often is in forms of dynamic, 
Protean complexity. 
On this count, Gilles Deleuze reminds his readers that, “the best commentators [on the 
subject of the baroque] have had their doubts about the consistency of the notion, and have been 
bewildered by the arbitrary extension that, despite themselves, the notion risked taking. … It is 
nonetheless strange to deny the existence of the Baroque in the way we speak of unicorns or 
herds of pink elephants.”20 Laying aside such skepticisms about the term’s conceptual coherence, 
and also rebuffing the temptation to define the baroque as an essence of sorts, Deleuze 
recommends that we consider it instead a “pure concept,” such as philosophers are in the 
business of having to invent, and even more than a concept, an operation (a function that 
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endlessly produces folds [The Fold 3]). In light of these recommendations, I aim to trace a 
history of numerous attempts at conceptualizing the baroque on the part of philosophers and 
theater artists alike—in other words, an operational history of an ongoing “epistemological 
performance.”21 Each of this project’s four case studies follows a different “staging” of this 
concept. In the work of constructing modern philosophical and aesthetic concepts, pace Plato, I 
count dramatists on equal footing with philosophers. That is, I take it as axiomatic that artists, art 
mediums, and acts of performance participate in the construction of ideas every bit as much as 
philosophers do, and are equally actors in the field of knowledge production.22 Therefore, and 
since the notion of theatricality will appear to occupy a crucial place in the baroque’s conceptual 
history, this dissertation focuses on thinkers and writers whose philosophical interests and whose 
literary approaches to form can described as taking place at the intersection of theory and 
performance. Demonstrating the baroque’s tendency to effect the theatricalization of thinking 
itself, I aim to locate modernism’s baroque paradigm among philosophical dramatists like 
Mallarmé and Stein in dialogue with dramaturgical philosophers like Benjamin and Nietzsche.23  
 Although I mean to avoid superimposing a general definition of my own upon historical 
material retrospectively, several key points of similarity emerge across all four of these figures’ 
works, and so must be drawn together here into an initial assemblage. For each, the “baroque” is 
taken historically to designate a complex of aesthetic and stylistic conventions couched within 
the chronologic framework of the long European seventeenth century—in the time of the 
Counter-Reformation, especially, but not limited to the cultural traditions of Catholic countries. 
In Wellek’s view—which I adopt as thoroughly congenial to the viewpoints of the various 
figures I track, at the very least since Wellek is a contemporary to most of them—the term is best 
used to describe “a general European movement whose conventions and literary style can be 
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described fairly concretely and whose chronological limits can be fixed fairly narrowly, from the 
last decades of the sixteenth century to the middle of the eighteenth century in a few countries.”24 
Although I sometimes reserve the term for the aesthetic conventions and literary/cultural 
production of the seventeenth century in a stricter sense, historiographers of music from the late 
nineteenth century on have traditionally framed the baroque period between the years 1600 and 
1750—a time contemporaneous with the emergence of the earliest operas, from the birth of the 
form in Florence to the death of Bach and Handel in the 1750s.25 For this reason—and because 
opera plays such an important role in the theater history of the baroque, figuring significantly 
into the thinking of Nietzsche, Wagner, and Stein—I often observe these somewhat expanded, 
now standard historiographic contours when considering the baroque in its chronologic sense. 
Geographically speaking, I again follow Wellek in using the term baroque to describe a set of 
phenomena that transcends national, ethnic, and religious boundaries. In his richly informed 
opinion—which takes account of a wide panorama of historians and critics from Jacob 
Burckhardt’s time in the mid-nineteenth century until the mid-1940s (i.e. a swath of time roughly 
contiguous with the time of baroque modernism)—the term effectively “points out that Sir 
Thomas Browne and Donne, Góngora and Quevedo, Gryphius and Grimmelshausen have 
something in common, in one national literature and all over Europe” (“Concept of Baroque” 
87). The baroque thus depends on a strategic essentialism of sorts, but so forms one of the 
classical concepts of comparative literature. It can accommodate a variety of linguistic, literary, 
and cultural traditions without discounting the differences between and among them, 
constellating them together into an unassimilated unity.26 
But this is only the baroque in its historical sense, the “historical baroque” as I will refer 
to it in the chapters that follow. Assuming, as Wellek does, that we can describe the salient 
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stylistic conventions of the baroque in at least relatively comprehensive terms, what can account 
for the persistence of such conventions after the middle eighteenth century and into time of 
modernism? What explanation can be offered for the supposed “afterlife” of baroque form, 
beyond the frame of the early modern period? Here, William Egginton’s much more 
contemporary concept of the baroque provides a useful and compelling guide. Egginton writes, 
in his recent book The Theater of Truth: The Ideology of Neo(baroque) Aesthetics:  
Is the neobaroque turn of the twentieth century something akin to the 
Neoclassicism of the sixteenth century, or the Neo-Gothicism of the nineteenth? 
Or on an even more condensed scale, is it similar to the rapid returns 
of previously dismissed fashion decades, as evidence by the proliferation in the 
early years of this century of those beads and bellbottoms associated with the 
flower children of the Age of Aquarius? The baroque's return, if it is a return at 
all, has nothing to do with the recycling of culture that these examples represent. 
Instead the baroque must be understood as the aesthetic counterpart to a problem 
of thought that is coterminous with that time in the west we have learned to call 
modernity, stretching from the sixteenth century to the present. (1) 
Here, Egginton asserts that the question of the baroque’s importance for the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries ought not to be understood in terms of an historical dynamics of 
obsolescence and revivalism. His skepticism about whether the baroque’s supposed return is or is 
not a return at all should be duly noted. Rather, in Egginton’s view—a view I share in this 
dissertation and that is demonstrably in evidence among the figures I survey here—the baroque 
amounts to a stylistic complex with origins in the seventeenth-century past, but one that 
continues, persistently and archaeologically, to structure the developmental course of modernity 
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well into the twentieth century. In this sense, it amounts not so much to a discrete historical 
phenomenon as a enduring condition of sorts, the sign of a permanent situation, the situation, as 
Egginton puts it, of modernity. On this point, Egginton shares much in common with the French 
philosopher Christine Buci-Glucksmann, who describes the baroque—from the seventeenth 
century through the period that stretches between Baudelaire and Benjamin—quite simply as 
“the aesthetics of modernity.”27 In this view, the baroque is to be thought less as something that 
returns and more as something that remains, in Schneider’s sense of the term—the sign, as 
Egginton puts it, of a problem of thought “that affects or unsettles an entire culture in the largest 
possible sense.” As Egginton writes, “Western culture since the sixteenth century has been 
entangled in a particular problem of thought, and if the baroque aesthetics of the seventeenth 
century are the sign of its inception, the neobaroque aesthetics of the present and recent times are 
the sign, if not of its demise, then of the exhaustion of all previous attempts to solve, undo, or 
otherwise remove the problem” (1–2). He sums up this “problem of thought” succinctly by 
writing, in terms that Nietzsche will have already anticipated, that, “The Baroque makes a theater 
out of truth, incessantly demonstrating that truth can only ever be an effect of the appearances 
from which we seek to free it” (2).  
Unlike Egginton, I do not favor, and so tend to eschew as much as possible, the notion of 
the ‘neobaroque’ for the way it continues to suggest (in spite of his best intentions) a certain 
“recycling of culture” akin to forms of Neoclassicism and other revivalist projects that seek to 
revivify the (implicitly) defunct aesthetic “trends” of the past.28 But like Egginton, I also claim 
that the baroque amounts to an aesthetic reaction to a problem of thought and theater 
coterminous with Western modernity—a problem that can only ever be partially repressed and so 
is always capable of making a return. In each of my four chapters, a modernist embrace of 
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baroque conventions appears as a symptom of modern thought turned newly “problematic.” My 
argument is that the baroque emerges again and again between the 1880s and the 1930s—
whether in Nietzsche’s writings, or Mallarmé’s, Benjamin’s or Stein’s—as a stylistic as aesthetic 
reaction to a modern epistemological crisis of faith, truth, and language, a crisis that has its 
origins in the early modern period, but that can never fully been resolved under the terms set for 
modernity by the modern project of secularization. Egginton frames this crisis in terms of “a 
theatrical aporia—between the mediation of appearances and presence to self, the truth they 
purport to represent” (49). It is a gap that numerous positivist epistemological regimes have 
aimed at eliminating, particularly those of modern instrumental reason since the time of the 
Scientific Revolution, but that remains stubborn and ultimately irreducible.  
Correspondingly, Egginton claims, early modernity developed two baroque strategies—
which he terms major and minor, drawing on Deleuze’s lexicon—for coping with this aporetic 
gap. The major strategy amounts to a hegemonic re-affirmation of Truth and Presence as self-
sufficient categories, thus effectively situating the domain of appearance as Truth and Presence’s 
pale imitation. The minor strategy, by contrast, affirms only the reality of mediation in itself, and 
in terms that subvert that authority of claims to transcendental Truth or Presence to Self.29 This 
provocative narrative, if taken to be accurate, requires us to rethink not only our understanding of 
the baroque, but also our view of its relationship to what we describe as the modern. It is now a 
critical commonplace to consider baroque style as a primarily conservative aesthetic formation, 
in service to absolutist or theocentric ideologies (a view most forcefully advocated by José 
Antonio Maravall in his 1975 book Culture of the Baroque: Analysis of a Historical Structure). 
Egginton’s readings, however, make clear that properly deconstructive, counterhegemonic 
tendencies are already at play in the cultural production of seventeenth-century Europe.30 His 
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argument suggests that we may need to revisit some of the ways in which we in the twenty-first 
century understand ourselves to be basically different from our seventeenth-century 
predecessors. For example, it was perhaps formerly believed that all of seventeenth-century 
Christendom understood the entire cosmos as an elaborate theater with the Divine Presence as its 
sustaining center and anchor. Nowadays, to the extent that we consider reality to be theatrical in 
a similar manner, we moderns often consider the space of our social life in similarly theatrical 
terms, but from a less clearly theological standpoint that lacks the central presence of any 
godhead. So, in this way, the baroque theatrum mundi is said to be surrogated by a contemporary 
view of social life composed of roles and enactments, but correspondingly devoid of any 
transcendent ontological anchor. (That is, where once we had the baroque theatrum mundi, now 
we tend to understand identity as either a performance, or performatively constituted.) 
Egginton’s narrative has consequences for this narrative, however. The notion of a minor 
baroque asks us to take seriously the possibility that the aesthetics of the historical baroque were 
not so uniformly theocentric, not so homogeneously given over to re-entrenching foundationalist 
ideology, and that consequently, our contemporary version of the theatrum mundi, which sees 
the world as a theater of sorts in which the self appears as something troublingly masklike, might 
itself be a view generated by a longstanding internal schism within the baroque dating back to 
early modernity.  
My argument builds on Egginton’s claims by reframing what he terms “the theatrical 
aporia” between appearances and truth in terms of an enduring semiological process of 
secularization that extends from the seventeenth century through the present. The various authors 
in this study register this gap in the terms of comparative linguistics—congenial to the task of the 
(traitorous) translator—by noting that, when different languages are set alongside each other, it 
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becomes clear that linguistic signs necessarily fail to express their referents’ full and substantial 
signification, and that no linguistic signifier can thus function transcendentally or absolutely.31 
Words appear to communicate or represent an external reality, but fail to do so in a manner that 
conveys the full truth of the thing, which is somewhere lost amid the mediations of language and 
bodies. Since this sense of language’s inherent incapacity for truth stems directly from the act of 
encountering different languages in translation, the derealization it occasions reflects an 
experience of being removed forcibly from the space of the center, linguistically, ethnically, 
nationally, metaphysically, and so forth. The much discussed sense of linguistic and 
representational crisis during the late nineteenth century, in which language appears no longer 
capable of corresponding fully and faithfully to the reality is seems to designate, is richly 
imbricated in the emergence of the modernist baroque during this period. As Friedrich Nietzsche 
will note: a full articulation of “pure truth, truth without consequences,” capable of getting 
beyond the veil of linguistic forms and corresponding to some substantial reality—proves 
ultimately impossible (TL 144). In a similar vein, Walter Benjamin observes in his study of 
seventeenth-century German allegorical theater that the historical baroque period experienced 
precisely this vanishing of the transcendent realm upon its exposure to ancient Egyptian 
hieroglyphics—giving rise to a new and terrible skepsis in religious life and in 
linguistic/hermeneutic practice alike. Both periods witness the beginnings of an unprecedented 
epistemological groundlessness, the awakening of modern nihilism. The modernist baroque, like 
the historical baroque, recognizes the nonidentity of words and things and the incapacity of 
language to perfectly encompass the objective world it seeks to grasp. Both intuit the mediated, 
hence inaccessible character of both the physical and the metaphysical “real world” to their 
human interpreters.  
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With the category of truth thus thrown into crisis, both moments of the baroque—
historical and modernist alike—strikingly appear to embrace the theater in response, as a lifeboat 
of sorts in the wake of the shipwreck of metaphysics.32 Although this nihilistic “problem of 
thought” dates back to antiquity and to the ancient problems of thought proposed by the highly 
theatrical mode of Greek sophistic rhetoric, as Nietzsche will show, it reaches a new, decisive, 
critical point during the period of the historical baroque, whose global consequences are 
unprecedented in extension.33 While the baroque period, as such, would seem from a modern 
vantage point to have been unambiguously superseded at any number of discrete historical 
boundary points—say, in the time of Bach’s death or at the end of the ancièn regime—the 
baroque problem refuses to be consigned so easily to historical oblivion. Instead, something of 
the baroque—its basic historico-philosophical conditions—continues to “survive,” manages to 
“escape,” or else, retains the capacity to “haunt,” beyond the point of its apparent “death” in the 
eighteenth century.34 When baroque modernism emerges in the late nineteenth century, it serves 
effectively to register an underlying sense that modern attempts at solving or reducing this 
problem of thought have exhausted themselves.  
So far we have discussed in some detail the historical components of the baroque 
concept, but have yet said little about its relevant formal or typological aspects. Although, as 
Wellek points out, the term “baroque” was originally applied, however casually, to designate a 
species of artistic ugliness (“Concept of Baroque” 82, 86), we nowadays use the word, both 
formally and colloquially, to denote a style that tends toward structural asymmetry and 
complexity, material extravagance, ornamentation, and exciting visual spectacle, all of which 
unfolds according to a dynamic and uncertain interplay between anarchy and restraint. 
Etymologists now mostly agree that the word baroque itself was, in its earliest recorded usage, 
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meant to designate an irregularly shaped pearl, grotesque and tumorous in form, thus denoting 
something rich and strange, ugly and ostentatious at once.35 At face value, it seems possible the 
word shares an etymological heritage with the modern word queer, which descends from Middle 
Low German (dwer) and Indo-European roots (terkw-) designating something off-center, 
oblique, twisted, or torqued, just as the non-spheroid baroque pearl’s center of gravity is itself ec-
centric, exiled from the center. It is likewise significant—in light of the problems the baroque 
poses to thinking, thought, and truth, as sketched above—that the term has a secondary lineage 
from the history of rhetoric: drawing on Benedetto Croce, Wellek has observed that the term 
baroco at one point referred to “the fourth mode of the second figure in the nomenclature of 
syllogisms in Scholasticism, a type of syllogism considered strained and artificial” (“Concept of 
Baroque” 77). “Baroque” can thus also suggest a certain form of circumlocution or roundabout 
reasoning—cognitive “ostentation” that can be interpreted (however uncharitably) as either 
virtuosity, sophistry, or both. 
These associations are abundantly useful for thinking the baroque in both its art historical 
and its modernist contexts across a wide array of art mediums and practices, and will certainly 
inform the chapters that follow. But although the philosophical discourse of the baroque touches 
on music, the visual arts, architecture, and many other fields, I approach it as a historian of 
dramatic literature and performance, and so my primary interest in it is its relationship to 
theatricality as such. As the first chapter of this dissertation shall show, Nietzsche was among 
the first and the most influential to conceive of the baroque in terms of its necessary givenness to 
theatricalizing effects, although his comments construe the baroque primarily as a theatrical 
approach to thought, writing and language. From Nietzsche’s time until the present, this 
conceptual affiliation between the baroque and theatricality has endured: Egginton himself 
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claims this affiliation most recently and emphatically in The Theater of Truth when he proposes, 
in terms that are evocative (if nonetheless a touch essentializing) that “The Baroque is theater, 
and the theater is baroque” (39).36 Perhaps not surprisingly, the subject of baroque theatricality 
has been well explored in the fields of the visual arts and art history;37 and the field of historical 
musicology recognizes the conceptual importance of theatricality to the baroque by fixing the 
period’s beginnings with the origins of the dramma-in-musica and other proto-operatic genres 
that attest to the modern theatricalization of music in and around 1600. Curiously enough, 
however, despite the attention other fields have given to the subject of baroque theatricality, the 
fields of literary, theater, and drama studies have had relatively little to say about it.38  
This reticence is particularly obvious in Anglophone scholarship, where theater studies 
are still likely to take place within the institutional frameworks of English literature departments. 
Wellek observes that English cultural historians have maintained a longstanding ambivalence to 
baroque as an aesthetic framework (“Concept of Baroque” 85); and this ambivalence may stem 
from the influence of nineteenth-century art critics like John Ruskin, from an intuitive, negative 
association of baroque style with continental Catholicism, or from the fact (still valid today) that 
“the English seventeenth century does not impress the historian as a unity” (85).39 Where 
contemporary Anglophone scholars of seventeenth-century theater and drama have taken the 
topic of theatricality into consideration, they have largely avoided the conceptual framework 
provided by the baroque.40 American historians of performance have been equally remiss in 
taking up the baroque as a category, for altogether different reasons, often relating to the 
institutional history of the field of performance studies in the United States.41 Their oversight 
seems particularly regrettable, given that questions of historical and aesthetic styles (like 
baroque) are now being engaged elsewhere, by Peter Burke among others, for their 
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fundamentally performative character.42 Nevertheless, a discursive lacuna has opened up, in 
which historians of the visual arts dominate scholarly conversations on baroque theatricality, 
even as drama, theater, and performance scholars have remained noticeably absent while the 
medium of our own specialization is being defined elsewhere, without our involvement. It falls 
to comparative theater, drama, and performance studies to redress this opening in the 
conversation. If scholars of theater in the field of English literature are loath to consider the 
question of baroque drama, other transnational perspectives can be brought to bear.43 This 
dissertation offers an initial, anachronic foray into this question, using the subject of theatricality 
to account in systematic and theoretical ways for the relationship between modernism and 
baroque, a project still largely unexplored in the domain of theater studies.44  
While the topic of the baroque has not yet gained traction, the subject of theatricality has 
assumed a unique importance in recent performance studies.45 (Like “baroque,” however, the 
concept proves immensely elusive.) As a comparative historian of hispanophone theater and 
literature, Egginton offers an interpretation of the theater that resonates amply with the notion I 
uncover and embrace in this project: he describes it as “that medium of interaction whose 
conventions structure and reveal to us our sense of space or spatiality. The spatiality so revealed 
is theatricality” (How the World 3). My own interpretation of the term, while acknowledging the 
strong sense of the spatial that Egginton urges, also endeavors to maintain a certain negative 
capability that owes a strong debt to thinkers working in the tradition of Derridean 
deconstruction, however. For example, Australian theater and performance scholar Glen 
McGillivray gets at the intractable problems of defining the theatrical most immediately in his 
2006 essay “The Discursive Formation of Theatricality as a Critical Concept,” where he writes: 
“Historically, theatrical metaphors have been employed in anti-theatricalist discourses to suggest 
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ideas of inauthenticity and deception. … Yet, for the European avantgarde [sic], theatricality was 
the ‘essence’ of theatre. What appears to be a contradiction seems less so when it is understood 
that ‘truth’ in these instances lies not in what is claimed for theatricality, but in the juxtaposition 
of it and another term” (101). McGillivray cautions us about seeking out the “truth” of 
theatricality (just as Egginton claims that truth can only and ever be a function or effect of those 
appearances we describe in theatrical terms). In his view, theatricality appears primarily as a 
rhetorical device—that is, “as a value, rather than simply describing stagecraft of things to do 
with the theater” (105), but even more urgently, as “an empty value” (104), always available to 
being contrasted negatively against some other term in a convenient binary pairing, endlessly 
susceptible to the biases of those who wish to deploy discursively to shore up the truth-value of 
their positions. (So for example, Theatricality vs. … anti-theatricality, actual theater, painting, 
art as such, life, reality, textuality, performance, performance art, performativity, truth, and so 
forth.) McGillivray concludes his reflections: 
Rather than enter into debates concerning art versus theatre, theatricality versus 
performativity, or reality versus (theatrical) simulation, and attempt to assert a 
‘truth’—contingent or otherwise—for ideas clustered under the umbrella of 
theatricality; it is better that we critically appraise just how metaphors of theatre 
and theatricality are used in a particular argument and for what ends. Ultimately, 
such appraisal will lead us to discover, like Nietzsche did with the Judeo-
Christian and Platonic tradition, that genealogies of interpretation, concealed as 
Truth, Being or Subject, succeed in establishing [in Samuel Weber’s phrase] their 
“own authority and driving all competitors from the field.”  (113) 
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As a value, a concept, and a signifier, theatricality can thus be seen to maintain a properly 
deconstructive potential, in so far as it remains stubbornly resistant to any clear meanings apart 
from those that can be conferred upon it through a proliferation of more and more other 
signifiers. It amounts regularly to the placeholder for ‘absence’ in any neat binary pairing that 
would otherwise help to underwrite an unspoken metaphysics of presence.  
Against this possibility of meaning’s presence unto itself, theatricality seems not so much 
to exist stably but rather to unfold somewhere in the playful and immanent interstices of presence 
and absence. Elinor Fuchs writes, in a similarly deconstructive vein, “Theatre is ever the 
presence of the absence and the absence of the presence. Both are component in its every motion, 
but until recently its motions have taken place within phonocentric limits” (“Revenge of 
Writing” 173). Although this hardly counts as a definition, or even the beginning of one, what 
appears thus to constitute theatricality, in this view, is the presence of an irreducibly sensuous (or 
“spatial”) and medial quality that hovers around an abyssal emptiness, an ostentatious 
proscenium opening onto the void, presence and absence conditioning and transforming into 
each other mutually. If we wish to remain suspicious of metaphysical presuppositions, 
theatricality and its other (whichever other that might be at any given moment—“anti-
theatricality,” for example, whatever that is) can never hope to be resolved into a stable and 
reliable pairing of truth and untruth, as a number of anti-theatricalist critics seem to wish. Rather 
McGillivray and Fuchs would have us conceive of theatricality and its various others as 
constantly flowing into and out of each other, not so much the irreconcilably opposite sides of 
one coin, but rather like the “two” “sides” of a Möbius strip.46  
Where this anti-theatrical tradition is concerned, in both theater studies and art history 
alike, perhaps the most influential and polarizing recent concept of theatricality has come from 
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the visual arts historian Michael Fried, who has sought to delineate an anti-theatrical project in 
French realist painting between the period of Denis Diderot’s lifetime in the mid eighteenth 
century and Édouard Manet’s in the late nineteenth century. In Fried’s now famous view, which 
draws assiduously on Diderot’s writings on painting and theater, a painting achieves the 
desirable appearance of “absorption” in those cases when it focuses upon a figure or figures 
“entirely engrossed or absorbed in an action, activity, or state of mind and therefore oblivious to 
the beholder’s presence” (Absorption and Theatricality 100). In brief, “absorption” occurs, in the 
visual arts as on the realistic stage, when the figures depicted behave as though an audience were 
not observing them—as though separated from any spectator by the existence of what Diderot 
would call the “fourth wall,” which separates the audience from the onstage spectacle by way of 
an imaginary boundary line drawn along the edges of the proscenium arch. Theatricality, by 
contrast, occurs in Fried’s view when this appearance or illusion of absorbed action is disrupted. 
Fried observes that Diderot reserved the term théâtral—“the theatrical,” a sign of artistic 
mediocrity in his estimation—for those moments that imply “consciousness of being beheld, as 
synonymous with falseness” (100). Typically such theatrical moments, in Fried’s analysis of 
Diderot, occur in painting when the “painted figures … appear openly to address the viewer” 
(Moment of Caravaggio 2). These moments of address, in which the figure in the painting or on 
the stage appears to return the spectator’s gaze, effectively devastate the realistic illusion of 
absorption, revealing both a theater conscious of itself as theater, and a spectator conscious of 
herself in the act of spectating. Fried thus defined theatricality as a self-referential form of spatial 
organization in painting, theater, and across any other number of artistic mediums, one that 
makes a direct appeal to a spectator through a glance or a some other conspicuous gesture, 
breaking the illusory fourth wall of pictorial or dramaturgical realism.47 Absorption puts forward 
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a theater of representations; theatricality threatens to draw the spectator into the theater space 
itself, landing her somewhere within the theatrum mundi, the self-conscious understanding that 
all the world’s a stage. 
In Absorption and Theatricality (1980), Fried shows how this anti-theatrical project arose 
in reaction to “the apparent neglect of absorptive considerations” among painters of the French 
Rococo in the early eighteenth century (Absorption 35). Painting prior to the rise of French 
classicism in Diderot’s lifetime (Fried offers 1747 as the decisive turning) was soon deemed too 
“exquisite, sensuous, intimately decorative,”—ultimately incapable of the morally serious 
imperative of pictorial absorption, and so was though to be given over to theatrical effects.48 The 
project of French realistic painting that begins in Diderot’s lifetime emerges as a reaction to this 
Rococo moment in the visual arts, and extends into the late nineteenth century time of Manet, a 
time contemporaneous to the period I sketch here as the beginnings of the modernist baroque. 49 
Fried describes the general collapse of this project during Manet’s lifetime as follows: 
The project was ultimately doomed—in the long run it was bound to fail—
because the ineluctable truth of the situation—that easel paintings are made to be 
beheld—kept making itself felt, calling for new measures to bracket or neutralize 
or disguise that truth, in short, to hold it at bay, measures that in turn were sooner 
or later revealed to be inadequate in one way or another. … In my trilogy, 
Absorption and Theatricality, Courbet’s Realism, and Manet’s Modernism, I track 
the far from simple path of a central antitheatrical project, which eventually, more 
than a hundred years after it got under way, reached a critical stage. At that point, 
in the early 1860s, the task of defeating theatricality by one means or another had 
to be given up as no longer feasible, and in Manet’s revolutionary canvases of the 
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first half of that decade … an attempt was made to refound ambitious painting on 
the basis of a new acknowledgement of the beholder’s ineluctable presence before 
the canvas (Moment of Caravaggio 121). 
Theatrical address thus comes to “triumph,” in Fried’s terms, over painting during the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, at a time when new considerations are being given by 
Nietzsche and others to the eminent theatricality of baroque style.  
This historical simultaneity is far from merely adventitious. Fried has more recently 
advanced the claim—in his latest art theoretical writings, on the Italian baroque painter 
Caravaggio—that the earliest seeds for the modern concept of absorption were sown during in 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries,50 during a period when “absorption and 
[theatrical] address were not … imagined as fundamentally at odds with one another, as by and 
large would be the case for absorption and theatricality in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
France” (Moment of Caravaggio 121–22).51 He continues: “By the 1630s theatricality of an 
obvious sort did become a conspicuous strain in what we have come to call baroque art—not 
only in painting but also, more importantly, in sculpture and architecture (the great exemplar is 
of course Gian Lorenzo Bernini)—but it remained for a future age, the mid-eighteenth century 
and after, to criticize that art specifically on those grounds” (122). That is, just as the period of 
Caravaggio’s lifetime sees the emergence of absorption as an autonomous aesthetic category, so 
too does a new, modern theatricality assert itself powerfully during this time, “conspicuous” in 
the sculpture and architecture of Bernini, and demanding negotiation in the paintings of 
Caravaggio. It was precisely this theatricality that drew the derision of Diderot and his 
Enlightenment contemporaries, both as it appeared in the paintings of the seventeenth-century 
baroque, and in those of the early eighteenth-century Rococo up until 1750.  
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The project of realism in painting that Fried’s career has traced can be said to amount 
effectively to an attempt at forestalling [“to bracket or neutralize or disguise… to hold it at bay”] 
a form of theatricality that in Fried’s own account emerges and distinguishes itself forcefully 
during the period of the historical baroque. When this realistic project’s efforts are exhausted in 
the late nineteenth century, it is perhaps little wonder that forms of baroque theatricality should 
reassert themselves emphatically, however differently in these new historical circumstances. 
Fried also demonstrates, however, that Diderot’s foundational anxieties about conspicuous 
theatricality pertain not just to painting, but to actual theater as well. The theater Diderot 
condemned was a theater lacking in absorptive properties, without sufficient respect for the 
ontological illusion of the “fourth wall.” In Diderot’s accounts, adduced by Fried, this appears to 
be a theater full of ham actors, endlessly appealing and winking to the audience for cheap 
applause.52 Fried’s account, however, offers little overt recognition that European traditions of 
theater acting prior to the early eighteenth-century had their bases in the ancient practice of 
oratory, which ensured that performers were bound, at frequent occasions, to gaze outward into 
the audience, penetrating through the “fourth wall” that would only come into existence later in 
Diderot’s time, as performance historian Joseph Roach has shown. Of the acting methods that 
were pervasive in the early seventeenth century, Roach writes: “Oratorical delivery, by 
definition, orients the speaker face to face with his audience, whose continuous presence he must 
at least implicitly acknowledge. … This profound belief, bolstered by ancient authority, provides 
a key reason why rhetorical delivery required actor and spectator to meet face to face” (Player’s 
Passion 46–7). The primary and default orientation of most acting in the early modern period—
whether its theoretical influences were Quintillian, Bulwer, Galen’s humoral theory, or the new 
Cartesian mechanism—was thus outwardly directed, following a theatrical vector.  
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This aesthetic context helps elucidate why the attribute that Diderot and Fried would later 
call theatricality could not be deemed an aesthetic demerit during this time. During the historical 
baroque, the appearance of theatricality arises not so much from the incorrigible exhibitionism of 
the actor, but rather because the oratorical inclination of performance was a historically 
venerated convention in itself (and one uniquely conducive to the deployment of theatrical 
allegory, as I shall explain momentarily). Importantly, this outward orientation did not 
completely preclude frequent moments of dramatic absorption onstage. Rather, it is more 
accurate to say, along with Fried, that in European theaters in the seventeenth- and early 
eighteenth- centuries, just as in the painting of the period, “absorption and theatrical address 
were not imagined as fundamentally at odds with one another.” A basic familiarity with the 
structures of Shakespearean drama—in which scenes of absorptive and dramatic action sit side-
by-side with frame-breaking moments such as prologues, epilogues, soliloquys, asides, songs, 
interludes, and the like—makes clear that ‘absorption’ and ‘theatricality’ were not mutually 
exclusive criteria for the baroque stage, as they would become during the Enlightenment for 
Diderot. The point most worth underscoring here, however, is that the historical baroque saw the 
emergence of an emphatic new form of theatricality, in theater and visual art alike, that cannot be 
delimited merely to the matter of certain actors’ preference to orient their bodies and gestures in 
certain directions. This form of theatricality, in Fried’s own account, becomes increasingly 
pervasive in painting between the time of Caravaggio’s baroque (particularly Rome in the 1590s) 
and Bucher’s Rococo (Paris in the 1740s), and even infecting the practice of playwriting during 
the period. 53  
And not just playwriting; theatricality proliferates the possibility of its effects across the 
stage space in its entirety. Surely the period’s manifest obsession with forms of opulent 
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spectacle, scenography, and all sorts of visual, aural, and sensual display evince an increasingly 
ubiquitous theatricality, unmoored from the discrete bodies of any specific onstage performers.  
In the baroque, it can be said that the full stage and all its technological appurtenances—the 
entire medium, as it were—are put into the service of soliciting the audience’s admiration, like 
Fried’s theatrical actor hopes to do as he plays out to the crowd. (Fried, it should be noted, has 
less to say on the subject of settings and their capacity for hailing the spectator theatrically.) 
Indeed, the aesthetic-theoretical discourse during the historical baroque placed unrivalled 
emphasis on the need for the arts to elicit just this quality of admiratio—wonder, astonishment—
emotions that carry within them the potential to inspire either curious, philosophical reflection or 
dumbfounded, religious awe.54 As Fried suggests, the surest case-in-point where wonder and 
theatricality are concerned, the surest case in point is Gian Lorenzo Bernini, who for many critics 
and admirers of baroque style alike (including Nietzsche and Stein) amounts to its avatar and 
epitome. Fried asserts that baroque theatricality is “of course” exemplified in the sculptural and 
architectural work of Bernini, but what he neglects to acknowledge is that Bernini, like Diderot, 
was both proficient not only in the visual arts but in the actual practice of theater itself. In both 
arenas he excelled in the production of theatrical effects intended to appeal directly to his 
spectators in as powerful, affective, and immediate a manner as possible. As a theater impresario, 
he served as private capomaestro dei teatri for the Roman Cardinal Maffeo Barberini, who in 
1623 became Pope Urban VIII, elevating Bernini to the position of the Papacy’s official theater 
artist. In these capacities he became known for his extraordinary virtuosity across all the stage’s 
various media. The English traveler and diarist John Evelyn wrote admiringly, after visiting 
Rome in 1644, that he had attended an opera by one Bernini, who, in Evelyn’s description, 
sounds like an baroque theorist of the modern Gesamtkunstwerk (or total artwork) avant le lettre. 
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Combining the intelligence of a Ben Jonson and an Inigo Jones in one total mastermind of the 
craft, Bernini is said to have “painted the scenes, cut the Statutes, invented the Engines, 
composed the Musique, writ the Comedy and built the Theater all himself” (Diary II, 261). Other 
documentary evidence attesting to Bernini’s career in the theater is slight, but the few remaining 
testimonies similarly bespeak a creative imagination devoted to totalizing effects, aimed at 
arousing the spectators’ wonder.  
In those accounts that do survive from the time, Bernini was apparently well known for 
achieving this quality of wonder, not only through overwhelming scenic effects, the likes of 
which had already been mastered by many of contemporaries, but specifically for effects that 
threatened the stable barrier between representation and reality, between art and life (Bernini 
25.n.7). Baroque wonder in its most astonishing forms always consists in this—not just technical 
admiration for an actor’s performance or a feat of stage engineering stunningly pulled off, but 
also a total disorientation between the simulacrum and truth, where the theater and reality 
overspill into one another, allowing one to feel or intuit oneself inhabiting a world or a space that 
is always already theatrical. Bernini gained notoriety in the year 1638 with a court spectacle 
entitled The Inundation of the Tiber, which responded to the river’s actual flooding in Rome the 
year before. He not only flooded the stage to depict a scene full of boats upon the water—an 
impressive achievement in itself but one that was already gaining popularity elsewhere during 
the time—but also allowed the stage’s mechanical retainers to break as if by accident, thus 
threatening the auditorium with a very real, catastrophic flood, avoided at the last moment by a 
trick of hydraulic engineering that allowed the rushing river water to drain magically away 
before it soaked its terrified audience.55 In another piece, The Fair (ca. 1645), he adapted yet 
another convention of baroque theater spectacle to shocking ends, by having a torchbearer 
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“accidentally” set fire to the production’s scenery, inciting the audience to flee in panic, before 
magically changing the scene to a noble and beautiful garden out of harm’s way (Bernini 7). In 
yet another piece, The Two Coviellos (ca. 1637), the curtain rose to reveal a second auditorium 
made to mirror the actual audience perfectly; then the curtain fell so some commedia clowning 
could be played on the apron of the stage; and when it arose again, it revealed an onstage replica 
of the piazza outside the theater, Saint Peter’s Square, full of spectators leaving the building after 
the performance, heading home on foot, horseback, and in carriages.  
Though these anecdotal tidbits might suggest an artist given over to totalizing theatrical 
effects, and so correspondingly to what might be deemed ‘totalitarian’ ambitions in art, amenable 
only to the purposes of strengthening established power relations, a closer look at the few 
surviving documents that attest to Bernini’s life in the theater suggests otherwise. Drawing on 
Paul Fréart de Chantelou’s diary, Mary Ann Frese Witt observes that—while Bernini was often 
employed in lavish settings for sumptuous audiences, he “produced most of his own plays with 
low budgets, at his own expense, in his own home or in the Vatican foundry where he did his 
sculpture. … [These productions were] often ‘homegrown and home-staged,’ often featuring 
members of his family and his workshop” (80). His sole dramatic work to have survived—an 
untitled and not-fully-extant comedy discovered in 1963 among receipts for repairs to the Trevi 
Fountain—focuses on the character of Graziano, a modern stage impresario clearly modeled 
after Bernini himself, whom Bernini was very likely to have played in performance. The short 
and fragmentary takes for its subject the question of how to create a work of theater that can 
engender the effect of the marvelous in its beholder. Against his wishes, Graziano has been 
commanded to produce a comedy for the Prince, and (worlds within worlds!) he plans to 
compose a drama about a theater impresario like himself. (At one point near the end of act two, 
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Graziano even comes face-to-face with a character named only “Graziano’s Double,” the actor 
who will play his onstage doppelganger in the play he is to write for the Prince. (That is, the-
actor-Bernini-playing-a-character[-Graziano]-based-on-Bernini has to confront, onstage, an-
actor-playing-an-actor-who plays a-character[-Graziano’s-Double]-based-on-Bernini.)  
The play’s second act takes place in Graziano’s theatrical workshop (and possibly was 
performed in Bernini’s actual Vatican foundry in what we today would describe as a “site-
specific” gesture that conflates the real and the represented). Here, in this backstage space, all the 
various stage machines designed for manipulating the audience’s sense of theatrical 
excitement—the means of spectacle production—are laid crudely bare for the audience to see 
and contemplate. Left briefly alone onstage among these membra disjecta of theatrical illusion is 
a stock commedia clown or Zanni, who in this play functions as Graziano/Bernini’s constant foil 
and alter ego, a deviant and a schemer who plots comic subterfuges as skillfully as the master 
plots entrancing intrigues and stage effects. Looking over these various decontextualized 
devices, the Zanni imagines the marvelous illusion they will create in the theater, commenting in 
a remark made directly to Bernini’s audience: “I can already see a sky full of beautiful clouds. 
When a thing looks truly natural, there’s got to be some craft behind it [emphasis mine]. That the 
Prince, the very image of courtesy and kindness, would bully a rare artist like Graziano for a 
piece of work—that isn’t natural. It’s craft.  Somebody’s pulling the strings.”56 It is a particularly 
gestic moment for an artist whose theater work (like his work in sculpture and architecture) 
seems otherwise so superficially committed to wholesale aesthetic enchantment. Between the 
various anecdotes we have left of Bernini’s magical stagecraft, on one hand, and this abyssal 
scene of metatheatrical reflection, on the other, in which the theater’s magical spell is broken, 
Bernini embraces both “sides” of the theatrical Möbius Strip, allowing theatricality and 
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metatheatricality, theatricality and “anti-theatricality,” theatricality-and-reality to flow into 
another restlessly. In Egginton’s terms, if Bernini’s statuary and architectural offerings at St. 
Peter’s Basilica in Vatican City evince the baroque’s “major strategy,” testifying to the grandeur 
of Catholic hegemony and the eternal reality of the Judeo-Christian Godhead, this moment in the 
scene-shop offers another, altogether more critical view, a view Egginton associates with the 
baroque’s “minor strategy,” training Bernini’s audience to think in disenchanted, skeptical terms, 
particularly when confronted with both stagecraft and statecraft alike. “When a thing looks truly 
natural, there’s got to be some craft behind it”: with these words, Bernini suggests to us a 
defamiliarized, baroque way of reading history in precisely those phenomena that couldn’t 
otherwise seem more natural. 
This baroque apothegm—based as it is on both falling in and out of illusion, on seeing 
“the natural” as something historical, something carefully constructed out of sight—speaks 
volumes to the enduring cultural legacy of the baroque, its cultural and historical dynamics that 
persist well into the time of modernism and beyond. The modernists I survey in this dissertation 
are inheritors to both Bernini and his Zanni alike: theirs is by turns both a mystifying and a 
demystifying sense of the theatrical, though the accent falls repeatedly with heavier emphasis on 
the latter. In any case, whether in its historical or modernist manifestation, whether “major” or 
“minor,” the baroque always expresses a consciousness that the stable category of self-identical 
truth has fallen into uncertainty, and thus requires either shoring up or critical remediation. In 
Fried’s view—to return to our discussion of his writing and conceptual legacy—theatricality 
becomes a problem whose eminently philosophical stakes concern precisely this self-sufficient 
domain of truth. In his narrative, when the dialectic of absorption and theatrical address emerges 
in Caravaggio’s paintings in the 1590s, its appearance signals an epistemological and 
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metaphysical crisis manifested also, remarkably enough, in Shakespeare’s tragedies of the 1610s. 
Here Fried takes up Stanley Cavell’s thesis, propounded in Disowning Knowledge in Six Plays of 
Shakespeare, that the Shakespearean tragedies of this decade unfold as reactions to new and 
modern forms of skepticism which result from the period’s shaken or displaced faith in God, that 
is, from the new forms of epistemological groundlessness unleashed by the period’s increasingly 
secularized historical situation.57 For Fried, absorption comes into being in painting in order to 
forestall or negotiate this groundlessness, but all too visibly does theatricality come into 
existence as well, in Caravaggio, in Bernini, and elsewhere. 
It seems plausible to me that Shakespeare’s tragedies effectively mediate this new sense 
of ontological groundlessness, as Cavell and Fried claim they do—and indeed, Walter Benjamin 
will offer a very similar reading of Shakespeare in his own philosophical inquiries into baroque 
theater, as this dissertation’s third chapter will show. Still, however, the formal tendency for the 
early modern actor to break the stage’s absorptive illusion and address his discourse directly to 
the audience exists throughout Shakespeare’s writing, not just the tragedies, and indeed, 
throughout much seventeenth-century performance, as I have already observed. In this light, I 
find Peter Szondi’s Theory of the Modern Drama most helpful in clarifying the dramaturgical 
stakes of Fried’s theatricality narrative.58 In an influential account of the emergence of modern 
drama, whose congruency with Fried’s portrayal of the emergence of modern painting is 
astonishing, Szondi attaches primary importance to the notions of dialogue, relationality, and 
intersubjectivity onstage, all of which echo the category that Fried terms absorption: 
 The Drama of modernity came into being in the Renaissance. It was the result of  
a bold intellectual effort made by a newly self-conscious being, who after the 
collapse of the medieval world view sought to create an artistic reality within 
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which he could fix and mirror himself on the basis of interpersonal relationships 
alone. … The “place” at which he achieved dramatic realization was in the act of 
self-disclosure. … The verbal medium for this world of the interpersonal was the 
dialogue. In the Renaissance, after the exclusion of prologue, chorus, and 
epilogue [emphasis mine], dialogue became, perhaps for the first time in the 
history of theater (excluding the monologue, which remained occasional and 
therefore did not constitute the form of the Drama), the sole constitutive element 
in the dramatic web (194–95). 
Drama, in Szondi’s narrative, emerges gradually in and after Shakespeare’s time primarily on the 
basis of intersubjective relationships conducted through dialogue alone. It sets up “a self-
contained dialectic” on the stage, an “other world” to which the spectator is a silent observer: 
under the aesthetics of drama, “The lines in a play are as little an address to the spectator as they 
are a declaration by the author” (195). As it develops through the Age of Reason into the time of 
the Enlightenment, drama can only emerge as a modern cultural formation, significantly, “after 
the exclusion of prologue, chorus, and epilogue”—that is, once any dramaturgical allowances for 
a direct address to the spectator have been circumscribed (or dissimulated) completely. In brief, 
drama comes increasingly into being in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries precisely 
through an antagonistic relation to what Fried calls theatricality, by excising those forms that 
dramaturgically require the performer to address the audience directly. In this regard, it is 
unsurprising that Fried regularly uses the terms drama and absorption in close proximity to each 
other: both delineate the closed circuit of a self-sufficient representation, where theatricality 
renders that circuit incontinent.59 Theatricality, then, maintains an inherently anti-mimetic, anti-
representational orientation in the theater.   
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But, again, the phenomenon I have been describing as baroque theatricality also suggests 
an inherently anti-representational approach to language and truth. Szondi’s narrative grounds 
the ideology of drama, through dialogue as its primary characteristic, in a firmly-rooted belief in 
the dramatic character’s capacity for self-disclosure and in the dramatic acts of expression and 
communication: “The drama is possible only when dialogue is possible” (197). Szondi takes 
pains to trace this notion of drama’s descent into crisis in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century—the same period I designate here as the beginnings of baroque modernism, and the 
same period that sees the collapse of Diderotian realism in Manet’s painting, by Fried’s 
account—a time that gives witness to what Szondi calls “the collapse of communication” (209) 
which thus renders the possibility of dramatic, absorptive dialogue impossible in turn. This 
collapse proves highly productive for modern dramatists—Szondi finds evidence of it in Ibsen, 
Chekhov, Strindberg, Maeterlinck, and Hauptmann—but it signals both an end to the notion of 
drama as it was traditionally conceived, and an end to traditional understandings of language and 
communication. Here the sense of semiological crisis I have briefly sketched above is most 
significant: once communication is rendered suspect, and the relationship between words and 
things comes to seem arbitrary or purely conventional, interpersonal dialogue can no longer 
flourish on the stage, and neither can drama, in Szondi’s self-enclosed (absorptive) sense. It is 
thus little wonder that this period sees a turn, or a return, toward new forms of theatricality that, 
paradoxically, are also old centuries old, long laying dormant since the historical baroque period, 
with all its modes of direct address that were necessarily suppressed by the hegemony of 
dramatic dialogue and absorption. This is not to say that all modernism in drama will embrace 
prologues, epilogues, choruses, and other neo-Jacobean devices in slavish imitation of 
Shakespeare, for example; but rather, that modernism amounts to a moment when a once-
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repressed vision of theatricality resurfaces, in a variety of modes that the following chapters will 
trace. In each case, the preference for theatricality opposes itself to the realistic and naturalistic 
traditions of theater grounded in absorption, mimesis, and representation. Nietzsche’s writings 
will disparage the mimetic qualities of the nineteenth-century stage while calling for new and 
nonmimetic forms of theatricality that, most conspicuously, appear in the manifestly rhetorical 
form of his writing itself. Benjamin’s baroque theater refuses to remain strictly and securely 
mimetic, overbrimming with theatrical emblem effects. And Mallarmé and Stein will advance 
new visions of modernist drama grounded not in absorptive action, but in the theatricality of 
gestures and operatic arias, their inspiration directly drawn from seventeenth-century materials. 
None of these authors, in my view, can be said to take up an expressly or coherently anti-
theatrical position, the likes of which Fried is eager to associate with modernism:60 they all reject 
or critique the theater inasmuch as it is grounded in representation and drama, but embrace 
theatricality as such in a manner that at once recalls the baroque past and presages the avant-
garde future. 
Here I aim to supplement and revise the narrative influentially advanced by Hans-Thies 
Lehmann in his groundbreaking work Postdramatic Theater. Lehamnn draws directly upon 
Szondi’s Theory of the Modern Drama to demonstrate that the modernist moment in drama 
witnesses the formal, conceptual, and phenomenal “estrangement of theater and drama” from 
each other, allowing for the emergence, as his title declares, of a new and “postdramatic” form of 
theater production (30). (In Diderot’s writings, however, as Fried reads them, this estrangement 
between the “purely” dramatic and the “merely” theatrical is already in abundant evidence, albeit 
in a preparatory, rather than reactive manner.61) Lehmann has productively argued, particularly 
with respect to our post-Brechtian historical moment, “theatre without drama does exist,” taking 
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shape as theatre in a reconfigured relationship to the notions of the dramatic text, textual 
authority, the coherent and closed “fictive cosmos” that appears on the stage interpersonal 
relationships, mimesis—in brief, to all the ideological trappings of “drama” that have been in 
place since the emergence of the eighteenth century discourse of the drame.62 Thus the period of 
modernism, in Szondi, Lehmann, and Fried’s analyses alike, amounts to a period when drama 
itself (or “absorption” as Fried terms it) enters into an agonistic relationship with theater (or 
“theatricality”): but where Lehmann sees the late twentieth-century and contemporary theaters 
under the sign of postdramatic conventions, I argue instead that the modernist crisis of drama 
creates the opportunity for forms of theatricality, central to the tradition of the historical baroque 
and long eclipsed since that time, to remerge.63 Put another way, we can say that during the time 
in which modernism emerged around the turn of the twentieth century, the historical and 
aesthetic residua of early modernity became in some sense newly recognizable, both in 
themselves and as baroque, and that these residua exerted at that time a compelling forcefulness 
over their modernist inheritors. (Again, I do not wish to argue that this compulsion means that all 
modernism is necessarily “another version of” baroque; rather, I wish more simply to 
demonstrate the cultural weight that the baroque inheritance accrues in the modernist context.) 
As such, the emergence of a manifestly baroque form of modernism around the turn of the 
twentieth century signals the need to rethink “the modern” altogether, and announces the 
unbelievability of the Enlightenment vision of modernity’s historical unfolding as a 
straightforward, linear, or progressive narrative, nourished by instrumental reason and anchored 
in the telos of a better, more enlightened futurity.64 In baroque modernism, this narrow vision of 
modernity appears newly untenable. This is neither to say that the notion of modernity in itself 
must be abandoned altogether, nor that modernism witnesses the beginning of “the end of 
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modernity,” ultimately culminating in a late twentieth-century form of “post-modernity.” Rather, 
baroque modernism requires us to adopt a different and more complex notion of modernity and 
historical progress, one not based exclusively on the history’s triumphant march into the future. 
In making this focal shift from theater to theatricality (as Erika Fischer-Lichte and others 
in the field of performance studies have proposed), it becomes possible to recognize theatrical 
forms and structures outside the discrete space of the literal theater itself. Where history is 
concerned, for example, it has been important for us to note that the idea of baroque modernism 
involves both the past in terms of its pastness, and in terms of a continued presence that 
importunes acts of repurposement. This doubleness, this paradoxical both/and, can itself be 
considered a theatrical relation: theatricality thus comes to manifest itself in the historiographer’s 
perspective and the movement of historical time itself, resulting in an awareness of what 
Schneider deems “the theatricality of time” (6). Curiously enough, however, others working the 
field of literary studies have described this same sense of doubleness, not in terms of 
theatricality, but in terms of a certain allegorical operation. In Shakespeare Among the Moderns, 
Richard Halpern draws on Benjamin’s writings to rewrite Eliot’s “historical sense” as a kind of 
“historical allegory.” There he writes that, “The presence of the past results, for Eliot, from the 
fact that the works of the tradition form an atemporal, ideal order among themselves. If from one 
perspective they are products of a specific historical era, from another, they participate in a 
timeless structure that is eternally present. It is in this sense that Eliot’s ‘historical sense’ may be 
called allegorical” (2–3). In Halpern’s reading, this allegorical sense of time and history allows 
“the past to be reconfigured in conformity with current needs and preoccupations” (3), and in this 
sense the tradition of modernism I trace here can be described as effecting an allegorical 
maneuver with respect to the baroque past by bringing it into alignment with the needs of the 
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modernist present.65 But it is even more remarkable that where Schneider would situate the 
iterability of the past within a rhetoric of temporal theatricality, Halpern sees its recuperability as 
a function of historical allegory.  
The question thus arises: what conceptual relation can exist between theatricality and 
allegory that the two can be used to describe such similar views of historical time? Fredric 
Jameson offers the possibility of an answer at the outset of his chapter on “Allegory” in Brecht 
and Method. Taking influence from Benjamin’s concept of the allegorical, Jameson writes: 
 Allegory consists in the withdrawal of its self-sufficiency of meaning from a  
given representation. … The theatre is once again a peculiarly privileged space  
for allegorical mechanisms, since there must always be a question about the self-
sufficiency of its representations: no matter how sumptuous or satisfying their 
appearance, no matter how fully they seem to stand for themselves, there is 
always the whiff and suspicion of mimetic operations, the nagging sense that 
these spectacles also imitate, and thereby stand for, something else (122). 
Allegory, like theater, takes for its basic structure this duplicity or multiplicity of signification—
the not only/but also referred to by Eliot and the both/and referred to by Schneider—where the 
possibility of meaning’s self-sufficiency or self-identity is forestalled. Like allegory, theater 
always poses the possibility of interpretation in terms that are conspicuous—at times patently 
embarrassing—and that allow meaning to reside at another level or a host of other levels, beyond 
what appears initially. Even in the most nominally realistic of theater, the spectator sees not only, 
say, John Gabriel Borkman, but also an actor playing him: one can potentially see both the actor 
and Borkman at once with a kind of stereoscopic gaze. So much is also true for the allegorist, 
who interprets not only the surface, direct, or literal meaning of the text, but those hidden 
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meanings that avail themselves only through the light of learning, knowledge of the tradition, 
and allegorical contemplation.  
In the baroque tradition outlined here, between the seventeenth-century past and the time 
of modernism, allegory and theatricality emerge quite simply as the two preeminent and defining 
characteristics of the baroque as a concept of style. Among the theorists surveyed in the 
following chapters, the concept of baroque trades endlessly and necessarily in allegorical 
theatricality and theatrical allegory. Nowhere is this clearer than in the form of the early modern 
masque, a primarily allegorical form of theatrical entertainment in which personified virtues and 
abstractions take center stage as the form’s principal dramatis personae. Even more than on the 
public stage, in the court masque, as in other allegorical forms of the period that were typically 
intended to glorify a monarchical audience, it would have been necessary for the actors to face 
outward into the audience in order to address and glorify the royal presence directly. In a more 
general sense, however, to be explicitly recognizable as allegories, the performers in these 
entertainments would have needed to face outward from the stage, as in a prologue, epilogue, or 
chorus, to appear in full view of the auditorium, so their emblematic properties and attributes 
could be glimpsed and hopefully interpreted by the spectators assembled.  
The allegorical figure onstage thus ceases to be a character in the dramatic, Aristotelian 
sense necessary for absorptive action, and instead transforms into a character in the hieroglyphic 
sense, to be read and deciphered.66 Lavishly and studiously bedecked, onstage constellations of 
emblematic figures in the baroque masque were certain to solicit astonishment from their 
audience, both in the theoretical senses I have already alluded to and in Fried’s sense of 
theatrical pandering to the crowd, but they also functioned as an invitation to allegorical 
interpretation, and in this sense Fried’s tendency to dismiss theatricality as tantamount to mere 
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vainglorious showmanship on the actor or playwright’s part is inappropriate. Allegory and 
theater go hand in hand, and this conjunction will be more fully elaborated in the fourth chapter 
of this dissertation, which examines the theory of allegory advanced by Benjamin’s readings of 
baroque theater. But it is also necessary to mention here that the literary theorist Paul de Man 
would later take up Benjamin’s writings in order to designate allegory, together with irony, as a 
deconstructive figural trope par excellence.67 In de Man’s writing, allegory can be said to reveal 
“a gulf that now opens up between word and object, language and the world … statement and 
meaning” (Tambling 129). In this—the capacity for glimpsing the nonidentity between words 
and things, signifiers and referents—and in their various stylistic manners of responding to this 
uncanny nonidentity, all the thinkers that appear in this dissertation can variously be described as 
allegorical writers. Furthermore, since Benjamin makes clear that this particular notion of 
allegory declines from the time of the Counterreformation, their allegorical modernism comes to 
appear even more patently baroque in character.  
Under de Man’s influence, allegory has come to seem a primary rhetorical mode for the 
aesthetics of “postmodernism” and for the “postmodern neobaroque,” and is still regarded as 
such today.68 Nevertheless, prior to this dissertation, a sustained effort at constellating allegory, 
theatricality, and baroque together has not yet been attempted by theater scholars.69 The 
conceptual history of allegory in the late twentieth century is itself instructive for this 
constellation. The term attracted an extraordinary new critical attention in the 1960s, the same 
period that led up to Michael Fried’s first and most famous attacks—in his 1967 Artforum essay 
“Art and Objecthood”—against the theatricality of the new minimalism in sculpture, heralding a 
new era of postmodern theatricalism.70 Some years later, when Rosalind Krauss and several 
others who dissented from Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried’s views of modernism broke 
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away from Artforum to found the art journal October in 1976, they ran a series of essays between 
1980 and 1981 in response to de Man’s Allegories of Reading (1979) that helped to fix allegory’s 
meaningful place as an aesthetic concept for postmodernism in the arts. These essays include 
Joel Fineman’s “The Structure of Allegorical Desire” (Spring 1980), Craig Owens’s two-part 
article, “The Allegorical Impulse: Toward a Theory of Postmodernism” (Spring/Summer 1980), 
and Stephen Melville’s “Notes on the Reemergence of Allegory” (Winter 1981). The last of 
these three essays especially makes explicit that the journal’s sudden commitment to 
reconsidering allegory during these years should be understood as a rejoinder to Michael Fried’s 
anti-theatrical aesthetic program, first begun in 1967 but by then more fully articulated in his 
1980 publication of Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the Age of Diderot. 
In his essay’s introduction, Melville writes that his notes on allegory’s reemergence should be 
seen as responses to the terms and limits of “the formalist program of the middle and late sixties 
(the terms and limits of ‘Art and Objecthood’ above all)—and of the historical elaboration that 
program has received in Michael Fried’s subsequent writings”; he unabashedly states: “This 
essay takes this book [i.e. Absorption and Theatricality] as an opportunity to review an argument 
and a career.”71 Seen in this light, what Melville calls the reemergence of allegory in modern and 
postmodern times must be understood as contiguous with the reemergence of theatricality: the 
two terms are crucially and conceptually linked throughout his essay, as they are in Fineman and 
Owens’s essays also. According to his October detractors, what Fried describes as theatricality is 
also thus in critical ways a form of allegory, in de Man’s sense.72 Both theatricality and allegory 
maintain rich ties to the historical baroque, as I have observed here, and both make a marked 
reemergence, not just in the 1960s, ’70s, or ’80s, but as I will show, as hallmark signs of baroque 
modernism in the last years of the nineteenth century.  
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Here I should offer a methodological caveat to my primary claims in this dissertation. 
Although at times the modernists in this dissertation may seem willingly to take up baroque 
stylistic conventions—especially forms of theatricality and allegory—and knowingly put them to 
use in deliberate and premeditated ways for the purposes of modernist experiment, the stronger 
version of my argument amounts to something else. Namely this: in the time of modernism, 
these baroque conventions are already at work prior to any given act of enunciation on the part of 
Nietzsche, Mallarmé, Benjamin, Stein, or any other historical actor. In this sense, they cannot be 
said to amount to a dead inheritance consciously taken up in every case, but to part of an ongoing 
historical unfolding. Another caveat: I do not wish to personify the baroque, to render it 
anthropomorphically, as a ghostly or spiritual agent in some transcendent or ideal historical 
realm, compelling specific human philosophers or artists to do its bidding; nevertheless, as a 
complex of conventions and historico-philosophical conditions, the baroque does indeed prove 
spectral, haunting modern cultural production in the uncanniest of ways. Though it may not 
amount to an agent— a Zeitgeist, Time-Spirit, a Ghost making injunctions for us moderns to 
avenge its supposed “death”— its conventions and conditions do however necessarily precede 
and exceed any given action or utterance that might be taken up in the later time of modernism, 
just as they precede and exceed the lives of any of the individual figures surveyed here. I thus 
aim not to delineate a situation in which a metaphysical baroque force manipulated modern 
artists toward its inscrutable will like so many hapless tools, nor do I wish to describe one in 
which these artists had to choose whether or not to take influence from the baroque past. Radical 
volition and an absolute freedom of choice are not eminently at stake in these historical 
dynamics, and neither are their opposites. Rather, I wish to depict a historical moment in which it 
is no longer fully possible to evade a complex of stylistic conventions and historical 
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determinations that is baroque in origin—a situation in which baroque conventions become 
newly and urgently recuperable, regardless of the relative blindness or insight brought to bear 
upon these conventions by their modernist inheritors.  
Unfashionable though grand narratives may now be, the recurring interest in the baroque 
among all the authors surveyed in this dissertation suggests that a fundamental historico-
philosophical shift has taken place—one congruent to the historical movement, described 
elsewhere by Paul de Man, away from classical mimesis to modern allegoresis73—impressing the 
necessity for both baroque modernism and its equally though differently inflected baroque 
“postmodernism.” (Indeed, “postmodern” neobaroque deserves to be fundamentally rethought as 
an intensification and dissemination of the baroque tendencies already manifest in the time of 
modernism. Where the rhetoric of the post- suggests a rupture, we might more productively think 
in terms of an entrenchment. Such rethinking would inevitably cause us to reconsider some of 
the most foundational academic source texts on the subject of “postmodernism” in the theater.74 
And indeed, a growing fascination with baroque could easily be shown to persist in every decade 
of the twentieth century.75) Fried describes this same shift in terms of the need to give up the task 
of defeating theatricality as no longer feasible in the time of Manet’s modernism: it is, as he 
describes it, a sign of a modern crisis. With modernism and the historical baroque reflecting each 
other dialectically in this way, baroque style comes to appear as a permanent and irreducible 
fixture of modernity, and a sign of an underlying catastrophe, standstill, or recursion in the 
domain of historical progress. 
In this respect, I will in the course of this dissertation situate the history of the baroque 
theater in an archaeological relation, not only to modernist theater practice, but to the modern 
practice of philosophy that extends from Nietzsche to Benjamin through to Jacques Derrida, Paul 
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de Man, and Samuel Weber. (Mallarmé and Stein both play important, though less direct roles in 
this genealogy, as the chapters below will show.) By figuring the concept of the baroque as a 
relevant precursor to the modern practice of deconstruction, I place both in a position of critical 
supplementarity to that of Michael Fried, who has since his earliest years in “Art and 
Objecthood” sought to oppose theatricality to the expressly theological value of “grace” (Art and 
Objecthood 172), a rhetorical maneuver that allows the binary opposition of absorption and 
theatricality both to depend on and shore up what Derrida has termed a “metaphysics of 
presence.” It seems necessary to reconsider and complicate this binary thinking, as McGillivray 
has enjoined us to do, and to do so from a theater-historical vantage. Some readers may find my 
interest in allegory—or this project’s emphasis on locating aesthetic precursors to the critical 
genealogy of deconstruction—as curiously outmoded or somehow old-fashioned.76 But allegory 
has also been claimed, as Gail Day specifically has aimed to do, as occupying a conceptual 
position somewhere “between deconstruction and dialectics,” helping to mediate political and 
methodological disputes between Marxists and post-structuralists. If this is true, neither allegory 
nor the baroque can be thought to be devoid of a contemporary political significance.77 In this 
respect, the stakes of rethinking the baroque—beyond those that I have already discussed at 
length above with respect to Michael Fried, Peter Szondi, Hans-Thies Lehmann, Rebecca 
Schneider and the emerging field of queer historiography—are considerable and well worth 
elaborating here.  
 Before speaking about political stakes directly, let me first aim to articulate the stakes of 
this project as I see them within the more delimited domain of theater studies. Of course, I hope 
that the concept of the modernist baroque will allow for a rethinking of other modernist authors 
not included here—Eisenstein, Valle-Inclán, Lorca and the Generation of ’27, Artaud, Auden, 
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Genet, and others, for example, all come to mind as potential candidates for reconsideration 
within the framework of this paradigm. In terms of theater-historical discourse, however, my 
greater hope is to counteract a predominantly anti-theatrical discourse among scholars of 
modernism. In theater studies, Michael Fried’s position has most actively been promoted by 
Martin Puchner, whose writings—particularly on the concepts of metatheater and about the 
intersections of theater and philosophy—have influenced this dissertation abundantly and 
positively. Nevertheless, despite Puchner’s many outstanding and admirable contributions to the 
field, his emphatically anti-theatrical position with regard to modernism—notably in Stage 
Fright: Modernism, Anti-Theatricality, and Drama (2003), where he asserts that the primary 
tendency of dramatic modernism is an opposition to theater as such—seems overstated. Here I 
share Mary Ann Frese Witt’s skepticism, and seek to echo her questioning of Puchner’s general 
framework: if modernism maintains a primarily anti-theatrical stance, “What are we to make of 
Pirandello?” she asks, before announcing her aim ‘to bring out the protheatrical aesthetic in 
modernist and postmodernist, as well as in baroque, metatheater” (10). I share this aim, and 
pursue it in the following chapters’ study of modernism. Where Puchner argues that Richard 
Wagner forced the emerging scene of modern dramatists to take a committed stance either for or 
against theater and theatricality (Stage Fright 9), I detect a more ambiguously stratified field. In 
spite of the copious and often explicit anti-theater rhetoric Puchner adduces admirably 
throughout Stage Fright, the phenomenon that he describes as modernist “anti-theatricality” I am 
more likely to read as an ambivalence among modernists’ to their contemporary conditions of 
stage production, particularly the conditions of the bourgeois realistic stage, and a desire to 
reinvent the notion of the theatrical altogether for a nonrealistic or nonrepresentational future, a 
desire for reinvention that I see as taking place along aesthetic boundary lines set down by the 
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baroque concept.78 At the risk of stating what might otherwise be obvious, it seems necessary to 
note the distinctions between being categorically anti-theater (in itself and as such), being 
relatively opposed to the dominant forms of theater that exist in one’s culture and historical 
context, and being philosophically opposed to theatricality as an abstract notion. It does not seem 
worthwhile to conflate these various stances, as Stage Fright sometimes does. It is of course 
eminently possible (nothing more common, probably) to take up a critical position to the 
dominant theater of one’s lifetime, regarding it as mostly trivial and uninteresting, while neither 
opposing the genre of theater across the board, nor taking up a necessarily negative attitude 
toward theatricality as such wherever one may find or situate it. Puchner, I believe, agrees with 
me on principle on all of these counts, though argumentatively Stage Fright would seem to 
advance a contrary view. With all due respect to his almost unrivalled contributions to the field, 
to move from the observation that many modernists took a critical view of their contemporary 
theater to the conclusion that they maintained a necessarily anti-theatrical posture seems too 
overhasty, and the partisan vision of modernism advanced by Puchner and Fried strikes me as 
too characteristically Puritan to be tenable.79 Theatricality may inevitably be a suspicious 
category—particularly where aesthetics and politics come to intersect, it seems a quintessentially 
pharmacological concept, with the capacity to function both as medicine and poison, depending 
on its uses or abuses, its intended or unintended consequences. Still, my interpretive instinct is to 
focus, however willfully or unfashionably, upon its powerful critical potentials. 
 Here I have in mind the fact that the criterion of theatricality has historically held special 
importance for queer-identified persons in their struggle against normative conventions of gender 
and sexuality, in a variety of different ways and to just as many different ends.80 Theatricality can 
register as a visible or sensuous sign that an otherwise invisible and performative functioning of 
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a norm or convention has been transgressed, however slightly. My desire, quixotic and utopian 
though it may be, is to hold out a limited faith in its promised potential. And so is it with the 
category of the baroque—like theatricality, a treacherous and ambivalent concept surely, and one 
that lends itself easily to discussions of violent and absolute state power, grotesque inequalities 
of wealth, religious mystification, aestheticism, luxury (in the bad sense), and all sorts of other 
bad things. Still, there has been a rich tradition of writers who have found in the baroque some 
measure of liberatory or radical potential. Benjamin and Deleuze are certainly among them, but 
one might also cite the Austrian painter Oskar Kokoschka, the Spanish philosopher Eugenio 
d’Ors, and the Cuban authors Severo Sarduy and Alejo Carpentier: a heterogeneous group, to be 
sure.81 These various authors agitated for more democratic, subversive, or radical interpretations 
of the baroque concept—Sarduy notably even clamoring for “A Baroque of the Revolution” 
(Zamora and Kaup, eds. 290)—all opposing themselves to the received wisdom that sees 
baroque only as a repressive, compensatory ideological apparatus to be wielded by the absolutist 
state.82  
There has also been a rich tradition of openly gay- or queer-identified writers claiming 
kinship with baroque style: Stein and Sarduy were among the first and most prominent to do so. 
In this regard, it is not fortuitous that the modern concept of the baroque emerges in aesthetic 
discourse at roughly the same fin-de-siècle moment hat the concept of homosexuality emerges in 
modern social and political discourse, as Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s Epistemology of the Closet 
can remind us. Perhaps the baroque and the theatrical, when each configured into a binary with 
any other opposing term (classicism, realism, etc.), are in some measure products or co-
participants of the same epistemology and discourse that Sedgwick so carefully traces.83 In this 
dissertation, Stein emerges as an emphatically queer thinker of baroque style, one who takes the 
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baroque’s conceptual history into yet gayer and more playful directions, which can be followed 
well into the mid-twentieth century and which converge strikingly in the mid-century discourse 
on camp.84 And yet, at every instance, not just in Stein’s case alone, the modernist baroque 
tradition I trace throughout this project amounts to a sustained attempt, not without peril, to find 
in the baroque a capacity for subverting the ideological regimes of the past.  
My first chapter locates the inauguration of this tradition in Nietzsche’s late writings on 
baroque style in Human, All Too Human and in his private correspondence, which take Richard 
Wagner and the ritualistic ecstasies of opera at Bayreuth as their unspoken reference point. 
Across these various writings, Nietzsche tacitly and repeatedly describes the composer and stage 
director as an avatar of baroque aesthetics and a sorcerer of the theatrical, frequently assailing 
him for his similarities to his predecessor Bernini. Only later would Nietzsche’s confess to 
having used Wagner’s name in his younger writings covertly to describe himself, a confession 
that clearly suggests an anxiety about his own philosophical susceptibility to baroque forms of 
thought and expression. In Nietzsche’s writings, baroque style can be said to emerge from a 
sophistic awareness of the rhetoricity of language, from an intuition that language’s expressive 
and communicative force—its capacity for corresponding “truthfully” with the world it seeks to 
represent—has somewhere been lost. In this view, the distance between signifier, signified, and 
referent grows infinite, yawning open into a sublime abyss, requiring the rhetorician to engage 
language in a manner that can approximate this sublimity. (Benjamin will later call this almost 
infinite nonidentity between the world of languages and things and the world of their supposed 
meanings “allegory.”) Nietzsche will characterize the baroque as an eminently rhetorical and 
dramatic approach to thought, writing, and artistic production, that is, a means to communication 
that has always in mind the fact of a reader, a listener, a spectator, whose presence cannot be 
!
! 52 
ignored and whose passions must called forth—theatrically. I thus argue that Nietzsche positions 
himself as a Dionysian counterbaroque to the Apollonian baroque style he finds in Wagner, a 
distinction with crucial political significance (given those aspects of Wagnerian aesthetics that 
most bespeak an inclination toward totalitarian beliefs), and one that allows Nietzsche to criticize 
his nemesis from a position of immanence. Nietzsche thus initiates a philosophical discourse on 
the baroque that simultaneously posits theatricality as its necessary condition, gathers 
seventeenth- and nineteenth-century theater practices under the sign of baroque aesthetics, and 
invokes the baroque to characterize the performativity of modern philosophy itself. In naming 
both himself and Wagner as bound up in the historical dynamics and contradictions of baroque 
style, Nietzsche thus suggests the baroque as an enduring conceptual problematic with meaning 
for the ensuing course of modernity’s development well into the twentieth century modernity, 
and indeed beyond. 
Stéphane Mallarmé, the subject of my second chapter, continues this tradition of baroque 
modernism within a Symbolist context largely shaped by Nietzsche’s thought. Mallarmé’s late-
twentieth-century interpreters, particularly those affiliated with French structuralism and post-
structuralism, would almost uniformly attempt to interpret his writings in relationship to the 
history of baroque literature and culture, and this chapter aims at charting the sources and 
meanings of these various interpellations. In crafting his ornately hermetic poetics, Mallarmé 
synthesizes the influence of numerous seventeenth-century dramatists (Shakespeare and Racine, 
notably), theatrical traditions (allegorical dumbshow, for example) and notions of architectural 
ornamentation (as seen at the Palace of Versailles). He would draw these influences together into 
a luxurious textual weave, focusing many of his poems, in his own words, upon images “marked 
by a mysterious seal of modernity, at once baroque and beautiful.” In this chapter, I revisit 
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Mallarmé’s early, quasi-tragic drama Hérodiade, a fragmentary work based on the Salomé myth, 
which Martin Puchner has notably claimed for the tradition of anti-theatrical closet drama. In a 
close reading of this play’s three scenes, particularly its longest, central dialogue, I exhibit the 
work’s saturation with the specific form of theatricality I have described here as baroque. The 
Hérodiade was to factor centrally into Mallarmé’s other major unfinished lifetime ambition, a 
mysterious project he worked on throughout the 1890s known only as “The Book,” which aimed 
to put Wagner’s notion of the Gesamtkunstwerk into the service of poetry and performance 
(rather than opera), while also hoping to effect the retheatricaliazation of the world, a 
refunctioning and a return of the baroque theatrum mundi. In reading Hérodiade in this context, I 
argue that Mallarmé’s seeming distaste for the theater of his lifetime actually situates him as a 
participant in the modernist project of repurposing baroque forms of theatricality to vanguardist 
new ends. And by focusing on the rich and luxurious imagery of jewels and precious metals that 
decorate the nude body of Hérodiade’s titular character, I consider the play as a means by which 
Mallarmé was able to offer a critique of both gender and the capitalist economy of commodities. 
As Symbolist avant-garde aesthetics spread to Germany and influenced the rise of 
Expressionism throughout the 1900s and ’10s, critics of the avant-garde came to observe 
remarkable similarities between this new Expressionist theater and that of the historical baroque. 
Walter Benjamin, the subject of my third chapter, takes these observations as his starting point 
for studying the neglected and melancholy theater of the German seventeenth century in his 1928 
book on The Origin of German Trauerspiel (or The Origin of the German Mourning Play). Here  
Benjamin proposes a radical theory of modern allegory that, I argue, is also a theory of baroque 
theatricality in performance. In positioning the form of the Trauerspiel as the pattern and 
paradigm of modern drama, and in imputing to it a necessarily allegorical quality, Benjamin sets 
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forth an argument for the influence of the baroque over subsequent theater history, and 
particularly over the emergence of an emphatically theatrical modernism. Not content to stop 
with the Expressionists, Benjamin’s study names Strindberg (explicitly) and Kafka (implicitly) 
as two inheritors to the mournful baroque Trauerspiel tradition, thus paving the way for his later, 
groundbreaking readings in The Arcades Project of Baudelaire as an radical inheritor to the 
baroque practice of allegory. In this view, it becomes clear that Benjamin sees modernism in 
general engaged with a widespread renegotiation of baroque forms—a phenomenon that extends 
even so far as to encompass Brecht’s Epic Theater, which Benjamin cites as an exemplary 
inheritor to the seventeenth-century theater tradition. Given Benjamin’s resolute focus on the 
literary category of allegory, it seems understandable that theater and performance historians 
have often overlooked his importance for theater history, focusing mostly on his writings on 
Brecht of his theses on the concept of history. Against this tendency, I characterize Benjamin 
primarily as a dramaturgical thinker and a theater theorist, and argue that Benjamin’s concept of 
allegory functions as a critical rejoinder to Brecht’s defamiliarization effect, one that makes 
space for the necessity of grief, remembrance, and retrospection, where Brecht privileges instead 
revolutionary action dedicated to the utopian future more predominantly. In both his theory and 
his praxis of criticism, Benjamin’s early study of baroque allegorical emblems afforded him a 
means to understanding the capitalist economy (and particularly the nonidentity or arbitrary 
relationship between commodity and price). In this regard, the baroque offered him a tool to 
repurpose the cultural inheritance of the seventeenth-century past in order to interrupt the 
phantasmagorias of capitalist commodity production.  
My fourth and final chapter focuses on the figure of Gertrude Stein, who supplements 
Benjamin’s mournfulness with pleasure and affirmation in her opera Four Saints in Three Acts 
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(written 1927). Puchner has characterized Stein as yet another thinker in the modernist tradition 
of anti-theatrical closet drama, but Stein actively and eagerly sought opportunities for her work 
to be performed theatrically before an audience, and the work embraces numerous expressly 
theatrical characteristics that descend from the baroque past. Remarkably enough, Four Saints in 
Three Acts takes for its protagonists a pair of Counterreformation-era Spanish saints, Teresa of 
Ávila and Ignatius of Loyola, whose writings and mystical visions were instrumental in the 
Catholic Church’s development and deployment of baroque aesthetic strategies across all the arts 
for the purposes of retaining the faithful against the threat of Protestant conversions. The opera 
debuted in a 1934 production that was financed by one of America’s first curators of both 
baroque and modernist visual art, one that was also replete with deliberate citations to baroque 
stage design, gesture, painting, and music, details that have gone almost entirely unnoticed in 
recent theater studies of Stein. In this chapter, I recuperate these forgotten attributes of the 
opera’s premiere, in order to lay the groundwork for an extensive reading of the baroque traces 
that pervasively animate Stein’s text and performance theories. Where other scholars have 
focused primarily on Stein’s relationships to feminism, cubism, or other modern movements, 
here I interpret Stein’s methods within the framework of allegorical theater and the modernist 
baroque tradition, attending to the many resonances between Stein and Benjamin’s thought. In 
particular, I aim to show how Stein’s theory of dramaturgical landscape—by which she sought 
to break up the psychological, characterological, and temporal focus of the drama in order to 
isolate figures on the page and the stage in a set of polyfocal, syncopated relations with each 
other and the audience—corresponds richly to Benjamin’s claims about setting, scenography, 
history, and nature in his Trauerspiel study. In this way, I argue that Stein’s baroque modernism 
effectively defamilarizes the very idea of “the natural” itself, and that Stein found in the concept 
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of the baroque a productive means of challenging naturalized norms of representation across a 
wide array of registers – linguistic, aesthetic, sexual, racial, and historiographic.  
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1 For a fuller conceptual historiography of modernism as a term, see Latham and Rogers on “The Emergence of 
Modernism” 17–66. 
 
2 It is useful to clarify that each of these notions of modern/modernist rupture announces a break with the immediate 
past (modern realism with romanticism, modernism with realism). Against these immediate pasts, modernism did, it 
must be acknowledged, also erect a cult of the prehistoric and the primitive, which is in abundant evidence in the 
works of Picasso, Gauguin, and Rousseau, and others. 
 
3 My view of modernism thus owes a debt to Rosalind Krauss’s view of the modernist “myth” of avant-garde 
originality. See: “The Originality of the Avant-Garde,” where she writes: “the very notion of avant-garde can be 
seen as a function of the discourse of originality, [but] the actual practice of vanguard art tends to reveal that 
‘originality’ is a working assumption that itself emerges from a ground of repetition and recurrence” (157–58). 
 
4 As evidence of this critical tendency, see Marina Kotzamani’s claim about Christian LaCroix, who in her view, 
“regards postmodernism, with its penchant for accumulation, synthesis, and decoration, as another version of 
baroque.” (107); See also: Calabrese’s Neo-Baroque: A Sign of the Times, which finds baroque tendencies in the 
1982 motion picture Blade Runner and Umberto Eco’s 1980 debut novel The Name of the Rose; See also: the 
chapters on “Baroque and Postmodern” in Gregg Lambert’s The Return of the Baroque in Modern Culture; Finally, 
see Sarduy and Chiampi’s inclusions in Zamora and Kaup, eds. Baroque New Worlds. 
 
5 A brief terminological clarification: I view the late nineteenth-century emergence of the historical avant-gardes as 
part of a larger panorama of modernism. Martin Puchner advances the theory that modernism ought to be considered 
anti-theatrical and the avant-gardes pro-theatrical, but it in large part the purpose of this dissertation to complicate 
such clear and binary mappings. See: Stage Fright 6–7, 181n.26, 27. 
 
6 In making this claim, I announce my debts to Brecht and to the Frankfurt School tradition of thinkers who, in their 
debate with Georg Lukács, sought to claim a necessarily anti-realistic tendency as the defining, legitimating 
characteristic of modernism. See the essays collected in Taylor, ed. Aesthetics and Politics. 
 
7 One thinks immediately of the title of the modern Austrian architect Adolf Loos’ 1910 lecture, “Ornament or 
Crime,” a harbinger of the modernist embrace of functionality. 
 
8 Here, I follow Elin Diamond’s view that early modernity gave rise to new and modern notions of time predicated 
both upon models cyclicality and futurity. See: “Modernity’s Drama” in Knowles, et al, eds. 7. In the field of 
musical aesthetics, similar claims appear in the introduction to Berger Bach’s Cycle, Mozart’s Arrow.  
 
9 See especially “The Metaphysical Poets” in Selected Essays (241–51), but also this volume’s essays on the 
dramatists Marlowe, Shakespeare, Jonson, Middleton, Heywood, Tourneur, Ford, Massinger. 
 
10 As Stein will remind us, an exact repetition is logically and technically impossible, even on the most basic level of 
language itself, since each attempt at repeating a seemingly self-identical word or phoneme deforms and transforms 
it given its new situation at a different point in a temporally extended sequence.  
 
11 For the discussion of “homogeneous empty time,” see Benjamin’s 13th, 14th, and 17th theses on the philosophy of 
history, (GS I.1 691–706). For Benjamin’s concept of history as setting, see: U 72–75. 
 
12 For a rich catalogue of some outstanding examples of this new queer historiography, particularly as it implicates 
the fields of theater and performance studies, see Schneider 14–5, 35: “Recent scholars in queer historiography, such 




Love, and Judith Halberstam build on materialist, post-colonial, psychoanalytic, and post-structural theories to argue 
for an inquiry and analysis that challenges received modern Western conventions of temporal linearity” (35).  
 
13 Here Schneider is describing Elizabeth Freeman’s historiography, but this sentence also summarizes Schneider’s 
own position as well. (Schneider 15) 
 
14 Schneider cites Hollingdale’s translation. The German original reads: “Alles Gerade lügt … Alle Wahrheit ist 
krumm, die Zeit selber ist ein Kreis.” I admire Hollingdale’s translation greatly, though beyond “crooked” or “bent,” 
“Krumm” also suggests something “twisted” or “winding,” torqued or queer or baroque in its form. 
 
15 Schneider describes theater in terms that suggest its refusal of the logical laws of non-contradiction and of the 
“excluded middle.” (To phrase this refusal in Leibniz’s terms, we might add that the theater is a force capable of 
reconciling “impossible compossibilities”): “Both are true—real and faux—action and representation—and this 
both/and is the beloved and often discussed conundrum of theatricality in which the represented bumps 
uncomfortably (and often undecidably) against the affective, bodily instrument of the real” (41) 
 
16 Wellek cautions against precisely this “realist” tendency in “Concept of Baroque,” as does Peter Murray in his 
introduction to Wölfflin’s Renaissance and Baroque.  
 
17 Here I have in mind a particularly negativist moment in Heidegger’s description of Being in Being and Time: “We 
can infer only that ‘Being’ cannot have the character of an entity. Thus we cannot apply to Being the concept of 
‘definition’ as presented in traditional logic, which itself has its foundations in ancient ontology and which, within 
certain limits, provides a justifiable way of characterizing entities” (Being and Time 23). If the baroque “is” anything 
apart from a conceptual abstraction, whatever it then “is,” like Heidegger’s Being, it cannot be said to have the sort 
of objective and ontic character that would permit it to participate in a logic of definition. Perhaps worse, the 
baroque may open up the impossibility of any stable ground of Being that could lend clear forms of definitional 
meaning at all levels any reliable force whatsoever. 
 
18 Here my project draws methodological influences from the field of conceptual history or Begriffsgeschichte, 
particularly Raymond Williams (Keywords) and Reinhart Koselleck (The Practice of Conceptual History). In 
regarding the baroque as a concept, I owe a debt to Deleuze, whose study of Leibniz quite self-consciously treated 
the term as a “pure concept” of philosophy (See: The Fold 41–42; See also: “What is Philosophy” 5). 
 
19 I am indebted to Lydia Goehr for this insight. For reasons of space, I will mostly forego the opportunity to digress 
at length in reflection upon my concept of “concept” itself. (Though perhaps the concept of the baroque inevitably 
invites abyssal speculations such as these.) Briefly, however, I will mention that Nietzsche takes up the question 
“What is a Concept” quite directly, as do Deleuze and Guattari (What is Philosophy 5–11), all of whom argue that 
philosophical concepts are not givens, but are created by the philosopher.  
 
20 Deleuze continues: “For in this case the concept is given, while in the case of the Baroque the question entails 
knowing if a concept can be invented that is capable (or not) of attributing existence to it. Irregular pearls exist, but 
the baroque has no reason for existing without a concept that forms this very reason. It is very easy to call the 
Baroque inexistent; it suffices not to propose its concept” (The Fold 33). Panofsky notes that similar skepticism has 
often plagued art historians dealing with the concept of the Renaissance.  
 
21 Against Deleuze and Guattari, the Israeli philosopher Adi Ophir has argued for an understanding of concepts as 
performative. He writes: “A concept is neither given nor created but rather performed or played in the act of 
conceptualization. This play both invents and discovers the concept, both lets it appear and gives it existence, and in 
doing all this it also blurs the distinction between what is given and revealed, and what is invented and created” 
(“Concept”). In a similar vein, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has written of epistemological performance as the work 
of constructing an object of knowledge (“Foreword” 112). 
 
22 Here I am indebted to the recent philosophical turn in performance studies, particularly the work of Laura Cull 




part of the construction of ideas as well as of society, the construction of concepts as well as of materials. 
Architecture is not a pure art. Architecture is about concepts that need to be materialized, and only then is it about 
form or about what it looks like” (Dwyre et al. 15). And in similar terms that are just as influential for me, the Italian 
director Romeo Castellucci has claimed that “Artaud [was] not really a playwright, because Artaud was a 
philosopher who interpreted life through the theater” (“Questions of Practice”). 
 
23 Here I am indebted to the methodological procedure that animates Freddie Rokem’s Philosophers and Thespians: 
Thinking Performance.  
 
24 (“Concept of Baroque” 87). His view, that a period spanning more than a century and a half of European history 
should be considered as fixed “fairly narrowly” will seem laughable by the standards of most modern historicists, a 
true sign of the methodological differences between his period and our own. Be that as it may.  
 
25 This was already the case in Wellek’s time. See “Concept of Baroque” 78, which names both Bach and Handel. 
 
26 Even more recently, comparative literary studies have gone further, elaborating the idea of the baroque in a more 
pervasively global context that takes into consideration the fundamental role of the Global South in the development 
of baroque style, a role that is not considered in this dissertation, but that must still be acknowledged nevertheless. 
See, for example, the many Central and South American perspectives surveyed in Lois Parkinson Zamora and 
Monika Kaup’s collected anthology: Baroque New Worlds: Representation, Transculturation, Counterconquest. 
 
27 This phrase forms the subtitle of Bryan Turner’s 1994 English-language translation of Buci-Glucksmann’s La 
raison baroque: de Baudelaire a Benjamin, and it is also the title of her short introduction to the book.  
 
28 Egginton also seems uncomfortable with the “neo-” prefix, and so puts it in parentheses: (neo)baroque. In 
architectural history, however, neobaroque also designates a specific nineteenth-century historicist and revivalist 
style of building that seeks consciously and accurately to recreate seventeenth-century architecture with post-
industrial means. By contrast, Frank Gehry, Gregg Lambert and others have distinguished between the neobaroque 
and what they term the “new baroque,” whose major influences are modernist or postmodernist rather than 
historicist or revivalist in nature (See: “Radio Prague”; Lambert On the (New) Baroque). 
 
29 Egginton writes: “The major strategy of the baroque assumes the existence of a veil of appearances, and then 
suggests the possibility of a space opening just beyond those appearances where truth resides. […] The baroque’s 
minor strategy [takes] the major strategy too seriously; it nestles into the representation and refuses to refer it to 
some other reality, but instead affirms it, albeit ironically, as its only reality” (see: Egginton 3–6). One does not need 
to appeal, however, to a Deleuzian framework to observe this internal dialectic operating within baroque style. As I 
will show, Nietzsche’s writing already suggests a similar division between Apollonian and Dionysian strategies of 
the baroque that correspond to what Egginton terms “major” and “minor.” 
 
30 Nietzsche, Benjamin, Moretti, and Deleuze (in The Fold) all seem to echo this view of the baroque. 
 
31 In this sense, the insights and limits of structural linguistics as De Saussure developed them are symptomatic of 
the emergent modernist/baroque situation during this period.  
 
32 I borrow this theater-as-lifeboat metaphor from Elinor Fuchs, who uses it to characterize poststructural and 
postmodern theatricalist efforts at surviving the delegitimation of western metaphysics (Death of Character 14). 
 
33 Nevertheless, I want to reject the temptation to extend the term “baroque” throughout all of history, as Nietzsche 
and Eugenio d’Ors both suggested we might (whether seriously or no). This seems to risk reducing the term to 
conceptual incoherence. (D’Ors, for example, impishly suggested the possibility of stretching the term to include 
instances of Macedonian, Nordic, and Buddhist baroque. See: Zamora and Kaup, eds. Baroque New Worlds 76.) In 
my view, the term is most useful when considered in light of its history as an explicit concept, emerging during 





34 For a studied analysis of the exemplary, aesthetic circumstances of this apparent “death,” see Vernon Hyde 
Minor’s The Death of the Baroque and the Rhetoric of Good Taste. 
 
35 Gregg Lambert begins his remarks in On the New Baroque by offering this very jeweler’s definition. He writes: 
“As the Cuban writer Severo Sarduy once observed, ‘every essay on the Baroque opens by considering the origins of 
the term itself.’ … This study is no exception” (xxxiii). For this introduction, you may now notice, I’ve aimed to 
circumvent this perhaps helpful but now predictable practice. 
 
36 For example, the historian of baroque art Irving Lavin writes: “The phrase ‘Baroque theatricality,’ meaning both 
exaggerated emotionalism and a direct transfer of formal devices from one field to the other, is almost synonymous 
with ‘Bernini.’ In a sense, therefore, it might be said that our conception of the whole period, as well as of the artist 
himself, has been colored by Bernini’s activity in the theater” (“Review” 568). Lavin, a renowned specialist in 
Bernini and baroque visual art, draws similar connections between Bernini, baroque, and theater in Visible Spirit 16. 
 
37 See, for example: Borngässer, Baroque Theatrum Mundi; Norman, The Theatrical Baroque; Warwick, Bernini: 
Art as Theatre; van Eck and Bussels, eds. Theatricality in Early Modern Art and Architecture. 
 
38 A notable and laudable exception is Mary Ann Frese Witt’s recent study, Metatheater and Modernity: Baroque 
and Neobaroque (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2013). Significantly, the word theatricality does not enter 
into the English vocabulary until the early nineteenth century, in the writings of Thomas Carlyle, as Tracy Davis has 
shown: see her essay “Theatricality and Civil Society” in Davis and Postlewait Theatricality 127–55. 
 
39 Mario Praz has aimed to contest this ambivalence and to theorize the place of the Baroque in seventeenth-century 
English culture, but his is admittedly a minority opinion. See Zamora and Kaup, eds. 119–35. 
 
40 See, for example, the title of and essays collected in: Turner, ed. Early Modern Theatricality. 
 
41 The neglect for the baroque among American performance scholars likely owes to the preference afforded to 
anthropological methods and models over aesthetic ones in the tradition of the field advanced at NYU by Richard 
Schechner, Victor Turner, and others. By contrast, the European tradition of performance studies remains more 
firmly grounded in aesthetic preoccupations, as Marvin Carlson points out in his introduction to Erika Fischer-
Lichte’s The Transformative Power of Performance.  
 
42 The European Renaissance historian Peter Burke has, for example, characterized the shifts between early baroque 
style and late baroque style in the paintings of Rembrandt and Guercino as forms of occasion-specific, performative 
“code switching.” See “Performing History,” 44. See also: Burke, “Varieties of Performance” in Gillgren and 
Snickare, eds. Performativity and Performance in Baroque Rome.  
 
43 For example, it is no surprise that Shakespeare returns repeatedly throughout the chapters of this dissertation as an 
exemplary baroque dramatist, since authors writing from French and German national perspectives (e.g. Mallarmé 
and Benjamin) are well suited, culturally and historically, to considering him in the terms of a broad-reaching 
baroque literary phenomenon that pervades all of seventeenth-century Europe (however differentially inflected by 
region), where English readers are more likely to consider him part of an exceptional moment in the English 
Renaissance. In brief, these designations are nothing if they are not tendentious and ideological.  
 
44 For a notable exception, again see Witt, Metatheater and Modernity. Both Witt and I agree that baroque aesthetics 
become significant for modernism, though Witt defines this significance with respect to Lionel Abel’s concept of 
metatheater, where my approach privileges theatricality and allegory—terms that are crucially related to 
metatheater, but irreducible to it. Witt, furthermore, does not confine her admirable study of baroque to the 
modernist and avant-garde traditions alone: she splits her attention with these later sources, where I aim to 
concentrate on earlier sources more exclusively, to help delineate even more painstakingly the distinctions between 
modernist and postmodernist affinities with the baroque (Witt 13–14). Finally, as this introduction makes clear, my 
approach aims primarily to connect the baroque’s “return” to the larger aesthetic dynamics theorized by Fried, 





45 In recent theater and performance studies, the subject of theatricality has attracted abundant critical attention, with 
Schneider’s research on reenactment forming an important touchstone for current debates For several other salient 
analyses, see: Davis & Postlewait; Fischer-Lichte “Theatricality”; and for an extensive bibliography on this subject, 
see “Theatricality and Performativity.” 
 
46 Above all, I am indebted to the dramaturg and deconstructive theorist Samuel Weber for the concept of 
theatricality that emerges from his 2004 book Theatricality as Medium. I borrow the Möbius Strip metaphor from 
Ryan Anthony Hatch (“Performance Geometries” 58). 
 
47 Put somewhat differently, Fried’s concept of theatricality can be said to designate a phenomenon we in theater 
studies typically refer to as metatheatricality or theatricalism. In Witt’s view, however, which is informed by the 
writings of Lionel Abel, Martin Puchner, Alan Ackerman and Elinor Fuchs, these distinctions begin to prove 
circular or tautological. She writes that Lionel Abel had argued “that metatheater was a subset of theatricality, or the 
glorification of theater itself” but that Puchner, Ackerman, and Fuchs assert that “’anti-theatricalism can be thought 
of as a subset of what Lionel Abel called “metatheatre,” the critical version of the theatre’s tendency towards self-
commentary and self-reflection.’ Thus, if Abel’s classification cited above still holds true, metatheater is a subset of 
theatricality and anti-theatricalism a subset of metatheater—a kind of critical circle” (7). 
 
48 Fried singles out the example of Boucher’s paintings, which came under attack beginning in 1747 “for being 
artificial in color, mannered in drawing, and uncertain in expression,” and in which “most of the figures did not 
appear to be paying attention to the actions taking place before them,” creating a distracting theatricality (36).  
 
49 In The Moment of Caravaggio, Fried traces this historical trajectory as follows: “Starting in the mid-1750s—
ambitious painting in France assigned itself the immensely productive if ultimately doomed project of establishing 
positively, as a matter of unswerving principle, what I have called the supreme fiction or ontological illusion that the 
beholder did not exist, that there was no one standing before the canvas; the least failure of would-be absorptive of 
dramatic paintings to achieve that illusion—the least imitation that one or more figures in a painting were not so 
completely engaged in their actions, feelings, and thoughts as to be wholly oblivious to anything else—was 
stigmatized as théatral, ‘theatrical,’ which is to say that absorption and drama were pitted against theatricality, with 
no possibility of compromise, in principle at any rate” (Moment of Caravaggio 120). 
 
50 See the title to the third lecture in Moment of Caravaggio, “The Invention of Absorption.” 
 
51 “Another way of putting this,” writes Fried, “is to say that [during Caravaggio’s lifetime,] a pejorative notion of 
theatricality had no purchase on the practice and evaluation of painting” (Moment of Caravaggio 122).” 
 
52 See the passages cited in Absorption and Theatricality 94–5, where actors of the time are said to “seek applause; 
they depart from the action; they address themselves to the audience; they talk to it and become dull and false.” 
 
53 See Diderot’s comments on playwrights to take the spectator into account in their plays, particularly in the case of 
those who write speeches specifically addressed to the spectator (qtd. in Absorption and Theatricality 94). 
 
54 The primary example here is Pierre Corneille, who proposed the addition of a third affect, admiratio (wonder), to 
Aristotle’s twin tragic affects of pity and terror. (Carlson Theories of the Theater 100–103). Wonder figures 
prominently elsewhere during this period in the aesthetic writings of Castelvetro, Marino, Sidney, Dryden, Bernini, 
and others. The notion of Philosophical wonder (thaumazein) as the source of philosophical speculation dates back 
to Plato’s Theaetetus and Aristotle’s Metaphysics. During the historical baroque, it receives pride of place in 
Descartes’s aesthetics, where Descartes, drawing on the ancients, influentially names it as the first of the passions. 
 
55 The accounts of Bernini’s theatrical career are discussed extensively in Lavin, Bernini and the Unity of the Visual 
Arts, I, 146–57; in Beecher and Ciavolella’s Introduction to Bernini Impresario 5–7; and in Witt 79–81.  A full 





56 The play was first published as the appendix to Cesare d’Onofrio's Gian Lorenzo Bernini, Fontana di Trevi: 
Commedia Inedita. I have been unable to locate a copy of this edition. Here I rely upon Beecher and Ciavolella’s 
translation, titled The Impresario.  
 
57 Fried writes: “’My intuition is that the advent of skepticism as manifested in Descartes’s Meditations is already in 
full existence in Shakespeare, from the time of the great tragedies in the first years of the seventeenth century, in the 
generation preceding that of Descartes.’ […] In Cavell’s account of Shakespeare’s plays, the latter at once ‘interpret 
and reinterpret the skeptical problematic—the question whether I know with any certainty of the external world and 
of myself and others in it.’” (Moment of Caravaggio 105). Then, later, “For Cavell, as has emerged, it is not at all 
coincidental that the skeptical crisis he associates with Shakespearean tragedy occurred when it did, in the 
generation of Galileo and with the calling into question of the role of the Christian God in the maintenance of the 
world” (106–7). 
 
58 I am grateful to Elinor Fuchs for recommending Szondi’s essay to my attention.  
 
59 Furthermore, Szondi’s notion of drama, like Fried’s notion of absorption, grounds the function of representation 
entirely in the realm of interpersonal connections. Again, drama emerges in the theater, in Szondi’s account, in the 
depiction of characters engaging in interpersonal dialogue. In Fried’s view, the deployment of absorption in 
Caravaggio’s work aims at eliciting from the spectator “unselfconscious acts of projection of imagined inwardness 
in respect to merely depicted personages,” thus making the philosophical issue of ‘other minds’ central to painting. 
Moment of Caravaggio 103–5, 227). For a dramaturgical theorization of incontinence, see Weber Theatricality as 
Medium 181–200. 
 
60 Fried argues for the necessarily anti-theatrical bias of modern art most vocally in “Art and Objecthood.” 
 
61 For an adept deconstruction of the “pure/mere” binary, see Melville 72. 
 
62 Lehmann Postdramatic Theater, 29–30.  
 
63 During the baroque period, for example, one can already detect a tension between more properly dramatic 
forms—(comedy, tragedy, and so forth) which trace their history back to the ancient traditions of drama in Seneca 
and through him to Aristotle—and more emphatically theatrical forms, like the masque, and other related forms that 
are typically allegorical. In brief, it is not that the baroque theater was always already postdramatic, but rather that 
the baroque theater preexists the historical ideology of drama, which, as Szondi describes it, arises out of the 
seventeenth century, takes shape in the eighteenth century (one thinks of Diderot’s writings on drame), and 
disintegrates in the nineteenth century. 
 
64 Here, I echo but also adapt the sentiments of numerous authors: Drawing on Benjamin, Nikolaus Müller Schöll 
describes the historical baroque as “a period often forgotten when the story of the modern subject and the project of 
modernity is written and which in some ways can be called the dark precursor of its end in twentieth-century 
modernism” (45). Witt cites Francesco Guardini, who draws on Northrop Frye and Marshall McLuhan to argue that 
“Baroque leads to modernity while Neobaroque moves away from it” (11). Egginton and Witt both embrace this 
view. For Egginton, baroque and neobaroque amount to modernity’s “bookends,” and neobaroque rejects 
Enlightenment instrumental reason (Theater of Truth 70). Witt writes that the baroque helps to “introduce modernity 
as defined by the Enlightenment and then reject it” (13). 
 
65 This is ultimately Halpern’s argument about Eliot’s interest in early modern literature, and more broadly, about 
modernism’s interest in Shakespeare and the early moderns in general [3]. 
 
66 See Kogan, The Hieroglyphic King: Wisdom and Idolatry in the Seventeenth-Century Masque. 
 
67 See “The Rhetoric of Temporality” in Blindness and Insight (187–228); See also: “The Concept of Irony” in 
Aesthetic Ideology (163–84). Jeremy Tambling offers a useful analysis of the terms’ interconnectedness in Allegory 





68 See, for example, Michael Golston’s recent book on postmodern poetry—which he considers to be closely related 
to baroque poetry—Poetic Machinations: Allegory, Surrealism, and Postmodern Poetic Form, particularly the 
discussion of “the new baroque” in its introduction (10–18). 
 
69 Samuel Weber’s Theatricality as Medium comes closest to this project, but the subject of the baroque is explicitly 
taken up in only one of that book’s fifteen chapters. 
 
70 See Fried Art and Objecthood 148–72. Authors involved in the late twentieth-century reconsideration of allegory 
include Northrop Frye (The Anatomy of Criticism, 1956); Angus Fletcher (Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic 
Mode, 1964); Edwin Honig (Dark Conceit: The Making of Allegory, 1966); Rosemond Tuve (Allegorical Imagery: 
Some Medieval Books and their Posterity); Paul de Man (“The Rhetoric of Temporality,” 1969).  Elinor Fuchs cites 
a number of other later authors central to the continuing reevaluation of allegory: Maureen Quilligan, Morton 
Bloomfield, John MacQueen, Joanne Kantrowitz, Carolynn Van Dyke, and others. (Death of Character 204n.20). 
 
71 Melville continues: “My concern will be to explore the extent to which the formalist program is and is not still that 
in which we move and write and engage our issues—to explore the current condition of criticism at least; how far 
formalism touches the condition of art may remain an open and contested question. Allegory has come to appear for 
us as ‘the trope of tropes’—and my concern is then with who we are now and what it means for us to find ourselves 
before this appearance” (57). 
 
72 Here, I am indebted to Katherine Biers for reminding me of Samuel Weber’s assertion, given in the context of a 
talk in the Spring of 2009 at Columbia University on his book Theatricality as Medium, that he often uses the term 
“theatricality” where he believes his mentor Paul de Man would use the term “rhetoric.” De Man’s other major 
preoccupation, “allegory” easily mediates between these two. 
 
73 Although a larger discussion of the complexities of this shift in de Man’s thinking would require space not 
available here, it could be described as coincident with de Man’s concept of modernity. De Man traces this shift in 
his introductory responses to Hans Robert Jauss’s Toward an Aesthetic of Reception, in an essay entitled “Reading 
and History” (Resistance to Theory 67–69). 
 
74 For example, since Benjamin maintains that the primary form of baroque allegory is emblematic-imagistic, 
Bonnie Marranca’s theory of a (post)modernist theater increasingly given over to imagery and the visual stands in 
this clear, close relationship to a baroque paradigm. Meanwhile, Elinor Fuchs’s view that modern theater sees the 
dissolution of the anthropocentric ideology of character onstage into a variety of alternatives—allegorical/ 
Strindbergian, critical/Brechtian, and theatricalist/Pirandellian (31–32)—could likewise be focused through the lens 
of the modernist baroque. Brecht and Strindberg are cited by Benjamin as inheritors to the baroque tradition, as 
Chapter 3 will show, where Witt discusses Pirandello’s clear affinity with baroque in Metatheater 79–144. It seems 
likely that these three alternatives all amount to sub-variants on what Benjamin calls allegory, and so instantiate a 
new and theatrical (i.e. non-dramatic, anti-mimetic, anti-realist, anti-absorptive) view of modernist character. 
 
75 The curator Stephen Calloway has attempted a decade-by-decade charting of this kind in Baroque Baroque: The 
Culture of Excess, focusing on the fields of fashion, film, photography, design, and decoration. Although Witt does 
not attempt such an exhaustive chronological synopsis, Metatheatre and Modernity does consider modernist figures 
like Pirandello alongside figures from the later twentieth century like Stoppard and Kushner. 
 
76 As recently as January 2016, at the MLA’s annual convention, Lauren Berlant was heard publicly, in her role as 
moderator for a working session on “Allegory and its Others,” to express incredulity that anyone should care about 
such old aesthetic debates as concerning the difference between allegory and symbol. Such topics must surely smack 
of a certain fustian formalism or aestheticism, or at least so it seems, perhaps particularly when contrasted with the 
more obviously apparent political exigencies of neoliberalism and “slow death.” 
 





78 In this, I follow Elinor Fuchs who has productively seen anti-theatricality as vanguardist pathway to new forms of 
(pro- or meta-)theatricalism (“Clown Shows” 341). This essay also sets up a distinction between classical and 
modern forms of theatricalism (or “metatheater”) that is thoroughly complicated by Egginton’s notion of minor and 
major baroque strategies. Grossly put, Fuchs argues the classical theatricalist play is still grounded in some 
transcendent point of the real, where modern theatricalism sees this hierarchical grounding structure collapse until 
the real is lost. In The Theater of Truth, Egginton argues, pace Fuchs, that the historical baroque produced examples 
of both of these theatricalist modes (classical and modern), which he labels its major and minor strategies. 
 
79 Witness the epigraph from Jonathan Edwards that begins the “Art and Objecthood” essay. I do not mean to set up 
a straw-man version of Puritanism: more recent authors, for example Marilynne Robinson and Margot Heinemann, 
have depicted visions of Calvinist Protestantism in rich and evocative terms that are not so polemically anti-
theatrical. Nevertheless, Fried seems to take Puritan anti-theatricalism as the warrant for his own position. 
 
80 Judith Butler, for example, in her reflections on the ACT UP die-in enactments/protests during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, writes: “Paradoxically, but also with great promise, the subject who is ‘queered’ into public discourse 
through homophobic interpellatons of various kinds takes up or cites that very term as the discursive basis for an 
opposition. This kind of citation will emerge as theatrical to the extent that it mimes and renders hyperbolic the 
discursive convention that it also reverses. … To oppose the theatrical to the political within contemporary queer 
politics is, I would argue, an impossibility” (“Critically Queer” 23). 
 
81 See Kokoschka, “An Approach to the Baroque Art of Czechoslovakia”; See also, the essays by d’Ors, Sarduy, and 
Carpentier excerpted in Zamora and Kaup, eds. Baroque New Worlds.  
 
82 See Maravall 19–53. As a hispanist, Egginton might also be counted in this company. His Deleuzian category of a 
minor baroque responds directly to Maravall’s Culture of the Baroque and maintains a necessarily subversive or 
critical potential (Theater of Truth). 
 
83 For the purposes of comparison with the topics covered in this dissertation, see particularly Sedgwick’s 
Introduction (1–67) and her chapter on Nietzsche and Wilde (131–181). 
 
84 For example, through one of his gay characters, the novelist Christopher Isherwood would propose in his 1954 
book The World in the Evening that camp can be divided into two categories, low and high— the former epitomized 
by “a swishy little boy with peroxided hair dressed in a picture hat and a feather boa, pretending to be Marlene 
Dietrich,” where the latter, High Camp, forms “the whole emotional basis … of baroque art” (110). 
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1 
Passion and Sublimity 
The Nietzschean Transvaluation 
 
 
The history of the modern theater and the history of the baroque as a modern philosophical 
concept cannot be fully separated from each other—in part because theatricality has long been 
considered a necessary quality of baroque style, and in part because the thinkers who offered the 
first attempts at conceptualizing the baroque were themselves sometime patrons of the modern 
theater, spectators shaped in the mold of its conventions, structures, and architectonics. As an 
admirer of the opera, and as the first philosopher to treat the subject of the baroque as a category 
worthy of serious contemplation rather than a species of mere artistic ugliness, Friedrich 
Nietzsche is exemplary in this regard. Unlikely though it may seem, the modern concept of the 
baroque has a largely unacknowledged set of origins in his friendship with the composer-
impresario Richard Wagner, which famously collapsed in 1876 shortly after the opening of 
Wagner’s festival theatre at Bayreuth. This chapter aims to reconstruct the traces of those 
beginnings in order to reframe our understanding of the baroque as an object of conceptual 
history and theater history alike.  
First, some necessary scene setting. While the underlying reasons for the schism between 
Nietzsche and Wagner are complex, the anecdotes surrounding their falling out are unusually 
vivid. As is well known, the young Nietzsche had befriended the elder Wagner in 1868 and had 
dedicated to him his philosophical debut text, The Birth of Tragedy (1872), a work that portrays 
Wagner as the promise of tragedy’s salvific rebirth in a modern, demythologized world. 
Although The Birth of Tragedy claims the spirit of Dionysus once coursed through the tragic 
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choral songs and dances (or dithyrambs) of antiquity, and that this tragic spirit would reemerge 
through Wagner’s music dramas, Nietzsche’s hopes for Wagnerism would be dashed at his first 
visit to the Bayreuth stage. He attended the Bayreuth Festival for its inaugural performance of 
Das Rheingold in 1876, but was gripped with physical nausea and moral disgust at the sight of an 
audience full of cultural philistines. In his study Nietzsche as Philosopher, the American 
philosopher Arthur Danto offers a compelling summation of the scene: Nietzsche had hoped to 
find “one grand chorus of dancing, singing satyrs,” but instead these “were simply people out for 
a good time. Anyone with 900 marks could gain admission; the audience was opulent, made up 
in at least as high a proportion of paunchy businessmen from the nearby Marienbad, and their 
wives in diadems and lavalieres, as it was of noble spirits. Wagner was elated, directing what 
must have seemed more like a circus rather than officiating, as chief priest.”1 Nietzsche was 
apparently unwilling or unable to stay past the first act and fled Bayreuth in horror. Over the next 
year and a half, the friendship between the two men dissolved irreparably. By the end of his 
career as a writer, long after Wagner had died, Nietzsche would submit his former friend to a 
savage, public attack in The Case of Wagner (1888), denouncing him as a fraud: not a pure 
musician of the tragic spirit, but a mere histrio, a mime, an actor, a man of the theater through 
and through. 
In the months following the Rheingold premiere at Bayreuth, however, Nietzsche began 
referring to Wagner in his published writings and private correspondence as a representative of a 
baroque style in art. At this same time, he was at work on an analysis of baroque style in Human, 
All Too Human (Volume II, 1879), which conceives the baroque primarily in terms of its 
givenness to a certain theatricality. Clearly, Nietzsche’s brief time as a spectator at the Bayreuth 
Festspielhaus encouraged him to draw this most unusual connection. Although it might seem 
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peculiar for Nietzsche to claim Wagner for a period of artistic and theatrical production that 
flourished some two centuries prior to both of their births, few scholars have questioned 
extensively what he might have meant by these assignations. 2 Just as few, it seems, have 
inquired about whether the concept of baroque held any significance for Nietzsche at all.3 What 
accounts for these curious critical lacunae? Taken together, Nietzsche’s writings on baroque 
permit theater history to recontextualize his critique of Wagner within the longue durée of 
theatrical modernity stretching back to encompass the performance conventions of the 
seventeenth-century stage, a critical framework rarely if ever applied to either man. Doing so 
promises to shed new light not only on Wagner’s debts to baroque theater, but also on 
Nietzsche’s view of theatricality as it pertains to his conceptualization of the baroque. Theater 
scholars have often taken Nietzsche at his word, using the polemic stance adopted in The Case of 
Wagner to characterize him—erroneously, I will argue—as ultimately and unambiguously anti-
theatrical in disposition.4 The field has not yet accounted, however, for the Nietzsche who 
demonstrably saw Wagner, the theater, and the baroque as philosophical problems intertwined 
with one another in a way that directly implicated his own thinking. Although this chapter 
demonstrates that Nietzsche came to view Wagner as a baroque figure in his own right, it also 
uncovers Nietzsche’s self-awareness of his own complex imbrication within baroque structures 
of reason, feeling, and expression.  
Our attempt at unearthing Nietzsche’s concept of the baroque will require us to suspend 
our familiar understanding of the topic, still shaped in large part by Heinrich Wölfflin’s later, 
more sustained, and more influential analyses of the subject in Renaissance and Baroque (1888) 
and Principles of Art History (1915). Although these works owe clear, significant, and unspoken 
debts to Nietzsche’s thought, and thus can be said to have introduced into the modern discourse 
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of the baroque a trace of covert Nietzscheanism, they have largely overshadowed Nietzsche’s 
own commentary on baroque style. One result of this overshadowing is that art historians writing 
in Wölfflin’s tradition have largely considered the baroque as an antiquarian question of (mere) 
style and as a cultural phenomenon chronologically significant only for a specific moment within 
the European past, typically the seventeenth century. Anglo-American theater historians, on the 
other hand, have largely ignored the conceptual usefulness of the baroque as an aesthetic 
category, often tending to assume its relevance extends only to other fields like visual arts and 
music. Although Nietzsche’s comments might seem like minute footnotes to his larger corpus, 
they actually trouble all of these familiar ideas. They situate the baroque as a historically 
recurrent, typological complex of style, a phenomenon that manifests itself not only in art and 
artistic production but more primarily in language, thought, and reason, a style that has recourse 
to theater and theatrical maneuvers first and all other arts secondarily.5  
At the same time, Nietzsche envisions the baroque in historical terms as a moment of 
crisis, one that has a primary locus in the seventeenth century past, but that also extends 
pervasively into nineteenth-century modernity as a permanent condition of sorts, one that 
ensnares both himself and Wagner alike.6 Amid such a crisis, in which traces of the theatrical 
appear increasingly to pervade the “expanded fields” of artistic media and everyday life in 
general, one can hardly maintain the old, familiar view of Nietzsche as a purely anti-theatrical 
philosopher offering a critique of Wagnerian pro-theatricalism from the privileged standpoint of 
some transcendent truth. In Nietzsche’s hands, the baroque concept becomes a way to designate 
an operation of self-criticism and immanent critique, and a warning sign that the usual 
distinctions between philosophy and theater have become newly tenuous. Nietzsche understood 
his own writing as the paradigmatic document of a crisis of knowledge, religious faith, and 
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language in modern Europe (EH “Destiny” 1)—a crisis in the idea of truth as representation or 
correspondence, and in what Derrida will later call the transcendental signified—one whose 
parameters are delineated most succinctly in his poetic proclamation of God’s death. While 
scholars have often recognized Nietzsche as a theorist of historico-philosophical crisis in a more 
local, fin-de-siècle milieu, his writings on baroque suggest the general upheavals of the 
nineteenth century as parts of a greater process with roots in the early modern history of 
secularization that begins in the historical baroque with the dialectic of Reformation and 
Counterreformation. This chapter argues that Nietzsche’s concept of the baroque forms a 
significant component of his response to this crisis, in both the narrower nineteenth-century 
context and the broader context of modernity writ large. It asserts that his baroque concept 
entails a tendency for forms of theatricality capable of contesting the very notion of 
representation at every level: representation in its linguistic, metaphysical, and socio-political 
senses; but above all, its dramaturgical-aesthetic sense. Where the theater is concerned, 
Nietzsche’s baroque necessitates the rejection of the traditional, Aristotelian criterion of dramatic 
mimesis as represented or imitated action, in favor of an idea of theatricality that instead 
privileges sensory and emotional excitement by means of direct modes of address and powerful, 
imagistic gestures. Where some have argued that Nietzsche denounced theatricality outright, I 
aim to show that Nietzsche maintained a richly ambivalent identification with the very idea of 
baroque theatricality in performance throughout his late writings, and found in the concept of the 
baroque a means not only to critique Wagner and nineteenth-century modernity, but to attempt 
the act of self-criticism as well.  
Understood in this manner, Nietzsche’s vision of baroque theatricality in performance 
bears a strong family resemblance to—and asks that we rethink—the forms of theatricality that 
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emerged during what Michael Fried has described as a nineteenth-century crisis in French 
portraiture at the limits of realist pictorial representation. Heralding the limits of representation in 
both the domains of truth and theater alike, Nietzsche’s baroque announces the exhaustion of 
realism as a dramaturgical project, and clears the way for the new methods of formal 
experimentation that characterize both fin-de-siècle and high modernism alike. That is, these 
basic historic, philosophical, and aesthetic conditions of Nietzsche’s world persist in animating 
ways throughout the works of his modernist successors well into the twentieth century.7 As 
Nietzsche’s philosophy became inspiration for the earliest generations of the avant-garde, so too 
would the idea of the baroque, helping produce uniquely baroque forms of modernism in works 
of Mallarmé, Benjamin, Stein, and others that can hardly be accommodated in a single 
dissertation. This influence extends beyond the historiographic limits of modernism, usually 
conceived. It is not coincidental, for example, that Nietzsche is often credited as a precursor of 
late twentieth-century postmodernism, and that postmodernism has in turn been hailed as a 
“return of the baroque.”8 One does not need to agree with the general idea of “the postmodern” 
or the historical claims and narratives this idea inevitably relies upon in order to appreciate this 
coincidence. If there is something baroque about the “postmodern” turn Nietzsche’s writings are 
said to have helped inaugurate, it is because they themselves take up the baroque concept 
directly, use it to articulate a report on modern conditions of knowledge, and thereby offer an 
archaeology of the knowable available to thinkers across the twentieth century, to his most 
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1.1 A crisis in representation, and a response  
Published in 1879, the second volume of Human, All Too Human (entitled Assorted Opinions 
and Maxims, henceforth AOM) contains Nietzsche’s most sustained efforts at thinking the 
baroque style as a philosophical question. Names and ideas touching upon the history of baroque 
Europe are scattered throughout the book, but its theoretical inquiry into baroque style as such 
can be delimited primarily to two sections. The first appears within the book’s opening pages as 
a sidelong comment in passage 131:  
On excitement in the history of art. –  If one follows the history of an art, for 
example, that of Greek rhetoric, as one passes from master to master and observes 
the ever increasing attention paid to obeying all the old and more recently added 
laws and self-limitations, a painful tension results: one grasps that the bow must 
break and that the so-called inorganic composition, decorated and masked with 
the most marvelous means of expression, the baroque style of Asianism, that is, 
was once a necessity and almost a relief.9 
There are several, classically Nietzschean bait-and-switch maneuvers to be found here. From the 
passage’s title, one might expect to find a reflection on excitement in the visual arts, but it turns 
instead to the arts of eloquence and public speaking. Further, it appears at first glance to take up 
a subject of purely philological or antiquarian concern, of interest only to sometime professors of 
classical literature—namely, the emergence of the Asianist school of Sophistic rhetoric in third 
century Greece, which developed in reaction against the more plainspoken Attic style of 
oratory.10 Closer scrutiny, however, opens up a view into an even deeper and more abyssal set of 
problems. The narrative of a break from ancient discursive regulations into a marvelous new 
means of expression calls the reader’s attention to Nietzsche’s own eminently stylistic writing in 
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this text. Rejecting systematic argumentation of the kind found in the modern philosophical 
tradition from Descartes through Kant and Hegel, Human, All Too Human offers its reader 
instead a mosaic of apothegms, equal parts glittering and obscure.11 Implicitly identifying with 
“the baroque style of Asianism,” Nietzsche suggests himself at the point of rupture, when the old 
discursive rules governing philosophical discourse must not only be abandoned, but broken, as 
illustrated for the reader through an expressly rhetorical or figurative maneuver—the metaphor 
of the bow.  
  To cast the Attic-Asiatic dialectic in the terms of Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy, the Attic 
style demands Apollonian restraint, where the Asiatic demands a Dionysian release.12 Typically 
considered as an effete, even effeminate mode of public oratory when compared to the more 
unmarked Attic mode, Asianism amounts to a queer sort of Dionyisanism in rhetoric.13 It breaks 
away from the old rules, out of form, and into something else altogether, with all the force of a 
necessity. It bursts or irrupts into a mode of oratory conceived as an art and intended to arouse 
and discompose its auditors. It acknowledges both an audience and the psycho-physiological 
demands of spectatorship—the need for excitement and for relief from the tedium of discursive 
practices grown old, abstract, and painfully formal. Briefly put, the Asianist rhetorician trades in 
a specific kind of theatricality of speech and gesture that registers and responds to the spectator’s 
affective excitability.14 This theatricality takes explicit form in Nietzsche’s text as a means of 
expression that is not simply “decorated,” but “masked.” Abounding in inventive figures of 
speech and lively gestures, the baroque stylus asiaticus addresses itself directly to a receptive 
party—a spectator, listener, or reader—in order to produce certain affects—wonder, admiration, 
or the marvelous.  
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  But just as Asianism is a mode of rhetoric that approaches the conditions of theater, it is 
equally significant that Nietzsche classifies it as an ancient species, ur-phenomenon, or 
premonition of the modern baroque style.15 Nietzsche’s implicit narrative of himself as a moment 
of rupture within the philosophical tradition thus offers a first set of indications that the story he 
wants to tell about the baroque applies to him as well, and perhaps primarily: “De te fabula 
narratur.”16 The text’s self-indexical gesture is elliptical, to be sure, but deserves even closer 
scrutiny: there is more at stake here than a matter of “mere” writerly style. Aligning the baroque 
with the stylus asiaticus effectively conscripts it within a complex of epistemological positions 
surrounding the history of the Greek Sophism, of which the Attic-Asiatic debate forms just one 
chapter, and with the Sophists’ inclination in varying degrees toward skepticism and nihilism 
specifically.17 These various philosophical threads intertwine in Nietzsche’s early unpublished 
writings on Greece’s pre-Socratic intellectual situation (between 1870 and 1873), where one 
finds the basis for what Paul de Man has painstakingly described as a Nietzschean rhetoric of 
tropes (Allegories of Reading 103–18).18 De Man’s now famous reading of these early writings 
made clear the decisive importance of rhetoric as a deconstructive force animating Nietzsche’s 
critique of Western metaphysics, and put forward language and literature as keys to 
understanding Nietzsche in terms of a rigorous epistemological skepticism. In these early 
writings, the representational use of language appears in the light of a sophistic crisis, in which, 
as Nietzsche writes, “all words are tropes in relation to their meanings, in themselves and from 
the beginning. . . . language never expresses a thing fully, but only emphasizes one of its 
outstanding outward characteristics.”19 At its most basic level, language operates through words 
that function synecdochically as attempts to encompass or comprehend their objects; when 
languages are placed alongside each other, however, the diversity of words for any given thing 
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makes abundantly clear that, for any given word, something always escapes the grasp of 
conceptualization, which remains a fragment, bound to a specific perspective.20 In taking this 
view, Nietzsche reformulates the fundamental claim of Kant’s first critique along linguistic lines: 
not only is the cognitive mind incapable of knowing things-in-themselves, the nature of language 
makes the act of expressing the pure and absolute truth of things-in-themselves equally 
impossible (TL 1).21  
  The loss or non-availability of an independent, knowable truth, a truth clearly expressible 
through language, forms the epistemological bases of Sophistry as a philosophical and rhetorical 
practice, eventually giving rise to Asianism and baroque style. Nietzsche’s early notes on 
rhetoric pay witness to this loss. They can be said, in the terms of de Man’s deconstruction, to 
offer a preliminary theory of the dispersal of the referential sign into an infinite play of other 
signifiers. Perceiving the necessarily tropic and rhetorical character of language, Nietzsche 
demonstrates that a word’s denotative capacity functions as a surface illusion, a mask.22 
Formulating this quintessentially Nietzschean moment of defamiliarization in the terms of 
Austin’s speech-act theory, we can say that it exposes the apparently constative appearance of 
language as a deceptive and theatrical exterior, masking an underlying performative functioning. 
I wish to stress that these two qualities—language’s seductive, illusionary theatricality and its 
underlying, efficacious performativity—cannot ultimately be extricated from their mutual 
intertwinement. Whenever a constative utterance is recognized as having a hidden degree of 
performative force, this recognition amounts to an unmasking, which detects something of a 
theatrical status as well.23 Shorn of its “masks,” the signifier’s relationship to its referent now 
appears as something conventional or arbitrary rather than natural and necessary. (This maneuver 
already anticipates de Saussure’s semiology and the impossibility of a complete and consistent 
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science of structural linguistics; and it is significant that Walter Benjamin will later describe this 
linguistic arbitrariness as the characteristically baroque form of allegory, a subject to be 
discussed in detail in this dissertation’s third chapter.) Unmasked, this signifier’s relationship to 
other signifiers expands to encompass an infinite play of deferrals, and its distance from any 
transcendent signification grows abyssal—terrifying and sublime.24 Nietzsche’s early notes 
insist, as de Man observes, that “There is simply no unrhetorical “naturalness” to which one 
might appeal: language itself is the result of purely rhetorical arts”; that “the power that Aristotle 
calls rhetoric is also the essence of language”; and that “Language is rhetoric, because it wants 
only to convey a doxa [opinion], not an epistēmē [knowledge.]”25 For de Man, this absence of a 
court of final, transcendent appeal where language could be redeemed from rhetoric forms an 
initial insight of deconstructive reading—but in passage 131, it lies within an intertextual web, 
interweaving Sophistic Asianism with what Nietzsche calls “baroque style.” 
  This theory of language likewise permeates Nietzsche’s evaluation of Greece’s Pre-
Platonic philosophical context, the era he calls Greece’s genuinely “Tragic Age,” wherein words 
are described as incapable of transcending the medium of worldly relations that they summarize 
in order to thereby arrive at some stable ground of meaning: instead, words only refer or defer to 
other words in an endless, linguistic, Heraclitan flux.26 In this way, the Sophistic rhetoric tends 
toward an archaic species of nihilism, an ancient crisis of representation that Plato’s metaphysics 
of the logos would endeavor to bring to a halt. It is this Sophistic crisis that Nietzsche takes up in 
passage 131 by invoking Asianist oratory—neither as an end in itself, nor as the object of an 
unambiguous affinity—but as a uniquely realistic starting point for understanding phenomena in 
his own post-Kantian context, where the “thing-in-itself” is never available or desirable for 
articulation. (TL 144).27 In claiming Asianism for a species of baroque style, he thus develops a 
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founding hypothesis—still implicit here but reinforced and developed elsewhere, as we shall 
see—that conceptualizes the baroque in terms of a markedly anti-foundationalist rhetoric, a 
theatrical rhetoric, delineating the impossibility of truth conceived as correspondence. With 
Asianist sophistry as its prototype, baroque style is never a question of “mere” style; rather, it 
more closely resembles an epistemological horizon, what William Egginton has described as 
“not yet a philosophical problem,” but rather, “a problem of thought [that] affects and unsettles 
an entire culture in the largest possible sense” (143). This style reflects the problematic 
knowledge that language functions performatively underneath a host of theatrical disguises, that 
thought can never divorce itself from language or performance, and that no “pure,” unrhetorical, 
unstylistic knowledge system is ultimately possible. The baroque style “knows” that truth cannot 
fully or finally be distinguished from persuasion, opinion, from the feeling or pathos of truth, 
from one’s perspective or “place of seeing" [theatron].28 Like the stylus asiaticus, it allows 
dissimulation, deception, and art to burst forth as Dionysian ways of knowing in themselves.  
  A philosophical pessimist might view the apparent nihilism of these foregoing positions 
as a triumph for the theater on one hand, and an epistemological catastrophe or a “tragedy for the 
intellect” on the other.29 (We ought not to assume that Nietzsche so quickly and unequivocally 
equates tragedy with either pessimism, however.30) As a medium that trades in persuasion and 
the manipulation of affect, the theater is always sophistic—or Gorgiastic, as Simon Critchley and 
Jamieson Webster have recently claimed—amounting to a paradoxical kind of deception “in 
which the deceiver is more honest than the nondeceiver, and the deceived is wiser than the 
nondeceived” (17). Likewise, from the view of a philosopher practiced in the normative stylus 
atticus, there is always something conspicuously theatrical about the Sophistic and Asianist 
rhetoric, not only in their persuasive use of tropic or figural language, but also in their preference 
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for histrionic gestures. (In Greek discourse, furthermore, linguistic tropes are understood as 
forms of gesture in themselves, with the concepts of gesture and figure both connoted in the 
word schema [σχημα].31) As de Man has observed, philosophers have long interested themselves 
in rhetoric as a field of logical and dialectical inquiry, but once it expands to encompass the 
domain of oratory and persuasion—raising questions about gesture, performance, embodiment, 
affect, audience, and the like—rhetoric comes to seem a fraudulent endeavor (Allegories of 
Reading 104, 131). By naming Asianism in conjunction with baroque style at passage 131, these 
questions come emphatically to the fore for Nietzsche’s effort to conceptualize the baroque. An 
Asianist rhetorician does not absorb himself in a purely teleological or apophantic discourse;32 
instead, he behaves according to the supposedly immoral libidinal demands of exhibitionism. He 
makes a spectacle of himself, literally, for his own and others’ excitement, acknowledging the 
attention of his beholders and soliciting it directly, not only through voice, but through gesture as 
well. Decorated and masked—like an actor’s body—his discourse mimes a solo gestures drama, 
while his own body becomes a series of moving hieroglyphs, with the gestures becoming a kind 
of corporeal writing, always threatening to displace or defer attention from what would otherwise 
desire to be a purely vocal speech. In Nietzsche’s assessment, these gestures emerge precisely 
from the non-identity of signifier and referent:33 the same holds true for masks, both here and 
elsewhere in Nietzsche’s writing.34 They are aimed at the excitement of an expressly affective 
spectator. Although the citation of Asianism as a form of baroque style in passage 131 is brief 
and elliptical, it is nevertheless significant. Through this assignation, Nietzsche foundationally 
suggests the baroque as a name for a crisis—the disintegration of the linguistic sign, leading to a 
proliferation of theatrical gestures—and as a way of responding to that crisis—by unfolding 
more and more gestures, thus turning rhetoric into a kind of theater.  
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1.2 “To set the heart trembling…”  
Only in passage 144 of the Assorted Opinions and Maxims does the baroque receive its fuller 
conceptualization in Human, All Too Human.35 Even more assertively than in passage 131, there 
the baroque amounts to a matter of style, not just in art or oratory, but in thought and writing.36  
On the baroque style. – The thinker or writer who knows that he was not born or 
trained for dialectics or the unfolding of ideas will involuntarily grasp at the 
rhetorical and the dramatic: since in the end what matters is to make himself 
understood and thus to gain power, regardless of whether he draws feeling to 
himself along an even path or ambushes them suddenly—whether as a herdsman 
or as a brigand. This is equally the case in the visual and the musical arts, where 
the feeling of a lack of dialectics or an incapacity for expression or narration—
together within an overreaching, urgent impulse in form—brings to light that 
species of style called the baroque [emphases in original]. 
At its outset, the baroque knows only an originary lack or loss, a basic absence. As in passage 
131, where the stylus asiaticus can be seen to register the unavailability of a single and 
transcendent truth, what appears lost or lacking in 144 is a capacity for—or a faith in—the sort of 
dialectical reasoning that might attain to such a truth. Perhaps this capacity is only absent for 
certain local and specific thinkers: sophistic orators in their disagreement with Plato; former 
philology professors, composers, and other “writers” who were never adequately trained in the 
academic discipline of philosophy. Or perhaps it has become lost in some more general and 
epistemic sense and as the result of concrete historical conditions, amid the advent of an 
unprecedented, all-encompassing hegemony of nihilism. Either way, the style is a symptom, a 
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manifestation of a pressing need “to be understood” (writes Nietzsche, with conspicuous 
emphasis conveyed through stylistic, typographical means, as though these means would 
guarantee his intelligibility), and through understanding to secure a certain kind of power or 
force [Gewalt].37 Perhaps the baroque style amounts ultimately to a variety of what Nietzsche 
will later call the Will to Power, as of these early writings of 1879, we cannot yet know. 
Moreover, we cannot yet be certain whether this need for power stems from a personal debility; 
whether the desire for communication arises from a specific thinker’s feelings of being 
personally incapable of expression and narration (guilty feelings surely); or whether this need 
and his desire are signs of a larger crisis in the domain of communication and intelligibility in 
general. That is, if the baroque stylist fails to control his discourse, to maintain it within the 
precincts of the “unrhetorical ‘naturalness’ of language,” if this discourse gets “involuntarily” 
out-of-control, over-excited, hyper-gesticulated—somewhere “between histrionics and hysterics” 
(Derrida Spurs 69)—all this could be the result of a larger, impersonal historical situation in 
which language has become newly unreliable as a means to knowledge. It may yet be that 
dialectics in general fail to deliver us into the domain of truth, or that such a domain has become 
inaccessible altogether. It is nevertheless apparent that this feeling of epistemological impotence 
leads, in familiar, “compensatory” ways, to the need for a supplement (Cf. AOM 77, 117). 
Foregoing dialectics and the analysis of ideas, baroque style resorts to artistic devices for this 
supplementarity. It aims not at truth, but at what feels like truth: at persuasion, whether as a 
herdsman or as a brigand (suggestive images in Nietzsche’s rhetoric38), whether through subtle or 
overwhelming means, through “soft” or “hard” power.  
 These opening sentences of passage 144 go beyond extending the idea, first assayed in 
passage 131, of the baroque style as akin to the persuasiveness of Asianist rhetoric, however. 
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They make clear that Asianist rhetoric and baroque style are not just similar; rather, as passage 
144 wants to claim, the Asianist rhetoric was already an instance of baroque style in antiquity. In 
ways that look forward to the concept of eternal recurrence that appears in Nietzsche’s later 
works, passage 144 figures the historical dimension of the baroque in hybrid fashion: as a 
phenomenon of style both singular to Europe’s early modernity—with Michelangelo as its 
“father or grandfather”—and, at the same time, as a style that is endlessly iterable. Passage 144 
claims that “a baroque style has already existed many times since the age of the Greeks,” indeed, 
especially in the domain of eloquence. In this view, it is not that the baroque is a later version of 
Asianism, but that Asianism is an “archaic” version of a baroque style born originally out of the 
tragic-Dionysian, pre-Socratic spirit of sophistry. Of course, as passage 144 acknowledges, the 
baroque also has a specific and modern historical locus, a time of its greatest, most climactic 
unfolding, in the work of Michelangelo’s inheritors, for example—an inheritance that guarantees 
at least the semblance of a straightforward, genealogical historical process (e.g. first 
Michelangelo, then Bernini). But in its capacity for recurring across the ages cyclically, it traces 
a spiraling figure of placement and displacement, location and dislocation, moving forward—
though not necessarily upward, toward the progressive future of the Enlightenment—while also 
turning upon itself repeatedly. These baroque returns occur “as a natural event that can be 
observed with melancholy,” like the transition from midday to the long shadows of twilight.39 
Like the overly taught bow of the stylus atticus, which breaks forth into the stylus asiaticus, the 
baroque style comes about not once, but “whenever a great art fades from bloom, when the 
demands in the art of classical expression have become too great (emphasis mine).” Its reach is 
not only transhistoric, but also, transmedial: it occurs “in poetry, eloquence, prose style, 
sculpture, . . . architecture,” and perhaps especially, “music.” The baroque style can affect, or 
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infect, all these various media, because it is primarily a problem of thought and writing, a 
problem of dialectics and truth, a symptom of an apparently disordered state of language.40  
  Above all other arts, however, the baroque style has a special relationship to the theater 
and theatricality, the media that bind together “the rhetorical and the dramatic.” The category of 
“the rhetorical” has already proved significant for this inquiry,41 but for Nietzsche’s critical 
concept of baroque to come into clearer view, the category of “the dramatic” deserves further 
qualification here. With the words drama and dramatic, Nietzsche explicitly does not seek to 
designate theater activity governed by a central representational text or script intended for 
enactment in performance (in the familiar sense by which one might speak of “dramatic 
literature” as a category). Rather, in writings as early as 1870 and as late as 1888, he repeatedly 
proposes an unorthodox notion of drama, one directly opposed both to this logocentric definition 
and to the normative Aristotelian definition familiar to modern readers of The Poetics, where 
drama is defined in terms of a representational plot, a mimesis praxeos, “the imitation of an 
action.” In terms still favored in Denis Diderot’s lifetime, for example, and well into Nietzsche’s, 
Aristotle had asserted that drama involves plot and represented action primarily by declaring plot 
in metaphysical terms to be the center, first principle, and soul (ψυχὴ, psyche) of tragedy. 
Character, thought, and diction enter into tragic drama only secondarily: beneath all these are 
music and spectacle, Aristotle’s least favored of his six component parts of drama. For 
Nietzsche, however, such a continued, metaphysical emphasis on the representational capacity of 
drama no longer appears possible. Repeatedly, he stands the Aristotelian view on its ear, 
subjecting the concept of drama to a genealogical reversal of sorts. He describes the Aristotelian 
(and nineteenth-century neoclassical) equation of drama with action as “a real catastrophe for 
aesthetics,” writing,  
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  Ancient drama had its eyes upon great scenes of pathos—it left out action  
  altogether (placing it before the start of the tragedy or behind the scenes). The  
  word drama is Doric in background: and in the Dorian language it meant “event”  
or “history” in the hieratic sense of both words. The oldest drama represented 
local legends, “sacred history,” on which rested the foundation of the cult (—thus  
not an act, but a happening: dran in Doric means absolutely nothing like ‘act’).42 
Drama then is not human action, but a superhuman eventuality, a kind of a historical unfolding 
(precisely in the sense in which we are given to speak of crises as having a way of unfolding), 
and a ritual enactment of this unfolding through the dithyrambic, choral movement and scenic or 
gestural images of pathos.43 Defamiliarizing the dramatic in order to reclaim it from its 
hegemonic Aristotelian articulation, Nietzsche thus sunders drama from representation and 
dialectics, handing it over to dancers, orators, hierophants, and other performing bodies whose 
theatrical explicitness does not involve mimesis in the manner described by Aristotle. Before The 
Poetics, drama had nothing to do with mimetic representation, the teleological accomplishment 
of an anthropocentric action, or even dialogue—a late development in the history of Greek 
drama (Das griechische Musikdrama, 27–29). Rather, in his resolutely anti-mimetic view, the 
original form of “drama” consisted instead in pathetic gestures and scenes of intense affective 
display delivered up to the eyes and senses.44 For Nietzsche, “drama” does not involve the 
representation of a closed, fictive, anthropocentric world; it rather unfolds as a play of expressive 
gestures and steps that mime the myth of Dionysus. It is everything Plato seems to have feared 
and Aristotle seems to have despised most: Dionysian music, dithyrambic dance, the spectacle of 
bodily movement, and the play of powerful feelings. 
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  When Nietzsche defines baroque style as tending toward “the rhetorical and the 
dramatic,” he is alluding to “drama” in this anti-Aristotelian, anti-mimetic sense. Today, 
following the distinction between theater and (neo/Aristotelian) drama proposed by Hans-Thies 
Lehmann, this anti-Aristotelian sense of drama could more easily be understood as theatricality. 
In this sense, we can say that Passage 144 values the properly theatrical properties of rhetoric 
and drama, making a value out of theatricality as such, and claiming theatricality as a necessary 
and constitutive condition for the baroque. An orator’s dramatic gestures do not function 
mimetically as an actor’s gestures do when creating the illusion of a represented character, rather 
these gestures are dramatic in a different sense, inasmuch as they arouse excitement. They don’t 
depict an arrangement of incidents causally connected and culminating in a narrative telos, 
instead they create images, spectacle, and powerful feelings of suspense, surprise, and delight. 
Passage 144 opens with the assertion that such theatrical effects are to be found in thinking and 
writing as well: the baroque stylist wants to be understood, wants to gain power through 
understanding, but needs to excite his audience in exchange, and first, needs to acknowledge that 
his audience exists so he can solicit this excitement unabashedly. Like the rhetorician who 
confronts his auditors face-to-face, appealing to them with physical, imagistic gestures as much 
as with spoken words, so too does the baroque stylist acknowledge the reception of his discourse 
as its necessary and inevitable horizon. He thus aims to address his reader, his listener, his 
spectator directly. Baroque style, as it emerges in the first lines of passage 144, cannot pretend 
the reader, the listener, or the spectator does not exist. It is theatrical in precisely the sense that 
Michael Fried has determined with respect to the history of painting since the time of Diderot, 
that is, theatrical inasmuch as it cannot maintain a principle of absorption, “the supreme fiction 
of the beholder’s nonexistence”: rather it aims to address or appeal to that beholder directly 
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(Absorption 108). Fried’s exhaustive analysis of painting between Diderot and Manet is a 
testament to a crisis in realist painting’s capacity for representing an self-enclosed, autonomous 
world constituted through interpersonal relations, where the possibility of the painted figures’ 
returning the spectators’ gaze is foreclosed. It is the same crisis of representation that Nietzsche’s 
concept of the baroque aims to diagnose.  
  In light of this definition of the baroque, Nietzsche’s own conspicuous givenness to forms 
of theatricality in writing must be frankly acknowledged.45 It is not only that this writing entails a 
perpetual, dizzying game of masks and characters that serve as Nietzsche’s philosophical 
mouthpieces—Zarathustra, Dionysus, the Anti-Christ, Empedocles, and so forth—as Martin 
Puchner has rightly observed (Drama of Ideas 142). Nor is it only that Nietzsche’s philosophical 
discourse sometimes has recourse to the formal structures of drama, as in The Birth of Tragedy, 
which has been recognized by numerous commentators (Fuchs Death of Character 28; de Man 
Allegories of Reading 96) as proceeding according to a dramaturgical structure all its own, one 
that Paul de Man likens convincingly to the baroque genres of Florentine opera and Trauerspiel. 
Rather, Nietzsche demands to be taken seriously as a theatricalist in Fried’s sense as well; doing 
so, we are bound to notice, perhaps with some embarrassment, his discourse’s frequent, gestural 
solicitations to an audience, its attempts to rouse the reader, its manner of transforming direct 
address into something approaching a systematic stylistic principle. De Man notes this quality 
when he seeks to interrogate The Birth of Tragedy “in terms of its own theatricality” and ends up 
describing it as “a harangue” and almost “a sermon” to a collective audience.46 At the end of The 
Birth of Tragedy, for example, Nietzsche writes that tragic myth “says to us ‘Look at this! Look 
directly at this! This is your life! This is the hour hand upon the clock of your existence!’” (BT 
24). In moments like these, which are typical throughout Nietzsche’s corpus, there appears to be 
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no escape for the reader from the text’s stylistic devices: its four exclamation points overflowing 
in didactic hyperventilation, its almost hysteric emotionalism, its deictic gestures, the direct 
appeal of its address to the reader’s pathetic involvement, to fear. This theatrical rhetoric seeks to 
persuade, whether by hook or by crook, “whether as a herdsman or as a brigand”: here perhaps 
the reader is being bashed over the head by the highwayman’s club. Compared to the most 
puritanical of Attic orators, whose discourse can pretend to proceed without acknowledgement of 
any listener or viewer, Nietzsche seems to gaze out, intently and enigmatically, from behind the 
lectern. 47 That is, his discourse fails, as it were, to acknowledge the illusion of a “fourth wall” 
insisted upon by Fried and Diderot, but rather, seems intent upon disturbing this boundary 
theatrically.  
  In its peculiar rejection of this fourth wall, the theatricality that haunts Nietzsche’s 
discourse deserves to considered alongside the practices of stage performance in the historical 
baroque. Fried has most recently argued, with respect to Caravaggio’s painting, that modes of 
dramatic absorption and theatrical address were not thought to be incompatible with each other 
in the early baroque, and that the notion of theatricality would only come to acquire its pejorative 
connotation in the later eighteenth century (Moment of Caravaggio 121–22). The stage history of 
the baroque period corroborates this interpretation: it abounds in asides, soliloquys, prologues, 
epilogues, choral interludes, intermezzi, songs, and other moments that interrupt the closed 
circuit of dramatic representation, allowing the performer to glance outward at his beholders, 
breaking the boundary between performer and audience.48 As Joseph Roach has convincingly 
shown, stage performance during the early baroque was practically a species of oratory focused 
almost exclusively around the criterion of actio or pathetic gesture as it was received from such 
ancient authorities as Cicero and Quintillian and disseminated by early moderns like Bulwer. The 
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theatricality of these gestures resided in their performative capacity to render speech excitable 
for both performer and spectator alike: the gesture was a means of commanding the animal 
spirits and a magical summoning of the dark, earthy, psycho-humoral force of the passions.49 On 
the other hand (pun intended), the outward-facing gaze that often accompanied such gestures 
served effectively as a gesture of its own, one that would create a tear of sorts in the fabric of 
dramatic representation. In acknowledging the spectator’s gaze, the baroque performer interrupts 
the illusion of dramatic action and character to become an emblematic image of sorts, something 
akin to what the Romantics would later describe as a fragment, which requires the viewer’s 
interpretation not so much for the completion of the fragmentary form, but to extend the work of 
its interpretation endlessly. Likewise, in these moments, when the actor and indeed at times the 
character sees the spectator seeing, the theatrical fiction recognizes itself metatheatrically as 
such, becomes allegorical of itself, creating an abyssal image of internal reflection that could 
captivate the viewer, intellectually and emotionally. A contemporary engraving taken from the 
Works of Terence (1561) reproduced in Roach’s The Player’s Passion (28) depicts the period’s 
paradigmatic figure of “the actor as orator,” facing flat outward to his spectators, sawing the air 
with his right hand extended, before a crowd of apparently transfixed spectators below [Figure 
1].50  
  If, as Fried argues, the painting of Diderot’s lifetime sought to hail, attract, and enthrall 
the spectator through absorptive means and by denying theatrical address,51 the baroque stage 
often inverted this tendency, using address as a means to captivate attention. This was 
particularly true in the earliest operas, which historiographically are thought to be coincident 
with the shift from the music of the Renaissance to that of the baroque. (In modern music-
historiographic terms, the baroque is still thought to begin at the moment when music is put into  
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FIGURE 1: The actor as orator. From the Works of Terence (1561). 
 
the service of theater and theatricality for the invention of opera.) These operas distinguished (as 
Nietzsche well knew) between dramatic recitative and the theatricality of the aria, the latter of 
which brought the action of the plot to a standstill for a moment of virtuosic display on the 
performer’s part, demanding yet again the performer’s outward-facing gaze. One need only 
consider the very first moments of the oldest surviving baroque opera, Monteverdi’s musical 
fable L’Orfeo (1607, published in its first modern version in Berlin in 188152), in which this 
strategy is allegorized as an admonition to the audience to still themselves for the performance 
about to begin. The work opens with a prologue sung by Music, allegorically personified, who 
addresses the assembled audience directly in order to command their attentive silence in florid 
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and rhetorical terms. In its closing lines, she instructs her spectators to be still and observe, just 
as Orpheus’s music will work hypnotic effects of its own upon the landscape. “Now, as I vary 
my songs from joy to sorrow, / May no small bird move in these plants, / May no sounding wave 
be heard on these banks, / And may every little breeze be stopped still in its path.”53 On the 
baroque stage, moments of this kind, when theatrical address breaks the frame of mimetic 
representation (as the allegorical person of Music does here), could just as easily bring the 
spectator to a powerful, enchanted standstill, as moments of the most heightened dramatic action.  
  Perhaps university lecturers (as Nietzsche once was) are strangely like baroque actors and 
opera singers in this regard: they need to face their audiences, and cannot pretend their audiences 
do not exist. If the testimony of Nietzsche’s friend and would-be lover Lou Andreas Salomé is to 
be believed, Nietzsche himself made a case for these theatrical elements of style explicitly. Her 
late reflections on her friendship with Nietzsche include a list of his ten aphorisms composed 
“Toward the Teaching of Style.” Like those Greek and Roman orators who practiced their 
compositions by declaiming them aloud to themselves (a practice Nietzsche also favored54), 
Nietzsche’s notes conceive stylistic writing in terms of vivid, theatrical oratory, predicated 
entirely upon the theatrical relation between orator and audience. Note 2 embraces the strange 
feedback loop between speaker/writer and spectator/reader: “Style should be suited to the 
specific person with whom you wish to communicate. (The law of mutual relation.)” Note 4 
returns to the bond between lack and compensatory excess: “Since the writer lacks many of the 
speaker’s means, he must have in general for his model a very expressive kind of presentation of 
necessity, the written copy will appeal much paler.” Note 5 makes writing into a play of 
gesticulation and feeling: “The richness of life reveals itself through a richness of gestures. One 
must learn to feel everything—the length and retarding of sentences, interpunctuations, the 
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choice of words, the pausing, the sequence of arguments—like gestures.” Notes 7 and 8 are 
especially significant in the privilege they accord to the role of feeling in written and oral 
communication. The former reads: “Style ought to prove that one believes in an idea; not only 
that one thinks it but also feels it”; while the latter states: “The more abstract a truth which one 
wishes to teach, the more one must first entice the senses” (Qtd. in Salomé, Nietzsche 77–8). 
Given all these prescriptions for stylistic writing, Nietzsche comes to seem unequivocally like 
the various baroque stylists described in Assorted Opinions and Maxims’ passages 131 and 144. 
  Yet coyly, without naming names, passage 144 turns away from its initial questions of 
thinking and writing to end by asserting modern music is “just now” entering into a baroque 
phase. The implicit referent here is Wagner: Nietzsche would make this assignation explicit 
repeatedly throughout the remainder of his sane life.55 Even an untrained listener can tell that 
Wagner’s music sounds almost nothing like the music produced during what modern scholarship 
has come to designate as the baroque period, but the many correspondences illuminated in 
passage 144 are nonetheless striking. Here again, the exciting, emotionally manipulative 
theatricality of dramatic gestures figures prominently, as the baroque style is seen to entail “the 
choice of material and themes of the highest dramatic tension, which can set the heart trembling 
even without art because they bring Heaven and Hell too near to each other in feeling: then the 
eloquence of powerful affects and gestures, of the ugly and the sublime, of great masses, of 
quantity in itself above all. . .” While these descriptions could easily apply, say, to the sculpture 
of Bernini, the painting of El Greco, or to Bach’s Saint Matthew Passion, here they are 
allegorically or subtextually aimed at Wagner and stem from Nietzsche’s experience as a 
spectator in the Festspielhaus theater at Bayreuth. In this way, Human, All Too Human begins to 
adopt a position of rigorous ambivalence toward baroque style as a concept of philosophical 
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concern. It clearly applauds the baroque Asianist orator of passage 131, makes seemingly self-
referential descriptions of baroque style, and describes key aspects of baroque cultural 
production in taxonomic and manifestly appreciative terms in passage 144, thus helping 
transvalue the baroque from an entirely derided category to one useful for aesthetic thought. (For 
all these reasons, as Nietzsche says, it would be “pretentious to judge [this style] immediately 
with disdain,” as his predecessors Jacob Burckhardt, Johann Joachim Winckelmann, and others 
had done.) However, by suggesting Wagner as a modern-day avatar for baroque style, this 
passage also raises a critical warning: although “this style has always appealed to many of the 
best and most serious of its time,” those who do not succumb to its attractions can count 
themselves lucky. 
  If the baroque style appears here as a seductive Other to be overcome, just as Nietzsche 
ultimately had to overcome his friendship with Wagner in the later years of his life, it would also 
develop, as we shall see, into a desired means to Nietzsche’s own self-overcoming. The baroque 
style concerns music and musicians, to be sure, but as it is more primarily a phenomenon of 
thinking and language confronted with the unavailability of a transcendent truth, it affects all 
linguistic beings, and philosophers specifically. It is not accidental that those characteristics 
Nietzsche finds in baroque style to describe Wagner’s musical aesthetics (“the eloquence of 
powerful affects and gestures, of the ugly and the sublime,” etc.) cut equally in the direction of 
his own theatrical rhetoric. For Nietzsche’s writing also sets the heart trembling; its materials and 
themes are of the highest dramatic tension; it too trades in powerful emotions, striking gestures 
and figures, in its own furious sublimity. But if Nietzsche aims to implicate himself within a 
larger historical problematics of the baroque, this self-implication remains only suggested. The 
baroque concept that emerges from passages 131 and 144 appears tantalizingly Dionysian, and 
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Nietzsche would also claim during these years that the Dionysian dithyramb “is the baroque style 
of poetry.”56 Nevertheless, the author who would later take up the name of Dionysus for 
himself—and would even take to the writing of modern Dionysian dithyrambs—here leaves the 
question of his own inclination to baroque style largely in the background, keeping his subtle 
critique of Wagner closer to the fore. 
   
1.3 De te fabula narratur 
The characterization of Wagner as a baroque stylist is a particularly biting allegation, since 
Wagner distanced himself deliberately from most baroque music and architecture as the 
apparently degenerate products of foreign lands that needed to be overcome on the path to a 
national German artwork of the future [See Figures 2 and 3].57 As a youthful Wagnerian, 
Nietzsche himself had helped establish this distance in the Birth of Tragedy, whose last ten 
chapters, written at Wagner’s urging, contain a critical account of opera’s origins in Italy and its 
earliest musical aesthetics, particularly its use of recitative to establish communicative clarity 
(BT 19). Human, All Too Human marks a reversal from this pro-Wagnerian stance, but the 
connections it draws between Wagner and baroque style barely scratch the surface. Samuel 
Weber has more recently demonstrated that Wagner’s Ring Cycle borrows its dramaturgical 
structure, whether wittingly or no, from the baroque form of the Trauerspiel or mourning play 
(Benjamin’s –abilities 281–96). Moreover, Wagner’s aesthetic goal of synthesizing disparate the 
arts of dance, tone, and poetry into a single, unified art form (the Gesamtkunstwerk or Total 
Artwork) develops and extends a project first initiated in the time of the historical baroque with 
the early development of modern opera, ballet, and scenography.58  
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FIGURE 2: The Margravial Opera House at Bayreuth, originally designed by members of the Galli 
da Bibiena family, which Wagner had considered early on as a possible home for his festival 
performances, but ultimately rejected out of an opposition to its ornamental baroque style. 
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FIGURE 3: Initial plans for Bayreuth Festspielhaus by Otto Brückwald (1872), bearing Wagner’s 
handwritten response, “Die Ornamente fort!” (“Away with the ornaments!”) 
 
  The Jesuit opera theaters of the Counterreformation, for example, had already sought this 
goal of totalization after the manner of an Ignatian spiritual exercise. By appealing to the 
spectator’s separate senses through the coordinated use of multiple artistic media—spectacle, 
poetry, music, and so forth—these theaters created scenes of overwhelming excitement for him 
to project himself into—to “enter” spiritually so to speak, as one might enter through one of St. 
Ignatius of Loyola’s meditations into a vividly corporeal scenes from the life or death of Christ. 
A similar principle of medial combination likewise animates much baroque architecture, 
sculpture, and painting, especially in the Catholic effort to combat the spread of an iconoclastic 
Protestantism through the exciting effects of artistic and liturgical media. Wagner’s theater at 
Bayreuth clearly built upon these various techniques, depicting mythic allegory through the 
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necessarily crude machinery of modern phantasmagory. Combining the various arts into an 
overwhelming spectacle, and deploying an array of stage machines rivaled only in ingenuity by 
those of the baroque period, it aimed to entice spectators to project themselves empathetically 
into the mythic onstage fiction, to immerse themselves, to lose themselves in feeling, all goals 
that Nietzsche ultimately recognized as strategic.59 At Bayreuth, the stage becomes the necessary 
space where the various forms of art can intermingle, the necessary medium for their 
intermediation, the paradoxical technology that can heal an overly technologized modernity, and 
the institution that can mediate between a modern audience and the possibility of its 
redemption.60 But in seeking to excite the audience’s rapt, empathetic attention through these 
strategies of intermedial synthesis, Wagner’s basic goal was ideological, just as had been the 
case in Jesuit opera and other forms of courtly and ecclesiastical baroque theater. (The official 
Catholic promotion of emotionally and ideologically persuasive artworks during the 
Counterreformation had, after all, coincided with both the intensification of a baroque paradigm 
in the arts, and with the emergence of the modern notion of propaganda as a means for the literal 
propagation of Catholic ideology.61) As Nietzsche saw it, Wagner desired above all to conduct 
sensibilities and feelings toward himself like a magnet or a lightning rod—like a herdsman or a 
brigand, as Human, All Too Human claims. The deeper meaning of Bayreuth—as was true for 
the propaganda theaters of the Counterreformation and the age of absolutism, as for the Asianist 
rhetoricians of antiquity—is persuasion through enchantment: theatricality as a seductive appeal 
to the beholder, and an invitation to enter the illusion.62  
  Nietzsche’s most emphatic public denunciation of Wagner, and his most full-throated 
critique of these enchanting technologies, would come some five years after the composer’s 
death, in Nietzsche Contra Wagner and The Case of Wagner (both composed 1888). In The Case 
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of Wagner, he presses the charge of theatricality against his former friend, slighting his place in 
the history of music by describing him as primarily “a great actor” (CW 7), “an incomparable 
histrio, the greatest mime, the most astonishing theatrical genius that the Germans have known” 
(10). He alleges that Wagner made music into a kind of “theater rhetoric, a means of expression, 
of amplifying gestures, of suggestion” (8) and that Wagner remained always a “rhetorician in 
music” (10).63 In Nietzsche Contra Wagner, he echoes these charges: 
You will guess that I am anti-theatrical in my essential disposition. I have for the 
theater, this mass art par excellence, a deep scorn from the bottom of my soul, 
which every artist today feels. … [N]ext to the Wagner who created the most 
singular music ever, there was the Wagner who was essentially a man of the 
theater and an actor, the most enthusiastic mimomaniac that has ever existed, even 
as a musician. And by the way, if it was Wagner’s theory that “the drama is the 
end, music is always only the means”—, his praxis was from beginning to end: 
“the pose is the end, the drama and also the music are always only the means.” 
Music as a means for the clarification, amplification, and deepening of dramatic 
gestures and the actor’s appeal to the senses; and Wagnerian drama only an 
opportunity for many interesting poses!64  
These charges culminate in a single name, one that Nietzsche borrows and adapts from the third 
book of Plato’s Laws: “Theatrocracy—, the madness of a belief in the primacy of the theater, of 
the theater’s right to dominate the other arts and over art in general” (CW “Postscript”).65 Not 
only does Wagner render music secondary to drama in its Aristotelian sense, the representational 
text or script of dramatic poetry; rather, his tendency for theatricalization renders music and 
dramatic poetry both secondary to statuesque poses, gestures, attitudes, all in order to gain a 
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sensuous, affective control over his spectators (CW 5, 6). Music and poetry are here dominated 
by the theatrical tendency to grasp for “the rhetorical and the dramatic.” Here, the critique of 
Wagner as a baroque stylist appears to reach its conclusion and culmination, decrying Wagner’s 
theatricality as the sign of a widespread cultural decadence, and his name as an emblem for “the 
ruin of music, as Bernini is for the ruin of sculpture” (CW “Second Postscript”).66 
  Much ink has been spilled over Nietzsche’s late turn against Wagner in these writings, 
and many theater historians seem content to take Nietzsche’s late anti-Wagnerian, anti-theatrical 
opinions at face value (Barish 400–18; Puchner Stage Fright 2–3, 31–40; Smith 115). The 
trouble with this interpretation, however, is that Nietzsche himself asserts unambiguously in The 
Case of Wagner’s preface that there is no outside to Wagnerism—no point of pure and 
transcendent critique, uncontaminated by the decadence that Wagner represents. The tendency 
toward theatricality that the theater at Bayreuth so vividly embodies is just the most outstanding 
emblem of a larger crisis, and Wagner’s name is just a metonym for modernity conceived 
precisely as this crisis’s unfolding, ensnaring Nietzsche as well.67 Nietzsche unequivocally 
confesses in The Case of Wagner’s preface, “I am as much a child of my age as Wagner is, that 
is to say, a decadent: only, I recognized this fact, I struggled against it. The philosopher in me 
struggled against it.”68 Eve Sedgwick has showed in The Epistemology of the Closet that the 
recognition of decadence animating Nietzsche’s critique of Wagner follows a certain form 
(namely, that of homosexual attribution within the late nineteenth-century epistemological 
context established by the notion of the closet) whose “interminable logic” is always “it takes 
one to know one” (169). Likewise with the baroque style, whose description in Human, All Too 
Human already figures within a double-sided rhetoric of decadence (“…the lights of twilight, 
transfiguration…”), cutting toward both Wagner and Nietzsche alike. A deeper sympathy and a 
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covert self-referentiality motivates Human, All Too Human’s notes on baroque style and 
Wagner’s place within it —it takes one to know one. The self-referential quality of these various 
gestures is only made more explicit by Nietzsche’s late confession, in Ecce Homo (1888), that 
his past writings used Wagner’s name as a mask, another one of his many theatrical disguises. 
“At all psychologically decisive points I alone am the one being discussed—one must ruthlessly 
put down my name or the word ‘Zarathustra’ wherever the text has the word Wagner.”69  
  This is an admission with consequences not only for the interpretation of Nietzsche’s 
early writings on Wagner (in The Birth of Tragedy and the Untimely Meditations), but also for 
the mature writings as well (Human, All Too Human and The Case of Wagner). In its light, the 
polemic against Wagner and theatricality that courses through the later writings must not be 
understood simply as criticism from a pure and external source, but rather as a highly self-
conscious attempt at disidentification. We cannot read this metatheatrical allegation of Wagner’s 
theatricality without remembering Nietzsche’s own histrionics; rather, The Case of Wagner and 
the related later writing deserve to be reconsidered more precisely as efforts at self-overcoming, 
and not just as denunciations of a sometime friend. If we follow the advice of Ecce Homo and 
read substitutively, we might ask how these texts amount to The Case of Nietzsche; or else, we 
might collectively retitle them borrowing a phrase given to the preface of the 1886 reprint of The 
Birth of Tragedy: “An Attempt at Self-Criticism.”70 Similarly, we cannot consider Nietzsche’s 
comments on the baroque style without acknowledging that they reflect inevitably back upon 
their author. The concept of the baroque, then, functions in a dual way in Human, All Too 
Human, both prosecuting Wagner and indicting the prosecutor Nietzsche at once, as an ironic 
and immanent critique. This duality helps make sense of the ambivalence that governs this text’s 
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allegations—its seemingly simultaneous mixture of both sympathy and revulsion for the baroque 
as a style and a concept.  
  In other words, the concept of baroque that emerges from Human, All Too Human and 
Nietzsche’s other writings effectively entails a crucial, internal division between competing 
tendencies—variously Wagnerian and Nietzschean in orientation, baroque and counterbaroque—
which cannot be resolved into a stable binary opposition but which takes shape as a Möbius strip 
of sorts. Neither of these tendencies operating within the baroque concept involves a simple, 
either/or approval/rejection of theatricality as a value: rather, both deploy theatricality in 
different ways and for different ends, just as Nietzsche and Wagner themselves had done 
throughout their lives and works. However, it is not just that Nietzsche adopted baroque style 
“consciously and coolly,” where Wagner was drawn to it “half unwillingly, half irresistibly”: 71 
we are not simply discussing the crucial difference between Romantic and Modernist attitudes 
toward the baroque. Rather, we can go farther by reorienting this internal division by way of 
Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy as a distinction between Apollonian and Dionysian manifestations 
within the baroque style itself—or more grossly put, between centering and decentering 
tendencies respectively.72 An altogether simpler view has it that the baroque style amounts to a 
moment of purely Dionysian release, breaking out of the classical constraints of Apollonian form 
in the Renaissance. But Nietzsche’s ambivalence about baroque style—his simultaneous 
sympathy (AOM 131) and revulsion (AOM 144) for it— suggests something more complicated 
afoot. Rather than conceptualizing the baroque as a purely Dionysian phenomenon, as some 
have,73 we can instead note that Nietzsche’s baroque already incorporates both Apollonian and 
Dionysian tendencies. The baroque period had already taken Apollo and Dionysus as fetish 
images of its own in the visual and performative rhetoric of the court of Louis XIV (the 
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Apollonian Sun-King-as-Sun-God) and in Caravaggio’s fixation with Bacchus and Dionysian 
feeling. Nietzsche’s Apollo and Dionysus do not descend to him directly from antiquity; his 
inheritance of these myths is always already mediated by these various baroque avatars. Their 
prior existence is a testament to the fact that there already existed, prior to his intervention, a 
dialectics between an Apollonian baroque and a Dionysian baroque.74 Recognizing this fact 
allows us to see that Nietzsche’s late critique of Wagner and his late insinuations of Wagner’s 
baroque style both target Wagner’s conspicuously Apollonian qualities.  
  Early on, of course, The Birth of Tragedy had hailed “Wagner” as a means to the renewal 
of music’s Dionysian potential, but the latter writings turn against Wagner, now seen as a 
baroque stylist, to describe his theatricality in what are more primarily Apollonian terms. In the 
aesthetic field, this characterization includes Wagner’s subordination of music to an emotionally 
coercive, narrative, and representational plot, the Aristotelian mimesis praxeos (RWB 9, CW 9); 
to picturesque gesture (NCW Objections); to stage naturalism (NCW 1, Aphorisms 2); and to 
intelligible lyrics as a means of making himself understood and persuasive (UM 7, 9). These are 
Apollonian attributes, to be sure; and although Wagner’s baroque style depends on the Dionysian 
sublimity of music and affect, it is distinguished primarily by its Apollonian leanings, not just in 
the field of aesthetics, but in the broader metaphysical and socio-political fields as well.75 Amid 
all the various semio-theological upheavals that characterize modernity, Wagner appears to 
harbor a melancholy desire for the lost Apollonianism of monotheism’s now lost Godhead (or 
“the One”), and Parsifal recalls for Nietzsche the arts of the Counterreformation in its apparent, 
retrograde desire to reinstate a universal European Christian theism.76 A melancholy metaphysics 
of presence such as this has manifold effects. It authorizes the emergence during Wagner’s 
lifetime of the autonomous stage director as an transcendent, executive force organizing the 
 
  99 
theatrical collaboration and spectacle from outside, effectively displacing the prior tradition of 
actor-managers organizing the theatrical process from within.77 More threateningly, however, in 
Nietzsche’s prophetic analysis, it leads to a charismatic dictatorship of the actor and of spectacle 
as such. Wagner is “a tyrant,” dominated by his own passions and instincts for theatricality, and 
thereby dominating others in turn (CW 8); he desires a herd of followers whose capacity for 
critical judgment is overthrown (CW 5, 6, 9). “It is full of deep significance that Wagner’s 
emergence has coincided with the rise of ‘Empire’: both of these facts are proof of one and the 
same thing—obedience and long legs.—Never have people obeyed better, never have people 
taken orders better. Wagnerian conductors in particular are worthy of an age that posterity will 
regard with timidity and awe as the classical age of war” (CW 11).78 What once appeared like 
Dionysian sublimity in Wagnerian music now translates into a horrific vision of the sublimities 
of nationalism, empire, war, and terror;79 and just as disturbing, into Apollonian forms of state 
organization predicated on hierarchy, structure, leadership, and unthinking obedience. The 
baroque Wagner glimpsed by Nietzsche embodies the most Apollonian tendencies of the 
baroque—that is, tendencies toward a metaphysics based in truth-conceived-as-correspondence, 
in mimesis, representation, the referent, intelligibility, clarity, sovereignty, and the subject—and 
these tendencies also illuminate the political dangers of baroque Apollonianism, namely, that it 
requires an obedient herd. 
  This conceptualization of baroque can thus finally be said to make plain a Nietzschean 
political anxiety about democracy itself, and its susceptibility to manipulation within a mediated 
context.80 The primary holders of hegemonic power in the historical baroque period—the 
Catholic church and the absolutist state—deployed theatrical, emotionally exciting artistic media 
precisely for its popular, demotic appeal, and did so for the purposes of shoring up radically 
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unegalitarian political configurations. In this way, as Nietzsche clearly perceived at Bayreuth and 
described in The Case of Wagner, democratic tastes can easily be perverted to antidemocratic 
ends. Against the grain of baroque style’s seemingly democratic appeal, Nietzsche frequently 
admires the age of the baroque precisely for its “aristocratism” (WP 95; D 201; NF-1888, 
25[10]), embracing baroque style for its noble strength and its flourishing, aesthetic, anti-ascetic 
morality.81 This admiration of baroque aristocratism does not extend so far, however, to favor the 
literal and violent exercise of force (Kraft) through tyranny, imperialism, warfare, or the like: 
hence the condemnatory comments on Wagnerism and empire in The Case of Wagner. Neither 
does it authorize aristocracy in the more familiar sense of the word as the enforced rule by a 
ruthless economic elite: Nietzsche’s disdain for the wealthiest members of his own bourgeois 
society is manifest at numerous instances throughout his body of work.82 The hegemonic, 
Apollonian uses of baroque style result in the deployment of these kinds of force, but a more 
properly Dionysian baroque would sublimate the capacity for primordial force into the power 
(Macht) of creative and artistic potential available to every human being. The Apollonian 
baroque of church, state, nation, and empire belongs to Wagner and to the past. The Dionysian 
baroque that Nietzsche’s writings effectively produce is the baroque of the future.     
 
1.4 Apollonian and Dionysian Baroque 
How then to envision this Dionysian baroque, this dissident theatricality par excellence, and 
what sense can ultimately be made of Nietzsche’s untimely claim of kinship with baroque style? 
What writings best reveal the Nietzschean baroque “in action”? Is its primary location the 
baroque dramaturgy of The Birth of Tragedy, with its creaky, quasi-operatic stage machinery of 
intriguers, gods, and mythic heroes? Or is it better found in the claim that the Übermensch greets 
 
  101 
the thought of eternal recurrence and the possibility of infinite iterability by likening such 
endless returns to the paradigmatic operatic structure of the baroque aria, by “insatiably calling 
out da capo” (BGE 56)?83 Or in the late dithyrambic poetry, where productive correspondences 
can be made, say, to the sculpture of Bernini, the writings of Saint Teresa and Richard Crashaw, 
or the operas of Monteverdi?84 Or should we proceed another way altogether, by reevaluating  
early modern authors (say, Christopher Marlowe, for example) according to a Nietzschean 
hermeneutics? Reconsidering Nietzsche as one who felt an elective affinity with baroque style 
promises to raise many fruitful avenues of future inquiry, but I wish to close instead by 
elaborating the potential meanings of a Dionysian baroque for modern performance and theater, 
by returning to the categories of gesture and feeling.  
  In the case of Wagner, the name of the baroque signals for Nietzsche an anxiety about 
gesture conceived metaphysically, with the gesturer understanding himself as a cause and the 
resulting gestures as effects whose physical conduct and communicative meaning remain fully 
under his control, thus shoring up a consoling, identitarian notion of the self. Nietzsche’s 
Dionysian baroque dispenses with these possibilities altogether. In his writing, the gesture 
becomes “hysteric,” loses control of itself and its significations in a drive toward Dionysian self-
abandonment. These gestures point, as it were, to no single stable referent, but in a multiplicity 
of sometimes contradictory directions all at once. They open up an abyssal, ironic game of 
reflections, a space of infinite play. Where Nietzsche saw Wagnerian gesture as overly 
naturalistic, reflecting the near total identification of actor and represented character, Nietzsche’s 
gestures are more enigmatic; they seem less like the sort of gestures we expect from modern 
actors, and more like those of ancient oratory; they are non-matrixed, non-unified, enfolding an 
unbridgeable distance between the gesturer and the gestured. In this case, the gesture does not 
 
  102 
shore up the illusion of a stable, sovereign subject; rather, it unravels stability and sovereignty 
altogether at a single stroke.  
  To articulate this difference in affective terms by returning to the notion of “excitement,” 
and to the idea of baroque style as “the most marvelous [wundervollsten] means of expression,” 
we should follow the transfer from motion to emotion, from actio to admiratio, and interrogate 
the different forms of wonder that Wagner and Nietzsche’s gestures inspire, since wonder itself 
numbers among the historical baroque’s most pronounced aesthetico-affective concepts. In 
Nietzsche’s view of Wagner, the gesture’s affect- or wonder-producing power is directed toward 
the overthrowing the spectator’s capacity for critical thought amid intensely elevated feeling and 
vague, unthinking anticipation. Ventriloquizing Wagner, Nietzsche writes: “Concerning the 
production of wonder: here our concept of style takes its starting point. Above all, no thinking! 
Nothing is more compromising than a thought!” 85 With Wagnerian wonder, as with the wonder 
demanded by the Apollonian baroque, thought is held continually in abeyance, deferred to some 
future point while the audience is suspended indefinitely amidst an overwhelming, passionate 
chaos (CW 6). It is, in other words, a kind of metaphysical awe the Apollonian baroque demands, 
akin to that demanded by the God of monotheism in Ecce Homo’s description: “God is a crude 
answer, an indelicacy against us thinkers—at bottom merely a crude prohibition for us: thou 
shall not think!”86 It serves, finally, subtly, to entrench the status quo, to reinforce a “reified” 
view of the world as full of fateful necessity and metaphysical inevitability.87 
 By contrast, the Dionysian baroque embraced by Nietzsche proceeds toward the horizon 
of demystification. It deploys theatrical effects and their attendant excitements to produce, not 
theological awe, but philosophical wonder as the necessary prior condition for the beginnings of 
critical thought. Apollonianism from baroque to Bayreuth produces spectacle that conceals its 
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own means of production, but Nietzsche effectively exposes, unmasks, “pulls back the curtain” 
to expose the mechanisms of mystification at work. The former still maintains a faith in the old 
metaphysics—a credulous, dogmatic faith in truth, representation, action, dialectics, and so forth; 
the latter peers obscurely through the “fourth wall” to cast this entire regime into doubt. The 
former preserves the age-old, clear and distinct separation, originally Platonic, between “truth” 
and “theater” as incommensurable values. The latter witnesses the decomposition of this 
distinction into a truly baroque complexity, in which the very conceptual autonomy of “truth” as 
such is revealed as necessarily dependent upon some Other against which it can be opposed and 
defined in positive terms. (“Truth” as a function of theater, the theatron [seeing-place], 
perspectivism, error, falsehood, opinion, semblance, art, and all the other logoi Nietzsche 
regularly deploys in his prismatic rejoinders to Platonism).88 Once this “fourth wall” is 
effectively broken, the Dionysian baroque thus comes to see theater everywhere. It skews the old 
theocentric metaphor of the theatrum mundi or the world as a stage, with a center, subject, 
creator, audience, stable roles, indeed, even stable actors (a metaphor still residual in the early 
modern period and favored by the Apollonian baroque) and in so skewing it, reimagines the 
world as a theater with no center at all—a mysterium tremendum et fascinans, and a labyrinthine 
field of immanent play.89  
 This distinction can be summed up ever more succinctly by observing that the Apollonian 
baroque strategy aims at the manipulation of empathy, while the Dionysian seeks to 
defamiliarize, particularly where existing conditions are concerned. (Only later, with the concept 
of allegory, will Walter Benjamin offer a credible theory that the roots of modernist 
defamiliarization, when sought exhaustively enough, can be found in the historical baroque.) The 
fourth essay of the Untimely Meditations, on “Richard Wagner in Bayreuth” expresses these 
 
  104 
aims most pithily, and so elaborates the contemporaneity that underwrites Nietzsche’s untimely 
identification with baroque style. Untimeliness, this mediation professes, is precisely the capacity 
“to look upon the familiar and everyday as something very uncommon and complex;”90 or, as 
Giorgio Agamben has argued, the capacity for feeling disconnected, anachronistic, or out-of-
joint with one’s present time.91 Against the crypto-theological myths of progressive history, those 
same myths that so easily assert that that (the baroque) was then, and this (the not-baroque) is 
now, Nietzsche asserts the need to attempt a stance apart from the flow of time, outside the 
flatfooted optimism that views the historical present as a set of conditions both good and 
unalterable. Comparing German scholars of history to Leibniz’s theological optimism in a 
passage that both seems to anticipate the writings of Brecht and qualify Marx’s eleventh thesis 
on Feuerbach simultaneously, he writes: 
  Most of them [i.e. German historians] involuntarily believe that the way things  
have turned out [in history] is very good. If history weren’t still a veiled Christian 
Theodicy, if it were written with more justice and ardent sympathy, so would it 
actually be useless for the ends it is put to now: as an opiate against all revolution 
and renovation. It is a similar case today with philosophy: from which most 
people want to learn only how roughly—very roughly!—to understand things, so 
they can fit into them. […] It seems to me, however, that most important question 
of all philosophy concerns the extent to which things have an unalterable 
character and form: and then, once this question has been answered, it falls to 
philosophy to begin improving that part of the world recognized as variable with 
the most ruthless bravery.92  
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Against the fated sense of a given reality, against what the Apollonian baroque posits as “the 
seemingly invincible necessity [of] power, law, custom, contracts, the whole order of things,”93 
Nietzsche posits untimeliness as the means to an attenuated, but still revolutionary variability. 
Through such an anachronistic posture, the untimely Dionysian attains to the astonishing, critical 
defamiliarization of everyday “reality.” This Dionysian sense accounts for Nietzsche’s untimely 
embrace of the baroque as a style as a means to critical thought. The difference, for now, is clear: 
with “powerful affects and gestures” (AOM 144), exponents of the Apollonian baroque enchant 
their auditors to ensure their continued credulity. Using precisely the same theatrical strategy, the 
same recourse to such powerful affects, powerful gestures, exponents of the Dionysian baroque  
enchant their auditors initially, but only as a means to effect a subsequent disenchantment. 
  After Nietzsche’s psychological disablement, Heinrich Wölfflin, his fellow University of 
Basel affiliate, would offer baroque style a more thoroughgoing and systematic interpretation in 
Renaissance and Baroque (1888) and The Principles of Art History (1915), thus popularizing it 
and making it available to a wider audience, specifically for the study of art history. Nietzsche’s 
transvaluative interest in the baroque can thus be deemed to have been efficacious. But his 
influence would extend far beyond the academic study of art history, over the emergence of 
modernism in the theater and critical theory as well.94 Even where this influence cannot be traced 
directly, the condition of crisis his writing diagnoses as constitutive of modernity itself would 
only continue to persist and be amplified in the time of the twentieth century. Indeed, the 
problematic question of theatricality in the field of modern art would continue to trouble thinkers 
well into the late 1960s, as Michael Fried’s writing makes clear, and beyond that time into our 
contemporary present.95 As such, it is little surprise that the question of the baroque should 
become a subject of vibrant concern for figures as disparate as Mallarmé, Benjamin, Stein, and 
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others. It would fall to these interpreters of Nietzsche’s thought in the avant-gardes of theater 
and philosophy to develop his specifically Dionysian baroque vision into a dynamic theory and 
praxis for performance. The chapters that follow will undertake to explore the ramifications of 
this conceptual inheritance. 
                                                
All parenthetical citations to Nietzsche’s writings above and in the footnotes below are given according to the North 
American Nietzsche Society’s citation guidelines and refer to the Kritische Gesamtausgabe edition by Giorgio Colli 
and Mazzino Montinari. Unless otherwise indicated, the translations are my own, and all emphases and italics that 
appear in quoted material are the author’s.  
 
1 Danto 63. For Nietzsche’s own account, see his letters to Mathilde Maier of July 1878. (See also: KSA 8: 30 [1]) 
 
2 For an exception, see Zamora and Kaup, eds. 41–3.  
 
3 Of the few, Geoff Waite comments—in a passing and largely paranoid reading drawing on Wilfried Barner and 
José Antonio Maravall’s scholarship—on the similarities between Nietzsche and baroque rhetoric, in order to 
characterize Nietzsche’s ideological position as an “liberal-fascoid” one, incommensurable with liberatory politics. 
See Waite 189–90. 
 
4 See Barish 400–417; Puchner Stage Fright 2–3. 
 
5 Although the association of the theater with the concept of the baroque has since become a critical commonplace, 
Nietzsche appears to have been among the first and most forceful to draw this connection, doing so precisely at the 
outset of the term’s modern conceptual history. 
 
6 In advancing this claim, I build upon William Egginton’s argument in The Theater of Truth, whose major premise 
is that the twentieth-century “neobaroque” must be understood as a continuation of the historical baroque rather than 
a return to it. 
 
7 For Nietzsche’s influence over modern drama, see Kornhaber. 
 
8 See, for example, Aylesworth, who writes: “Nietzsche is also a precursor for postmodernism in his genealogical 
analyses of fundamental concepts, especially what he takes to be the core concept of Western metaphysics, the ‘I’.” 
For the rhetoric of the return of the baroque, see Lambert. 
 
9 AOM 131: “Das Aufregende in der Geschichte der Kunst.—Verfolgt man die Geschichte einer Kunst, zum 
Beispiel die der griechischen Beredtsamkeit, so geräth man, von Meister zu Meister fortgehend, bei dem Anblick 
dieser immer gesteigerten Besonnenheit, um den alten und neuhinzugefügten Gesetzen und Selbstbeschränkungen 
insgesammt zu gehorchen, zuletzt in eine peinliche Spannung: man begreift, dass der Bogen brechen muss und dass 
die sogenannte unorganische Composition, mit den wundervollsten Mitteln des Ausdrucks überhängt und maskirt—
in jenem Falle der Barockstil des Asianismus—einmal eine Nothwendigkeit und fast eine Wohlthatwar.” 
 
10 On the contrast between the stylus atticus and stylus asiaticus, see Cicero, Brutus §325 and Quintilian, Instiutio 
Oratoria §XII.10. On the debts of Asianist rhetoric to Gorgianic sophistry, see Pernot 82. 
 
11 On the Asianist preference for lapidary utterances, see Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language 232–33. On 
Nietzsche’s relationship to aphoristic rhetoric in the baroque, especially Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, and Gracián, see 
Merrow, “Nietzsche and the Baroque.”  
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12 For Nietzsche’s own overview of this now famous conceptual distinction, foundational to much of his later work, 
I refer the reader to the first chapter of The Birth of Tragedy, where Nietzsche adduces Apollo and Dionysus as the 
Greek’s two primary art deities: the former as the god of images, sculpture, and individuated form; the latter is 
described as the god of imageless, nonrepresentational music—ecstatic song and dances in the dithyrambic mode. 
 
13 On the historically persistent analogy between Asianism and effeminacy, see: Dominik Roman Eloquence 9, 85, 
91, 105–7). Like Dionysus’ own queer androgyny, the Asianist rhetoric even seems to confound stable gender 
categories: bedecked and masked, this orator effectively drags the “serious,” Attic use of language practiced by 
virile philosophers and Athenian statesmen. 
 
14 Plato and Aristotle’s writings make clear that oratory in antiquity was, gesturally speaking, close to the kind of 
declamation practiced in theaters: “Whenever delivery comes to be developed as an art, it will have the same power 
as acting” (Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1904a; cf. Plato. Gorgias, 502d). 
 
15 Cf. Nietzsche’s warning to his students that Asianism has never ceased to exist since antiquity, even unto the 
present day (Nietzsche on Rhetoric 234). See also: Nietzsche’s linking Bernini with Asianism in HH 161. 
 
16 Nietzsche’s admonition to his students, whom he perceives in his lecture notes as scoffing at the notion of 
Asianism as one lacking in contemporary relevance, takes the form of this conventional phrase from Horace, 
typically translated as “This story is about you” (Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language 234). 
 
17 Cf. The sophist Gorgias’ claim in “On the Nonexistent, or On Nature” that “Nothing exists; or if it does, we 
cannot know it; or if we can know it, we cannot communicate it” (Bizzell and Herzberg, 24). 
 
18 See also: the preliminary draft essays for The Birth of Tragedy (1870–72), the Basel notes on Rhetoric (1872–73), 
and the various texts written for the unpublished Philosophenbuch (or “Philosophers’ Book”), including “On the 
Pathos of Truth” (1872), “On Truth and Lies” (1873), and Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks (1873). 
 
19 “Alle Wörter aber sind an sich und von Angang an, in Bezug auf ihre Bedeutung, Tropen. . . . die Sprache drückt 
niemals etwas vollständig aus, sondern hebt nur ein ihr hervorstechend scheinendes Merkmal hervor.” (Nietzsche on 
Rhetoric and Language, 22, translation mine).  
 
20 As hallmark example, Nietzsche offers the word “snake” (“Schlange”) to illustrate this view in both the notes on 
Rhetoric and the essay “On Truth and Lies.” The Greek word drakōn designates only the thing’s shiny quality, 
where the Latin words serpens and anguis designate its crawling and constrictive qualities respectively, where the 
Hebrew language designates it as a thing that writhes or gobbles or creeps (Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language 22; 
Cf. TL 1). In the terms de Man offers, through words we never come to know the snake absolutely or fully, rather, 
we posit it in some performative and partial sense (Allegories of Reading 121–2). On Nietzsche’s debts to Schlegel, 
to the German Romantics’ theories of language and the fragment, and to the Romantic interpretation of Kant, see 
Allegories of Reading 106. 
 
21 Cf. Critique of Pure Reason, A256/B312–A258/B314.  
  
22 Elsewhere in the Philosophenbuch, in the essay “On Truth and Lie,” Nietzsche famously describes truth in terms 
of illusion and the temporality of forgetting: truths are illusions whose illusory quality has been forgotten through 
repeated use over time (TL 1). On words that function as masks, see BGE 289. 
  
23 It is important to note in passing, even at this juncture, that for Nietzsche the performative dimension of language 
is inherently given to a persistent and queer kind of failure, in that the foundational speech act of naming inevitably 
misfires to the degree that words, as partialities, necessarily fail to express fully the things they purport to represent. 
 
24 Two parallel moments of infelicitous cognition in Kant. In the third critique, the sublime experience proceeds 
from the failure of the finite mind to imagine an object that can correspond to an a priori concept. In the first 
critique, a similar cognitive catastrophe occurs, insofar as the finite mind is incapable of cognizing any object as a 
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thing-in-itself. The thing-in-itself thus amounts to a sublime object of sorts. Lyotard has written evocatively of the 
post-Kantian aesthetics of modernism (and post-modernism) as being both “after the sublime” and “after the thing” ( 
The Inhuman 142). For a dissenting view, see Rancière (“The Sublime from Lyotard to Schiller”).  
 
25 “Es giebt gar keine unrhetorische ‘Natürlichkeit’ der Sprache, an die man appelliren könnte: die Sprache selbst ist 
das Resultat von lauter rhetorischen Künsten. Die Kraft, welche Aristoteles Rhetorik nennt, an jedem Dinge das 
heraus zu finden und geltend zu machen, was wirkt und Eindruck macht, ist zugleich das Wesen der Sprache. . . . 
Die Sprache ist Rhetorik, denn sie will nur eine doxa, keine epistēmē übertragen” (Nietzsche on Rhetoric and 
Language 20–23, translation mine; Cf. de Man Allegories of Reading 105–6). 
 
26 See PTAG 11: “Die Worte sind nur Symbole für die Relationen der Dinge unter einander und zu uns und berühren 
nirgends die absolute Wahrheit. . . . Durch Worte und Begriffe werden wir nie hinter die Wand der Relationen, etwa 
in irgend einen fabelhaften Urgrund der Dinge.”  
 
27 See also Nietzsche’s characterization of sophist culture as “realist culture” in TI “Ancients,” 2. For an analysis of 
Nietzsche’s debts to Sophistic culture, see Brobjer, “Nietzsche’s Relation to the Greek Sophists.”  
 
28 On the perspectivism found in Sophistic thought, see Dissoi Logoi (in Contrasting Arguments) which asserts the 
need for a capable orator to conduct both sides of an argument, to see values from opposing perspectives. Good and 
bad, seemliness and shamefulness are thereby relativized by the introduction of the Other and of difference, since 
illness is bad for the ill, but good for physicians; public female nudity is shameful for Ionians and seemly for 
Spartans, etc.  
 
29 Cf. Untersteiner’s view of sophistic rhetoric as “a tragedy for the intellect,” in which “only through a sort of 
deception—through allowing oneself to be persuaded—can a person feel that he or she knows anything” (35). 
 
30 Nietzsche’s depiction of the Greeks’ tragic world cannot be described as pessimistic: rather, the emergence of 
tragedy in antiquity denotes an affirmation and a celebration of life, rather than the sort of pessimistic fatalism 
Nietzsche associates with Schopenhauer. Elsewhere in the Philosophenbuch, when he directly relates the human 
desire for experiences of deception to the space of the theater (TL 2), this desire leads to a tragic festival or 
“Saturnalia” of the mind that results from the feeling of being (in de Man’s words) “freed from the constraints of a 
referential truth” (Allegories of Reading 114).  
 
31 I am indebted to Martin Puchner for this insight (Gestures of Modernism 1). Of course, in describing figures of 
speech as gestures (or claiming that they are like gestures), the word schema necessarily involves another recessed 
and implicit dimension of figuration. That is, when used to describe a gesture as a figure, or a figure as a gesture, the 
word schema functions either as metaphor or simile, by comparing unlike things through equation (a gesture is a 
figure) or comparison (a gesture is like a figure). In brief, to describe a figure as a gesture through the word schema 
is already to trade in further figures and gestures, raising the possibility of an infinite regress. 
 
32 Agamben has discussed apophantic discourse in numerous places. See, e.g.: “Gesture, or the Structure of Art” 
 
33 On linguistic non-identity as the source of gestures: De Man notes Nietzsche’s claim in the early writings on 
rhetoric that words are only “partial properties [of objects] are being torn away from their supports” in the world of 
referential substrates [109], only then to be “falsely identified [with these objects] as a whole. [Allegories of Reading 
122; Cf. Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language 58]) In strikingly similar terms (as Judith Butler noted in her 
elaboration of gesture as a form of “unsupported action” [in Butler “When Gesture Become Event”), Benjamin 
elsewhere claims that Kafka “divests human gesture of its traditional supports, and then has for a subject reflection 
without end.” In Nietzsche (as de Man makes clear), the word is torn away from its supports; in Kafka (as Benjamin 
and Butler note), the gesture is torn away from its supports. If gestures evacuate actions of their ontological fullness 
just as words do with things, the word-by-word activity of naming comes to appear as a repeated gesturing, 
endlessly self-reflective within the medium of language, an infinite play of signifiers. 
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34 Nietzsche will say in Beyond Good and Evil 289, “Every word is also a mask” (“Jedes Wort auch eine Maske”). In 
the context of BGE 289, these words describe philosophical writing that hides or dissimulates its own “actual and 
final” opinions, as Nietzsche’s writing famously does. But, again, each word is also a mask in the Sophistic sense of 
language as well, where words amount to tropes or figures masquerading as real essences. The word never attains to 
a truthful unity with the referent it figurally denotes; just as little does the masked actor (in the traditional theater of 
mimesis) ever fully become the role he is meant to represent. 
 
35 As this note is extensive, and somewhat to be cited in full at once in the course of this chapter, it appears in its 
entirety, both in my translation and in the original German, in the dissertation appendix. 
 
36 Where “baroque style” is concerned, it is significant that style in itself (particularly in a plural form—styles) 
emerges as a privileged deconstructive figuration throughout Nietzsche’s writing in Derrida’s analysis (See Spurs; 
for other readings in the philosophy of style, and the scandal of style in philosophy, see also: Frank, “Style in 
Philosophy”; Sontag, Against Interpretation 15–36. 
 
37 Cf. Nietzsche’s descriptions of Wagner in RWB 7 and 9, which assert Wagner’s desire for musical clarity to 
“compel popular understanding.” See also: the analysis of baroque opera conventions in BT 19, where the stilo 
rapprasentativo (the early recitative) of baroque music is said to have to satisfy the auditor’s desire to hear sung 
words clearly. 
 
38 Cf. the identical terms offered in TI 9: “Viele wegzulocken von der Heerde — dazu kam ich. Zürnen soll mir Volk 
und Heerde: Räuber will Zarathustra den Hirten heissen.” (“To lure away many from the Herd—that is why I came. 
The Volk and the herd should rage against me: brigands want for the shepherd to call him a brigand.”) 
 
39 Nietzsche’s later writings take up the commonplace imagery of twilight as a metaphor for late nineteenth-century 
cultural decadence (as for example with the discussion of decadence in Twilight of the Idols). While passage 144 
draws on this familiar imagery, it does not make an explicit connection. Nietzsche’s late interest in decadence can be 
traced to his exposure to Bourget’s writing in 1883.  
 
40 Nietzsche’s rhetoric of illness is also apparent in RWB 5, where he hails Wagner as the first to recognize the 
disease of language as a widespread phenomenon. Fischer-Lichte cites these passages to argue that Nietzsche’s 
writings on Wagner diagnose a larger cultural deterioration of language, in which “single words appear as 
turbulences that do not lead to the perception or interpretation of reality, but instead, to a complete void.” She asserts 
that “retheatricalization of theatre” in the later twentieth century (heralded by Wagner in Nietzsche’s time) amounts 
to an attempt “to open up possible solutions to this crisis” (Show and Gaze 62–3). 
 
41 For a greater sense of Nietzsche’s conception of the rhetorical, one can consult the comment that begins his 
analysis of “the relation of the rhetorical to language” in the Notes on Rhetoric: “‘Rhetorisch’ nennen wir einen 
Autor, ein Buch, einen Stil, wenn ein bewusstes Anwenden von Kunstmitteln der Rede zu merken ist, immer mit 
einem leisen Tadel. Wir vermeinen, es sei nicht natürlich und mache den Eindruck des Absichtlichen” (20). 
 
42 “Es ist ein wahres Unglück für die Aesthetik gewesen, dass man das Wort Drama immer mit ‘Handlung’ übersetzt 
hat. Nicht Wagner allein irrt hierin; alle Welt ist noch im Irrthum; die Philologen sogar, die es besser wissen sollten. 
Das antike Drama hatte grosse Pathosscenen im Auge—es schloss gerade die Handlung aus (verlegte sie vor den 
Anfang oder hinter die Scene). Das Wort Drama ist dorischer Herkunft: und nach dorischem Sprachgebrauch 
bedeutet es ‘Ereigniss,’ ‘Geschichte,’ beide Worte in hieratischem Sinne. Das älteste Drama stellte die Ortslegende 
dar, die ‘heilige Geschichte,’ auf der die Gründung des Cultus ruhte (—also kein Thun, sondern ein Geschehen: 
δρᾶν heisst im Dorischen gar nicht ‘thun’).” (CW 9). See also, the nearly identical claims made in (Das griechische 
Musikdrama, 27–29).  
 
43 In this regard, Puchner writes: “It is almost as if Nietzsche is trying to imagine an original form of tragedy, or 
rather the very origin of tragedy when it was little more than choral recitation and dance and not yet drama based on 
dialogue among individuals” (Drama of Ideas 139). Indeed, The Birth of Tragedy claims that: “Diese 
Ueberlieferung sagt uns mit voller Entschiedenheit, dass die Tragödie aus dem tragischen Chore entstanden ist und 
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ursprünglich nur Chor und nichts als Chor war: woher wir die Verpflichtung nehmen, diesem tragischen Chore als 
dem eigentlichen Urdrama in’s Herz zu sehen…” (BT 7). 
 
44 On Nietzsche’s anti-mimetic bias, which favors the theater’s “presentational” over to its “representational” 
capacities, see Barish 403. See also, Allegories of Reading, which describes Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy as one of 
the “pre-expressionist critical documents in which a non-representational art is being prepared” (95). 
 
45 For other treatments of Nietzsche as a preeminently theatrical thinker and writer, see: Puchner Drama of Ideas 
138–48; Agamben Means Without End 52; Sloterdijk Thinker on Stage; Fuchs Death of Character 28. 
 
46 See Allegories of Reading 93. De Man continues: “The complicity between the ‘I’ of the narrator and the 
collective ‘we’ of his acquiescing audience functions relentlessly, underscored by the repeated address of the 
audience as ‘my friends’” (94). Elsewhere, he writes: “Nietzsche’s philosophical contempt for oratory finds 
impressive confirmation in the rigor of his epistemology, yet, as any reader of The Birth of Tragedy, The Genealogy 
of Morals, or of that irrepressible orator Zarathustra knows, there is hardly a trick of the oratorical trade which he is 
not willing to exploit to the full” (131). 
 
47 De Man defines Nietzsche’s rhetoric in terms of his givenness to allegory (a category to be discussed in this 
dissertation’s third chapter) and Schlegelian irony (Allegories of Reading 116). Of the latter, de Man observes that 
Schlegel’s irony takes shape as a “histrionic style,” namely, the Italian buffo of commedia dell’arte, the moment of 
performance that results in “the disruption of narrative illusion, the aparté, the aside to the audience, by means of 
which the illusion of the fiction is broken,” a moment of rhetorical parabasis or “interruption of the narrative 
illusion” (Aesthetic Ideology 178). De Man writes: “Irony is not just an interruption; it is (and this is the definition 
he gave of irony), [Schlegel] says “the permanent parabasis” (178–9). Schlegel himself claims modern irony and wit 
have their roots in the baroque, particularly in the writings of Bacon and Leibniz. See: Athenaeum Fragment 220 (in 
Philosophical Fragments). 
 
48 On these points, Szondi significantly claims that the emergence of a modern neo-Aristotelian conception of drama 
(as an imitated dialectic represented through dialogue) in the period between the seventeenth and nineteenth 
centuries necessitated “the exclusion of prologue, chorus, . . . epilogue, . . .[and] monologue”—in other words, those 
elements of theatrical presentation that had enjoyed a privileged status in the baroque period and that serve to 
rupture Diderot’s fourth wall, giving rise to Fried’s sense of theatricality (Szondi 5). I am again indebted to Elinor 
Fuchs for this suggestion. 
 
49 Roach writes vividly:  “The passions are easily summoned from the lower regions, but, like devils, onece 
summoned they cannot so easily be put back. In this view the actor, like the Sorcerer’s Apprentice, toys with 
enormous forces that he can evoke quickly but not easily subdue. For this reason imagination was both powerful and 
dangerous” (The Player’s Passion 47). 
 
50 “Oratorical delivery, by definition, orients the speaker face to face with his audience, whose continuous presence 
he must at least implicitly acknowledge. Quintilian confesses that even in his moments of transporting passion, he 
keeps an eye on the judge to gauge his performance” (46). Elsewhere: “This profound belief, bolstered by ancient 
authority, provides a key reason why rhetorical delivery required actor and spectator to meet face to face” (47).  
 
51 See Absorption and Theatricality 92. 
 
52 See Whenham, ed. Claudio Monteverdi 80–1. 
 
53 “Or mentre i canti alterno, or lieti or mesti, / Non si mova augellin fra queste piante, / Nè s’oda in queste rive onda 
sonante, / Ed ogni auretta in suo cammin s’arresti.” “L’Orfeo” 
 
54 See Graham Parkes, “Introduction,” Thus Spoke Zarathustra, xxix.  
 
55 Cf. HH 219, AOM 171, and Nietzsche’s private letters both from this time (July 29th, 1877; January 4th, 1878), and  
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much later (August 26th, 1888; September 9th, 1888). See also CW 9, which compares Wagner to Corneille, and 
presumably to Corneille’s desire to produce wonder (admiratio) in his public. 
  
56 See: Aphorism 96 in Nietzsche’s “Rückblick” aphorisms, which appear in Vol. 4 of the Naumann edition of 
Nietzsches Werke 457. “Der griechiche Dithyrambus ist der Barockstil der Dichtkunst.” On this analogy between 
the Dionysian and the baroque, see also Zamora and Kaup, eds. 42. 
 
57 The anecdotes testifying to Wagner’s dislike of baroque style are ample. He famously disdained the sumptuous 
baroque Margravial auditorium as a potential site for his operas to be performed. He also likely borrowed (or stole) 
the basic plan for the Bayreuth Festspielhaus from a design by Gottfried Semper, the baroque revivalist architect, 
and modified it with the help of Otto Brückwald to fit his needs better and eliminate its baroque ornamentations. 
(Payne, “Kunstwollen,” 5-6; Koss, Modernism, 40; Barth, et al. 116. Wagner’s major, 1851 theoretical treatise 
Opera and Drama makes almost no comment on the earliest Italian operas (not yet designated as baroque by 
German musicology, to be clear), other than to dismiss them as the products of a luxurious, courtly society. (See: 
Richard Wagner Oper und Drama 20). In truth, his knowledge of these early operas in 1851 was likely minimal 
(See: Ellis’s “Introduction” to Wagner Opera and Drama 18). Lydia Goehr, however, has claimed that Wagner’s 
Meistersinger was “set in the period prior to opera’s birth [in Italy] to show the terms of opera’s true birth [in 
Germany], the terms therefore by which his own [German] opera would displace opera’s first [Italian] birth” (See 
her essay on “The Concept of Opera” in Greenwald, ed. Oxford Handbook 124.) 
58 See Artwork of the Future 75, 153. Walter Benjamin describes the Gesamtkunstwerk, following Kurt Kolitz, as 
“the summit” of the baroque period’s aesthetic hierarchy (U 158). For a dissenting view, which makes a useful 
historicist distinction between the “lavish multimedia extravaganzas” of the baroque period and Wagner’s 
Gesamtkunstwerk based on their differing publics (elite publics vs. mass publics, respectively), see Smith Total 
Work of Art 11. 
 
59 In AOM 134, Nietzsche describes Wagner’s music as effecting an experience in the listener akin to literal 
immersion—going into the sea, losing one’s foothold, beginning to float, succumbing to the oceanic element. See 
also RWB 9, which describes the feeling of “passionate empathy” (“Miterleben”) evoked in the spectator by the 
simultaneous effects of word, gesture, and music. Nietzsche’s contemporaries identified this feeling of empathy with 
the aesthetic criterion of Einfühlung (feeling-into) as a characteristic component of Wagner’s stagecraft (See: Koss, 
Modernism After Wagner 68). But the concept of Einfühlung had developed previously among such architectural 
theorists as Semper and Wölfflin from the study of seventeenth-century baroque architecture, as Alina Payne has 
showed (See her essay “On Sculptural Relief” in Riegl 42-3). 
 
60 Accurately assessing the theater’s troubling intermedial status—while also attempting to establish a simple binary 
between “mere” theater on one hand, and true art on the other—Fried claims in “Art and Objecthood,” that “What 
lies between the arts is theater” (164). 
 
61 The word propaganda itself derives from 1622, with the curia’s founding of the Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda 
Fide (Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith) under Pope Gregory XV. 
 
62 Here see the early Notes on Rhetoric (in Nietzsche on Rhetoric and Language, which compare the sense of 
phrasing in Asianism and Wagner’s music, and claim that the Asianist rhetorician “appealed to the whole Hellenistic 
mass, which was enchanted for a few centuries” (233). For Nietzsche’s critique of Wagner as an enchanter, see Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, part four, chapter five. For perhaps the most famous locus where sophistic rhetoric is conceived 
as enchantment (also, as intoxication) see Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen. 
 
63 For an exhaustive analysis of the role of gesture in Wagner’s music and theory, see Smart Mimomania 163-204. 
 
64 NCW “Objections”: “Man sieht, ich bin wesentlich antitheatralisch geartet, ich habe gegen das Theater, diese 
Massen-Kunst par excellence, den tiefen Hohn auf dem Grunde meiner Seele, den jeder Artist heute hat. Erfolg auf 
dem Theater—damit sinkt man in meiner Achtung bis auf Nimmer-wieder-sehn; Misserfolg—da spitze ich die 
Ohren und fange an zu achten . . . Aber Wagner war umgekehrt, neben dem Wagner, der die einsamste Musik 
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gemacht hat, die es giebt, wesentlich noch Theatermensch und Schauspieler, der begeistertste Mimomane, den es 
vielleicht gegeben hat, auch noch als Musiker… Und, beiläufig gesagt, wenn es Wagner’s Theorie gewesen ist „das 
Drama ist der Zweck, die Musik ist immer nur das Mittel“—, seine Praxis dagegen war, von Anfang bis zu Ende, 
„die Attitüde ist der Zweck, das Drama, auch die Musik, ist immer nur ihr Mittel“. Die Musik als Mittel zur 
Verdeutlichung, Verstärkung, Verinnerlichung der dramatischen Gebärde und Schauspieler-Sinnenfälligkeit; und 
das Wagnerische Drama nur eine Gelegenheit zu vielen interessanten Attitüden!” 
 
65 “die Theatrokratie —, den Aberwitz eines Glaubens an den Vorrang des Theaters, an ein Recht auf Herrschaft des 
Theaters über die Künste, über die Kunst . . .” For Plato’s idea of theatrocracy, see Laws III, 700a-d. 
 
66 “Wenn Wagner der Name bleibt für den Ruin der Musik, wie Bernini für den Ruin der Skulptur, so ist er doch 
nicht dessen Ursache.” 
 
67 “Wagner sums up modernity in a word. […] There’s no helping it, we must all first be Wagnerians” (CW Preface). 
“Wagner resümirt die Modernität. Es hilft nichts, man muss erst Wagnerianer sein . . .” 
 
68 (CW “Preface”) “Ich bin so gut wie Wagner das Kind dieser Zeit, will sagen ein décadent: nur dass ich das begriff, 
nur dass ich mich dagegen wehrte. Der Philosoph in mir wehrte sich dagegen. . . . 
 
69 (EH “Books” BT:4) “. . . an allen psychologisch entscheidenden Stellen ist nur von mir die Rede, — man darf 
rücksichtslos meinen Namen oder das Wort „Zarathustra“ hinstellen, wo der Text das Wort Wagner giebt.” 
 
70 I am grateful to Judith Butler for this recommendation. 
 
71 Benjamin makes this conscious/unconscious distinction between Goethe and Schiller’s identification with baroque 
style in U 104. 
 
72 William Eggington has borrowed a Deleuzian vocabulary to claim that there are competing “major” and “minor” 
strategies within the baroque style—the former being hegemonic tendencies which shore up the illusion of an 
autonomous truth, while the latter are strategies of immanence and irony that demystify the possibility of 
transcendent truth. These categories correspond to what I am attempting to distinguish with the categories of 
Apollonian and Dionysian baroque. In my view, a Deleuzian optic is not necessary to see that Nietzsche had already 
detected the baroque’s internally divided status as a concept, and had done so precisely at the originary moment of 
the baroque’s conceptual history. See The Theater of Truth 3-8.  
 
73 Nietzsche’s interpreter and fellow Basel affiliate, Heinrich Wölfflin, would advance this view in most of his 
writings, adapting the Apollo-Dionysus dialectic of The Birth of Tragedy into the Classic-Baroque dialectic that 
animates Renaissance and Baroque (1888) and Principles of Art History (1915). Nietzsche’s own writing (AOM 
133, for example) would seem at places to authorize such a view. Erwin Panofsky, however, offers a critique of this 
simplistic conceptual transfer. In his writings, the baroque amounts to a tenuous classical overcoming of the 
Dionysian contradictions of mannerism, and contains its own internal classical-anticlassical dialectic. See Lavin’s 
Introduction (6–7) to Panofsky (25). 
 
74 In similar, related, though not identical terms, Franko describes there existing within the baroque a tendency 
toward burlesque, which could be mentioned in this context (xvi, 3).  
 
75 In the social field, Nietzsche’s description of Wagner as an actor deserves to be read alongside his late meditations 
on acting in The Gay Science, which are taken up in Paul Patton’s essay, “The Problem of the Actor” in Schrift, ed. 
Why Nietzsche Still. In Patton’s reading of GS 356, actors appear to stand in for a certain identitarian concept of a 
centered, sovereign subject (the actor’s “role faith”), which Nietzsche opposes to an aesthetic view of identity 
constructed through play and performance. (This opposition, in a sense, revises and extends the Kierkegaardian 
notions of the religious and aesthetic forms of life, respectively.) I would add that the former vision of selfhood—the 
self-as-actor—takes an Apollonian shape, where the latter follows the Dionysian logic of dispersal and decentering. 
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The former view can be said to anticipate Erving Goffman’s sociology and Bruce Wilshire’s phenomenolgy, where 
the latter has more in common with Judith Butler’s notion of performativity.  
 
76 See again: the Rückblick Aphorisms on Wagner, where Nietzsche describes Parsifal as Catholicism’s “streaming 
restoration” and as a kind of ultramontanism. “Rückblick auf die Freundschaft mit Richard Wagner,” in the 
Naumann edition (vol. 4) of  Nietzsche’s Werke 457. 
 
77 I am indebted to Joseph Roach for this insight. 
 
78 “Es ist voll tiefer Bedeutung, dass die Heraufkunft Wagner’s zeitlich mit der Heraufkunft des ‘Reichs’ 
zusammenfällt: beide Thatsachen beweisen Ein und Dasselbe — Gehorsam und lange Beine. — Nie ist besser 
gehorcht, nie besser befohlen worden. Die Wagnerischen Kapellmeister in Sonderheit sind eines Zeitalters würdig, 
das die Nachwelt einmal mit scheuer Ehrfurcht das klassische Zeitalter des Kriegs nennen wird.” 
 
79 I am indebted to Judith Butler for this insight. 
 
80 What Nietzsche, following Plato, decries as theatrocracy might in today’s post-Deboridan, increasingly 
technocratic, multi-platform moment be described (in a neologistic, Greco-Roman hybrid) as medi(a)ocracy. 
 
81 On Nietzsche’s “aristocratism” see Brandes. For a more critical view, see Losurdo. For Nietzsche’s interest in 
baroque morals, see Merrow. 
 
82 See for example, WP 61, where Nietzsche asserts that those called rich in our modern world are actually the 
poorest and most bankrupt of all. 
 
83 In the da capo aria, whose use is largely unique to baroque opera, an A section of musical material is followed by 
a contrastive B section, which then returns to repeat the initial A section with virtuosic embellishment. (Randel ed. 
Harvard Dictionary of Music 54). This principle recalls Suzan Lori-Parks’ discussion of “Rep & Rev” or “repetition 
and revision” in jazz (The America Play, 9). 
 
84 We might consider, for example, that Nietzsche drew his inspiration for the Dionysian Dithyramb entitled “Night 
Song” (1883) set midway through Thus Spoke Zarathustra from Bernini’s sculpture in the Piazza Barberini (Graham 
Parkes “Explanatory Notes” 299n91). Or else, that the ecstatic Dithyrambic hymn to “Sanctus Januarius” in The Gay 
Science deserves to be read alongside the baroque imagery of Teresa’s ecstasy, as recorded in her Vida and in 
Crashaw’s later poetry. Or else, we might follow Martin Lorenz’s example and consider the late dithyramb entitled 
“Ariadne’s Lament” (a modified version of the Sorcerer’s lament in Zarathustra”) as an opera scene in response to 
the fragmentary “Lamento d’Arianna” of Monteverdi’s forgotten baroque opera L’Arianna, rediscovered in Paris  in 
1868. See: Carter, Monteverdi's Musical Theatre, 5; Lorenz, Musik und Nihilismus 1.4–1.4.3. 
  
85 “Entschliessen wir uns, meine Herrn Musiker: wir wollen sie umwerfen, wir wollen sie erheben, wir wollen sie 
ahnen machen. So viel vermögen wir noch. Was das Ahnen-machen betrifft: so nimmt hier unser Begriff ‘Stil’ 
seinen Ausgangspunkt. Vor Allem kein Gedanke! Nichts ist compromittirender als ein Gedanke!” (CW 6).. 
 
86 “Gott ist eine faustgrobe Antwort, eine Undelicatesse gegen uns Denker —, im Grunde sogar bloss ein faustgrobes 
Verbot an uns: ihr sollt nicht denken!” (EH “Clever” 1). 
 
87 Nietzsche’s earlier 1876 essay on Wagner wrote that in the presence of the Wagnerian artwork “one feels only its 
necessity” and that “his music subjugates itself to the progression of the drama, which is as inexorable as fate” 
(RWB 9).  
 
88 William Egginton effectively makes a claim of this kind regarding what he considers the baroque’s “minor” 
strategy in “The Theater of Truth” (Egginton 39–55). 
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89 I borrow the figure of the labyrinth and the concept of the mysterium tremendum et fascinans (the tremendous and 
fascinating mystery associated with the idea of the numinous, originally Rudolf Otto’s concept) from Karsten 
Harries, whose essay “Nietszsche’s Labyrinths.” considers Nietzsche’s relationship to the baroque as a philosophical 
problem that stems from his disagreement with Cartesian rationalism. See Kostka and Wohlfarth eds. 
 
90 “Schon um zu begreifen, inwiefern die Stellung unserer Künste zum Leben ein Symbol der Entartung dieses 
Lebens ist, inwiefern unsere Theater für Die, welche sie bauen und besuchen, eine Schmach sind, muss man völlig 
umlernen und das Gewohnte und Alltägliche einmal als etwas sehr Ungewöhnliches und Verwickeltes ansehn 
können.” (RWB 4) 
 
91 Agamben adduces the opening of the second meditation in support of this reading: “This meditation is untimely . . 
. because it seeks tounderstand as an illness, a disability, and a defect something which this epoch is quite rightly 
proud of, that is to say, its historical culture, because I believe that we are all consumed by the fever of history and 
we should at least realize it.” (Qtd. in Agamben What is an Apparatus? 1) 
 
92 RWB 3: “Wäre die Historie nicht immer noch eine verkappte christliche Theodicee, wäre sie mit mehr 
Gerechtigkeit und Inbrunst des Mitgefühls geschrieben, so würde sie wahrhaftig am wenigsten gerade als Das 
Dienste leisten können, als was sie jetzt dient: als Opiat gegen alles Umwälzende und Erneuernde. Aehnlich steht es 
mit der Philosophie: aus welcher ja die Meisten nichts Anderes lernen wollen, als die Dinge ungefähr — sehr 
ungefähr! — verstehen, um sich dann in sie zu schicken. Und selbst von ihren edelsten Vertretern wird ihre stillende 
und tröstende Macht so stark hervorgehoben, dass die Ruhesüchtigen und Trägen meinen müssen, sie suchten 
dasselbe, was die Philosophie sucht. Mir scheint dagegen die wichtigste Frage aller Philosophie zu sein, wie weit die 
Dinge eine unabänderliche Artung und Gestalt haben: um dann, wenn diese Frage beantwortet ist, mit der 
rücksichtslosesten Tapferkeit auf die Verbesserung der als veränderlich erkannten Seite der Welt loszugehen.” 
 
93 RWB 4: “… als scheinbar unbezwingliche Nothwendigkeit entgegentritt, mit Macht, Gesetz, Herkommen, Vertrag 
und ganzen Ordnungen der Dinge.” 
 
94 While Nietzsche’s influence over modern culture and philosophy has been immense and widely discussed, his 
equally significant influence over modern theater is only now beginning to be fully explored in Anglo-American 
theater studies. See: David Kornhaber. “The Philosopher, the Playwright, and the Actor: Friedrich Nietzsche and the 
Modern Drama’s Concept of Performance” in Theatre Journal, Volume 64, Number 1, March 2012, p. 29. For 
Wagner’s central place of influence over the history of modern culture, see: Puchner, Stage Fright; Koss, 
Modernism; and Smith Total Work of Art. 
 
95 For a recent volume taking up the contemporary reaction to Fried’s anti-theatricalism, see the essays and 









Against the cacophony issuing from the orchestra pit at Bayreuth and the equally powerful 
fulminations thundering forth from Nietzsche’s desk at Sils Maria, Stéphane Mallarmé sought 
out metaphysical silence as sources of spiritual and poetic inspiration, becoming at times like the 
Saint Cecilia who appears in one of his 1865 poems, “Saint,” as a “musician of silences” (OC 
54). And yet, perhaps counterintuitively, this preference for silence, for blank space, and for 
contemplating the Void did not lead Mallarmé to a radically minimalist poetics. Quite the 
contrary, as Henry Weinfield has observed in his commentary on this short text, “There is 
something deeply baroque about the poem, in spite of its quiet simplicity” (185), and “Saint” is 
far from unique in this regard, when considered alongside the complexity and range of 
Mallarmé’s larger oeuvre. A poetry of extraordinary ornateness and complexity, Mallarmé’s 
writing concerns itself endlessly with questions that are decidedly baroque in character and 
origin, which also declare him as a contemporary to Wagner and Nietzsche: a mounting sense of 
historical crisis, the shipwreck of western metaphysics, the antinomies of allegory, the 
inaccessibility of the transcendent or ideal realm, the theatricality of the world and of the mind’s 
perspective upon it. His occasional verse, so often dismissed as mere poetic baubles, fashion 
plates, or the lyric equivalent of Sèvres porcelain, returns repeatedly to images and objects 
reminiscent of the historical baroque period—angels painted in gilt, obsolete musical 
instruments, engraved fans decorated with fauns and other pastoral scenes, jewels, ornamental 
goldsmithery. And then there are also the monstrances—which appear not only here in a short 
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poem like “Saint,” but in a discarded pile at the opening of the drama Hérodiade, which forms 
the main subject of this chapter—not only suggesting the depth of Mallarmé’s roots in Catholic 
pageantry, but through their French name, ostensoir, also pointing to the truly stunning 
ostentatiousness of the poems’ textual construction.  
Indeed, Mallarmé’s baroque qualities are perhaps made most explicit in a comment he 
himself offered in the course of a late interview with Maurice Guillemot, in which he deflected 
charges of obscurity by describing himself instead as a syntaxer: “At Versailles, there is a kind of 
florid, spiraling foliage ornamentation (boiseries à rinceaux), lovely enough to make one weep; 
shells, coils, curvatures, repeated motifs—That is how the phrase I throw out onto the paper 
appears to me at first, a summary outline, one that I then revise, purify, reduce, synthesize…”1 
The syntax of what Fredric Jameson calls (not disapprovingly) “this exasperatingly mannered 
discourse” (330) deploys the interfolding and convoluted lines of baroque surface decoration not 
merely to embellish a structure but to provide a foundational structure in themselves, thus 
forming the basis of Mallarmé’s entire discourse, and so inverting the traditional priority 
typically given in classical aesthetics to structure over surface and ornament.2 Even if they are 
later to be “synthesized,” such baroque folds, deviant curves and swerves of thought and 
language, are for Mallarmé a starting point for an entire poetic process, one that fixes repeatedly 
on what he will describe, in the closing lines of his 1886 prose poem, “The Ecclesiastic,” as 
images “marked by a mysterious seal of modernity, at once baroque and beautiful.”3 
Historically, all these affinities with the cultural memory of the baroque have not been 
seen as merely topical. Albert Thibaudet, Jorge Luis Borges, René Wellek, Umberto Eco, 
Octavio Paz, and numerous others have all sought, at various instances and for various reasons, 
to interpret Mallarmé under the sign of baroque aesthetics.4 Furthermore, French Structuralist 
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criticism would make much of Mallarmé’s preoccupation with images of folds in the early 
1960s;5 and Jacques Derrida would in turn reformulate the Structuralist principle of the 
Mallarméan fold into a properly deconstructive figure in his landmark reading of Mallarmé in 
Dissemination (1972), a reading which Harold Bloom would later describe approvingly as “a 
baroque elaboration” in its own right (Bloom Stéphane Mallarmé vii). From thence, Gilles 
Deleuze would adopt Derrida’s figure of the fold, retaining its Mallarméan trace, and would 
develop it into the central, dominating concept of his reading of Leibniz and baroque philosophy 
in The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque (1988). Through all these various interpretations, 
Mallarmé has come to be seen as an instrumental touchstone for efforts at developing a 
philosophical concept of the baroque, and also as a particularly baroque modernist in his own 
right. Deleuze writes: “The fold is probably Mallarmé’s most important notion and not only the 
notion but rather, the operation, the operative act that makes him a great Baroque poet” (30–1).  
 Remarkably enough, while Mallarmé demands to be considered a primary exemplum of 
baroque modernism, he also produced a considerable body of writings on and for the theater, 
although his significance for theater history has gone largely unappreciated in academic theater 
studies, thus leaving the place of theater in his baroque poetics entirely under-theorized. Where 
the field of theater studies has taken up Mallarmé’s theatrical output, it has too often 
characterized him as an anti-theatricalist or a writer of a purely “virtual,” mental, or ideal theater 
(Gould 141–78; Puchner Stage Fright 59–80), or as one whose dramatic writing is 
unstageworthy insofar as it breaks with the most fundamental given conditions of drama or stage 
performance (Szondi Lyrische Drama 73–141). These characterizations are not wholly 
inaccurate—Mallarmé did feel demonstrable scorn toward the bourgeois, commercial theater of 
his own time, and did interest himself, just as demonstrably, in the theater as a philosophical 
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metaphor for the mind. But it goes too far to argue, as Martin Puchner does, that Mallarmé made 
a “systematic retreat from the stage” in the 1860s when his dramatic writings were rejected from 
the Théâtre-Français, that he thereafter adopted an expressly resistant, critical, or oppositional 
attitude to the theater tout court (Stage Fright 59), and that the presence of performative 
elements in Mallarmé’s texts (as Mary Lewis Shaw and others have observed in detail) can thus 
be equated with a simple anti-theatricalism (Stage Fright 64).6   
In my view, the questions of whether or not Mallarmé imagined his dramatic works being 
performed on the stage, and whether he can therefore be assigned to an unequivocally pro- or 
anti-theatrical position in general, are largely misleading, intentionalist, and reductive. 
Mallarmé’s attitudes to theater are clearly far more complex and ambivalent, and could just as 
easily be understood in terms of a theatricalist desire to reform or reinvent the theater altogether, 
rather than reject or simply abscond from it. This chapter proceeds from the position that an 
inclination for a more poetic theater—such as Mallarmé expressed continuously throughout his 
life in opposition to the dramaturgical formulae of bourgeois realism and naturalism—need not 
necessarily coincide with an opposition to theater or theatricality as such. In this, it draws 
support from a number of critics including Haskell Block, Frantisek Deak, Charles Lyons, and 
others who—against the anti-theatrical positions embraced especially by Gould and Puchner—
have argued that Mallarmé’s relation to theater deserves to be understood positively in terms of 
the transformations his writing effected in the domain of theatrical convention, helping to make 
possible the turn to new, modernist and avant-garde forms of performance (Block 104–5, 131; 
Deak 58–94; 100–103; Cohn, ed. 97–101). 7 As Patrick McGuinness has argued, in several 
searching and even-handed assessments of Mallarmé’s ambivalent attitudes toward theater, 
“theatricality” appears to lurk everywhere in Mallarmé’s universe, “embedded in the quotidian ... 
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at the heart of the everyday, even as it distils and transforms it” (Puchner and Ackerman eds. 
150), and that Mallarmé saw in the staging of Maeterlinck’s Symbolist dramas a vision of a 
théâtre futur, irreducible to the theater of the present or the virtual theaters of mental 
contemplation (Making of Modern Theatre, 162–68). Alongside these more generously and 
sometimes pro-theatrical perspectives, the deconstructive literary critic and dramaturg Samuel 
Weber has attended to the expressly theatrical qualities of Mallarmé’s writings in Theatricality 
as Medium, while also situating Derrida’s writings on Mallarmé as an extended reflection on 
theatricality as such, positioning Mallarmé as the avatar of a new, modernist, non-mimetic, 
deconstructive mode of theatricality (Weber Theatricality as Medium 14-16).8 Through this 
extended debate, Mallarmé has come to appear much like Barthes’s vision of Baudelaire: that is, 
like a poet whose writing is suffused with patently theatrical characteristics.9 But it is 
furthermore significant that Weber’s reading, much like its poststructuralist antecedents, also 
attends in spectacular fashion to Mallarmé’s fascination with folds, exposing how Derrida’s 
Dissemination links the figure of the fold to the linguistic structure of the present participle, 
which Weber considers “the grammatical hallmark” of theatricality as such (Weber 15). That is, 
where Deleuze saw Mallarmé’s folds as evidence of an imbrication within the long history of 
baroque style, Weber shows that Derrida sees these same folds as evidence of Mallarmé’s 
express theatricality.10 In brief, through the poststructuralist emphasis on the subject of the fold 
in Mallarmé, both the poet’s expressly theatrical qualities as a writer and his debts to the baroque 
come emphatically together into a conjoined focus.  
Building on Weber’s contributions, this chapter argues that Mallarmé effectively 
reorients the modernist theater toward a vision of baroque theatricality, a sensuous, non-mimetic, 
and allegorical form of theatricality that prepares the way for a new European avant-gardism in 
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performance. The historiographic significance of Mallarmé’s involvement with a long history of 
baroque theatrical style cannot be overstated, in part because Mallarmé is a figure often credited 
with initiating the tradition of modernist literary vanguardism altogether.11 If Mallarméan 
aesthetics deserve to be considered as an avant-garde return to the conventions of the baroque, 
doing so raises a number of questions about modernism as a historical system of cultural 
production and about the thoroughness of its systemic debts to the baroque past, its saturation 
with baroque style, as it were. That is, a closer reading of Mallarmé’s theatrical writing will 
make clear that an idea of baroque style was a source of inspiration for the origination and 
development of literary and theatrical modernism in its earliest historical instance; the more 
pressing question, however, will be whether the ensuing trajectory of modernism more 
generally—and the various avant-garde traditions of performance that Mallarmé’s writing will 
ultimately come to initiate—can thus be said to develop under the persistent influence of baroque 
conventions, whether consciously, conspicuously, or otherwise. 
As this chapter will make clear, Mallarmé’s writing for the theater reaches back to cite 
and reiterate numerous baroque theater practices common to the seventeenth-century European 
stage: reconfiguring and repurposing elements drawn from early opera, the commedia dell’arte, 
pantomime and the English dumbshow, the tragic dramas of Shakespeare and Racine, and the 
emblematic use of stage gesture broadly conceived. In its manner of synthesizing these various 
media and performance practices together into a rich and luxurious poetic weave, Mallarmé’s 
theater unfolds as a modernist variation on the tradition of multimedia court theatricals that came 
to prominence during the seventeenth century in France as the ballet de court and in England as 
the masque. Seen in this light, it is little wonder that Mallarmé’s theater should prompt such 
misrecognition, particularly by those who seek to measure its suitability for stage performance 
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by nineteenth- and twentieth-century standards of dramaturgical realism and dramatic mimesis.  
Against traditional forms of mimetic drama, Mallarmé’s dramaturgical poetics no longer permit 
anything approaching the “direct treatment of the ‘thing.’” In Mallarmé, the nineteenth-century 
mechanisms of theatrical representation that had given rise to Zola’s theater and the French 
traditions of realism and naturalism appear no longer operable, and new strategies of indirection 
must necessarily be found. Here again, I echo the claims—if not the anti-theatrical conclusions—
put forward by Michael Fried in his trilogy of books on the development of French eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century realist painting. In the last of these three texts, Fried elaborates the 
circumstances under which an Enlightenment-era project of French realism exhausted itself over 
the course of Manet’s career, a period that overlapped considerably with Mallarmé’s own 
lifetime. Manet’s Modernism makes clear that the exhaustion of this realist project led Manet’s 
painting to struggle with new, theatrical effects that had not been seen in painting since (as Fried 
claims in his latest text, on Caravaggio) the time of the historical baroque. In the chapter that 
follows, I argue that Mallarmé, like Manet, represents a turn toward what Fried describes as 
theatricality, and I contend that the theatricality of Mallarmé’s writing involves a recognizably 
baroque orientation, repurposed for modernist ends. (I also share Samuel Weber’s view that 
Derrida’s reading of Mallarmé in Dissemination underscores a theatrical position for both 
Mallarmé and Derrida alike. For this reason, I find Fried’s conscription of Derrida and 
deconstruction in Manet’s Modernism (356–70) to his own anti-theatrical and admittedly 
metaphysical project both peculiar and misleading, but a fuller critique of Manet’s Modernism 
far exceeds the scope of this chapter.)  
Where naturalism and realism become no longer reliable as methods of organizing 
dramaturgical material, and so succumb instead to a preference for theatrical effects, a 
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simultaneous interest in the form of allegory—largely inherited during his youth from 
Baudelaire, and anticipatory of Benjamin’s later study of the baroque—will also suffuse 
Mallarmé’s dramaturgical thought, as this chapter will show through readings of the early 
theoretical writings on theater, alongside two of his life-long, unfinished, potentially unrealizable 
theater projects: Hérodiade and “The Book.” It is in this orientation toward a specifically 
allegorical theatricality, which permeated the sumptuous spectacles of the masque genre, that 
Mallarmé’s baroque dramaturgy comes most sharply into focus. This dramaturgy would have 
wide-reaching effects in both art and politics—helping give rise to the larger aesthetic movement 
of the Symbolist avant-garde, and ushering into existence critical, potentially radical modes of 
reading and spectatorship suitable for the politico-economic conditions of turn-of-the-century 
modernity. In this way, Mallarmé’s writing advances both an idea of modernity as something 
“baroque and beautiful,” and a queer and Janus-faced conception of historical unfolding, which 
feels its way backward toward the past as it gropes forward into the future. 
 
2.1 Mimique / Baroque 
The roots of Mallarmé’s affinity for baroque form can be traced to the extended period of severe 
depression and ill health he endured during the time of his early twenties, a period famously 
accompanied by an all-consuming spiritual crisis that had been culminating gradually over 
months and years. The contours of this crisis are briefly sketched in the well-known letter to his 
friend Cazalis of April 1866, where Mallarmé describes having gained a despairing insight into 
“the Void,” obtained “without any knowledge of Buddhism.” Continuing, he writes: 
Yes, I know, we are but vain forms of matter, — but sublime enough indeed to 
have invented God and our soul. So sublime, my friend!, that I want to gaze upon 
!
! 123 
this spectacle of matter, being fully conscious of it, and still hurl myself 
passionately into Dream despite knowing that it does not exist, singing praise to 
the Soul and all such divine impressions that have amassed within us since the 
earliest ages of time, and proclaiming, before the Void that is truth, these glorious 
lies! (C 297–8)12 
Composed in 1866, these melancholy reflections on materialism already anticipate the entire 
Dionysian-Apollonian dialectics of truth and lies, physical reality and myth, waking and 
dreaming later formulated in Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy (1872) and Nietzsche’s even later 
proclamation of God’s death (1882). As Henry Weinfield has noted, they reflect outward to “a 
general religious crisis occurring in Europe during the nineteenth century, with roots that stretch 
back much earlier” (xiii), a crisis of metaphysical faith whose social and aesthetic counterpart 
would later appear in Mallarmé’s writings as the so-called “Crisis of Verse” (1897).13  
This sense of an “exquisite, fundamental crisis” in belief, poetry, language, and literature 
more broadly—whose most glaring symptom is the increasing obsolescence of iambic 
hexameter, the French alexandrine, increasingly replaced in Mallarmé’s lifetime by vers libre—
can be said to mark Mallarmé’s aesthetics from beginning to end.14 It can be detected in his early 
ruminations on an infinite firmament devoid of divine presence in “The Azure” (1864), and 
persists into his latest works, particularly A Throw of the Dice Will Never Abolish Chance 
(1897), a poem whose title suggests a rich affinity between the paroxysms of secularization 
experienced in Mallarmé’s lifetime and Pascal’s in baroque France.15 Mallarmé’s poetry and 
unpublished writings make clear his view that this at once metaphysical and aesthetic crisis has 
both a source in and a series of necessary implications for the practice of language use. Like 
Nietzsche and his Romantic forebears, Mallarmé experienced the multiplicity of human 
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languages as an occasion for confronting a linguistic void where the metaphysical thing-in-itself 
had once securely stood to guarantee a transcendent truth. In a famous passage in the late “Crisis 
of Verse” essay (that bears clear similarities to Nietzsche’s “On Truth and Lying” essay16), this 
crisis finds expression in terms that recall the myth of the Tower of Babel: 
Languages imperfect in their multiplicity, the supreme one is missing: to think 
being to write without accessories, not even whispering but still silent remains the 
immortal word, the diversity of languages on earth impedes anyone from 
proffering the words that, if they could otherwise be found, would by a unique 
stamp or coinage materialize the truth itself. (OC 363–64)17 
It is not just in a physical or metaphysical sense that the Void is an ultimate ontological reality 
encountered in Mallarmé’s cosmos, but in a linguistic sense as well: the immortal word has 
fallen silent, and human language cannot hope to access the truth in itself. In something of a 
Nietzschean turn however, the “Crisis of Verse” essay alleges that poetry springs from this 
general lack of an absolute or transcendent language, and compensates for it: indeed, were a 
supreme, perfectly correspondent, Adamic language available for human articulation, there 
would be no need for poetry at all. Still, where the divine logos has fallen silent, the language of 
man comes to seem simply transactional, with words seeming like so many minted coins in 
circulation, none of which possesses the unique stamp that vouchsafes the truth.18  
We will return to Mallarmé’s interest in coinage, and the patently economic anxieties that 
underlie his rhetoric in this passage, shortly. First however, to help elucidate Mallarmé’s baroque 
theater through the Héroidade as an example, it suffices that we delineate the effects of this 
multifaceted crisis upon Mallarmé’s aesthetic theory, where the question of linguistic and 
dramaturgical representation comes to seem newly problematic. In response to a situation in 
!
! 125 
which a representational approach to truth in thought and language has become newly 
unavailable, it would become Mallarmé’s credo from this early period on to deploy poetic 
writing in an explicit strategy of indirection, taking a detour away from straightforward 
structures of correspondence through an elaborate deviation, a swerve or curvature of thought. In 
October of 1864, he announced to Cazalis: “I have finally commenced work on my Hérodiade. 
With terror, for I am inventing a language which must necessarily erupt from a very new poetics, 
which I could define briefly thus: Paint, not the thing, but the effect that it produces” (C 206). If 
the truth of things in themselves can no longer be cognized through perception or language, if an 
independent domain of truth can no longer be fully guaranteed, and if it is no longer possible for 
the poet to represent the thing directly in itself, he might still at least evoke a spectral impression 
of its presence through a process of circumlocution, or speaking otherwise, which in Mallarmé’s 
work will take an exceptionally florid, luxurious form.19  
 Of course, this apothegm—“not the thing, but the effect”—bears a fairly obvious 
similarity to the emerging visual aesthetics of Impressionist painting, a movement whose 
practitioners Mallarmé knew well and whose general principles would form the subject of his 
later 1876 essay, “The Impressionists and Édouard Manet.” But this dictum also has a profound 
significance for the conceptual history and the cultural memory of the baroque during and shortly 
after the period of Mallarmé’s lifetime for two important reasons that scholars of theater and 
drama have not yet fully analyzed. First, as it declares its central ambivalence toward the 
representation of any external reality, Mallarmé’s poetics participates in a larger historical shift 
away from the primacy of mimesis in literature and toward a more depersonalized, derealized 
aesthetics that thinkers such as Walter Benjamin, H. R. Jauss, and Paul de Man have described as 
allegory, with a strong tie to Mallarmé’s nineteenth-century context, but with originary roots 
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much earlier in the time of the historical baroque period.20 (It is characteristic of Mallarmé that 
this shift from mimesis to allegory should place a concerted emphasis on the role of imaginary or 
perceptual effects: If the direct representation of a thing is no longer desirable, Mallarmé here 
calls for a poetry capable of stimulating exciting effects in the mind and in the senses, indeed—
as Nietzsche would have it in his discussion of the baroque—for a poetry capable of stimulating 
excitement as an affect in itself, thus also shifting emphasis from mimesis to affect as a primary 
aesthetic category for the modern lyric.) Second, and equally important for Mallarmé’s 
relationship to the baroque’s conceptual history, is the fact that this apothegm—“not the thing, 
but the effect”—would also become in modified form a central component of Heinrich 
Wölfflin’s foundational definition of baroque style some decades after Mallarmé’s death. As part 
of his effort to distinguish classical (linear) from baroque (painterly) style in art (following a 
patently Nietzschean Apollonian-Dionysian binary), Wölfflin would assert in his landmark 1915 
study Principles of Art History that “the former represents things as they are, the latter as they 
seem to be” (20), and furthermore, that “Although we are accustomed to describe only the higher 
degrees [of this principle] as Impressionism, we must always bear in mind that these do not 
signify something essentially new. It would be difficult to fix the point at which the merely 
‘painterly’ [i.e. baroque style] ends and ‘Impressionist’ begins. Everything is in transition” 
(emphasis mine, 22). Regardless of how one identifies classicism, Wölfflin would argue 
influentially that baroque style takes for its foundational principle the depiction, not of objects, 
but of appearances, impressions, aftereffects, thus preexisting and prefiguring the visual 
strategies of Impressionist painting. In doing so, however, he adduces Mallarmé’s 1864 aesthetic 
program, although implicitly and perhaps inadvertently, as a central theoretical device for the 
baroque as a concept of style, thus popularizing a Mallarméan schema for subsequent efforts at 
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conceptualizing the baroque. At the same time, however, Wölfflin also retroactively 
characterizes Mallarmé’s literary production as pursuing a baroque agenda in its manner of 
depicting effects rather than things, and offers us further warrant for investigating further 
baroque traces in his theatrical writing. 
As Mallarmé’s terrifying new aesthetics inaugurates an assault on the traditional notion 
of mimesis, and as mimetic operations have been foundational to drama since the time of Plato 
and Aristotle, it is not inconsequential that Mallarmé should have developed this new program 
while engaged in the preparations for a new work of theater. (We will have more to say about 
Hérodiade momentarily.) While Mallarmé clearly maintained a lifelong interest in theater (Block 
6–10, 16), his hostility to the bourgeois theatrical institutions and conventions of his own time 
demonstrate a largely anti-mimetic bent whose roots lie in the spiritual crisis of the 1860s, and in 
the challenge this crisis posed to the very idea of representation itself. Mallarmé’s most 
concentrated response to this challenge would come in 1886 with the publication of “Mimique” 
(or “Mimicry”) in La Révue Independante. This essay takes the form of a response to his cousin 
Paul Margueritte’s pantomime “Pierrot, Assassin of His Wife”—performed in 1881 at the 
Théâtre de Valvins, an amateur summer theatre where Mallarmé sometimes involved himself as 
a stage director and prompter (Block 73–4). Margueritte’s “Pierrot” developed the tradition of 
nineteenth-century popular pantomimes, and can largely be credited with igniting a modernist 
enthusiasm for commedia dell’arte and for Pierrot specifically, a fervor that would extend 
through the time of Picasso and the Second Viennese School.21 It remains unclear whether 
Mallarmé ever saw Margueritte’s pantomime performed, or if he only read an edition of its 
printed libretto published in 1886, containing a description of the 1881 performance.22 Even 
more significant is the fact that the 1886 pantomime booklet was composed and printed after the 
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1881 performance: the performance preceded the text, with the post facto libretto “reflecting the 
mimodrama rather than programming it” (Derrida 199). Rather like a masque of the Stuart court, 
the staged event occurred first, and a finished text appeared only later to capture and textualize 
its specific scenic and performative details. Mallarmé’s fascination with the piece stems in large 
part from this peculiar, inverted perspective—from performance to text—which cuts against the 
traditional direction of classical mimesis—from text to performance.23 Prefiguring the work of 
later French avant-gardists such as Artaud, and effectively forecasting an increasing, functional 
schism between the dramatic text and its theatrical performance understood by Lehmann as the 
emergence of postdramatic theater, Mallarmé sees the performance and staging themselves as 
texts in their own right.24  
“Pierrot, Assassin of His Wife” takes the form of a short, tragic pantomime for a single 
performer—Margueritte himself in the role of Pierrot, the white clown of French commedia—
who reenacts before the audience how he murdered his adulterous wife Columbine by tickling 
her to death just prior to the play’s beginning, a macabre, Satanic scenario all but torn from the 
pages of Poe or Baudelaire. Crucially, the central figure of Columbine remains physically absent 
the entire time: the pantomime begins with Pierrot coming onstage alongside a gravedigger, 
having just recently murdered and buried her. Still, she haunts the pantomime, insofar as Pierrot 
repeatedly steps in and out of her position to demonstrate, gesturally, the effect of his tickling 
upon her. At the pantomime’s conclusion, all distinction between Pierrot and Columbine has 
disappeared, and the murderer gets his comeuppance in being himself tickled to death by unseen 
forces, his dying laughter mingling with the sound of sadistic cackling ringing out from the 
vicinity of Columbine’s onstage portrait. The drama concludes something like a pastiche of the 
damnation scene from Don Giovanni: In its final, spectacular moments, an onstage bed—
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described in the pantomime’s stage directions as an object that “causes anxiety by the folds of its 
curtains which are drawn like those in catafalques (emphasis in original)”—bursts into infernal 
flames as “Pierrot’s corpse comes crashing down” to the sound of Columbine’s triumphant 
laughter.25 The pantomime thus depicts Pierrot’s agony through a form of imminent and 
dialectical self-division. In this way, the crucial “event” or “action” of the play, Columbine’s 
murder, is thus significantly never fully representable, it can only be conveyed diegetically 
through past-tense narration and a series of gestures that reenact it, allowing Margueritte by turns 
to play both murderer and murdered.  
That is, although the murder is not staged, its gestures are quoted, somewhere “between 
perpetration and its memory.” Mallarmé’s description of Margueritte’s play reads like a 
recollection of a forgotten, arcane theater of the past, or a prophecy of a theater to come. Indeed, 
“Mimique” is a manifesto of sorts for the new theater Mallarmé was himself already engaged in 
constructing through his ongoing work on Hérodiade, a play he began in 1864 and left 
unfinished at the end of his life. It is a call for the sort of avant-garde theater that would only 
emerge in the 1890s with the founding of Lugné-Poe’s symbolist Théâtre d’Art: 
Silence, sole luxury after rhymes, an orchestra only making with its gold, its 
brushings with thought and evening, the detail of its meaning equal to a dead ode 
which it falls to the poet, aroused by a challenge, to translate! the silence of an 
afternoon of music; I also find it happily before the always unprecedented 
reappearance of Pierrot or of the poignant and elegant mime Paul Margueritte. 
Thus this “Pierrot, Assassin of his Wife” composed and drawn up by himself, 
mute soliloquy that the phantom, white like a page yet unwritten, holds at full 
length to his soul in face and in gesture. […] The stage only illustrates the idea, 
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not any effective action, in a hymen (from which proceeds the Dream), depraved 
but also sacred, between desire and accomplishment, perpetration and its memory; 
here ahead of things, there remembering them, in the future, in the past, under a 
false appearance of the present. [Italics in original.] Thus does the mime operate, 
whose play-acting is restricted to a perpetual allusion without breaking the 
mirror’s glassy surface: he thus installs a pure medium of fiction. (OC 310)26 
There is much worth observing here, and much that would become central to the symbolist 
aesthetics in theater: a nearly frozen mise-en-scène, characterized by muteness and stillness; 
ghostly or dreamlike stage business, echoing a more metaphysical drama; hints of gold, as in an 
illuminated manuscript, baroque tracery, or a painting by Moreau or Klimt.27 Above all, we 
should observe Mallarmé’s fascination with white as visual motif denoting metaphysical silence, 
and a means to transform the stage into a tabula rasa, “white like a page yet unwritten.” 
Significantly, this theater is also a book; its mise-en-scène is also a mise-en-page; its theatricality 
is a kind of textuality. The Mallarméan spectator reads the figure or figures on the stage, along 
with their mimic gestures, as if they were so many printed, typeset characters on a white page, 
spaced apart from each other by a compositor. Or else, these figures appear like the images of a 
baroque book of emblems, in that they illustrate abstract ideas rather than traditionally 
Aristotelian characters and actions. In Mallarmé’s theater, drama as the Aristotelian imitation of 
an action (mimesis praxeos) is supplanted by a ritualistic actio or gesture: the “mimetic” 
functions of theater are short-circuited in favor of its more properly “mimic” functions. The 
mime is not a Stanislavskian actor who identifies affectively with a character furnished for him 
by a text: rather, the dramatic events remain alienated, kept at “full length to his soul in face and 
in gesture.” As Pierrot, Margueritte does not so much enact these events, as quote them. The 
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theatricality envisioned in “Mimique” thus takes place as a form of gestures drama—not drama 
in the Aristotelian sense of action, but in the Nietzschean sense of exciting, hieratic-hieroglyphic 
gestures. In Derrida’s reading of this text, mimesis requires that an a priori action be reproduced 
by imitation, but miming only cites previous gestures through the inscription of more and more 
gestures into a kind of “corporeal writing.”28 Where mimetic actors produce “reality effects,” the 
Mallarméan mime produces only what might be called emblem effects;29 where traditional 
mimesis is a kind of illusionism, Mallarméan mime unfolds as a kind of citational allusiveness; 
where the former imitates something supposedly external to itself, Derrida claims the 
Mallarméan mime “mimes imitation” itself,30 and in so doing, opens up a referential mise-en-
abîme.31  
This gestural inscription gives rise to a peculiar series of aesthetic effects. In the first 
place, it generates an unusual temporality, both syncopated and liminal. In Mallarmé’s 
description of “the always unprecedented reappearance of Pierrot,” the onstage mime seems 
repeatedly to re-present himself with each gesture as in an ongoing series of temporal 
punctuations. Pierrot (re)appears anew at each turn, is repeatedly original, and this repeated 
appearance establishes a rhythm of sorts. Against this rhythm of repeated and yet always novel 
appearances, the miming also takes place amid a queasy sort of temporal flux, moving back and 
forth through the spatio-temporal registers of a certain betweenness, a “hymen,” in the spaces 
separating one gestural iteration from the next. The illustration takes place “between desire and 
accomplishment, perpetration and its memory; here ahead of things, there remembering them, in 
the future, in the past, under a false appearance of the present.” Fredric Jameson notably sees 
this passage as a prefiguration of Gertrude Stein’s later anxieties about temporal syncopation, 
and her sense of being always “either behind or ahead of the play at which you are looking” (a 
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subject I will discuss further in Chapter 4 [317]). He claims in The Modernist Papers, with 
respect to both Stein and Mallarmé, that “It is the very existence of the present which is in doubt 
[…] and which it is the most august function of spectacle to convey” (317). But Mallarmé’s 
theater cannot truly be said to convey a sense of the present’s existence: rather, it conveys only a 
ghostly appearance or apparition of the present, and a false one at that, a simulacrum. Just as 
pantomime does not rely upon the presence of onstage objects or scenery to support its gestures, 
but rather communicates an illusory presence to such properties only by assiduously tracing their 
absences through gestured movement (one may think of the stereotypical figure of the mime, of 
the Marcel Marceau variety, who demonstrates the stock game of being “trapped in a box” by 
exploring the absent boundaries of his confinement with precise, gestural indications of the 
hands and fingers), so too does Mallarméan mime establish a peculiar game of presences and 
absences, eliciting less the secure existence of the present than a haunting doubt about the remote 
possibility of this existence. Put differently, one might say that there is no immediate access to 
any sense of presence on offer here, only a play of presence and absence within an irreducible 
medium, or “hymen”: Mallarmé calls it fiction, but following Weber, this medium could also be 
termed theatricality.32 In Mallarmé, the miming’s inscriptive gesticulations constitute this 
medium or “hymen.” They form a distancing texture that mediates between the performance and 
the spectator, resisting any naturalizing gaze, just as the symbolists at the Théâtre d’Art would 
later suspend a gauze curtain along the edge of the proscenium stage, whose translucency would 
enhance the dream-like quality of their theater works (a visual analogue to Wagner’s “mystic 
gulf,” i.e. the hidden orchestra pit at Bayreuth).33 In Derrida’s reading of “Mimique,” this 
Mallarméan medium (or hymen) forms a kind of textile that embraces “all the veils, gauzes, 
canvases, fabrics, moirés, wings, feathers, all the curtains and fans that hold within their folds 
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all—almost—of the Mallarméan text” (emphasis mine, 213). Against a drop curtain of rich and 
rippling fabrics, Mallarmé’s mime moves in and through the Mallarméan and poststructuralist 
figure of the baroque fold. 
  Yet there is another, equally significant connection between the drama of the historical 
baroque and the philosophy of theater sketched in “Mimique.” Margueritte’s “neurotic, tragic, 
and ghostly” Pierrot appears as an intertextual specter of Hamlet, as Derrida rightly notes.34 The 
initial, almost iconic appearance onstage of a gravedigger in Margueritte’s text is not 
inconsequential in this regard. Pierrot ludicrously reflects Hamlet’s impossible mourning, his 
devastating sense of betrayal, his perception of the world’s horrors, his outrage at marital 
infidelity, his melancholy scheming, his self-consuming desire for vengeance. The white smock 
is an inverse reflection of Hamlet’s “customary suits of solemn black.” In Mallarmé’s reading of 
Margueritte’s play, this inversion attains a complex, metatheatrical suggestiveness: Mallarmé’s 
mime responds to the famed prolixity of the seventeenth-century prince’s lamentations with the 
utterly silent play of gestures involved in dumb-show. Here it is significant that Mallarmé calls 
the Pierrot drama a “mute soliloquy,” and indeed, that Margueritte might have performed the 
work in complete silence.35 In this mute soliloquy, Pierrot is not only Hamlet, but one of the 
dumbshow players that perform in pantomime prior to Hamlet’s play-within-the-play, “The 
Murder of Gonzago.” “Mimique” may be a cryptic manifesto for a theater of the future, but it 
also contains within itself a set of metatheatrical reflections connecting Mallarmé to Margueritte 
to the seventeenth-century commedia dell’arte to Shakespeare, and finally to the tradition of 
English dumbshow that flourished in the early modern theater and that had a particularly opulent 
home in the tradition of allegorical theater that culminates in the masque.36 Therefore, when 
Mallarmé declares in “Mimique” that silence imposes duties of translation upon the poet, he is 
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not only articulating a chief tenet of Symbolist thought, nor simply invoking one of pantomime’s 
defining characteristics with respect to Margueritte’s original performance; nor is he merely 
proposing, for its own sake, an avant-garde conflation between the audibility of stage speech and 
the silence of a private dramatic reading. He is rather by extension calling forth a history of 
unspoken gestural performance that has roots in the time and the theater of the historical 
baroque. Mallarmé’s mime is a ghost of the baroque dumb-show performer, a silent figure 
trading in obscure and nonmimetic gestures, a vision (to borrow a phrase from one of the 1887 
prose poems) of “living allegory” (OC 282).  
 
2.2 Hérodiade, “a horrible birth”  
Mallarmé’s one surviving dramatic text, Hérodiade, puts the theater-theoretical sketches that 
appear in “Mimique” (concerning temporality, visual spacing, gesture, and so forth) into  
dramaturgical practice, and does so while also elaborating the baroque intertexutality of 
“Mimique” in richer, deeper, more complex detail. The work can rightly be considered the major 
poetic and dramatic project of Mallarmé’s lifetime: he worked on it continuously from 1864 until 
his death in 1898 without ever completing it (Block 9), and the surviving text furnished to 
readers in the Pléiade edition of the poet’s complete works retains an unfinished, fragmentary 
quality.37 It is clear he considered it by turns both as a tragedy to be performed theatrically and as 
a text to be read (Block 7-10, 18; Puchner Stage Fright 59; Shaw 105). In reality, however, the 
matter of his intentions for the piece vis-à-vis performance are complicated by the many key 
ways his writing—as we have already begun to note—effectively undoes neat binary distinctions 
between reading and theatrical spectatorship. In Deleuze’s description, the play amounts to 
Mallarmé’s vision of a “theater of reading” (31), what might be called, following Deleuze, a 
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baroque intermediation between the theater and the book. But this is not to say that the work 
takes up a necessarily hostile attitude to theater and theatricality across the board: far from it.38 
Although the play does indeed effectively create a form of “virtual theater” in the reader’s mind 
as Evelyn Gould has argued, it is also effectively calls for a new and nonmimetic kind of staging, 
requiring new forms of spectatorship that approach the act of reading, forms, in short, of 
theatrical allegoresis. 
Like his dramatic pastoral interlude, The Afternoon of a Faun, which he began in 1865 
during a pause from his work on Hérodiade, Mallarmé conceived the latter project by way of a 
central ambivalence: this was a work that was “absolutely scenic, not possible as theater, but 
requiring the theater” (C 242).39 That is—a play like the Hérodiade, written under the command 
to depict not the object but its effect, would be impossible for any theater still organized around 
the central, dominating principle of Aristotelian mimesis, in which the tragic dramatist claims an 
action for his central object of representation.40 In the new poetics the Hérodiade inaugurates, no 
such object lends itself for imitation. Hérodiade sees the temporal flow of action drawn to tense 
standstill, where the drama resides instead in a play of sensuous forms: emblematic images, 
evocative utterances, luxuriating feelings imagined and expressed in language, movements, 
affects, and gestures. Parting ways with the Aristotelian notion of drama as an imitated action, 
Mallarmé’s theater makes space instead for a play of sensory effects, for the bodies that register 
them, and for space itself.41 It envisions a new and “retheatricalized” form of theater42—a theater 
that can be characterized as no longer mimetic in Aristotle’s sense, but closer to Lehmann’s 
postdramatic theater of the twentieth century, where the typical Aristotelian criteria of 
representational drama and the dramatic text are decentered and divorced from more 
autonomously theatrical values as separate aesthetic criteria altogether.43 Even if the object that 
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traditionally grounds representation is no longer secure or available, the need to depict its effects 
is still pressing, which is why a work like Hérodiade, while unmoored from traditional norms of 
mimesis, still requires, or better yet, “installs” a “medium” for the presentation of these effects, 
that is, still demands the theater. One cannot depict the void with nothing. 
But the theatricality of the Hérodiade has a distinctly baroque character, as we shall see: 
The work is “already the poem of the fold” according to Deleuze’s claim, which suggests the 
extent to which theatricality and baroque style converge in the allegorical form of the work (30). 
In a letter to fellow Symbolist dramatist Villiers de L’Isle-Adam (dated December 1865), 
Mallarmé introduces the properly allegorical distinction between the ostensible subject of 
Hérodiade—namely, the Biblical myth of Salomé, Herodias, Herod, and John the Baptist—and 
its actual subject, which he designates simply as “Beauty.”44 Appropriately enough, given the 
principle of painting not things but their effects, this ostensible subject becomes over the course 
of the Hérodiade (in Henry Weinfield’s evocative phrase), “a vehicle for its own transcendence,” 
as the text ultimately comes to dramatize the poetic and dramaturgical process itself.45 In 
Hérodiade, Mallarmé represents not central action of the Salomé myth, but rather, a constellation 
of fragmentary images and impressions emerging from it. He abstracts his Biblical material 
almost to the point of unrecognizability, neither mentioning nor dramatizing the most 
fundamental nodal points of the narrative—the decapitation of the Baptist, the severed head 
displayed upon a silver trencher, and most significantly, the Dance of the Seven Veils, the 
narrative’s most famous event, and the one that most eloquently configures the larger myth into a 
parable for the lethal, veiled, ‘feminine’ character of truth.46 (Attempts at representing the 
famous dance do however appear in unfinished, experimental form among Mallarmé’s notes.47)  
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Ultimately, the central narrative elements of the Salomé myth are abandoned or refused 
in pursuit of a more self-consciously performative reflection on the creative act itself, in which 
Hérodiade comes to emblematize an unapproachably ideal artistic perfection. The choice to 
deploy the Salomé myth in this unusual way, as an emblem for the modern artist’s process, 
bespeaks an arbitrariness that verges upon formal violence; but on the other hand, such violence 
is often a necessary component of allegorical writing in general (as one can surmise from Samuel 
Johnson’s description of the seventeenth-century conceit, itself a form of allegorical writing, in 
which “the most heterogeneous ideas are yoked by violence together.”48) In this way, the drama’s 
form and its violent subject matter can be said to attain a harmonious discord (Jonson’s 
“discordia concors”) of sorts. In describing the extraordinary popularity of Herodian themes and 
martyrdom dramas in the baroque theater (U 51–7), Walter Benjamin remarks upon the formal 
violence of allegory in terms that are thoroughly consonant with the Salomé myth as a source of 
material for modern adaptation: “Indeed, it is typical of the sadist to degrade his object, and 
thereafter—or thereby—to satisfy it. This is also what the allegorist does in this era drunk with 
acts of savagery both experienced and imagined” (U 162).49 In Mallarmé’s hands, the sadistic 
violence of the Salomé myth is matched only by the violent arbitrariness of allegorical 
figuration, presenting itself as preeminent source material for adaptation under the sign of 
baroque modernism.50  
As it appears in the Pléiade edition, Hérodiade is divided into three disconnected 
episodes or movements, a bit like stations in a modern mystery play.51 Immediately prior to these 
three movements, however, there appears in the Pléiade edition of Mallarmé’s complete works a 
sonnet entitled “Gift of the Poem,” which Mallarmé composed as a “dedicatory epistle” to 
Hérodiade when he was first beginning to write it in 1865 (Weinfield 166). Appearing just 
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before the text of Hérodiade, this opening sonnet reads effectively as the drama’s prologue, 
hailing a “horrible birth”—both of Hérodiade the character and of Hérodiade the tragic poem, 
indeed of a character whose name is also the name of a poem52—and anticipating in miniature 
the tone, imagery, and narrative arc of the larger work. Unsettlingly, however, its biographical 
referent is the birth of Mallarmé’s infant daughter Geneviève only a few months before in 
November 1864 during the earliest phase of his work on Hérodiade, and so from its opening 
lines the sonnet is marked by an extraordinary ambivalence, embracing both the happiness of a 
new parent and, at the same time, a more decidedly ominous mood, anticipating the tragic poem 
to follow.53 “I bring you the child of a night of Idumea, / Black, with bleeding, pale, and 
featherless wings” (C 40).54 Behind this monstrous presentation, the dawn can be glimpsed 
through mournful windows enclosed with gilt, paneling, the smoke of incense, palm branches, 
and an angelic lamp. A father appears in the poem’s next few lines, attempting a hostile smile, 
and the blue and sterile firmament trembles. The terrible birth of Hérodiade is, in its way, the 
birth of (a) tragedy, and along with it, the birth of something bizarre, grotesque, and 
unbelievable. “Ô la berceuse, avec ta fille et l’innocence / De vos pieds froids, accueille une 
horrible naissance.” The poetic speaker instructs a female figure singing a lullaby to a newborn 
infant—a mother or nurse (la berceuse), with cold feet (pieds froids)—to welcome a daughter, “a 
horrible birth” (une horrible naissance).55 Hardly recognizable as a human infant, the child more 
closely resembles the bleeding raven deplumed of its feathers that appears in the sonnet’s 
opening couplet, a monstrous, misshapen prodigy, grotesque as the tumorous baroque pearl, an 
almost apocalyptic vision of the new (like Yeats’s “rough beast”) in all its promise and horror. 
Amid all these foreboding signs, and the strangely hopeful backdrop of the dawn’s rays suddenly 
piercing the sterile, empty heavens, the singer’s lullaby is heard to recall the sound of viol and 
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harpsichord (“Et ta voix rappelant viole et clavecin”), the principal means of baroque musical 
instrumentation, the musical underscore to Mallarmé’s ensuing tragic masque.  
Following upon this prelude, Hérodiade passes through a series of three movements, at 
least two of which are given musical titles. The drama is shrouded in an atmosphere of mystery, 
beginning with an initial Ouverture Ancienne (an “Ancient Overture,” but also, an “Ancient 
Opening”) sung by Hérodiade’s Nurse; followed by a Scène between this nurse and Hérodiade 
herself; and ending with a Cantique (or “Canticle”) to be sung by Saint John the Baptist.56 As a 
poem, printed on the page, the work is silent, but as a work of theater, whether imagined or 
actual, it verges upon the operatic, though the instruments mentioned in the closing of the “Gift 
of the Poem” suggest a form of opera altogether more ancient and obscure than the Wagnerian 
opera of Mallarmé’s lifetime. If we read Hérodiade alongside this viol and harpsichord, how 
might the poem appear new in light of its baroque orchestration? 
The ancient overture pronounced by the Nurse is explicitly termed an Incantation: 
somewhere between ritual chanting and enchantment, the word suggests the sort of transfixing 
mimeography of voice and gesture Nietzsche associated with the baroque styles of Asiatic 
rhetoric and gesture. The incantation narrates no events, but serves instead to conjure up the 
drama’s interior setting and melancholy atmosphere through evocative words and images. The 
blank stage of the drama, so to speak, is set through poetic language and gesture for the reader or 
spectator to imagine, as it was in the time of Shakespeare and—even more important for 
Hérodiade—Racine. The poem depicts a melancholy scene, a setting at once physical and 
spiritual (Block 13), plucked almost from the pages of Robert Burton, including a tearful lake, a 
garden, a tomblike tower, ebony plumes, a mournful and frightened swan (punningly, a “cygne” / 
“signe lamentable”), tarnished silver, the faded interior of a chamber in golds and crimsons, the 
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aroma of roses, spent candles, a bed abandoned by its female inhabitant, a distant dawn like the 
one in “Gift of the Poem.” The speaker returns almost obsessively to observe within this interior 
setting the ubiquity of surfaces in folds—that figure so crucial to Derrida’s reading of Mallarmé 
and to Deleuze’s concept of the baroque.57 These folds ripple throughout the decorative tapestries 
adorning this tower’s inner chamber, unsettling a cloth covering a confused mass of discarded 
monstrances, a funereal shroud, Hérodiade’s abandoned bed sheets, the pages of a book (or 
“grimoire”) of ancient spells: even thought and dreams themselves are also said to accrue in 
yellowed folds in this chamber. Hérodiade herself, however, remains absent from this scene; like 
Columbine in Margueritte’s “Pierrot,” though, she seems to haunt it, waiting in the wings.  
Against the critical interpretation of Mallarmé’s supposed anti-theatrical bias, this 
opening stage setting suggests an altogether different interpretation. Several commentators (Olds, 
Jameson) have remarked upon Mallarmé’s interest in interior spaces of this sort, spaces that are 
sometimes cluttered with enigmatic objects, and that in their recurring appearances throughout 
his poetry suggest the dimensions of a theater stage or a curiosity cabinet.58 As the entirety of the 
Hérodiade seems to transpire indoors (in Hérodiade’s chamber, at her toilette, and finally it 
seems, in the prison where Saint John is executed), the drama deserves to be considered in light 
of certain comments Mallarmé offered about theatricality and the depiction of the female figure 
in art. Writing on the subject of Édouard Manet and the emerging Impressionist movement in 
painting in 1876, Mallarmé remarks upon Manet’s preference for painting female bodies in open-
air settings suffused with natural sunlight, as opposed to interiors illuminated artificially with 
candles or gas, a preference that Mallarmé claims lends a more artistic effect to Manet’s practice 
of painting, but that also stands in stark contrast to the interior setting of the Hérodiade: 
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Those persons much accustomed … to fix on a mental canvass the beautiful 
remembrance of woman, even when thus seen amid the glare of night in the world 
or at the theatre, must have remarked that some mysterious process despoils the 
noble phantom of the artificial prestige cast by the candelabra or footlights, before 
she is admitted fresh and simple to the number of everyday haunters of the 
imagination.59 
In Mallarmé’s imagination, the image of the female figure framed by dark and indoor space and 
consequently set off by artificial light calls immediately to mind the space of the theater and the 
image of female performers onstage: there is a necessary theatricality to images of this kind 
when affixed upon the “mental canvass”—a sense of strangeness and mystery, a “noble phantom 
of the artificial prestige” that emanates from the luster of candelabra and gaslights—which 
Manet’s paintings are at pains to resist, and which is dissipated in Manet’s frequent choice to 
transfer the female figure to a daytime, outdoor setting [Figure 4]. By contrast, the first two 
movements of Hérodiade evoke images of women in claustral indoor spaces, at the dark time 
just before dawn, framed by the weird glow of the stage lights. In this, these movements call to 
mind the indoor theater spaces of Mallarmé’s own time—captured vividly, for example, in the 
weirdly lit later paintings of Henri de Toulouse Lautrec, for example [Figure 5]—and the greater 
historical shift of the baroque stage indoors into the darkened, artificially lit theaters of the 
seventeenth century.  
Pervading the thoroughly interior space of the Ouverture is a sense of palpable 
melancholy. The first word of the nurse’s incantation, “Abolie” or “Abolished,” which appears 





FIGURES 4 AND 5 (above and below, respectively): Édouard Manet. Le Déjeuner sur l’herbe. Oil 
on canvas (1862–3); Henri de Toulouse Lautrec. Au Moulin Rouge. Oil on canvas (1892–5). 
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modify no obvious referent. Suggestively, it proposes only the melancholy possibility that some 
thing has been ordered out of existence, lost or refused, and that even more fundamentally, even 
the name for this thing is also somehow unutterable. (This initial word—which has the terrible 
ring of a judgment—seems even more strikingly chosen when set against the backdrop of 
Mallarmé’s youthful spiritual crisis, the needfulness of depicting not the thing but the effect it 
produces, and his claim that the actual subject of Hérodiade is nothing less than Beauty itself.) 
The incantation that follows takes on a gloomy, oracular quality: the Nurse, Cassandra-like, 
pronounces visions of doom that soon approach a pitch of terror: “Crime! bûcher! aurore 
ancienne! supplice! / Pourpre d’un ciel! Étang de la pourpre complice! / Et sur les incarnats, 
grand ouvert, ce vitrail.” (OC 41); “Crime! pyre! ancient dawn! torture! Purple of a sky! Pool of 
purple complicity! And this stained-glass window, opening wide, on crimson bodies” (CP 25). 
No incident is directly related, however; the poem depicts only an aftermath, a heap of 
uncoffined and “enigmatic” corpses, an infernal landscape at dawn, a mournful vision both of 
desolation and of anticipation.60 The Nurse is waiting for the return of a king: “Reviendra-t-il un 
jour des pays cisalpins! / Assez tôt? Car tout est presage et mauvais rêve!” (OC 43); “One day he 
will return from the Cisalpine country! Soon enough! For all is foreboding and premonition!” 
(CP 27) But this mythic return, calling to mind the beginnings of Aescyhlus’ Agamemnon and 
the ramparts of Elsinore in Hamlet, is also a millenarian “second coming” that brings on the Last 
Judgment: the Nurse declares that the ruddy sky is not a sunset, but the redness of the last day, as 






2.3 Becoming ornamental 
Following upon this Ouverture, Mallarmé stages a short Scène, not even one hundred fifty lines 
long, between Hérodiade and her Nurse. As several scholars have noted, this dialogue unfolds 
deliberately and recognizably according to the Racinian convention of discourse between a tragic 
protagonist and her confidante (Weinfield 176, Puchner Stage Fright 189.n.6). Mallarmé’s Scène 
puts itself forward as a rewriting of the famous scene from the first act of Phèdre (1677)—
another scene between a princess and her nurse—when Phèdre makes her first entrance in that 
play, already in a state of crisis, buckling from exhaustion under the weight of her ornaments, 
clothes, and hair. Just as Phèdre tears these baroque adornments from her person—violently 
undoing her nurse Oenone’s handiwork as she succumbs to a fiery passion of the blood—
Hérodiade likewise undresses herself, and similarly refuses her Nurse’s efforts to assist with her 
toilette. In keeping with the vision of theater outlined in “Mimique,” no action is depicted here: 
rather, the scene famously revolves around three gestures of aid or supplication on the Nurse’s 
part—attempts to approach the princess’s person, hair, and jewelry—and three counter-gestures 
of refusal or negation on the part of Hérodiade. As in Shakespeare, Racine, and the genre of 
literary drama more broadly, these gestures are not given in the form of stage directions but are 
written directly into their corresponding lines of poetic text. Indeed, while Puchner and 
McGuinness have argued that these three gestures function as metaphors for Mallarmé’s refusal 
of stage performance (Puchner Stage Fright 62–3; McGuinness Making of Modern Drama 92), 
they could just as easily be understood to emblematize a refusal of traditional forms of dramatic 
mimesis—as manifest in the contemporary modes of realist and naturalist modes of dramatic 
performance during Mallarmé’s lifetime—and a preference instead for a nonmimetic drama of 
striking gestures and sensuous, enigmatic poses. At first, the Nurse seeks to kiss Hérodiade’s 
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fingers and rings, but the princess spurns her back icily with the laconic command, “Reculez” 
(OC, 44; “Recoil!”). She then seeks to offer Hérodiade a perfume, the funereal essence of 
withered roses, which Hérodiade likewise rejects: “Laisse là ces parfums!” (OC 45; “Leave off 
with those perfumes!”). Finally, she seeks to adjust a lock fallen out of place in Hérodiade’s 
chévelure, and Hérodiade repulses this advance as well: “Arrête dans ton crime / Qui refroidit 
mon sang vers sa source, et réprime / Ce geste, impiété fameuse” (OC, 45; “Refrain from your 
crime, which freezes my blood to its very source, and suppress that impious, infamous gesture.” 
By comparison with Oscar Wilde’s Salomé, who is all but consumed with the desire for 
Jokanaan to desire her in return, the Hérodiade of Mallarmé’s poem refuses all human contact 
with an air of profoundly splenetic melancholy. She is characterized throughout by a desire for 
absolute self-sufficiency and the quasi-divine inviolability of the injunction “Noli mi tangere.” 
An inaccessible ideal that conflates beauty with death, Hérodiade spurns the nurse’s aid, just as 
she spurns suitors. Because the Salomé myth that forms Hérodiade’s ostensible subject is, in 
Mallarmé’s express description, an allegory for Beauty itself and the poet’s attempt to approach 
beauty, these three gestures of refusal, these moments of sublime, inhuman inapproachability, 
take on a unique metatextual significance. Beauty (in itself, as an ideal) will not be touched or 
represented. As an object it cannot be depicted, even if its effects demand depiction.  
There is a markedly static quality that persists throughout this scène, a gestural 
frozenness that was to become a dramaturgical commonplace among Symbolist playwrights.61 At 
each turn, Hérodiade has the effect of interrupting the Nurse’s gesture, almost freezing it before 
she can be touched, and as the scene becomes increasingly gestic it becomes more and more 
cool, withdrawn, and imagistic (presaging the work of later avant-garde dramatists from Brecht 
through the so-called “Theater of Images” of the 1970s). But where, in Racine, Phèdre’s hot 
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blood and incestuous lust demand that all her baroque ornaments be ripped away, the icy 
Hérodiade, though denuding herself of her royal garments to the point of nakedness, keeps all 
her ornamental appurtenances upon her and seems almost to become an ornament in herself. 
Upon rebuffing the Nurse’s first attempt to touch her body, Hérodiade declares, “The blond 
torrent of immaculate hair bathes my solitary body and freezes it with horror.”62 Rebuffing the 
Nurse’s offered perfume a few lines later, she declares her desire for the tresses of her hair itself 
also to become “gold, forever virginal of fragrance, in their cruel shimmering and their muted 
pallor, observing the sterile coldness of metal, reflecting the jeweled and armored walls of my 
lonely childhood home.”63 The coils, folds, and rivulets that compose the blond torrent of her 
hair are frozen in the midst of their restless, cascading motion, while Hérodiade’s flesh seems to 
undergo an imaginary process of petrification, becoming metallic, almost mirror- or armorlike. 
She expresses a longing to become a statue, and she even prefers to speak to the gilded 
gemstones that support the “fatal splendor and massive allure” of her hair, rather than to her 
Nurse interlocutor.64  
Albert Thibaudet rightly draws attention to the bejeweled quality of the Scène, claiming 
that the poem “takes on the aspect of a Byzantine mosaic, recalling the Theodora of Ravenna,” 
and indeed, the figure of Hérodiade could also productively be compared to the mosaic-like 
depiction of Salomé in Moreau’s 1877 painting The Apparition [Figure 6].65 In the Scène, 
Mallarmé’s baroque dramaturgy finds its fullest, most luxuriating treatment: the language 
overbrims with rich jewels and metals and even richer sensations and pulsations of movement, 
particularly in the exquisite drama of Hérodiade’s blood running cold as wave upon wave of 









clear sense,” writes Charles Lyons, “the language of this piece is emphatically visual, moving 
from image to image as the body of Hérodiade herself becomes a dazzling scene within her 
imagination” (Cohn, ed. 97): although Lyons is correct to note the spectacular visuality of 
Mallarmé’s language here, he understates the stirring physical and haptic resonances of the 
scene. The ostensible object or referent of this allegory, Beauty, may be in danger of being lost 
irretrievably, but the theatrical effects being depicted here nevertheless proliferate dazzlingly, 
and in ways that are patently physical, in a space somewhere between the softness of rippling 
flesh, the movement of flaming hair, and the stoniness of accessories—somewhere between the 
undulating folds of Loie Fuller’s Serpentine Dance and of Bernini’s Saint Teresa in Ecstasy. It is 
not enough to say that Hérodiade appears as a dehumanized figure, an affront to the possibility of 
being represented by an actor. Rather, it would be more accurate to say that she appears like a 
princess of the ancièn régime, who, though stripped of the veils that clothe her, is nevertheless 
still sufficiently encrusted over with jewels and baroque finery to the point of becoming a 
mannequin of sorts, whose only purpose is to bear the weight of its own visual and physical 
ostentation. The Scène culminates in an emphatic tirade, a lengthy solo speech for Hérodiade 
after the manner of Racine that Weinfield considers an operatic aria of sorts (177), in which 
Hérodiade declares, “Yes, it is for me, for me myself, that I blossom, abandoned!” Behind this 
“aria,” the viol and harpsichord that Mallarmé calls for in the “Gift of the Poem” seem to throb: 
It is in this ecstatic, florid scene of unfolding—where Hérodiade’s body is shot through with 
rippling shimmers, and where it seems almost to transform before her Nurse’s eyes into a 
bejeweled sculpture—that the baroque tendencies of Mallarmé’s tragic masque achieve their 
most resplendent elaboration.  
!
! 149 
There are two remarks I wish to make about this moment—first on its aesthetic 
importance, and second on its political importance. Where the scene’s aesthetic qualities are 
concerned, Hérodiade’s “aria” deserves to be considered, again, in the context of the 
Hérodiade’s interior setting, where the optical deformations wrought by the necessity of artificial 
illumination become a necessity, regardless of whether the work is to be performed on a physical 
stage or within a mental imagining. Such a context denies the figure of Hérodiade of the 
freshness, simplicity, and verisimilitude of representation that Mallarmé attributes to painters 
working in the plein air tradition like Manet. Instead, Hérodiade becomes a more fully theatrical 
figure, lit by candles or gaslights as it were, and by Mallarmé’s own estimation too. In Charles 
Lyons’s reading of Mallarmé’s essay on Manet, which draws on Fried’s conceptual framework, 
“The impetus toward realism displays human figures absorbed in their activity, and their action 
and language is confined to the space represented. The behavior suppresses their awareness of 
the presence of the viewer. … In the theatrical painting, the subject of the painting—like [Georg] 
Fuchs’s actor—directs her or his gaze out to the spectator. … The painting of women, lit by 
artificial light—as in a theater—would configure them as subjects principally for viewing” 
(Cohn, ed. 100). So might it be said that Hérodiade appears, a subject configured primarily for 
display, lit by artificial light, directing her gaze out to the spectator rather than to her spurned 
onstage interlocutor, as a singer in the opera does when performing an aria before the footlights, 
thus gazing back at the spectators and reminding them of their position as beholders. (In 
moments like this, which part ways with all realism, and in some sense more fully 
“Impressionist,” the spectator does not perceive any thing or any scene directly and mimetically 
represented, but has their attention drawn directly to the perceptual act itself as the theatrical 
effects proliferate.) Like the new actors called for in Georg Fuchs’s 1909 essay Revolution in the 
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Theater, Hérodiade seems “to thrust [herself] forward toward the audience in an overt 
theatricality[, … to] break loose [i.e. of the fourth wall] and confront the space of the audience” 
(Cohn, ed. 97). In this she takes on a certain quality of flatness or facingness, which Thibaudet 
associates with Byzantine iconography (the Theodora of Ravenna), which Fuchs would associate 
with the form of the bas relief (Lyons 97), and which Nijinsky would famously adapt in his 
choreographic adaptation of Mallarmé’s other major dramatic work, The Afternoon of a Faun. 
Put somewhat differently, an object for spiritual contemplation in Mallarmé’s post-theistic 
religion of art, Hérodiade takes on all the flatness and two-dimensionality of a baroque emblem, 
an illustration upon a page.66 
But where politics are concerned, and to shift focus away from the realm of the visual to 
that of the physical, if Hérodiade allegorizes an ideal of beauty, then this ideal is curiously, 
sumptuously, heavily material. In seeming to become so frozen and so hard, Hérodiade certainly 
does come to resemble a piece of jewelry or a mosaic, to be sure, but in taking on the properties 
of precious gemstones and metals, she also seems suggestively to resemble a commodity or a 
token of currency. It is between these two possibilities—the ornament as quintessence of 
beautiful, decorative uselessness and the commodity as the nominal epitome of utility and use-
value—that Hérodiade comes to appear internally divided. That is, while Hérodiade seems to 
lack the psychological depth and multidimensionality one typically associates with the realist or 
naturalist theater, the vivid flatness of her character also calls the impressed face of a coin.67 I 
will conclude this reflection on Hérodiade’s Scène by considering momentarily the politico-
economic suggestiveness of this baroque transformation, which can hardly be deemed 
adventitious on Mallarmé’s part, particularly given the materialist undertones of Mallarmé’s 
youthful spiritual crisis. Where Mallarmé seems most intent on subjecting Hérodiade’s body to 
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an obscure process of petrification, it is significant that this motif of female petrification already 
appears a decade prior in Charles Baudelaire’s Les Fleurs du Mal—a text that directly inspired 
Mallarmé during his work on Hérodiade in the 1860s—as Walter Benjamin notes assiduously in 
The Arcades Project (J54a,4; J54a5). (This motif is perhaps most pronounced in Baudelaire’s 
poem on Allegory [Allégorie], which describes the allegorical personage of Beauty as one with 
granite skin.68) In Benjamin’s analysis, these scenes of “petrifaction” (J54a4) come to dramatize 
the work of allegory itself,69 and at the same time, the work of commodification, whereby 
dynamic historical processes are brought to a standstill and objectified (Lukács might say reified) 
into fetishes (J54a,5; J55,13). As is clear elsewhere in the Arcades Project (J802); J80a1]—and 
as the next chapter of this dissertation will discuss in much greater detail—the commodity form 
and the form of allegory amount in Benjamin’s analysis to the two emblematic faces of a single 
historical phenomenon: two sides of one coin, so to speak.  
With Benjamin, we can thus say that the Hérodiade does more than simply allegorize an 
ideal and impossible beauty (as its author intended) and goes beyond being solely “allegorical of 
itself,” that is, of the process that led to its creation; rather, Benjamin’s writing suggests that the 
Hérodiade might best be understood as a drama about the nature of allegory itself and the 
allegorical work of commodification and the commodity fetish.70 Over the course of the play’s 
central Scène, the commodity emerges as a ruinous translation of the once transcendent, no 
longer accessible form of the Platonic idea or logos: Where there was once Truth, what remains 
now are so many sullied and circulating coins (gradually losing their stamp, as Nietzsche might 
say). While the figure of Hérodiade was intended as a personification of Beauty in itself, the 
moment when Hérodiade glimpses her petrifying image in a mirror at the midpoint of the Scène 
reveals the dream of this ideal in all its monstrous nudity, as a spectacular and sterile token of 
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currency, the ultimate basis of capitalist economy. Thus, a century after the French revolution, 
Hérodiade can be said to stage a question about the ontological status of ideas as such, about the 
form these ideas under Mallarmé’s contemporary situation of semio-theological and political-
economic crisis. Without directly representing the violence of class warfare or the depredations 
of the capitalist economy (as a work like Hauptmann’s The Weavers might, for example) it 
stages the effects of commodity fetishism through an elaborate strategy of indirection, in which 
the relationship between poeisis and aesthesis has become indeterminate, requiring allegorical 
reading. To detect and make manifest this politico-economic staging in the text requires, as 
Jameson rightly suggests, “new representational strategies and therefore new reading processes” 
(326), beyond the limits of traditionally mimetic readings. As Mallarmé’s most enduring 
experiment in the theater, Hérodiade trains its readers and its spectators in these new processes 
of representation and interpretation, thus preparing a new, modern, and interactive subjecthood, 
capable of critically interpreting the enigmas of modern theater, poetry, and the capitalist society 
of spectacular, fetishized commodities. 
 The third and final movement of Hérodiade builds upon the iconographic qualities of the 
second. It draws upon much the same imagery of brilliance and hardness as does the Scène, but 
in different, ever more sanctifying ways. In this brief, closing movement, Mallarmé shifts from 
the figure of the tyrant princess to image of the saintly martyr’s ritual sacrifice, so that 
Hérodiade can train its splenetic gaze, finally, on what Benjamin will designate at the baroque 
“tragedy of the saint.”71 The Cantique is to be sung by Saint John the Baptist—potentially 
another nod to Racine, whose first name was “Jean-Baptiste,” as Richard Goodkin has suggested 
(Weinfield 179)—and this final song finds the condemned John either at or just after the moment 
of his decapitation, a moment favored for depiction by painters of the historical baroque period 
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like Caravaggio. As with the Scène, the Cantique also seems to unfold with a strangely static 
quality. It opens with the words, “The sun that halts / miraculously exalts” thus taking place 
during an instant arrested in time, at a solar standstill and the moment of the shortest possible 
shadows, just before this sun “immediately re-descends, incandescent” (OC 49).72 The Feast of 
Saint John, which aligns with the summer solstice, celebrates the sun at its highest point in the 
sky, the optimal moment of its splendor. Amidst the violence of the decapitation, the Cantique 
seems to take place in extraordinary calm, as at the eye of a storm.73 The heights of the sun’s 
climb, and the precipitous descent to follow, are mirrored in the striking down and raising up of 
the martyred baptist’s severed head, as the Cantique is addressed to no specified other character 
in particular, but perhaps, to the reader in a form of direct address. As shadows grip the 
shuddering corpse, the head rises up in the third of the poem’s seven stanzas—whether 
miraculously, as in a theatrical deus-ex-machina or in Moreau’s Apparition, or more simply, in 
the executioner’s grip. As the Baptist’s dying eyes gaze upward in the final stanza to meet “the 
eternal frozenness” of the azure sky, an ideal realm whose cold, immeasurable vastness 
transcends that of all glaciers, this frozen, resplendent firmament extends an enigmatic “salut” to 
him: its greeting, or potentially, its salvation—the word is heavily charged in Mallarmé’s writing 
as it also forms the title of the poem chosen by Mallarmé to appear first in his Poésies. As the 
drama closes upon a catastrophe, the poet’s prophetic voice invokes an opening of messianic 







2.4 The world as text and as stage 
As the 1860s drew to their close, and as his hopes to have Hérodiade presented at the Théâtre-
Français dimmed, Mallarmé turned his attention to another, even more grandiose project that 
would, like Hérodiade, also occupy him until the time of his death in 1898. In the last analysis, 
these two projects deserve to be considered together, as Mallarmé would eventually come to 
combine the two into one, considering Héroidade as one of the main pillars of this even greater 
work. In his private correspondence, Mallarmé described this project simply as The Book—“Le 
Livre”—but his plans for it never came to fruition, beyond the existence of several hundred pages 
of preparatory notes. This project had the ambition, not just of producing a new sort of text that 
could rightfully aspire to the conditions of theater, but of fusing all modalities of the performing 
arts and literature into a new kind of total artwork, entirely different than the one Wagner had 
imagined. While The Book would be Mallarmé’s ultimate poetic opus and not any typical 
dramatic script, it would nevertheless require a certain mode of ritual enactment for its 
fulfillment. Mallarmé imagined readings from The Book stretched out over a period of five 
years, all held in his private library before small, carefully chosen audiences of fellow aesthetes. 
For these readings, Mallarmé sought an absolute, obsessive control over all the conditions of 
performance and audience. A set of obscure mathematical calculations would determine the 
number of attendees and attendants to the ritual, the organization of furniture pieces in his 
library, the arrangements of seating, the cost of tickets, the specific choice, combination, and 
order of textual passages to be read, and other performance details. Through these countings and 
calculations, the interior space of Mallarmé’s library was to become a particular kind of theater, 
one that in a sense prefigures both the later Cagean traditions of performance and aleatoric 
composition, and the practices of “solo performance” and “loft performance” as they was 
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developed in New York over the course of the 1960s and ’70s. Mallarmé’s reading desk, 
illuminated by an electric lamp, was to take center stage at one end of his library, facing an 
arrangement of seats split evenly into two sections by a central aisle, and was to be positioned 
alongside a “diagonally placed piece of lacquered furniture equipped with a specific number of 
pigeonholes … to hold the loose sheets that constitute the performance edition of the Livre” 
(Puchner Stage Fright 68–69). At the appointed time, a special performer, an utterly anonymous 
figure whom Mallarmé called an operator, would appear at the desk to read, aloud and in a 
ritualistic manner, the fragmentary passages from The Book inscribed on these sheets. Following 
a brief intermission he would later re-read the same texts again in a different order, allowing 
different meanings to emerge through the new textual combinations. Along the way, these 
readings were to be accompanied with a quasi-religious ceremonial of hieratic movements and 
ritualistic gestures (Deak 89–93; Puchner Stage Fright 69–75). Although the performer’s focus 
would often be absorbed in the act of reading, his seat at the reading desk would position his 
body directly facing his audience, and these designated gestural moments would occasion a shift 
outward for the performer theatrically to meet the gaze of his spectators, theatrically refusing any 
semblance of an illusory fourth wall. This was a quasi-oratorical theater for initiates, bedecked 
with invocations to all the ornamental appurtenances of the theater stretching back originally to 
the historical baroque period—decorative devices such as lustrous chandeliers and curtains rich 
in folds (Puchner Stage Fright 75–76)—and whose gestural mimeography drew its basic 
inspirations from the baroque spectacle of the Tridentine Mass.74 But whereas the priestly 
gestures of Catholicism are meant to display—to the faithful at least—a series of theological 
symbols in which divine word and worldly thing find an unbroken unity in the image of the 
transubstantiated Eucharist, the operator’s gestures in performance, combined with the gestures 
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described in and enacted by Mallarmé’s text, amount to arbitrary movements with no apparent 
and necessary relation to one another (Deak 92). They are, in short, gestural emblematics, that 
seek the spectator and auditor’s active intervention for the construction of meaning to transpire.75  
Through all these (re)enchanting devices, the monadic space of Mallarmé’s private 
library becomes the nineteenth-century inheritor to the great church interiors, Kunstkammern, 
libraries, and indoor theaters of the baroque period, as The Book becomes a modern surrogate for 
the Judeo-Christian Bible. The Book, in Mallarmé’s description, was to effect a total 
(re)theatricalization of things: his oft-cited and aphoristic proposition “that everything in the 
world exists to end up in a book” sets the horizon for this pervasive retheatricalization (OC 378). 
Mallarmé’s Great Work was to be a Book of the World, an impossible, culminating totality, the 
one book “unknowingly sought after by everyone who writes.”76 While this dream of just such a 
World-Book is decidedly modernist in character, it too has origins in the time of the historical 
baroque. Just as the enclosed space of the theatrum proliferates within baroque discourse to 
encompass not just the allegorical vision of the Theatrum Mundi or theater of the world, but also 
the Theatrum Orbis Terrarum, Theatrum Belli, Theatrum Europeum, and Theatrum Naturae, 
among so many others—so too would the figure of the “the book of nature” become a 
commonplace during the historical baroque.77 The characteristically baroque sense of the world 
as a theater is mirrored in its sense of the world as a book, in which all of physical nature can be 
seen as enclosed within, or coextensive with, a pervasive textuality and theatricality.78 Advancing 
this conceit toward its logical, Borgesian extremes, the world comes to be seen as a library, an 
archive and repository of writings, and the setting for the ritual readings of Mallarmé’s Book 
takes on an even more suggestive character.79 With the enigmatic gestures such readings entailed, 
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these various, microcosmic spaces of enclosure—theater, library, book, world—were to be 
exhumed from the baroque past and reconfigured to suit a new, modern context.  
I will close this chapter with a few more brief comments on the political intentions of 
Mallarmé’s theatrical aesthetics, and particularly of this vision of the world as a modern, 
secularized theatrum mundi. It was Mallarmé’s hope that these spaces could provide the setting 
for a new form of collective ritual, one that would be—in Quentin Meillassoux’s assessment of 
Mallarmé’s aims—“capable of founding a civic religion and engendering a profound adhesion of 
individuals to the ends of their community” (107). Such a quasi-religious community would 
necessarily be post-monarchical, post-Christian, and revolutionary in spirit, a post-theistic sequel 
to those efforts at setting up new religious cults in the aftermath of the French Revolution, whose 
centennial coincided with the years when Mallarmé’s work on The Book was at its height.80 Like 
Wagner’s efforts at Bayreuth, against whose prior example the Livre project must be understood 
as a rejoinder, Mallarmé’s Book sought to turn theater and theatricality into the service of a 
modern, revolutionary religion of art. With all the various forms of performance and art it 
attempts to synthesize (ritual, dance, mime, gesture, tone, poetry), and in its utterly totalizing 
ambitions, The Book was indeed an attempt to outdo Wagner’s Gesamtkunstwerk, a different 
vision of the artwork of the future, and a means, potentially, to rescue the social organism from 
its alienation and disenchantment.81 But although Mallarmé admired Wagner in part, he was also 
critical of the aesthetics of Wagnerian music-drama insofar as they necessarily continue to 
depend, with a certain melancholic nostalgia, upon the very forms of mimesis Mallarmé’s 
poetics sought deliberately to escape.82 That is to say, like Nietzsche, Mallarmé based his critique 
of Wagner upon visions of a theater beyond mimesis. But where Nietzsche saw Wagner’s all too 
“naturalistic” mimomania as evidence of a persistent and melancholy “bad faith” in the 
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theological presuppositions of mimesis, in “Mimique,” Hérodiade, and his writings for The 
Book, Mallarmé proposes mime—that is to say: a not strictly mimetic use of gesture—as 
promising a potentially curative rejoinder to the crisis of mimesis besetting nineteenth-century 
modernity. 
 Consequent to this longed-for spiritual renewal, Mallarmé’s mimic-baroque theatricalism 
promises a new politics of reading and spectatorship as well. The Book, Mallarmé’s great, 
unfinished theatrical endeavor, would establish the conditions for a quasi-utopian form of 
community within modernity precisely because of the interpretive difficulty of Mallarmé’s 
poetry. Jameson explains the stakes of Mallarmé’s notoriously obscure syntax, arguing that it 
effectively generates “an interactive situation, in which the reader reassembles a new totality on 
the basis of hints and directions, and out of the isolated parts, ‘significantly’ positioned and on 
tactical offer from the poet.”83 (Jameson names this strategy “reconstruction” (326), but also 
refers to it, following Benjamin, as “allegory” [327].) If Hérodiade or any of Mallarmé’s other 
texts were to appear in theatrical performance, a spectator, a stage director, a performer, or an 
interpreter would need to undertake a similarly “reconstructive” process of allegoresis to make 
sense of them, constructing meanings out of their various, isolated components through a kind of 
bricolage. The Mallarméan interpreter needs to seize these component parts and assemble them 
into a “constellation.”84 (For this reason it is not insignificant that Mallarmé’s poetry makes 
repeated use of constellations as poetic images: particularly in the Plusieurs Sonnets, the “sonnet 
allegorical of itself,” and in the enigmatic and ambiguously redemptive closing of A Throw of the 
Dice Will Never Abolish Chance, Mallarmé’s most sustained attempt at materializing the new 
poetry of The Book.) Mallarmé’s theatrical writings force their readers and spectators to search 
for the constituent parts of these constellations and to find ways of bringing them together 
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meaningfully, even in the absence of a guaranteed, ultimate, and absolute interpretive solution. 
In doing so, they promote capacities for interpretation and modes of literacy that are the 
necessary condition for a viably critical politics.  
It is also noteworthy that Mallarmé’s desired reinterpretation of the body politic evidently 
involves a necessary reinterpretation of the “individual” body as a subject or ground for action. 
His essay on “Restricted Action”—composed during his preparations for The Book and 
published in Divagations—raises the question of “action” as an explicitly philosophical problem. 
The essay begins as a dialogue in poetic prose between Mallarmé and a young comrade on the 
subject of action: what, precisely, does it mean “to act”? (And, correspondingly, “what does it 
mean ‘to write?’”— the two concepts becoming linked over the course of the essay.) The essay’s 
narrator offers the following predication: to act is “to produce a great deal of movement that 
gives you in return the sensation that you were its cause, and therefore that you exist: which is 
something no one can be sure of, a priori” (OC 369).85 Mallarmé’s theory of performance 
thereby effects a negation of the classical Cartesian formula, cogito ergo sum, putting the 
existence, ontological security, and self-sameness of the modern subject back into doubt, and 
thereby allying himself with a Nietzschean understanding of selfhood as a Dionysian unfolding.86 
Insofar as Mallarmé’s aesthetics stems from his early spiritual crisis, and entails an injunction to 
“paint, not the object, but the effect it produces,” it can be said to demonstrate a continual 
awareness of the inaccessibility of the original, the substance, the thing, the cause, all of which 
are survived only by their remaining effects, which it is the poet’s task impersonally to depict or 
translate. (The ultimate horizon of this aesthetics is the disappearance of the poet as “author” into 
the very same anonymity that marks the operator of Mallarmé’s ritual of The Book.87) As such, 
this aesthetics inevitably prescribes the transformation of the actor, previously thought to have 
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been a physical source of his gestures, into an ongoing play of movement and miming that only 
retrospectively evokes the impression of his presence.88 In theatrical terms, it means that the 
onstage performer will ultimately cease to represent a stable, self-identical “character”—a “self” 
who “acts” upon the world—but will instead become a series of extrinsic gestures like the ones 
prescribed in Mallarmé’s notes for The Book. This Mallarméan actor does not produce the 
gestures, but is merely a medium for their communication; 89 and Mallarmé’s vision of stage 
space emerges not as a stable ground for intersubjective relationships between psychological 
characters, but as a dynamic play of effects without causal things grounding them.90 But even 
more basically, and beyond transforming the actor into a form of “living allegory”—the dynamic 
production of emblematic images in theatrical performance—this aesthetics enfolds a 
deconstruction of the notion of identity itself, an insinuation of identity’s irreducible 
performativity, along with all the ontological and political ramifications such an insinuation 
necessarily enfolds.  
It is in part for this reason that Mallarmé becomes important to Derrida, for helping to 
deconstruct notions of identity and substance as forms of self-presence. In Mallarmé, as in 
Nietzsche, the self becomes something protean, ludic, a space capable of trading in a host of 
character “masks” that can be traced in an through the various writings: Hamlet, Pierrot, Saint 
John, the Faun, Igitur, and so forth (Cohn 52). But if we view Hérodiade herself as one of the 
greatest and most enduring of Mallarmé’s masks, and consider also the fact that Mallarmé 
published a number of essays on the subject of fashion in La Dernière Mode from the behind an 
assortment of female pseudonyms—Miss Satin, Madame Marguerite de Ponty, and others 
including a broad range of races and ethnicities91—it becomes clear that Mallarmé’s theatrical, 
baroque vision of modern poetry and language also corresponded to a queer space of play, where 
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the author could experiment with a variety of other identity configurations, imaginatively 
crossing boundaries, not just of genre and medium, but of color and gender. Although a fuller, 
more critical analysis of these experiments’ social ramifications lies beyond this dissertation’s 
compass, it is nonetheless clear that the impulse to what might be termed queer and interracial 
modes of identification in Mallarmé’s writing stems from an even deeper intuition about the 
performative nature of social identities. If the world is destined to end up in a book, so too is it 
destined to end up becoming a stage of sorts: not the theatrum mundi of ancient theocentric 
doctrine, but a new and immanent theatrum, where all of social life is increasingly understood 
under the concept of performance and performativity. But this shift can also be registered in the 
degree to which Mallarmé’s poetry resists the plainness of normative modes of representation 
and in its manner of embracing exuberance, fanciness, and ostentation, thus inaugurating the 
cultural dynamics of modernism by hearkening back to the baroque past. It is perhaps in this 
double session of moving forward while simultaneously curving or folding backward, in this 
foundational moment of modernism that simultaneously deconstructs the very nineteenth-century 
norms of linear historical progress that makes such a foundational act possible, that Mallarmé’s 
contributions to the emerging baroque modernity are most profoundly felt. 
!
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Parenthetical citations to Mallarmé’s writings above and in the footnotes below refer to the following texts: 
OC  Stéphane Mallarmé. Oeuvres Complètes, H. Mondor and G. Jean-Aubry, eds. (Paris: Gallimard, 1945) 
C Stéphane Mallarmé. Correspondance, H. Mondor, J. Richard, and L. Austin, eds. (Paris: Gallimard, 1985) 
All translations are my own, unless otherwise noted. For euphony, and only where indicated explicitly, I 
occasionally cite from Weinfield’s wonderful, historically and theoretically informed translations of the poems: 
CP Stéphane Mallarmé. Collected Poems: A Bilingual Edition. H. Weinfield, trans. (Berkeley: U.Cal.P., 1994) 
 
1 “Il y a à Versailles des boiseries à rinceaux, jolies à faire pleurer; des coquilles, des enroulements, des courbes, des 
reprises de motifes—telle m’apparaît la phrase que je jette d’abord sur le papier en un dessin sommaire, que je 
revois ensuite, que j’épure, que je réduis, que je synthetize…” 
 
2 For a fuller treatment of the importance of decoration and décor in Mallarmé’s aesthetics, see Dee Reynolds, 





3 This passage reads: “l’image marquée d’un sceau mystérieux de modernité, à la fois baroque et belle” (OC 288). 
The object of Mallarmé’s focus in this poem is, curiously and queerly enough, an oblivious priest lying face first in 
the grass in an unfrequented corner of a Parisian park, his hands behind his head, grinding his pelvis into the earth in 
onanistic pleasure, with his cassock flapping in furious folds, “as though the night hidden in it were finally being 
shaken out,” while the ecclesiastic approaches orgasm. 
 
4 See Thibaudet 74; Wellek “Concept of Baroque” 96; Eco 13–14; Paz 381. (For Borges, see Baroque New Worlds 
173.n.v.) In addition, many critics (Borges, Reyes, Wellek, Chiampi) have observed suggestive historical and formal 
similarities between Mallarmé and the Spanish baroque poet Luís de Góngora, and by 1928 (Baroque New Worlds 
175, 510), though it remains uncertain whether Mallarmé had any familiarity with Góngora’s poetry. 
 
5 See Richard 177–80. An echo of Richards’s interest in the fold is to be found in McGuinness’s writing on 
Mallarmé’s, for example, in this passage: “We may note, first of all, the frequency of the word ‘pli’ in the 
Nourrice’s ‘Ouverture’: ‘plis roidis’, ‘plis | inutiles’, ‘plis jaunes de la penséee’, ‘des rêves par plis’. ‘Pli’—
Mallarméan for page or book, scattered throughout his writings as shorthands for the mystical folds of ‘le Livre’, 
used by Mallarmé to subsume the material into paradigms of reading (as in the ‘pli’ of the dancer’s dress)—has a 
high frequency rate in this ostensibly theatrical work whose genesis and progress is fraught with struggles to 
‘become’ performed.” (“Mallarmé Reading Theatre” in Freeman ed. et al. Process of Art, 83). 
 
6 On Mallarmé’s manifest interest in a wide array of performance genres throughout his writing, see Mary Lewis 
Shaw (1–7, 229); and on performativity (in J. L. Austin’s sense) in Mallarmé’s poetry, see Johnson Critical 
Difference 52–66. (Indeed, where the latter is concerned, Roland Barthes suggests that a self-consciously 
performative dimension may well be a predominant characteristic of literary writing across the board during and 
after modernism. See: Image Music Text 114.) Although I admire these writings by Shaw and Johnson immensely, I 
respectfully disagree with Puchner’s conclusion that any such performance elements or performative dimensions in 
Mallarmé’s work necessarily point to a fundamentally anti-theatrical disposition (64).  
 
7 To give one example of this pro-theatrical position, Haskell Block writes: “Without neglecting the purely literary 
qualities of Mallarmé’s poem, we may say that the ‘Scène’ [or second movement of Hérodiade] almost cries out for 
stage presentation” (Block 20), and he imagines how the production might be handled if staged by fellow symbolists 
Appia or Craig (13). Elsewhere, Martin Puchner has scoffed at the idea that the work could have possibly been 
intended for performance. He writes: “It would be technically possible to perform all of Hérodiade, but it would 
make relatively little sense to do so: Mallarmé fully transforms the actors and the setting into gestures and signs, so 
that an actual staging would seem to be not an enactment of the text but rather its vulgar and corporeal double” 
(Stage Fright 60). Here, however, Puchner’s own Platonic anti-theatricalism seems only to admit the possibility of a 
purely mimetic staging of the piece—that is, a dumbly literal staging that doubles the poem’s imagery with 
explanatory stage images—rather than one that transforms the piece’s signs and gestures allegorically, as the piece’s 
own form itself would seem to invite. Where Block imagines Appia and Craig staging Hérodiade in a pair of 
successful avant-garde productions, Puchner seems to imagine a mortifyingly mimetic production by a group of rude 
mechanicals. 
 
8 Thus, Weber’s reading of Mallarmé appears to contradict Puchner’s anti-theatrical reading decisively. Puchner 
describes Derrida as continuing a supposedly Mallarméan project of privileging literary texts over theater, but in so 
doing, Stage Fright consistently and erroneously conflates theatricality as such with (theatrical) mimesis. This 
elision allows Puchner to reduce both Mallarmé and Derrida to a shared anti-theatrical position, without taking 
account of either’s interest in forms of theatricality that do without traditional forms of representation.  
 
9 More specifically, Barthes argues Baudelaire put his theater everywhere except his plays (Critical Essays 28). 
 
10 For an example of the linkage between the structure of the fold and the (theatrical) form of the present participle, 
Weber writes: “Derrida is arguing that the traditional notion of truth as self-presence undoes itself in the 
phenomenological insistence on truth as an appearing, ‘in the ambiguity or duplicity of the presence of the present, 
of its appearance—that which appears and its appearing [. . .] in the fold of the present participle’” (emphasis mine, 





11 For two examples of this positioning, see Robert Greer Cohn’s essay “Mallarmé’s Wake” (885–901) and the 
discussion of Mallarmé in George Steiner’s After Babel (186–187). For another, see Derek Attridge’s view, offered 
in the course of his introduction to Derrida’s writings on Mallarmé in Acts of Literature: “Mallarmé’s writing … 
unsettles the traditional categories of literature and of literary criticism, including referent, book, theme, meaning, 
and form. … Derrida identifies the Mallarméan moment as one of crisis, simultaneously marking the end of 
literature as classically understood and the exposure of those aspects of literature which have always, potentially, 
threatened that classical understanding” (110). 
 
12 “Oui, je le sais, nous ne sommes que de vaines formes de la matière, — mais bien sublimes pour avoir inventé 
Dieu et notre âme. Si sublimes, mon ami! que je veux me donner ce spectacle de la matière, ayant conscience d'elle, 
et, cependant, s'élançant forcenément dans le Rêve qu'elle sait n'être pas, chantant l'Ame et toutes les divines 
impressions pareilles qui se sont amassées en nous depuis les premiers âges, et proclamant devant le Rien qui est la 
vérité, ces glorieux mensonges!” 
 
13 Derrida alludes to Mallarmé’s Nietzschean debts by describing the Crise de Vers as a text “which exhibits a 
modernity that could be judged untimely” (Dissemination 237). 
 
14 Among many others, including Jameson, Weinfield offers this interpretation (xi–xiv). See Mallarmé’s description 
of the crisis in the “Crisis of Verse” essay: “La literature ici subit une exquise crise, fondamentale.” (OC, 360) 
 
15 In Weinfield’s view, A Throw of the Dice raises the question “of how to establish meaning in an essentially 
meaningless universe, that is, a universe from which the gods have disappeared, with the result that meaning cannot 
be transcendentally conferred. Mallarmé’s most explicit forerunner in this regard is certainly Pascal, and here the 
basic motif or metaphor of the dice-throw hearkens back to Pascal’s wager” (Weinfield 266). 
 
16 NB: Mallarmé could not have known Nietzsche’s essay “On Truth and Lying,” as it remained unpublished until 
the twentieth century, but the congruency of thought is nonetheless striking for this ignorance. 
 
17 “Les langues imparfaites en cela que plusieurs, manque la supreme : penser étant écrire sans accessoires, ni 
chuchotement mais tacite encore l’imortelle parole, la diversité, sur terre, des idiomes empêche personne de proférer 
les mots qui, sinon se trouveraient, par une frappe unique, elle-même materiellement la vérité.” Significantly, 
Benjamin would make this passage a central point of analysis in his translation essay.  
 
18 Significantly for our purposes, the currency metaphor occurs elsewhere in this essay as well, as when Mallarmé 
characterizes the purely instrumental, informational use of language exemplified by modern journalism as a form of 
currency exchange, writing: “to take or to put into someone else’s hand in silence a piece of money” (OC 368). This 
metaphor deserves to be considered alongside Nietzsche’s philosophy of language, particularly the description of 
truths as coins that have lost their stamp in “On Truth and Lying in an Extra-moral Sense.” A juxtaposition of the 
two texts suggests the following possibility: In the last decades of the nineteenth century—that is, in the time of both 
the Nietzschean pronouncement of God’s death and also Mallarmé’s discovery of the Void, a time of crisis both 
theological and political, metaphysical and material, semiotic and economic—truth and its logoi no longer function 
as transcendental signifiers, or are no longer accessible as such. Instead they are transformed into, or else replaced 
by, words understood in terms of material bodies, tokens of exchange and circulation, items of common currency. 
As coins, these logoi become commodity fetishes in the purest sense. 
 
19 On Mallarmé’s use of allegory, see Barbara Johnson (Critical Difference 13-20), who, like Weber, draws on de 
Man’s practice of deconstruction. See also Fredric Jameson’s essay “Mallarmé Materialist,” where the concept of 
allegory is borrowed from Benjamin (Modernist Papers 313, 319, 333).  
 
20 For a brief summary of these critical positions, particularly as concerns Mallarmé’s larger place in literary history 
vis-à-vis the baroque, see Paul de Man, “Lyric and Modernity” in Blindness and Insight 65–67. 
 





22 See: Derrida Dissemination 197n20, 198. 
 
23 Derrida evokes this backward movement with a labyrinth figure common to both Nietzsche’s writings and the 
rhetoric of baroque aesthetics: “‘Composed and set down by himself. . .’ We here enter a textual labyrinth paneled 
with mirrors. The Mime follows no preestablished script, no program obtained elsewhere” (Dissemination 195). 
 
24 On Lehmann’s idea of  “performance text,” see Postdramatic Theater 85-6. The idea of a non-mimetic form of 
theatricality that inscribes rather than imitates a dramatic text connects Mallarmé to a long history of avant-garde 
theater, particularly by way of Antonin Artaud. Like Margueritte, Artaud sought a convulsive, nightmarish, gestural 
theater, uncoupled from the dominance of literary drama; and by using Margueritte’s play as a prototype for his own 
vision of a new theater, Mallarmé situates himself as a forerunner of Artaud’s aesthetics. Derrida perceived a 
connection between the two, and devoted an entire course to both men in 1968-69 (“L’écriture et le theater”), and 
also elected to close his reflections on Mallarmé in “The Double Session” with an epigraph from Artaud. 
 
25 All passages from Margueritte’s Pierrot are Daniel Gerould’s translation. See: Doubles 45, 50. 
 
26 “Le silence, seul luxe après les rimes, un orchestre ne faisant avec son or, ses frôlements de pensée et de soir, 
qu’en détailler la signification à l’égal d’une ode tue et que c’est au poëte, suscité par un défi, de traduire ! le silence 
aux après-midi de musique ; je le trouve, avec contentement, aussi, devant la réapparition toujours inédite de Pierrot 
ou du poignant et élégant mime Paul Margueritte. Ainsi ce Pierrot Assassin de sa Femme composé et rédigé par lui-
même, soliloque muet que, tout du long à son âme tient et du visage et des gestes le fantôme blanc comme une page 
pas encore écrite. […] La scène n’illustre que l’idée, pas une action effective, dans un hymen (d’où procède le 
Rêve), vicieux mais sacré, entre le désir et l’accomplissement, la perpétration et son souvenir : ici devançant, là 
remémorant, au futur, au passé, sous une apparence fausse de présent. Tel opère le Mime, dont le jeu se borne à une 
allusion perpétuelle sans briser la glace : il installe, ainsi, un milieu, pur, de fiction.” 
 
27 For brief overviews of Symbolist approaches to theatrical mise-en-scène and Mallarmé’s relation to them, see: 
Deak, Symbolist Theater 58–93 and Gerould, “Art of Symbolist Drama” (in Doubles 7–13), the latter of which 
describes Mallarmé’s vision of pantomime as “a mirror of silence” (12). See also Arthur Symons’s discussion of 
pantomime, which is cited by Gerould and which anticipates Derrida’s reading, in which he describes it as “thinking 
overheard. It begins and ends before words have formed themselves, in a deeper consciousness than that of speech. 
[. . .] Pantomime has the mystery which is one of the requirements of true art. To watch it is like dreaming” (Studies 
in Seven Arts 381, 383). 
 
28 For Mallarmé’s description of dance as corporeal writing (“écriture corporelle”), see the essay on “Ballets” in 
Divagations (OC 304). For Derrida on the corporeal writing of the mime, see Dissemination 194, 198, 223. 
Although the differences between dance and pantomime are irreducible, Mallarmé tends to consider the two together 
(e.g.: OC 315). For a generous performance/dance studies’ critique of Derrida’s privileging of language over bodies 
in his reading of Mallarmé’s “Mimique,” see Franko’s essay “Mimique” (in Migrations Nolan ed. et al. 241–258). 
 
29 For an allegoresis of the emblematic images (knives, goblets, flowers—and elsewhere, waves, clouds) created 
through balletic movement that deserves to be considered alongside Benjamin’s claim in the Ursprung that ballet 
eventually came to supplant the emblematic theater of the baroque  (O 95, U 75)— see again Mallarmé’s essay on 
“Ballets” in Divagations (OC 304). 
 
30 For Derrida’s most explicative passage on mime as a figure for corporeal writing, see Dissemination 219. 
 
31 Here I am indebted to Barbara Johnson’s reading. Johnson claims—in an extended analysis of Mallarmé’s “La 
Declaration Foraine” in The Critical Difference—that “the performative utterance is [. . .] the mise en abyme of 
reference itself” (57). In contrast, Weber claims Derrida’s reading of Mallarmé puts the notion of performative 
writing itself into question altogether, asserting instead that “Mimique” and Mallarmé’s mime instead expose “the 
theatrical movement of Mallarmé’s writing” (14). Where Johnson argues primarily in favor of the performativity of 





32 In this way, Mallarmé’s theater is liminal in another sense altogether. Its form and function exist somewhere 
between the traditional Aristotelian theater, on one hand—which, through the illusionist mechanisms of mimesis, 
sets up the false appearance of a present without disclosing its falseness—and what will only later come to be 
considered performance or performance art—in which all illusionist and mimetic mechanisms are stripped away in 
order to make or enacta claim for some manner of true, authentic, original, actual (i.e., not just apparent) presence. 
Mallarmé’s mimic theater is properly neither of these two options, but suspended somewhere between the two, at 
continual play between the traditional mimetic theater and other non-mimetic modes of performance.  
 
33 On the Symbolists’ scenographic practices, and their use of the scrims, see Deak, especially 117. For Derrida’s 
reading of Mallarmé’s Wagnerian debts, particularly as they relate to “Mimique,” see Dissemination 214. It is 
through the figure of the mime and through the possibility of mimomania that Mallarmé’s indebtedness to Wagner, 
Nietzsche, and the theater of the historical baroque can be best traced.  
 
34 For the connection between Margueritte’s Pierrot and Hamlet, see Dissemination 195, 197n20b. Space does not 
permit a full investigation into Mallarmé’s views of Hamlet, which would need to consider his essay “Hamlet,” the 
relationship between Igitur and Hamlet, and A Throw of the Dice… as a rewriting of both Igitur and Hamlet. 
 
35 The 1882 printed text of the play consists of a single lengthy monologue for Pierrot to speak, but it also opens, 
paradoxically, with the stage direction: “N.B. Pierrot seems to speak?—Pure literary fiction!—Pierrot is mute, and 
this drama, from start to finish, mimed”  (Gerould Doubles 45). 
 
36 I am indebted to Jean Howard and Michael West for reminding me of the rich connection between dumbshow 
pantomime and allegory. For the connection between dumbshow and the allegorical tradition of emblem books, see 
Freeman English Emblem Books, 15; see also Mehl, The Elizabethan Dumb Show, 13. 
 
37 NB: Only the second of Hérodiade’s three movements appeared during Mallarmé’s lifetime. A fuller history of 
poem’s manuscript variants and publication history is given in Weinfeld 168–171, Block 9–10.  
 
38  Benjamin cautions against this too-easy elision of reader’s drama with closet drama, in reminding us that the 
Trauerspiel genre of the German baroque were intended to be performed (U 163). 
 
39 This ambiguous phrase reads, in French, “non possible au théâtre, mais exigeant le theater.” According to 
Weinfield, it could “mean either ‘not just capable of being staged but demanding the stage,’ as Rosemary Lloyd 
translates it [. . .] or ‘not . . . playable on the stage, but needing the stage,’ as Bradford Cook renders it” (179). For a 
rich discussion of the Symbolist’s radical desire “to put on stage what common sense declared to be non-dramatic 
and undramatizable,” see Gerould Doubles 7–8.  
 
40 “Tragedy, then, is the imitation of a good action, which is complete and of a certain length, by means of language 
made pleasing for each party separately…” (1449b) Aristotle, The Poetics 12. 
 
41 See Marshall Olds’s essay, “From Stage to Page” in Benston and Olds, eds. 92–4. 
 
42 Charles Lyons makes the connection between Mallarmé and Georg Fuchs’s rhetoric of retheatricalization in Cohn, 
ed. 97. 
 
43 For Hans-Thies Lehmann’s comments on Mallarmé, especially with respect to Mallarmé’s scenic and gestural 
qualities, and on Symbolism’s prefiguration of the postdramatic, see Postdramatic Theater 93–4, 164. 
 
44 Describing Hérodiade, Mallarmé asserts: “In a word, the subject of my work is Beauty, and its apparent subject is 
nothing more than a pretext for approaching Her.” “En un mot, le sujet de mon oeuvre est la Beauté, et le sujet 





45 Weinfield 169. In Weinfield’s view, there is a dialectical relation between these two subjects (one that is arguably 
fundamental to baroque allegory, in Benjamin’s sense) in which the two subjects are ”incommensurate with each 
other and even in contradiction with each other.” (169). For the classical description of seventeenth-century poetry’s 
capacity for becoming a vehicle for its own abandonment, see Stanley Fish, Self-Consuming Artifacts, 1–5. 
 
46 For a pertinent discussion of the classical topos of truth as a woman, veiling and unveiling herself, particularly as 
it relates to Nietzsche’s rhetoric (and surely, also to Nietzsche’s modernist contemporary Mallarmé,) see Derrida, 
Spurs, 53–61. 
 
47 On Mallarmé’s unresolved attempts at depicting the dance through an imagistic mise-en-page, prefiguring the 
spacing experiments in A Throw of the Dice…, see Puchner Stage Fright 63–4. These efforts at emblematically 
conflating text and image in this regard owe debts to the baroque tradition of pattern poetry (the carmen figuratum), 
and Puchner himself suggests the seventeenth-century poet Herbert as a one of Mallarmé’s inspirations in this regard 
(Stage Fright 191.n.30). 
 
48 Samuel Johnson Lives of the English Poets I 20. 
 
49 “Es ist ja dem Sadisten eigentümlich, seinen Gegenstand zu wntwürdigen und darauf—oder dadurch—zu 
befriedigen. So tut den auch der Allegoriker in dieser von erdichteten wie von erfahrenen Frausamkeiten trunkenen 
Zeit.” 
 
50 On Salomé as a crucial figure at the intersection of modernist and baroque literature and theater, see Christine 
Buci-Glucksmann on “Salomé, or the Baroque Sceneography of Desire” (Baroque Reason 144–62). 
 
51 Benjamin also describes the baroque theater (from Caldéron to Strindberg) as attempting to depict “a tragedy of 
the saint by means of the martyr drama,” and a modern “form of the mystery play” (O 113, U 94). For Mallarmé’s 
designation of Hérodiade as a mystère, see Block 18. 
 
52 One need only compare the title Hérodiade with other similarly suffixed poems (The Iliad, Shakespeare’s 
Henriad, Pope’s Dunciad, Voltaire’s Henriade, Barlow’s Columbiad, etc.) to recognize that Hérodiade the character 
figures as an eponymous and allegorical personification of Hérodiade the poem. 
 
53 Weinfield notes that Mallarmé’s letters refer to Geneviève and Hérodiade as “his two daughters” (176). 
 
54 My literal, word-for-word translations of Mallarmé’s poetry fail to capture its sonorous musicality, and the fatal 
repetitions of its rhyming couplets: “Je t’apporte l’enfant d’une nuit d’Idumée! / Noire, à l’aile saignante et pâle, 
deplumée.” Weinfield offers a wonderful translation of this rhyme: “I bring you the child of an Idumean night / 
Black, and with featherless wings bled white” (CP 24). The sonnet’s opening couplet establishes a tragic mood 
through an anapestic tetrameter, the verse form reserved in French neoclassic drama for imitations of the insistent, 
martial anapests that accompanied the initial entrance of the chorus in ancient Greek tragedy; here, as elsewhere in 
French tragic drama, they serve to cast a dreadful pall over the text. 
 
55 Again, Weinfield’s translation here is particularly evocative, and fully suggestive of Mallarmé’s affinities with 
Nietzsche: “O mother, cradling your infant daughter, / Welcome the birth of this untimely monster!” (CP 24). 
 
56 At the very end of his life, Mallarmé would turn his attention once again “to dramatic dialogue and the physical 
demands of stage presentation” with Hérodiade, organizing the revised work around five movements—a prélude, a 
scène, the cantique de Saint Jean, a final monologue, and a finale. Mallarmé even gave a new title to this revised 
piece, Les Noces d’Hérodiade. Mystère (Block 18). See also: Shaw 104–5. 
 
57 Borrowing a phrase from Benjamin’s description of allegorical personages in Calderón’s baroque dramaturgy, we 





58 Marhsall Olds remarks that in Mallarmé’s poetics of crisis, the sense of an individual self “is no longer channeled 
through the inner life. Instead the approach is from the outside through gesture, scenic context, and a relationship to 
things” (in Benston ed. et al. Essays 85), and is ultimately displaced by questions of place, spatial arrangement, lieu, 
spacing, and visual constellations. (92–96). In Jameson’s view, cluttered interior spaces in Mallarmé come to 
spatialize the poetic function of allegory itself. See: “Mallarmé Materialist” in Modernist Papers 326-7. 
 
59 This is Arthur O’Shaughnessy’s 1876 translation, approved and emended by Mallarmé himself. (The original text 
is lost.) See: “The Impressionists and Édouard Manet” in The New Painting: Impressionism 1874–1886, 30. 
 
60 For a contrasting, elegant pair of allegorical interpretations for this overture, see Block (13) and Weinfeld, (172). 
 
61 See the description of Moreau and “The Beauty of Inertia” in Mario Praz, 289, and Dan Gerould’s remarks on the 
same topic in Doubles 19. 
 
62 “Le blond torrent des mes cheveux immaculés / Quand il baigne mon corps solitaire le glace / D’horreur…” (OC 
44).  
 
63 “Je veux que mes cheveux qui ne sont pas des fleurs, / A répandre l’oubli des humaines douleurs, / Mai de l’or, à 
jamais vierge des aromates, / Dans leurs éclairs cruels et dans leurs pâleurs mates, / Observent la froideur sterile du 
metal / Vous ayant reflétés, joyaux du mur natal, / Armes vases depuis ma solitaire enfance” (OC 45). 
 
64 “Vous, pierres où mes yeux comme de purs bijoux . Empruntent leur clarté mélodieuse, et vous / Métaux qui 
donnez à ma jeune chevelure / Une splendeur fatale et sa massive allure!” (OC 47). 
 
65 For Thibaudet’s claim, and on the Symbolist preoccupation with Byzantium, see Weinfield 176. See also Gerould, 
Doubles 18–19, on the Symbolist attraction to the flatness of Byzantine icons. 
 
66 Benjamin, however, suggests that the flatness of stage emblematics in the allegorical theater of the baroque 
precedes and prefigures the Symbolist theater’s aesthetics of pictorial or Byzantine flatness—as we shall see in the 
third chapter of this dissertation. In addition, Benjamin makes clear Byzantium was already a source of fascination 
for the baroque drama, centuries before it aroused the Symbolists’ interest. (O 68–9, U 50–1). Beyond this, there is 
also the famous image of the mosaic that serves as Benjamin’s metaphor for his allegorical methodology in the 
Trauerspiel book’s Epistemo-critical prologue, which at least potentially suggests the closeness of the baroque 
allegorical emblem and the byzantine icon in Benjamin’s thinking (O 28–9, U 10). 
 
67 That is, the allegorical character of Hérodiade character is emblematic, both in the sense of recalling the imagery 
of the baroque emblem book, but also in an etymological sense, where emblema suggests an image made through a 
process of insertion or stamping, as is the case with a coin. 
 
68 For other examples not mentioned by Benjamin, see Fleurs du Mal 39 (“Je te donne ces vers”) and the prose poem 
Le Fou et la Venus. 
 
69 “Whereas in the symbol destruction is idealized and the transfigured face of nature is fleetingly revealed in the 
light of redemption, in allegory the observer is confronted with the facies hippocratica [i.e. the death’s head] of 
history as a petrified, primordial landscape” (emphasis mine) (O 166; U 145). 
 
70 “Allegorique de lui-même” was Mallarmé’s description for another of his sonnets, “Ses purs ongles très haut” 
(Weinfield 217). 
 
71 Again, on the Trauerspiel as a modern tragedy of the saint see U 94. 
 





73 This sense of serenity and stasis is mirrored in the poem’s mise-en-page. The Cantique takes a distinctive verse 
form, each stanza comprising no more than four short lines: 
 Le soleil que sa halte 
 Surnaturelle exalte 
 Aussitôt redescend 
  Incandescent 
There are seven of these short stanzas, each separated by a page break. As such, the poem amounts very nearly to a 
reconfigured sonnet in rhymed alexandrines, with each alexandrine broken into two short lines at the central caesura 
Unbroken, these lines would read: “Le soleil que sa halte surnaturelle exalte / Aussitôt redscend incandescent.” 
Notably, Mallarmé has dropped a metrical foot between the third and fourth lines of these stanzas, between 
“Aussitôt redescend” and “Incandescent,” replacing it with an indentation. The fragmentation of the lines, and this 
added indentation in lieu of the dropped foot, suggest—at leas to this reader—a poetic discourse marked by pauses 
and by a certain contemplative slowness, almost glacial in quality. 
 
74 For a reading of Mallarmé’s interest in the Catholic mass as “the real convocation of a real drama,” a genuine and 
salvific mystery of passion, martyrdom, and messianic return, see Meillassoux (107–113), who describes Mallarmé’s 
interest in the diffusion of the transcendental in terms that mirror Derrida’s notion of dissemination. For Mallarmé’s 
views on Catholic ritual, see also his prose poem on Catholicism (in Divagations, OC 390–95). Mallarmé describes 
the ritual of The Book in his notes as a kind of mystère—the same term he uses at various instances for Hérodiade—
evoking the medieval sense of the ministerium craft guilds that promoted specialized, and  thus carefully guarded or 
secret forms of professional knowledge.  
 
75 On the precise nature of this mimeography, and on The Book as a form of “gesticulating prose,” see Puchner 
Stage Fright 75. 
 
76 See Mallarmé’s letter to Verlaine dated 16 November 1885. On the subject of totality, Jameson is attuned to the 
Hegelian resonances of Mallarmé’s poetics, naming Hegel “Mallarmé’s master” (323). These Hegelian resonances 
are also taken up in Sollers, “Literature and Totality” (in Bloom ed. Stéphane Mallarmé 54), and more exhaustively 
in Langan, Hegel and Mallarmé, specifically 42–53. 
 
77 For Benjamin on the baroque metaphor of the world as a book, see U 121–22. (See also Arcardes [N 4,2].) Deak 
sees a clear connection between Mallarmé’s Book and the Book of Fate dreamed of by Leibniz (85). 
 
78 Edward Said observes, in his essay on “The Problem of Textuality,” that the notion of textuality that emerges from 
Derrida’s writing consistently has reference to the ideas of theater and theatricality (691). Fuchs makes a similar 
observation about deconstruction in her essay on “Postmodernism and the ‘Scene’ of Theater” in Death of 
Character. 
 
79 See Borges’s essay “The Total Library” (Total Library 214–16) and short story “The Library of Babel” (Collected 
Fictions 112–18). 
 
80 Mary Lewis Shaw observes that Mallarmé initially and explicitly “tied his reflections on the ideal Book with the 
date 1889 and the opening of the centennial celebrations for the French Revolution,” but later shifted the focus of its 
intentions toward the dawning of the twentieth century (1.n.1). 
 
81 Puchner claims Mallarmé sought to “out-gesamtkunstwerk the Gesamtkunstwerk” (Stage Fright 71); and Mary 
Lewis Shaw asserts that the Livre was “the most ambitious theatrical performance ever conceived. Far greater in 
scope than either the Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk or such contemporary mammoths as Robert Wilson’s CIVIL 
WarS” (1). 
 
82 Mallarmé’s debts and ambivalence to Wagner have been extensively debated and discussed (Weinfield 227–29, 
Puchner Stage Fright 72, Meillassoux 108, Jameson Modernist Papers 315, 320, Shaw 87–96, Block 54–75, 79–81). 




laudatory “Hommage à Wagner” (published in the Revue in January 1886) and the more obliquely skeptical prose-
poem “Richard Wagner: Rêverie d’un Poëte Français” (published in the same journal in August 1885).  
  
83 See: Jameson Modernist Papers 326. Meillassoux expresses a similar opinion of Mallarmé’s mature poetry: 
“Mallarmé developed a writing technique that consisted in losing readers from the outset with an opening line whose 
construction initially escapes them entirely, it being possible to reconstitute the first phrase only by means of verses 
sometimes located far into the poem. The reading thus begins with a ‘dystaxic’ rather than a syntactical experience: 
One has the impression of words that are simply juxtaposed, but which, for this very reason, scintillate, as if they 
were appearing for the first time in their originary strangeness” (118).  
  
84 See: Jameson Modernist Papers 326-7. Like his concept of allegory, Jameson’s concept of constellation is likely 
derived from his reading of Walter Benjamin, even more than Mallarmé. For example, he gives as a paradigmatic 
example of one of Mallarmé’s constellations, “the collection of knickknacks and Victorian curiosities” that appears 
in the “sonnet allegorical of itself”: “the statue in the form of a lamp, the ashes in their tray, the credenzas, the 
missing ptyx (presumably a vial of some kind), the window and the windowframe, glints of a constellation, the 
mirror in which the statue of the nude is reflected.” Writes Jameson: “The complete object—the named 
constellation—reflects the closure of the ‘total’ new word of the poem which ends as soon as its allegory becomes 
visible.”  
 
85 “[Agir signifia] produire sur beaucoopu un movement qui te donne en retour l’émoi que tu en fus le principe, donc 
existes: don’t aucun ne se croit, au prálable, sûr.” 
 
86 Here, see the discussion in chapter one of Nietzsche’s critique of Wagner, and Wagner’s givenness to baroque 
forms of artistic production, which ultimately focused upon the distinction between two incommensurable visions of 
“artistic selfhood” and the self as “an actor.” 
 
87 The essay on “Restricted Action” suggests this in terms that anticipate Barthes’s notion of the death of the author. 
See particularly OC 370–1. 
 
88 On this subject, Mallarmé’s views on action should be juxtaposed with his famous description of dancing, already 
quoted above in full in note 17. “[T]he dancer is not a woman dancing, for these juxtaposed reasons: that she is not 
a woman [. . .] that she is not dancing [. . .] ” (Further Echoes of this passage can also be heard in Yeats’s famous 
question about how to know the dancer from the dance; and in Nietzsche’s belief, as expressed in the Genealogy of 
Morals that “there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming: ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the 
deed—the deed is everything” (GM 1 13). Jameson describes Mallarmé’s treatment of things as an allegorical 
process of sorts, which he articulates in almost deconstructive terms: “In terms of metaphysics, what is now to be 
underscored is the relationality of all this, the stress not so much on the individual object—the old-fashioned 
Aristotelian substance, with its solid presence and its unambiguous name, lending itself candidly and confidently to 
representation—as rather the multiplicity of overdetermined relationships into which the name of the object enters 
not merely with all the other words of its language but with all its internal connotations as well, the former thing 
now dissolving into a complex process which must somehow be modeled as such in all its heterogeneities and 
reversals, and yet ultimately brought to its own closure as though biting its own tail.” (Italics mine, Modernist 
Papers 323). 
 
89 As Puchner notes, Mallarmé’s vision of acting comes close to what Michael Kirby has elsewhere described as 
“non-matrixed performance.” See Puchner Stage Fright 190.n.22. 
 
90 I am grateful to Ryan Anthony Hatch for calling my attention to the ways Mallarmé’s theater prefigures the 
Ontological-Hysteric theater of Richard Foreman, in this regard. 
 
91 The majority of Mallarmé’s pseudonyms in La Dernier Mode were female, and included, among others, “A 
Creole Woman,” “Zizi, good mulatto woman of Surat,” “Olympia, the negress.” See: Furbank ed. et al. Mallarmé on 





Mournfulness and Ostentation 




Walter Benjamin’s late writings on Bertolt Brecht record a curious anecdote, one that can 
usefully be called upon to help unfold Benjamin’s concept of the baroque and its importance for 
modernism in the theater. The diary notes entitled “Conversations with Brecht” (written in the 
summers of 1934 and 1938, published posthumously) document the discussions that engaged the 
two men while both were in exile at Brecht’s cottage at Skovsbo Strand in Svendborg, Denmark. 
The notes from 29 July 1938 attest to a dialogue between the two that ranged over the subject of 
Brecht’s famous “defamiliarization effect” (or Verfremdungseffekt), which leads us into the 
vicinity of Benjamin’s baroque. Brecht, so Benjamin recalls, had turned to the conversation to 
the topic of flaws in performance that operate unintentionally to prevent the audience from 
identifying or empathizing with the drama onstage. This triggers a memory for Benjamin: he 
responds by recalling a production of Pierre Corneille’s 1637 baroque tragicomedy Le Cid that 
he had seen as a student visiting Geneva in 1915. In that production, Benjamin explains, taking 
up Brecht’s theme of onstage accidents, “the sight of the king’s crown worn crookedly on his 
head gave me the first inkling of the ideas I eventually developed in the Trauerspiel book nine 
years later.”1 Although the origins of scholarly projects, like origins in general, tend to be 
overdetermined, and although Benjamin says nothing more about this production of Le Cid, its 
mention suggests a depth of connection between Benjamin’s views on baroque theater and 
Brecht’s theory and practice of theater that has not yet been accounted for in Anglophone theater 




defamiliarizing stage property, helping the viewer to decode the scene in terms of the nonidentity 
between actor and character, action and possibility. But for the young Benjamin, the image 
amounted to something else, an obscure emblem like those that Corneille’s age produced in 
plentiful volumes, an allegory of a disordered sovereignty, refulgent in its outward appearance 
but suffering the initial pangs of profane decomposition. In view of this double image of 
grievousness and resplendence at once, we might say that the young Benjamin (then in his early 
twenties in 1915) already had a way of viewing baroque theater from a Brechtian, defamiliarized 
perspective. But we might just as easily invert this proposition and ask whether Benjamin’s 
concepts of the baroque and of baroque allegory do not, instead, provide a long theater-historical 
genealogy for Brecht and the practice of epic theater, or for theatrical modernism in general. 
 The study that Benjamin claims resulted from these initial reflections was his so-called 
Barockbuch or “baroque book,” the 1928 Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels (The Origin of 
German Trauerspiel, or The Origin of the German Mourning Play), a study of the melancholy 
baroque theater of the German seventeenth century. As his postdoctoral habilitation thesis, the 
book was written expressly to secure Benjamin a faculty position at the University of Frankfurt, 
but was famously rejected there by both the departments of German Studies and Aesthetics, both 
of whose representatives found it incomprehensible. This reputation for inscrutability has 
followed the book ever since, even (perhaps paradoxically) as it has also come to be regarded as 
a masterwork of modernist writing and a foundational text in critical theory—at least by 
contemporary literary and cultural historians. Surprisingly, scholars of theater and drama, 
particularly in the United States, have mostly continued to demonstrate toward this text a 
persistent neglect. It is an unusual neglect to be sure, since the Ursprung stands as Benjamin’s 




theater and to theater history.2 This is not to say that Benjamin’s influence is not felt in American 
theater studies today. Modern theater and performance scholars have notably turned to 
Benjamin’s famous essay on “The Artwork in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility,” 
mining its critique of “the aura” to help deconstruct the claims to “presence,” “authenticity,” and 
“liveness” that circulate in performance studies and performance art; they have taken up 
Benjamin’s late historiographic injunction to depict history with an eye to the oppressed past; 
and they have considered Benjamin a remarkable explicator of Brecht’s Epic Theater.3 But 
mostly, the American field of theater studies has shied away from Benjamin’s philosophical 
research on theater in the age of the German baroque. It seems likely that this neglect owes much 
to institutional histories and disciplinary differences within the university itself, since Benjamin’s 
work is better known among literary scholars for its theorization of allegory, seemingly a literary 
mode par excellence.4 But Benjamin’s anecdotal memory of his conversation with Brecht shows 
us that the Ursprung project has roots in the space of the theater and in Benjamin’s own practice 
of spectatorship, and that it carries implications for the practice of stage performance as well, 
both modern stage performance (i.e., as it was being conceived in Geneva 1915, Svendborg 
1938, and indeed later) and historical stage performance (Paris 1637). Given this fact, we might 
wonder: why is Benjamin so regularly conscripted as a mere adjunct to Brechtian dramaturgical 
thought, and might he not be considered a theorist of theater and theatricality in his own right?  
A closer look reveals that the modernist theory of allegory set forth in Benjamin’s study 
of the seventeenth-century Trauerspiel amounts also, remarkably enough, to a modernist theory 
of theatricality, and specifically baroque theatricality as it relates to both performance and what 
we now understand as the domain of “the performative.” This theory warrants our attention if we 




Benjamin’s views of modernity as well. As our initial example of the lopsided crown already 
suggests, Benjamin found in the allegorical baroque Trauerspiel a notion of theatricality that is 
imagistic and emblematic, requiring the supplementation of textual exegesis, just as the printed 
allegories of the period did. Often, for Benjamin, these images take the form of gestures or gestic 
attitudes brought to standstill, and the notion of gesture has its own conceptual importance for 
the history of baroque theater that this chapter will elaborate in some detail as well. For now, 
briefly, we can say that although the period saw a compendious literature emerge on the subject 
gesture—the very famous acting manuals of John Bulwer and Franciscus Lang [Figures 7 and 8], 
and the oratorical legacies of the Roman orators Cicero and Quintilian, for example—its 
approach to gesture can be said to amount less to any specific and formalized method than to a 
general theory of gestural signs, signs through which an action or an utterance can be transposed 
into bodily movement and so translated into an image. Although a plethora of authoritative texts 
came into existence during the period to document and prescribe the correct gestural deportment 
of the body for designating various passions and concepts appropriately, the very fact of their 
existence and their increasing multiplicity testifies to a creeping bewilderment on the part of 
actors and audiences alike when confronted with the manifestly conventional relationship 
between gesture and meaning. A gesture is supposed to have a natural, necessary, legible 
relationship to what it signifies, but in the baroque this relationship becomes obscure or 
enigmatic, requiring the manufacture of manuals and texts that can maintain and elucidate codes 
of bodily deportment. The baroque theater was already a gestural theater, one in which 
performers needed, as Hamlet says, to “suit the action to the word, the word to the action” with 




FIGURES 7 AND 8: (Left) Franciscus Lang. Illustration from Dissertatio de actione scenica 
(Munich 1727). (Right) John Bulwer. Chirogram from Chirologia: or the Natural Language of 
the Hand (London 1644). 
 
from any secure interpretive grounding that can offer them support in a single, clear, stable, or 
self-identical meaning. This proliferation thus belies a mounting sense of groundlessness and a 
crisis in formerly stable semiological and metaphysical categories—including that of the 
sovereign subject, as I will show here—a groundlessness that Benjamin will designate with the 




 For Benjamin, however, allegory is not only theatrical in the sense of being gestural or 
imagistic—though these notions certainly inhere in Benjamin’s view of theatricality, and in his 
own sense of himself as a manifestly theatrical writer. Rather, to speak of an allegorical theater is 
to describe a notion of theatricality that is likewise non-dramatic, if we conceive “drama” in the 
Aristotelian sense. Like Nietzsche and Mallarmé, Benjamin’s notion of baroque theatricality 
suggests not so much action in the sense of teleological progression that Aristotle had favored—
a temporal progression that stretches from a beginning to a middle to an end—but actio, gesture, 
a movement or progression truncated from its telos. In refusing an Aristotelian view of drama 
grounded in the notion of “imitated action,” the vision of theatricality that emerges from the 
Trauerspiel book can also be classified as non-representational, non-mimetic, and so non-
dramatic or non-absorptive in Michael Fried’s sense of the term as well. As I will show, in its 
most allegorical and theatrical moments, the baroque stage appears capable of rupturing the 
closed representational framework of the drama to returning the observer’s gaze, in precisely the 
manner that unnerves Fried and Denis Diderot alike, uncannily announcing a mediatic self-
awareness of its own status as theater. Considering Fried’s anxieties about absorption in the 
twentieth century, and returning again to Benjamin’s own example of the lopsided crown in Le 
Cid functioning as an unintentional “defamiliarization effect,” allegory then amounts to a notion 
of theatricality that appears central to our modern theater and performance practice, even still to 
this day in our presumably post-Brechtian, “post-modern” context. In this vein, Benjamin will 
claim that Brecht stands as a modernist inheritor of the baroque tradition of theater, one who 
effectively perpetuates and repurposes baroque techniques and conventions on the modernist 
stage. (This claim may seem particularly counterintuitive, since, as we have seen, Nietzsche had 




often and rightly considered as an anti- or counter-Wagnerian thinker, as Nietzsche often is. Be 
that as it may.) But rather than simply claiming Brecht as a figure of the modernist baroque, 
Benjamin will go further, and will use the notion of allegory to respond critically to Brecht’s 
notion of epic, suggesting allegory as a critical practice akin to Brecht’s use of defamiliarization, 
albeit one that remains resolutely, philosophically melancholy in orientation. 
Beyond Brecht, however, Benjamin found baroque elements among other members of the 
developing German modernist theater landscape, and these factor quite explicitly into the 
Trauerspiel book, where Brecht’s relationship to baroque would only become explicit to 
Benjamin a decade later. The emergence of Expressionism onto Germany’s literary and 
theatrical scene over the course of the 1910s gave the Trauerspiel study its urgency as a work of 
modern criticism. In an early subchapter in the book’s prologue, Benjamin cites the emergence 
of Expressionist theater, alongside contemporary debates about Expressionism’s relationship to 
the baroque, as a justification for his thesis’s subject matter. This subchapter names the 1915 
publication of Franz Werfel’s Trojan Women as a watershed moment for these trends and 
debates, comparing it to Martin Ovitz’s 1625 translation of Seneca’s play on the same theme (U 
37), while the book’s ensuing subchapters and Benjamin’s private correspondence from the 
period rope other authors variously associated with literary Expressionism into the sphere of 
baroque influence as well, including August Strindberg, Franz Kafka, and Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal.5 (Surely, still other Expressionists could easily be added to this list as well, 
especially Georg Kaiser and Oskar Kokoschka, to name only two.6) As his prologue explains, 
“Striking analogies to the present state of German literature have given increasing grounds for a 
new reconsideration of the baroque, one that is mostly sentimental, but nevertheless positively 




Benjamin feels his contemporaries have overlooked amid an uncritical empathy with the past, he 
nevertheless argues that clear analogies can be drawn in the uses of language manifested between 
these two general aesthetic movements (U 36, 38). In this way, Benjamin draws upon recent 
aesthetic history to figure Expressionism as a demonstrably baroque form of modernism, at least 
in part. Drawing initially upon a theoretical vocabulary borrowed from Riel and Nietzsche, he 
claims that both baroque and Expressionist literature demonstrate an “insuperable artistic will … 
[and a] striving after a rough style of language that could approximate the forceful impact of 
world events,” all resulting in the impulse to violent, arbitrary new combinations in artistic 
form.8 If the parallels between baroque and Expressionism are to be pursued, they must be 
considered with recourse to these linguistic deformations and the destruction of the experience 
they trace, where the act of expression itself orients language toward an almost operatic quality 
of lamentation (U 37). 
These felt resonances and echoes of lamentation were exceptionally pronounced in 
Berlin, where Benjamin had returned to live with his parents in March of 1920 upon the 
completion of his doctoral dissertation on the German Romantics, and where the Expressionist 
movement reached what Mel Gordon describes as a point of culmination between 1919 and 1921 
(Expressionist Texts 11, 20–2). In 1922, the theater critic Herbert Jhering gave them an eloquent 
voice in response to the Berlin premiere of Drums in the Night (1920), Bertolt Brecht’s dramatic 
debut as a young playwright still affiliated with Expressionism. In terms that are entirely 
consonant with Benjamin’s analyses in the opening of the Trauerspiel book, Jhering’s review in 
the Berliner Borden-Courier (5 October) begins by linking the recent wave of post-war literary 
Expressionism to the period of the historical baroque, claiming that Brecht’s generation “had to 




Thirty Years’ War: experience itself. The horrors of the last few years were not the collapse of a 
nation, but the inability to experience the elemental things elementally. People’s energy was so 
exhausted that they accepted apocalyptic events like everyday inconveniences.”9 In Jhering and 
Benjamin’s view, Expressionist and baroque forms of literature emerge as responses to situations 
of absolute historical crisis—explicitly in both cases, forms of total continental warfare fought 
predominantly on German soil—which threaten the capacity for experience and expression alike, 
thus demanding new forms of writing whose formal violence can approach the violence of 
historical life itself. In Benjamin’s view, these crises in language and national security are 
precipitated by (and refracted through) a greater crisis of secularization—one triggered initially 
by the Protestant Reformation, culminating in the wars of Religion cited by Jhering, but still 
remaining residually in Benjamin’s lifetime. So, like Nietzsche, Benjamin also conceives the 
baroque as an aesthetic symptom of a crisis in metaphysical and religious faith, an attempt to 
find new linguistic forms that can shore up the realm of expression once transcendent 
signification can no longer be guaranteed. Here—from the devastation laid to Germany during 
the baroque Thirty Years’ War and the modern Great War, and from the melancholy effects of 
the Protestant Reformation still palpable in the twentieth century as structures of feeling 
composed in and through secularization—above all from the destruction of experience these 
cataclysms helped to provoke, in Benjamin’s analysis—in all these historical domains can 
allegory be seen to have its origins. The Trauerspiel study will designate it as the privileged form 
of writing for a world in which language, objects, and meanings are no longer bound together in 
any necessary way.10  
But where Benjamin describes allegory’s emergence during the historical baroque as a 




will he describe a sense of theatricality saturating the baroque Trauerspiel and its historical 
context, and these two developments should be seen as crucially interwoven. Baroque style had 
been associated with a rhetoric of theatricality at least since the time of Nietzsche, as this 
dissertation has already demonstrated. During Benjamin’s lifetime, a new modernist rhetoric of 
theatricality also emerged forcefully in Georg Fuchs’s 1908 call for the re-theatricalization of 
theater, which the Expressionists had taken up enthusiastically and which had marshaled both 
Nietzsche and Wagner’s aesthetics in opposition to the hegemony of bourgeois realism on the 
German stage.11 Although Benjamin’s Trauerspiel study mentions neither Nietzsche nor Fuchs 
on the subject of theatricality, by invoking Expressionism it nevertheless insinuates, right at its 
outset, that the concept of the baroque involves an explicit, ostentatious form of theatricality in 
performance.12 With allegory, Benjamin will aim to pinpoint the conceptual specificity of the 
baroque stage’s unique form of theatricality, and to elaborate its meaning in historico-
philosophical terms whose significance will stretch outward to encompass not only 
Expressionism and Brecht, but the larger field of capitalist commodity production in general, as 
this chapter will ultimately show. With the baroque, Benjamin thus names a crisis not only in 
theology or semiology, but in the longue durée of modern economics, namely, the historical 
persistence of capital from the early modern period until our own. 
 
3.1 Concept and idea 
Apart from issuing Expressionism as the warrant for his investigations of the baroque theater, 
Benjamin’s prologue also significantly offers a conceptual formulation of the baroque as what he 
calls an “idea.” This prologue acts as Benjamin’s methodological and metaphysical position 




complexity, which, like one of Mallarmé’s prose poems, deliberately and effectively 
defamiliarizes the practice of reading itself, forcing the interpreter’s active and reconstructive 
engagement. 13 Like Nietzsche, who as we have seen similarly founds his writing at the 
intersections of philosophy and performance, Benjamin begins the Ursprung in its first sentence 
with the immediate assertion that philosophy must continually confront the question of its own 
representation, the way it stages its ideas, and indeed, its own style as such.14 The Prologue’s 
epigraph from Goethe makes an appeal (again, echoing elements of Nietzsche’s writing) for 
philosophical writing as an artistic activity, stressing the need to “think of science necessarily as 
art” (U 9). In light of these positions, Benjamin urges that the book should be understood as a 
treatise in the scholastic and theological sense, composed not in the coercive manner of the 
mathematical or scientific proof, but as a constellation of fragments, an assemblage of citations 
and of lapidary, semi-aphoristic utterances, whose unity is to be found in its internal 
discontinuity. He describes the work, in the first of many enigmatic images that proliferate 
eruptively throughout the text, as a kind of mosaic (U 9-10). In place of a series of propositions 
connected logically and directed toward some final conclusion, he explicitly offers digressions, 
new beginnings, returns, circumlocutions, swerves of thought, cognitive detours and deviations, 
and above all interruptions between each fragment of the whole. A stylistic principle of parataxis 
governs the writing, repeatedly arresting the continuous flow of thought with a gap opening up at 
each new sentence: Sontag termed this style “freeze-frame baroque.”15 The result is a discourse 
that proceeds with a “rhythm” of marked “irregularity” all its own (U 10-1). These flâneurial 
wanderings, these moments of standstill described as “pauses for breath,” and Benjamin’s 
repeated “gesture” or “gestus of the fragment” (“Geste des Fragments”) all frame writing as a 




is a highly calculated, gestural approach to philosophical representation, one that cannot be 
thought as merely stylistic or as an ornamental exercise on the author’s part. Rather, Benjamin’s 
discourse functions quite explicitly as a kind of representation or staging, by repeatedly and 
theatrically exposing its own rhetorical and performative conditions.  
When Benjamin’s major metaphysical and methodological terms and positions begin to 
appear in the course of this prologue, they seem at first glance pronouncedly, though 
idiosyncratically, idealist in orientation. The prologue’s major theoretical reference points are 
Plato, Hegel, and above all, the baroque philosophy of Leibniz. It asserts that this tradition still 
possesses validity and relevance for the contemporary world (even while acknowledging that 
these frameworks’ claims to “scientific truth” have been contested), since the task of 
philosophy—namely, the development of an order of ideas—lies somewhere between the realms 
of science and art. It describes ideas as constituting a given domain of truth that pre-exists and 
cannot be reduced to any individual human subject’s intentions or relations.16 (In a Nietzschean 
move that equates knowledge with power, Benjamin emphatically dissociates this intentionless 
and relationless domain of truth from the more debased sphere of “knowledge,” in which a 
subject approaches the phenomena of cognition as objects to be overpowered and possessed [U 
11–12, 18].) That Benjamin considers this realm of ideas as being internally both discontinuous 
and multiple, bound together by some resonant (“tönende”) or harmonious principle, both 
suggests his debt to Leibniz’s Monadology—expressed explicitly in a subchapter of the prologue 
specifically devoted to this subject—and his reasons for adopting the book’s hallmark methods 
of interruption and parataxis.17 If Benjamin approaches the “stylistic” aspects of his writing in the 
Trauerspiel book as partly a process of mapping the discontinuities between and within chapters, 




approach is consistent with a view of truth as a metaphysical domain of particulars constituted 
similarly by a necessarily discontinuous structure all its own.  
As it turns out, however, these ideas and the truth they constitute are ultimately linguistic 
in Benjamin’s analysis.18 And as much as the realm of truth comprises for Benjamin a mosaic 
composed of Leibnizian idea-monads, each idea is itself also a mosaic unto itself. For Benjamin, 
ideas (that is to say, words—as ideas) can in themselves be termed “constellations” of the 
objective phenomena to which they refer—a constellation whose internal “configuration” 
mirrors, monad-like, the idea’s own configured embeddedness within the larger network of ideas 
called truth. “Ideas are to things what constellations are to stars. … Ideas are eternal 
constellations, and by the elements’ being comprehended as points in such constellations, 
phenomena are divided and redeemed at once.”19 The constellation is a fortuitous figure for 
Benjamin: it is, in a sense, the most exemplary and memorable of the many Denkbilder or 
thought-images that populate his Trauerspiel study, and also a means by which he can organize 
other images. At the same time, the image of a constellation is always constructed by the human 
imagination, always projected creatively and figurally upon what are otherwise random, natural, 
astronomical configurations.20 This means that a constellation is both an imaged network of 
relations, and an assemblage marked by discontinuity—both a Big Bear (Ursa Major), and a 
collection of seven stars that happen to lie relatively near each other in the firmament, at least 
when seen from an Earthly perspective, but which are in physical reality separated by enormous 
gaps of emptiness, tremendous blank spacings. To borrow the terms of Nietzsche’s Apollo-
Dionysus truce, a constellation is both an image and a kind of imagelessness all at once.  
For Benjamin, such configured ideas or constellations effectively bridge the fields of 




distinct. Where language use is concerned, the constellation becomes a natural figure for the 
phenomenon the Trauerspiel study also describes as allegory: Jeremy Tambling notes that “a 
familiar explanation of tropes in the Renaissance held that ‘a simile is like a star, a metaphor is a 
star and an allegory is a constellation” (Tambling 121). To return this definition of the idea (as 
constellation) to the linguistic sphere of the word (as idea), Peter Szondi has defined the idea “in 
Benjamin’s sense” as “the figure of the unity of the diverse semantic nuances of a word.”21 In 
this way, the Benjaminian idea—which arranges an unassimilated and diverse unity of the 
multiple possible references attached to a single word—makes a rejoinder to Nietzsche’s 
linguistic theory—which had identified language with rhetoric by noting how different languages 
use different words for the same single referent. With both philosophers, no single word 
communicates a full meaning, signifiers only capture what they signify partially.22 (In Derridean 
terms, we might further say that for both, each word carries within it the trace of another word, 
the word that it is not.) Benjamin claims, in something of a mythographic maneuver, that the 
only words in which ideas display themselves fully are the prelapsarian names of the Adamic 
language, where word and thing form a total, natural unity (U 19).23 There, the creative, 
performative force of the speech act of naming is undiminished (Loc. cit.). With the exile from 
Eden, however, this force begins to etiolate, while correspondingly the ur-phenomenal ideas 
become shrouded in ambiguity, with the connection between meaning and sign becoming 
obscure. Both Nietzsche and Benjamin’s views of language therefore come together in 
agreement over the extent to which a word has no clear connection to its referent: Nietzsche 
detects a metaphysical crisis in which multiple words can signify the same thing, where 
Benjamin detects one in the fact that a single word can signify multiply, ambiguously, arbitrarily. 




presupposition of Derrida’s deconstruction.24 Although this genealogy of deconstruction’s roots 
in Nietzsche and Benjamin’s thinking may already be familiar to the reader, it bears rehearsing 
here (however copious and well-known the critical literature that has grown up around 
deconstruction’s origins and influences may be) in order to illuminate the inspiration 
deconstruction draws from the conceptual history of the baroque, and specifically from theorists 
who sought to come to terms with questions of baroque theater. The final chapter of Benjamin’s 
Trauerspiel study will posit this necessary undecidability as a property of allegory, and will 
argue that the baroque theater is the historical context in which this understanding of allegory 
emerges onto the historical scene in Western modernity.  
Moreover, in Benjamin’s conceptualization, baroque is one such word that can be 
considered as an idea, that is to say, as a constellation.25 It is precisely for this reason that basic 
efforts at conceptualizing the baroque inevitably necessitate the impossible work of gathering 
together and explicating the numerous other structural terms this concept seems inevitably to 
constellate within itself (e.g., rhetoricity, irregularity, modernity, affect, style, ornament, 
excitement, gesture, Dionysus, decadence, performativity, and so forth). One way to interpret 
The Origin of German Trauerspiel is to see it as an effort to create the conditions whereby this 
baroque idea can help the philosophy of art grasp conceptually the subject matter of the 
neglected German Trauerspiele, and elevate the form of these dramas to a philosophical idea or 
constellation in its own right.26 Where literary history sees the Trauerspiel as a kind of unified 
genre in terms of its most average characteristics, aesthetics must treat the term as an idea by 
seeking out its most distant formal extremes—holding the best and most highly regarded 
examples up alongside the crudest and most scorned (U 20-1). The Trauerspiel demands “a 




historico-philosophical meaning of this form itself in all its various constellated manifestations 
(U 22), which is also to say, for Benjamin, the “metaphysics” of the form (U 30).  
For this procedure to succeed, it is imperative that the researcher not fall into a relation of 
empathy or Einfühlung, seduced by the sensuous, if admittedly “awkward,” outward appearance 
of the plays. Rather, Benjamin’s critical approach begins with an immersion in the strange 
beauty of the works’ particular details; it then endeavors to constellate these details into an 
unassimilated idea that can represent not the average Trauerspiel but the form’s most extreme 
and emblematic properties; and it then aims to proceed upward, so to speak (upon Diotima’s 
ladder, Benjamin suggests with a reference to Plato’s Symposium), to discover a higher, universal 
truth within this idea. He makes clear, in a now famous passage, that this process demands that 
the external form of the works be destroyed (the book’s second chapter will say “mortified”27) so 
that their truth content can be illuminated in a Messianic moment of revelation: 
Can truth do justice to beauty? This is the innermost question of the Symposium. 
Plato answered it by having truth vouchsafe the being of beauty. In this sense, he 
developed truth as beauty’s content. However, this content is not exposed to the 
light of day in a moment of revelation [or unveiling], but rather shows itself in an 
event that could be described, using a parable, as the flaming up of the husk as it 
enters into the circle of ideas, as the burning of the work, when its form comes to 
the height of its illumination. (U 13)28 
Benjamin here offers his reader an alternative interpretation of the interpretive act itself. The 
artwork’s form is not to be stripped away by the critic in an act of unveiling that exposes its 
meaning and so denudes of its mystery. Another form of allegorical reading or unfolding is 




parables, as being more akin to the way a bud unfolds into a blossom than the way an origami 
boat unfolds into a flat sheet of paper.29 Benjamin illustrates this alternate vision of 
interpretation—this vision of allegoresis as unfolding—in a particularly imagistic manner. As 
works are exposed to the ideas, their outward form flashes up, burns away (almost alchemically), 
and in this visionary, mysterious moment of flashing illumination and apocalyptic destruction, 
both form and truth-content become most vividly apprehensible. In the case of the Trauerspiele, 
this truth-content is something decidedly historico-philosophical, for as Benjamin will explain in 
the book’s first chapter, the Trauerspiel form takes history and not myth as its material content 
or subject matter. The plays themselves thus have some obscure, philosophical wisdom to share 
about history itself. If we understand the literary baroque as being the most proximate point of 
historical origin for the German Trauerspiel, as Benjamin does, we can say that Benjamin 
regards it as his task in The Origin of German Trauerspiel to use (and ultimately to mortify) the 
Trauerspiel plays in order to illuminate what meaning they and the baroque period that they 
exemplify can be said to hold for both history and philosophy alike.30 How can the Trauerspiel 
be used to illuminate the baroque, and how does the baroque illuminate a properly philosophical 
understanding of history? How, indeed, can the Trauerspiel and the baroque be rescued or 
redeemed from historical oblivion, and how can they be made useful for what Benjamin calls 
“philosophical history” (which he describes as “the science of the origin” [U 29])? These are 
some of the principal questions the book seeks to address.31  
Benjamin’s concept of “origin” [Ursprung, literally, the primordial leap] is closely 
connected to his concept of “idea.”32 It is crucial to underline the extent to which this word does 




be considered a way of describing the first time some historical event took place, or the genetic 
emergence of an historical thing ex nihilo. 
 Origin should not be understood to mean the emergence of that which has  
arisen, but rather that which arises out of the process of becoming and passing 
away. The origin stands in the stream of becoming as a whirlpool, dragging the 
very material of emergence into its rhythm. The original never allows itself to be 
seen in the naked and manifest inventories of the factual, and its rhythm is open 
only to a double insight. It must be recognized, on the one side, as a restoration 
and reinstatement, but on the other and precisely for this reason, as unfinished and 
not fully closed. … The origin does not appear out of factual findings, but it 
relates to their prior and subsequent history. The proper manner of philosophical 
contemplation is recorded in the dialectic that attends to origin. In it, singularity 
and repetition turn out to determine each other in all their essentials mutually  
(U 28).33 
It is therefore decidedly not the point of Benjamin’s study to locate the first German Trauerspiel 
and from thence to trace its predecessors and influences; neither is it to make a claim for the 
absolute historical novelty of allegory as a unique aspect of cultural production totally unknown 
to periods prior to the historical frame of the baroque period. It is beside the point to argue with 
Benjamin, for example, that what he describes as allegory has existed prior to the historical 
baroque. Benjamin is not interested in making a set of historicist claims about the past “as it 
actually happened,” or about the way things might have happened “for the first time” in a 
progressive, historicist chronology of events. The concept of origin describes, in yet another of 




vortex that swallows things as they come into being and spits them out elsewhere in the stream 
of time’s flux, as recurrences, re-emergences, repetitions, and reenactments.34 Fully conscious of 
the dizzying effects that will result from glimpsing just such a maelstrom, Benjamin concludes 
his prologue by proposing to approach the baroque epoch from a distance, proceeding by minute 
details. His goal will be to reveal the epoch as in a panorama, without succumbing to the 
characteristic sense of vertigo that the sight of its spiritual contradictions regularly induces (U 
39).35 The Trauerspiel is the tool for approaching this panoramic viewing point. With it, 
Benjamin will proceed to an understanding of the baroque as the origin of modernity, that is, as 
the originary moment of a permanent historical catastrophe, in and through which he and his 
modernist contemporaries continue to live.  
 
3.2 “Images arranged in order to be seen”  
The Origin of German Trauerspiel commences with a remark on the fact that the German 
language has two words with which to designate tragedy as a dramatic genre—Tragödie, a loan 
word imported from the ancient Greek tragoidia, and the modern German Trauerspiel, literally a 
play (Spiel) of mourning (Trauer) or a mournful play—and from the conviction that these two 
words—these two ideas—must not be conflated, as has so often been the case throughout 
modern German literary historiography (U 99–102). The book’s second chapter is devoted to 
drawing out the conceptual differences between the two terms. An expressly non-Aristotelian 
form of drama (U 43), the Trauerspiel drew inspiration instead from medieval mystery theater, 
from English Jacobean and Spanish Golden Age drama, and from the Roman tragedies of 
Seneca. Benjamin neglects to inform the reader that English theater conventions were introduced 




“English Comedians”) that began touring the continent as early as the 1580s and whose presence 
there swelled with the closing of English theaters in 1642. It is largely for this reason that the 
Trauerspiel plays of Benjamin’s study bear clear resemblances to numerous Elizabethan and 
Jacobean tragic dramas, and that Benjamin describes English plays as Trauerspiele as well.36 In 
early modern Silesia, these influences gave rise to a new, courtly dramatic genre that cannot 
properly be called tragedy in the classic, Greek, Aristotelian sense: its bases were laid by Martin 
Opitz (1597-1639) and developed more fully in the writings of Andreas Gryphius (1616-1664) 
and Daniel Caspar von Lohenstein (1635-1683), among others.37 These Trauerspiele have 
historically been misunderstood, overlooked, or forgotten by German literary historiography. 
Characterized for a number of reasons as awkward in form, they have typically been consigned 
to historical oblivion (U 31). Benjamin’s work in the Ursprung is to rescue these plays from the 
scorn and neglect of history, not just because they contain some importance for understanding 
the baroque, but also, for a properly philosophical understanding of history. 
After Benjamin’s prologue makes his properly historico-philosophical interest in the 
baroque Trauerspiel, the two subsequent chapters in the Ursprung (on “Trauerspiel and 
Tragedy” and “Allegory and Trauerspiel” respectively) unfold a pair of intertwining historical 
secularization narratives, both of which result in the mournful feelings that give rise to the 
Trauerspiel genre.38 In the first chapter, this narrative centers upon the consequences of the 
Protestant Reformation as they played out in the realm of historical experience. In Benjamin’s 
account—a classic “Golden Age” narrative of secularization—the renunciation of “good works” 
effectively deprived the Protestant believer of any guarantee of salvation, which was now to be 
understood as dependent upon faith alone and upon the grace of God. This deprivation was not 




contaminate and prevail in “both confessions” (U 60). The unintended, affective consequences of 
this deprivation can hardly be overstated. Their ramifications were first felt primarily among the 
Lutheran faithful: with human actions deprived of their special soteriological value, Benjamin 
explains, “Something new arose: an empty world” (U 119), and along with it the 
characteristically baroque structures of feeling that Benjamin names mournfulness and 
melancholy—permanent fixtures in the unconscious of a modernity to which direct and 
efficacious access to the beyond has been is denied (U 60–1, 119–20).39   
Such melancholy had monumental consequences in baroque Europe for how the progress 
of one’s individual life and the course of human history could be understood and represented.  
Both, in Benjamin’s narrative, come unmoored from any sense in which they could be said to 
progress toward a salvific goal or end-point (U 62). With the schism between Protestant and 
Catholic Europe, this unmooring took place both on the level of the individual subject and on the 
continent-wide level of universal Christendom, now divided against itself to an historically 
unprecedented degree. (“Christendom or Europe is divided into a number of European 
Christianities whose historical actions can no longer claim to be in alignment with the sacred 
process of redemption.”40) Once this fixed and transcendent telos had been lost, a coherent 
narrative progression (from the singular human life to its redemption; from creation to the last 
judgment of the world) could no longer be assured, and a general feeling of historical and 
spiritual disorientation sets in. In the aftermath of the Reformation, what was once the royal road 
or “one-way street” of sacred history becomes instead secularized into a landscape or a labyrinth 
devoid of directional markers, a space for wandering, getting lost, and coming back repeatedly to 




 All this is important for the study of the Trauerspiel because, as Benjamin makes clear, 
the word itself was used in the German baroque to designate both a genre of drama and a 
pessimistic view of human history. “As the designation ‘tragic’ nowadays is applied to drama 
and historical events equally, so too—and even more appropriately—was the word Trauerspiel 
used in the seventeenth century.”41 The word Trauerspiel thus denotes a specifically 
historiographic form of language; through it, the baroque period puts into radical alignment the 
physical stage and the theater of history, assimilating in a new way the historical scene into the 
theatrical scenery. In its theater and its historiography, the baroque period had recourse to 
Trauerspiel (as form and idea) to stage its new understanding of history as something non-
progressive and thoroughly immanent within the context of physical nature. “Die Geschichte 
wandert in den Schauplatz hinein,” claims Benjamin: as it is being secularized, rendered 
immanent, history migrates or wanders onto the stage; or else, as in John Osborne’s evocative 
translation, it “merges into the setting” (Origin 92; U 73). As in Wagner’s Parsifal, then, the 
baroque dramas literalize a situation through which time has effectively become space.  
Melancholia no longer sees the past as irrevocably passed away, but as a new permanent part of 
the landscape.42 In a manner that Benjamin alleges would contribute to the baroque’s 
development (with Leibniz) of infinitesimal calculus, the fluid temporal process of historical 
time becomes graspable in images that can be contemplated and graphed (U 73). On the 
baroque’s increasingly spectacular stages and in the period’s larger conception, the coextensivity 
of history and physical landscape amounts to the emergence of what Benjamin calls “natural 
history” (“die natürliche Historie” U 29; “Naturgeschichte” U 71).43 By this phrase, Benjamin 
means to designate a view of history mournfully deprived of any eschatology—doomed to suffer 




ineluctably toward some great and unknown catastrophe, or endless succession of catastrophes.44 
This secular sense of historical non-movement and catastrophe, then, is the sense in which 
history is “the content” of the Trauerspiel.45 As works of drama the Trauerspiele depart from 
tragedy in that they take contemporary world-historical events and crises of sovereignty for their 
mournful subject matter (rather than ancient, mythic events and mythic heroism, as in tragedy), 
and inasmuch as they have as their material content the baroque’s unique, catastrophic 
experience of historical life.  
  Both in the gloomy theater of the German baroque and abroad, this historical content is to 
be unfolded in allegorical terms, and as such, the Trauerspiel as a dramatic genre focuses 
primarily upon the figure of the sovereign, the period’s allegorical personification of history par 
excellence (U 47–50). With recourse to yet another image, this one of a frozen, gesticulating 
body clutching a stage prop, Benjamin offers the Trauerspiel sovereign an emblematic 
description: “The sovereign represents history. He wields the course of history in his hand like a 
scepter” (U 47). The history the sovereign grasps and represents is not divine, but fallen history; 
he is an emblem not of a harmonious world, but of a disordered creation. Moreover, Benjamin 
argues that as Protestantism rejected the theocratic claims of renaissance kingship in order to 
authorize attempts at kingly deposition and assassination, this period also saw “the final collapse 
of the theocratic doctrine of the state” (Loc. cit.). As such, the baroque sovereign presides over a 
period of personal peril and international crisis, an ongoing state of emergency (or state of 
exception: Ausnahmezustand) that it is his task to decide upon—and in so doing, assume 
tyrannical power—and eventually succumb to, and in so doing, become a martyr.46 Amid this 
trio—Sovereign, Tyrant, Martyr—there appears to be no baroque unity of character: the 




proceeds violently to disincorporate him.47 The deranged, self-destructive baroque Tyrant and 
saintly baroque Martyr are alternative “faces” of this self-divided baroque Sovereign, whose 
characterological fragmentation (and in some cases, like Gryphius’s Leo Armenius, his literal 
bodily dismemberment) the dramas enact. 
Set alongside these centrally important figures in Benjamin’s analysis is a fourth “type”: 
that of the scheming Intriguer who conspires to overthrow the prince. This Intriguer stands, like 
the Martyr and Tyrant who are the twin faces of monarchical authority, as yet another 
counterpart to the baroque Sovereign (U 76). In response to Reformation-era theological come 
debates about the deposability of the monarch (U 47), Trauerspiel emplots history as an 
endlessly repeating, petrified (or perhaps, in Lukács’s very similar, though differently valenced 
term: reified) cycle of conspiratorial violence and overthrow, with the courtly Intriguer as the 
primary goad and motorial force to these constant upheavals. 48 No intriguer plots to abolish 
monarchical power; each intriguer strives, rather, to become a monarch himself: The constellated 
points within the landscape remain fixed, the occupants of them merely exchange places, moving 
within a larger field of stasis. The Intriguer becomes a Sovereign; the Sovereign becomes a 
Tyrant, thus giving inspiration to another Intriguer, the Tyrant ultimately becomes a Martyr; the 
process begins afresh. In Trauerspiel, catastrophes and overthrows of state come to seem 
“typical,” like Jhering’s “everyday inconveniences.”49 But the playfulness of these shifts of 
position is significant for Benjamin as well, and the Intriguer appears in Benjamin’s description 
as a metatheatrical character, whose intrigues take place “like a scenic transformation on the 
open stage” (U 56). Like the designers of baroque stage machinery, such intriguers are 
machinators, whose schemes construct the mechanisms of intrigue that play upon the creaturely 




can more and more easily be predicted.50 The Intriguer, like a playwright, scripts the 
Trauerspiel’s dramaturgical intrigues which—unlike the tragic plot’s playing out in 
“chronological progression”—take place “in a spatial continuum,” either as scenic 
metamorphosis, or as dance, with the Intriguer as choreographer (U 76).  
All these various scenes play a preparatory role in clarifying Benjamin’s understanding of 
the specific form of theatricality that emerges from the Trauerspiel and from the larger baroque 
theater whose paradigm Trauerspiel is. Problematically for the Trauerspiel form, its theatrical 
appeal has become increasingly unrecognizable: modern spectators, Benjamin claims, desire 
only “the impoverished feeling of suspense, which is the only remaining evidence of theatricality 
still available to him.”51 If the “soul” of Aristotelian tragedy is a mimetic plot that unfolds in 
forward-moving progressive time, teleologically from beginning to end, Trauerspiel can only 
instead track bodies as they play mournfully on the stage as a purely spatial medium. Central to 
the baroque idea of theatricality is that this mournful play arrests itself regularly into static 
moments of irruptive passion, pathetic gesture, and verbose profusions of emotive speech that 
come to resemble operatic arias. As these take place, the time of the forward-moving plot grinds 
to a standstill, frustrating any spectator expecting the enticements of suspense and fast-paced 
action. The performer becomes a moving statue or automaton—both frozen in place, and 
unfolding its gesticulations. Between stasis and motion, these figures are also caught between 
image and text: their pathetic gesticulation does not sink into what Benjamin describes as tragic 
silence, but rather overflows into what George Steiner calls “torrential prolixity.”52 Theatrical 
allegory takes place precisely at the site of this tension between an enigmatic image and a 
proliferation of words, words, words—in every case accompanied by more and more gestures. 




seeming deficient in dramatic action, but are highly dramatic in that they overspill with exciting 
gestures, becoming increasingly visual, even as they become similarly verbose.53  
 Another way of saying all this is that Benjamin conceptualizes the baroque theater as one 
whose scenes demand that mournful feelings take on a certain irreducibly spectacular value—
both in terms of the sensuous capacities of language, and even more so, as the enticements of 
imagery. For Aristotle, drama and tragedy are conceivable as purely poetic or linguistic 
categories, with the category of spectacle or opsis being almost entirely irrelevant. Trauerspiel 
on the other hand, insistently demands space for spectacle, machinic changes of scenery, bodies, 
dance, gestures, and images above all. It yokes together two unharmonious affects—
mournfulness and theatrical play, or else mournfulness and theatrical ostentation—into a single, 
unsynthesized concept governed by a principle of immanent polarity, and puts both together in 
space on display. The spectacular and affective theatricality of these mournful-playful feelings 
itself brings about a peculiar performative response when confronted with the spectators’ gaze: 
“Rather than plays that cause mourning, these are plays through which mourning finds its 
satisfaction: plays for the mournful. A certain ostentation is customary for them. Their images 
are arranged in order to be seen, displayed as they want them to be seen.” (U 100).54 This 
metaphysical mournfulness demands to be played, made visible, given over to gesticulation and 
performance, spectacle and spectatorship, as though through such theatrical expression its 
originary lack could be compensated or redeemed, on the part of both performers and audience 
members alike. 
Amid all this discussion of passionate feelings, we should be careful to stress that 
theatricality in Benjamin’s view of the baroque has little to do with modern ideas about character 




spectacle testifies less to an interest in behavioral psychology or a delight in opsis for its own 
sake, and more to a new and significant understanding of images during the period of the 
historical baroque, which Benjamin’s second chapter links to emblematic allegory. Dispensing 
with the progressive plot of classical tragedy, Trauerspiel favors isolated scenes of figures 
disconnected from each other, alienated into separate character typologies. Reflecting the 
influence of the medieval Passion Play—so full of devils and tyrants and Jews and other 
emblems of ‘motiveless malignancy’—the baroque drama “loves to grant the antagonists 
separate scenes, harshly illuminated, in which motivation usually plays the smallest part” (U 
56).56 Like sentences in Benjamin’s prose, events unfold in the baroque theater through paratactic 
discontinuities and interruptions: scenes and characters are decidedly separated out from one 
another in a way that calls to mind the modern practice of montage. In these moments, the 
characters appear caught, as if in a freeze-frame, illuminated by the weird light of the 
tempestuous passions raging through them: here, they are not recognizable as part of an 
enclosed, dialogic universe framed by intersubjective relations with their onstage interlocutors, 
come into view instead alone, seeming to direct their theatrical language and gestures directly to 
the audience. But far from remediating the void, this efflorescence of theatrical language, 
movement, and spectacle, instead only delineates it all the more visibly: beneath the baroque’s 
delight in theatrical gestures lurks an enigmatic infinity—potentially a bad infinity, an abyss of 
endless reflection.57 
While Benjamin’s Ursprung attempts to theorize these various aspects of baroque 
theatricality, and does so in a way that is reminiscent of certain theatrical modernisms’ givenness 
to emphatic forms of theatricality (Expressionism, for one example), it also advances a baroque 




Trauerspiel, and one with central relevance to Benjamin’s concept of baroque, since the 
paradigmatic subject matter of baroque the Trauerspiel is the all-consuming passion and 
martyrdom of the baroque sovereign. In this, the truest Trauerspiele take shape as secularized 
versions of the Medieval passion play (U 57, 107, 166), attempts to find a secular equivalent to a 
sacred dramaturgy of saintly martyrdom (U 94), in which the sovereign’s martyrdom becomes an 
analogue for the passion of the messiah. Consequently, the Trauerspiel is both a revolt against 
the affective conditions of secularization, and a new form of secular drama in its own right, one 
that performatively lets loose even more secularizing effects, as Franco Moretti has crucially 
demonstrated in an account (drawing on Benjamin) of the theater’s role in the desacralization of 
kingship in early modern Europe.58 If the sovereign is torn asunder by a maelstrom of powerful 
passions, increasingly conceived in mechanistic and physical terms, this fragmentation occurs in 
a way that illuminates the baroque’s unique insights into the constitutive contradictions of 
sovereignty itself. Here I wish to stress: in Trauerspiel, it is not only the agony of the sovereign 
that takes a gestural form, playing out in gestures as the stage king laments his mournful or 
melancholy state, but rather: these very contradictions themselves also unfold gesturally. 
Benjamin writes that, “The drama completely attaches the gesture of executive power to 
the stage monarch as his characteristic gesture” (U 51) [Figure 9].59 The sovereign is identified 
by this characteristic executive gesture, a seemingly efficacious gesture of commandment.60 
Beyond simply drawing together the physical action of the body with the action of speaking, the 
gesture yokes both body and language together with the action of speech acts. Indeed, the stage 
sovereign of the baroque Trauerspiel appears like a walking, talking, gesturing, allegorical 
personification of the speech-act in performance. Marlowe’s tyrannical Tamburlaine is 





FIGURE 9: Franciscus Lang. Gestural 
illustration from Dissertatio de actione 
scenica (1727).
 
persuasive rhetorician, rather, they function effectively to create his reality as he declares it, or as 
a result of such declaration. He need only proclaim his intention to transcend his status as a lowly 
Scythian shepherd and ultimately conquer the known world, and through a superhuman will-to-
power these wishes are made manifest.61 In him, as in all baroque stage tyrants, language seems 
to take on an emphatically magical and seemingly efficacious quality62—the scheming shepherd 
becomes a monstrous tyrant, through performative speech and executive gesture. These gestures 
not only mobilize effects within the world of the play’s established reality; they also mobilize 




Marlowe’s audience. The stage sovereign’s gestures mobilize the dramatic and historical context 
of his onstage world; the actor’s gestures militate the spectator’s theatrical passions. 
But although these gestures are at one both exciting and theatrical, both “efficacious” and 
performative (in the onstage world of the play, at the very least), there is something profoundly 
disordered about them. However much the sovereign is endowed with a special, characteristic 
gesture of commandment, this gesture inevitably seems prone to failure or misfire. Trauerspiel is 
by definition mournful, taken up with everything wasted, dissipated, unsuccessful, and 
infelicitous—everything that can be turned queerly or ruinously astray63—and it takes particular 
interest in the way the Sovereign’s commandments prove catastrophically to go awry at every 
instance. In a passage that alludes, implicitly and in equal parts to Carl Schmitt’s theory of 
sovereignty and the final chapter of Kafka’s Amerika, Benjamin writes: 
The Prince, in whom rests the power to decide upon the State of Emergency, 
reveals at the first available opportunity that he is almost incapable of making a 
decision. Just as mannerist paintings with tranquil lighting are virtually unknown, 
so too do the theatrical figures of this epoch appear in the garish radiance of their 
changing resolution. It is not so much sovereignty, exhibited in their stoic phrases, 
that imposes itself upon them, as the sudden caprice of an always changing 
emotional storm in which particularly Lohenstein’s figures wave about like 
tattered, fluttering flags. Also, they are not unlike El Greco’s figures in the 
smallness of their heads, if this expression is understood figuratively. Because it is 
not thought, but fluctuating physical impulses, that determine them (U 52–3).64 
The exemplary indecisiveness of the baroque prince—so evident in Benjamin’s frequent 




the prince’s subjection to his own contradictory physiological passions and thereby to the laws 
governing physical nature. This indecisive, passionate melancholy can culminate in a violent 
madness, in which the prince, “the highest of all creatures,” explodes “like a volcano” and thus 
destroys both himself and his entire court in an emblematic manner that suggests a human Tower 
of Babel (U 52). Or else, if the prince does become capable of overcoming this agonizing 
indecisiveness, and so succeeds in deciding upon the state of emergency and thus assuming 
absolute dictatorial power, he thus becomes a tyrant and thereby immediately susceptible to 
deposition, as for example in Shakespeare’s tragic history of Richard II. It is the same decision—
indeed, the very same gesture that both makes the sovereign and also unmakes him. The gesture 
sets off a series of unintended effects that deviate unpredictably from the sovereign’s intended 
aim, requiring that his sovereign identity splinters into fragments, proving itself not unitary but 
kaleidoscopic.65 In or through the act of gesturing, the princes of the Trauerspiele are torn 
asunder by their constitutive contradictions (sometimes literally so, in the case of Gryphius’s Leo 
Armenius). They become both tyrant and martyr, both sovereign and creature, both in and out of 
control, both bodies politic and natural, both lords over the created, physical world and subjects 
to this world’s laws of ruination and death.66 The gesture and the speech-act they seek to deploy 
ultimately prove more powerful than they, and enact, so to speak, a powerful vengeance upon 
them.67  
For these reasons, it is not just that such scenes of pathos effectively deconsecrate 
monarchical sovereignty, as Moretti has claimed. Rather, through the mechanisms of allegory by 
which the monarch comes to be seen as an emblem for the schismatic fallenness all of humanity, 
his particular agony is also the universal agony of all his temporal subjects and of sovereignty in 




subject (U 53-4). The political meanings of the Trauerspiel’s theory of sovereignty thus extend 
beyond the realm of monarchical politics and into the sphere of the social intercourse.68 These 
agonies are not produced by any Aristotelian hamartia (or error) but by a more general guilt 
produced in and through the original, Edenic fall from divine grace—the judgment passed over 
the earth is that of “creaturely guilt” or “original sin” (U 110). It is not through any fault of the 
sovereign’s own, but as a necessary and constitutive condition of the fallen world that such 
speech acts go necessarily and disastrously off course. There is something ruinous at work within 
the Trauerspiel’s conception of nature, something queer about the natural context—or indeed, 
one might say, something particularly baroque that sets the speech act against itself and causes it 
to go so wildly amiss. The second chapter of Benjamin’s Origin of German Trauerspiel will go 
on to offer a name for this infernal force: allegory. 
 
3.3 Staring allegory in the face 
To review: the baroque Trauerspiel gives formal shape to an experience of historical 
secularization, one in which physical nature is seen as being torn asunder from any transcendent 
significance, giving rise to a sense of the world as purely immanent reality. The form glimpses a 
condemned world, deprived of a divine or transcendent reality, one that is both petrified at the 
site of an absolute historical impasse and suffering the fate of ruination and enforced repetition.69 
This frozen world is also infernal, just as Hell is frozen over in Dante’s depiction. Defined by the 
seeming absence of any divine presence, it is ruled over by demonic ambiguity and other Satanic 
forces, such as the purely malevolent Intriguer (in whom Benjamin rightly observes a trace of the 
stage devils of the medieval mystery play genre [U 107–8]). A theatrum mundi in the grip of 




“the time of evil, the triumph of dark powers that are nourished by a power even more profound 
until extinction.”70 Amid this hellish landscape of impossible sorrows—transfixed and seemingly 
permanent—Benjamin glimpses the most limited of hopes, not in any German Trauerspiel but in 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet. The Danish prince is a combination of sovereign, intriguer, and martyr 
who also happens to be, as James I himself also was, a student and a scholar. In the “Trauerspiel 
and Tragedy” chapter’s final sentences, Benjamin cryptically characterizes Hamlet’s 
contemplative melancholy as being “redeemed, by encountering itself,” and asserts that in 
Hamlet the Trauerspiel form attains “a glimpse of self-awareness” (U 137) that betokens the 
possibility of Christianity’s salvific providence. These passages do not explain how or why this 
redemptive transformation takes place, or what Benjamin means by invoking the concept of 
redemption here. Understanding how such salvation works requires that we now turn our 
attention to the Trauerspiel book’s baroque concept of allegory. 
Where the first chapter of the Ursprung depicted the secularization of the world in 
theological terms—with disenchantment brought about as an unintended consequence of the 
Protestant Reformation—the second depicts it in semiological terms. Against a century of scorn 
heaped upon allegory since the Romantics’ valuation of the symbol, the Ursprung book trains its 
transvaluative gaze upon allegory for the sake of unfolding the second of its two secularization 
narratives.71 It claims that allegory took on an unprecedented, new function in the time of the 
Counterreformation, beginning with the attempts by sixteenth-century humanist scholars to 
decipher ancient hieroglyphs and translate their meanings from imagistic to alphabetic writing (U 
147). In rediscovering texts by the ancient Egyptians, particularly the Hieroglyphica of 
Horapollo, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century scholars began to produce modern hieroglyphic 




with the invention of the printing press. Using woodcuts and engravings—the mediums by which 
graphic art was first made technologically reproducible, long before text was made reproducible 
by type, as Benjamin’s Artwork essay reminds us, (GS 1.2 474)—the allegorists of the baroque 
filled these emblem books with elaborate illustrations that served as modern versions of ancient 
hieroglyphics, each supplemented with a descriptive caption and allegorical explication, each 
amounting to a baroque dialectical image [Figure 10]. These emblems were additionally, in 
Benjamin’s account, less Christian and didactic than previous, Medieval forms of allegory had 
been, drawing instead on the natural-historical and mystical functions of allegory in antiquity (U 
149). Enigmatic in character, the emblem or allegorical image presents itself as a rebus to be 
deciphered, even if this creates a creeping uncertainty about the possibility that the image might 
signify multiply or ambiguously. Because the image’s meaning is not fully present and self-
evident within the image itself, because it relies upon the supplementary explication provided by 
its textual matter, this new, baroque model of allegory reveals a non-necessary relationship 
between the visual signifier and its textually explicated meaning. In the baroque, allegory is not 
merely a “convention of expression,” not a cold, sterile technique arbitrarily applied, but an 
“expression of convention”—a way of glimpsing and giving voice to the irreducible arbitrariness 
of language in relation to the world of things (U 153). Following Herbert Cysarz, Benjamin 
claims allegory as the “dominant” stylistic tendency of the age (U 141).  
Benjamin’s analysis of modern allegory’s emergence and dominance over the baroque 
period entails yet another fall from grace. Formerly, so his argument maintains, words (as 
signifiers, to use de Saussure’s vocabulary) were joined to their transcendental/mental meanings 
(signifieds) and material objects of designation (referents) through a divine and necessary bond, 





FIGURE 10: George Wither. Plate XII from A 
Collection of Emblemes, Ancient and 
Moderne (London 1635), featuring the 
emblem’s typical three-part structure (motto, 
pictura, subscriptio).
unbroken unity between a name, a sensuous object, and a supersensible signification (U 138).72 
As with Edenic names, such symbols embody their meaning fully in themselves: these signs are 
self-contained, self-identical, and timeless (U 144). Benjamin observes in Marsilio Ficino’s 
commentary on Plotinus an erroneous concept of ancient hieroglyphs as a form of divine writing, 
full of the image-characters of divine thought in which words express things in perfect and direct 
fullness (U 148). The humanists’ obsession with the hieroglyph—and their wrongheaded 




resolutely melancholy attitude toward modern language use. Prior to the fall, word and thing are 
one: the performative force of the Adamic commandment of naming, by which a linguistic 
signifier is attached to a thing in the world, is in full effect. In the baroque, this performative 
force of these names begins to etiolate. In and through the Reformation—which breaks apart the 
unity of European Christendom but in so doing also reenacts the fall from Grace and precipitates 
the basic crises of the baroque world—things appear to have fallen apart from their meanings 
and linguistic designations. Their relations deteriorate, suffer ruination—both coming under and 
expressing the harsh judgment of natural history upon words and world alike. Allegory’s 
emergence in this period precipitates and registers a new understanding of language’s 
relationship to the world of things as being non-unified, non-necessary, conventional, historical, 
and aporetic.73 In a decidedly Nietzschean turn-of-phrase, Benjamin claims that allegory sees 
into the abyss [Abgrund] within language. [U 178]: less a formal technique and more an 
epistemology in itself, its expressions are both compelled and formally conditioned by the 
awareness of this abyss.  
 The emergence of a modern vocabulary of emblems in baroque Europe is thus a crucial 
moment in a narrative through which Benjamin means to depict the secularization of language, 
the process by which words and images alike are stripped of their auratic character by allegorical 
devices. As with the secularization narrative that drives the “Trauerspiel and Tragedy” chapter, 
this second sequence of secularizing events has its own mournful effects, not unrelated to the 
first. In the Ursprung’s first chapter, Lutheran doctrine (especially the motto of “Faith Alone”) 
had brought about an unprecedented stage in the disenchantment of the world, making 
widespread the unsettling possibility of the Deus Absconditus, looking backward to the 




Trauerspiel is a means by which the dissipation of sovereignty—not just human, but divine 
sovereignty as well—can be played out and contemplated. The stage sovereign may stand in for 
a historical figure (the martyred Charles I, for example, in the case of Gryphius), but he is not 
utterly devoid of mythic or theological significations: the deposition and dismemberment of the 
stage monarch is a figure for the shattering and dispersal of the divine realm into broken shards. 
His disastrously misfiring executive gesture, which lacks the performative force to fulfill his 
desires and which also undoes him, is an allegory for the nature of allegory itself, in which the 
performative force that binds words as names to things begins to disintegrate.  
Under the melancholic sign of baroque allegory, the mythic space of Eden—where words 
and things are one and where everything is full of divine presence—is lost and its recoverability 
is rendered impossible, thus giving way to the temporality of a fallen nature. Allegory sees and 
reveals human history through the temporal dimensions of natural history, in which both time 
and history alike are seen to become physical, devoid of transcendent significance, undergoing 
the ruinations of immanence:  
[I]n allegory, the spectator views the facies hippocratica of history as a frozen 
primordial landscape. Everything untimely, sorrowful, or failed about history, 
from its beginning on, impresses itself in a face—or rather, in a skull. … That is 
the essence of allegorical contemplation, of the baroque, secular exposition of 
history as the passion of the world, whose meaning is only in the stations of its 
downfall. The greater the meaning, the greater its deathly fallenness, because 
death digs the jagged demarcation line between physical nature and meaning 
deepest of all. If nature, however, is always fallen and subject to the power death, 




Death the Reaper, allegory of time, who surrogates the ancient melancholy figure of Saturn or 
Kronos (or Chronos), comes to extend a doleful power over all of creation (U 130). It is not just 
that Lutheranism evacuated good works of their metaphysical meaning: allegory had the same 
effect upon objective reality, the world of things, an effect that Benjamin describes as producing 
the antinomies of allegorical interpretation: “Any person, any thing, any relationship can mean 
anything else. This possibility passes an annihilating but just verdict upon the secular world. … 
[But] all of these stage props of signification win, by their very ability to gesture to something 
else, a certain power which is incommensurable with profane things and which can raise them to 
a higher level, indeed, a holy one” (U 152–53).75 The physical world of things is both drained of 
its divine mystery and condemned, and simultaneously imbued with a strange new enigmatic 
character in which everything seems to mean something inscrutable, potentially anything other 
than itself. It is both disenchanted and perversely reenchanted at once. Nature—as in the 
allegorical poetry of Baudelaire that occupied Benjamin’s attentions as a translator throughout 
the first years of the 1920s—becomes a forest or theater of emblems, with each image or object 
of attention breathing out confused words for the allegorical man to contemplate, transposing 
him from a melancholic attitude into a defamiliarized or wonderstruck one.76 Allegory dismantles 
the old theatrum mundi at whose center is the divine presence, and in its place creates a new 
theatrum mundi, a new, and seemingly centerless, immanent world of infinitely networked 
persons, things, and relations, all permeated with theatricality and theatrical play.  
But allegorical theatricality also takes a very specific shape inside the theaters of the 
baroque period as well. Where classical tragedy had, according to Aristotle, concerned itself 
primarily with dramatic representation, Trauerspiel and the baroque stage subordinate this 




hieroglyphically. This subordination amounts to yet another shift from the transcendence of 
imitation to the mediatic immanence of the physical stage space (i.e. its architecture, the bodies 
of the performing courtiers, the heavy material of the scenery, costume, ornaments, and 
machines). In brief: the baroque period can be said to amount, in Benjamin’s analysis, to the 
historical moment when theater itself becomes recognizable as an aesthetic and spatial medium 
unto itself. In terms of baroque spectacle, such subordination also means that scenographically 
the invisible fourth wall of Diderot’s time would have been an utterly alien concept to the 
Trauerspiel stage: its images are not so much represented as displayed to be seen by an audience, 
and most notably in the history of the courtly theater of the period, by a sovereign spectator 
seated in the auditorium or stage’s centermost point. As such, bodies onstage must pivot open 
partially outward into a proto-balletic “fourth position” of the feet or, in the case of the English 
masque or the Trauerspiel’s interludes, must face entirely outward through the proscenium 
boundary in order to display themselves and their allegorical attributes fully, breaking any 
semblance of absorptive illusionism and settling repeatedly instead into theatrical tableaux 
vivants (U 171). In these moments, the Trauerspiel effectively introduces and allegorizes a 
distinction between drama (in the sense of the word that descends to us from Aristotle, Diderot, 
and Michael Fried) and (the non-mimetic elements of) theater as such. 
An effect of these repeated tableau arrangements is that the baroque stage comes to 
appear like a massive illustrated page in a baroque emblem or festival book. In Benjamin’s 
reading of the figure of the sovereign, the depth and human suppleness of actors portraying fully 
psychological characters is replaced by a certain flatness and stiffness that recalls the illustrated 
page itself, the kings of playing cards or else, the rigid, wooden staginess of puppets swaddled in 




heightened dialectically by the use of forced perspective to create (from the sovereign spectator’s 
position) the illusion of an abyssal depth to the stage space itself. In the Trauerspiel’s most 
expressly allegorical, and thus most theatrical moments, the onstage figures face flat front, 
presenting themselves to the observer face-on, like so many of the personified emblems and 
allegorical properties in the emblem books from the period do [Figure 11]. Indeed, while he 
rejects the view that the Trauerspiel plays were written as closet dramas, Benjamin even goes so 
far to equate the experience of watching a Trauerspiel in performance with the experience of 
reading (U 163). Gazing outward from this page-like stage, the allegorical performers display 
themselves and their properties as emblem-fragments: open-ended, not at all self-sufficient, 
awaiting their interpretive “completion” or elaboration. Benjamin writes, “Only in their 
fragmentary incompleteness, however, do things stare out from the allegorical structure” 
(emphasis mine, U 164)77 and much of the baroque’s sense of theatricality can be understood 
through the enigmatic way in which the emblematic image seems to return the spectator’s gaze 
from the page or the stage alike. In this sense, when the baroque theater performer appears upon 
the stage in full view of the audience, not abiding by any enclosed dramatic or mimetic 
framework but instead appearing to return the spectator’s gaze, a dialectical process is set in 
motion. First, any “interpersonal” relations that that figure might have had with other figures on 
the stage are disrupted as the performer breaks eye contact with them and gazes out to the 
audience, in short the drama’s auratic illusion of a closed, absorptive, or represented world of 
“the interpersonal” is disrupted in the moment the onstage figures cease to regard each other. At 
the same time, in the moment that the onstage performer takes up eye contact with the spectator, 





FIGURE 11: George Wither. Selection of plates from A Collection of Emblemes (1635), showing 
figures “staring out from the allegorical structure.” 
 
powerful form of aura that seems to saturate the objective stage—an aura that is newly enigmatic 
and phantasmagoric—which the viewer then views with dumbstruck confusion, with awe, or 
with a more detached and contemplative attitude.78 Again, it is crucial to underline, these baroque 




whose attention is absorbed inside a mimetic framework. Instead, they exist at the meeting point 
of image and theater in another sense altogether: the baroque tableau vivant is precisely 
theatrical in Michael Fried’s sense, breaking with the illusion of mimesis to look outwards from 
the boards, rupturing the barrier of inscribed by the proscenium arch (or page/canvas) to meet the 
spectators’ gaze directly. 
Still, Benjamin’s concerns about the aesthetic dimensions of Trauerspiel, allegory, and 
baroque theatricality are in many ways secondary to his interest in the theological and historico-
political meanings that can be extrapolated from them, and in this regard all three raise again a 
question about redemption. Like the final pages of the “Tragedy and Trauerspiel” chapter—
which focus on Hamlet as a mournful play that turns ultimately to dramatize salvation—the final 
pages of the “Allegory and Trauerspiel” chapter suddenly shift the book’s focus back to a 
question of redemption. Where the book’s first chapter depicts Hamlet’s redemption as 
stemming from a certain contemplative self-awareness in which melancholy is redeemed through 
being reflected back upon itself, here allegory and allegorical contemplation are likewise said to 
redeem themselves in a miraculous and messianic moment of self-re-discovery.  
[I]t is precisely in visions of the thunderous rush of annihilation, in which 
everything earthly collapses into ruins, that allegorical contemplation’s limit, 
rather than its ideal quality, reveals itself. The desolate perplexity of Calvary, 
which can be glimpsed as the schema behind the allegorical figures in thousands 
of the engravings and descriptions of the time, is not only a sign of the bleakness 
of human existence. Transience is not so much signified or allegorically 
represented in it, but rather, in its own significance, presented as allegory. As the 




reverses itself in the death images of the baroque—swinging back in the opposite 
direction, redemptively. (U 207-8)79 
In the book’s concluding pages, the ruinous, corpse-laden, and petrified landscapes of the 
baroque imagination reveal themselves as redemptive Golgothas. They are allegories, but they 
are also allegories of allegory itself, and this reflective motion brings about—however 
mysteriously—a messianic moment in which the condemned world is saved from its fate. 
Salvation, then, springs forth immanently from the internal contradictions within allegory itself, 
rather than from any transcendent source, and functions as a final, miraculous deus-ex-machina 
for the Trauerspiel that the book itself performatively enacts.80 It is notable that the Ursprung 
book remains largely cryptic on the historico-philosophical meanings of this redemption, and on 
the precise way it takes place within the domain of human history. If such an enactment fails to 
make the nature of this messianic moment perfectly clear to the reader, at least its enigmatic 
character allows the allegorical dimension of the book’s ending to remain detectable as a spur to 
enigmatic contemplation in itself. Regardless, Benjamin maintains that such redemption as can 
be found in the hellish depths of the baroque world is available only at the limits of 
contemplation in a moment of self-reflection, when allegory as a mode of interpretation comes to 
confront allegory as a mode of expression.   
 Here it is important to recall that allegory, for Benjamin, exposes the non-identity and 
conventionality of relations between words and things, and as such, participates in a destructive 
(one might also say deconstructive) process by which a presumably natural order of things can 
be decomposed (or mortified) and so revealed to have been always already constructed.81 
Allegorical contemplation, when confronted with the allegorical sovereign of the Trauerspiel 




creaturely body natural and the transcendent body politic; and it is through allegory that these 
two bodies can be seen as severable and tyrants as deposable. In the time of the baroque, which 
saw both the apotheosis and the agony of absolute sovereignty, allegorical contemplation 
emerged as a mournful fact of modern life, and as a demonstration that things and their meanings 
can still be radically reconfigured, if only the most appropriate gesture can be found. In the time 
of early modernity, however, baroque allegory would remain largely reactive and mournful: its 
potential for radically reconfiguring things remains purely virtual. Only later, in response to 
Baudelaire and Brecht, would Benjamin discover a more politically viable, potentially 
revolutionary vision of the form. 
 
3.4 Benjamin’s baroque after the Ursprung 
As Benjamin was completing the Ursprung during his stay in Capri in 1924, he was already 
gaining exposure to the discourse of communism through his extensive readings in Lukács’s 
History and Class Consciousness and through meeting the Bolshevik theater director, Asja Lacis, 
a sometime collaborator of Brecht and Piscator’s. In the wake of Florens Christian Rang’s recent 
and untimely death, and under the influence of Lukács and Lacis, the gravitational centers of 
influence over Benjamin’s thinking were shifting from Rang’s Nietzscheanism to a newfound 
interest in Marxism (SW1 510). This shift, which never abandoned the theological cast of 
Benjamin’s earlier writing, nevertheless helped produce the more overtly political book One Way 
Street, which Benjamin composed between 1923 and 1926 for publication in 1928, an essay that 
could arguably not be farther in tone or compositional format from the Trauerspiel study, but 
that nevertheless puts Benjamin’s study of emblems into a new practice of political allegoresis. 




would come, in works like One-Way Street, to be trained upon the spectacle of the city itself: the 
allegorical emblems of the baroque theater had taught Benjamin a new way to interpret the urban 
labyrinth, with all its enigmatic fixtures, passages, arcades, and objects of visual attention.82 As 
Benjamin described in a letter to Scholem (18 September 1926), the onstage street scene of 
Palladio’s Teatro Olimpico in Vicenza was converging with the labyrinthine streets and 
spectacular street scenes of his childhood memories of Berlin and his newly adopted home in 
Paris. [Figure 12]83 Or, in Sontag’s aphoristic summary: “The successor to the baroque stage set 
is the Surrealist city.”84  
 
FIGURE 12: Francesco Zucchi. Engraving of the scenae frons and permanent stage setting 
depicting a city street at the Teatro Olimpico in Vicenza. Completed in 1585 according to 
designs by Andrea Palladio (architect) and Vincenzo Scamozzi (scenographer). Del Teatro 





Meanwhile, he continued his study of Baudelaire’s poetry, whose splenetic deployment 
of allegorical devices had provided him with some of his first occasions for thinking about the 
melancholy allegories of baroque Trauerspiel, and by 1927 he was already at work on the 
archaeological study of nineteenth-century Paris that would become known much later as The 
Arcades Project. The Konvolut of The Arcades Project that specifically takes up Baudelaire’s 
poetry offers Benjamin an opportunity to consider the way this poetry amounts to the nineteenth-
century inheritance of the baroque’s allegorical mechanisms and melancholic attitudes, thus 
creating the aesthetic preconditions for modernist poetry through a Janus-faced look backward to 
the seventeenth century.85 But at the same time, The Arcades Project unfolds a critique of the 
commodity form as allegorical that both reflects Benjamin’s newfound political education and 
the extent to which the ideas of the Trauerspiel study continue to underwrite his methods into his 
later, more explicitly Marxist years. “In Baudelaire, the commodity form emerges as the social 
content of the allegorical form of perception,” writes Benjamin in §J59,10 in this Konvolut.86 
Then, somewhat later in §J79a,4, he claims that Baudelaire’s most exemplary form, namely 
allegory “corresponded perfectly to the commodity fetish.”87 This gestural critique of the 
commodity as allegory receives its fullest articulation in §J80,2; J80a,1, in which Benjamin 
compares the task of the allegorist to the action of assembling a puzzle from its various 
fragmented image pieces. In this passage, Benjamin describes the figure of the allegorist as one 
who tries to fit images and meanings together like so many puzzle pieces whose connections 
cannot be foreseen and have no natural mediation: 
But this is also how it stands with commodity and price. The “metaphysical 
subtleties” that the commodity enjoys, according to Marx, are above all, the 




receive their price never allows itself to be seen, neither during their manufacture 
nor later when they come to market. This is also how things fare with the object in 
its allegorical existence. … In point of fact, the commodity’s meaning is called: 
price; it has no other meaning, as a commodity. Thus, with commodities the 
allegorist is in his element.88 
The arbitrariness with which signs and meanings are paired with each other in the form of 
baroque allegory finds its analog in the arbitrariness with which commercial goods are given 
prices and endowed with a fetishistic aura in the capitalism of the nineteenth century. Allegory, 
then, is a name for the process by which commodities are formed and given over to a reified 
world for consumption, but at the same time, a name for an insight into the arbitrariness of the 
commodity form provides a glimmer of revolutionary hope.89 The progressive key to the 
overthrow of a capitalist régime of commodities is to be found in the allegorical contradictions 
within the commodity’s phantasmagorical form itself:90 if redemption is to be found anywhere, it 
springs forth from a position of immanence within this objective form and these contradictions. 
In Benjamin’s view, Baudelaire’s poetic modernism was a reaction to a crisis within nineteenth-
century modernity being precipitated by the commodity: his splenetic use of allegory “bears 
traces of the violence that was necessary to tear down the harmonious façade of his surrounding 
world” (J55a3).91 But for all this violent potential, Baudelaire’s rage remained impotent, like one 
fighting through the wind and rain (GS 1.2 652). 
For this rage to be turned to productive, critical use, Benjamin would need to interpolate 
the work of another modernist poet heavily influenced by Baudelaire: namely, Brecht and the 
Brecht’s epic theater. As early as the Trauerspiel study, Benjamin had already reflected on the 




new conceptual-historical alignment with each other in the writings of the German Romantics (U 
145-6). Toward the end of Benjamin’s life, Benjamin would assert a substantive, historical 
connection between the baroque stage and Brecht’s theater practice, describing Brecht as the 
inheritor of the baroque Trauerspiel tradition in theater. The claim is made briefly and in 
passing, more as a critical gesture or aphoristic observation than as a fully substantiated 
argument; he offers it in the context of his essay “What is Epic Theatre?” (2nd version, 1939), 
focusing the relationship between Brecht and baroque on the figure of “the untragic hero.” 
Observing that theater in the French seventeenth-century often reserved a place on the open stage 
for aristocratic audience members to sit among the actors as contemplative spectators—examples 
of “the thinking man” onstage—Benjamin asserts that “Brecht often had something similar in 
mind. One can go further and say that the experiment Brecht undertook was to make the thinker, 
or even the wise man, the hero of the drama itself. In precisely this one can define his theater as 
epic.”92 (GS 2.2 534).  
Thus, Benjamin situates both the baroque Trauerspiel and Brecht’s epic theater against 
the traditional understanding of drama that has descended to modern times from Aristotle’s 
Poetics.93 In sprawling terms that yoke together disparate movements from across the entire 
breadth of European theater history, he claims that prior to the baroque period, theatrical 
experiments with putting wise men as untragic heroes onstage can be found in the examples of 
Plato’s dialogues (Socrates), and in the medieval passion play (Christ).94 From thence, “This 
important but poorly marked road (which here serves us as the image of a tradition) wandered 
through the Middle Ages through Hroswitha and the mystery plays, and in the Baroque period 
through Gryphius and Calderón.”95 Benjamin continues, tracing the tradition through 




discussing the Trauerspiel’s afterlife in his earlier Ursprung study.96 “It is a European road, but 
also a German one. If indeed one can speak of a road rather than a stalking path upon which the 
legacy of medieval and baroque drama has reached us. This horse and mule path, however 
shaggy any unkempt it may be, appears again today in Brecht’s plays.”97 
Brecht thus stands as the modern culmination of this rough tradition, an inheritor of the 
baroque theater in Benjamin’s present day (arguably even more than the Expressionist’s had 
been), one whose theatrical concerns overlap to a significant degree with those concerns 
evidenced in the Trauerspiel. For all the various, mostly superficial ways in which the baroque 
theater and Brecht’s theater seem to part ways (for example, the frequent tendency of baroque 
style toward strong emotions that Nietzsche’s writings diagnose, as opposed to Brecht’s 
predilection for scientific analysis), both come together in a shared interest in attempting to place 
an untragic hero, a thinking man, center stage. In this view, the contemplative figure of the 
English Trauerspiel is ostensibly James I, but all the more emphatically Hamlet, in whom the 
Trauerspiel’s melancholy fascination with allegory comes to redeem itself and the fallen world. 
In Benjamin’s essay on Brecht’s Epic Theater, this thinking man is Galy Gay from Mann ist 
Mann—the man who can be taken apart and reassembled like a car—and, by implication and to 
an even greater degree, the defamiliarized, critical actor and spectator (GS 2.2 534). In pairing 
the contemplative allegorist of baroque Trauerspiel with the thinking man of Brecht’s epic 
theater, Benjamin makes clear that he understands the redemptive operations of baroque allegory 
as being closely aligned with those of Brecht’s revolutionary concept of gestic defamiliarization. 
What’s more, in Benjamin’s various discussions of both baroque allegory and epic theater, the 
affective and temporal dimensions of allegory and gestus are the same. Both operate through 




astonishment, as in the concluding passages of the Trauerspiel book’s ponderación miseteriosa 
and in his discussion of epic theater, which claims, in its subchapter on interruptions: “The art of 
the epic theatre lies much more in producing astonishment, rather than empathy. Expressed in a 
formula: instead of empathizing with the protagonist, the audience should learn more to feel 
wonder at the conditions under which he exists.”98  
Benjamin furthermore makes use of the centrally important concept of gesture in his 
analysis of the way interruption functions for the production of defamiliarization and wonder in 
Brecht, and this concept is equally one that cuts both ways toward the epic theater and the 
allegorical stage of the baroque. “‘Making gestures citable’ is one of the most important 
accomplishments of the epic theatre,” he writes;99 “[E]pic theatre is by definition gestic. More 
and more gestures occur the more frequently we interrupt someone engaged in an action.”100 
Here—although the German words for gesture (Gebärde) and gest (Gestus) are not the same, and 
although Brecht’s writings makes clear that gestus is not reducible to manual gesticulation101—
Benjamin is once again drawing an implicit parallel between the gestic attitudes of Brecht’s 
writings and the theater practices of the baroque period. Baroque gestures take on an allegorical 
significance that is fundamentally gestic in character, and allegorical utterances take on gestic 
potential. As with the actors of the epic theater, who mount a reaction against the empathetic use 
of gesture found on the naturalist stage, the actors of the baroque period (the historical 
antecedents to naturalism) emphatically do not empathize with their “characters.” The baroque 
actor does not create a naturalist illusion of psychological interiority, but rather displays the 
figure’s actions and passions through a studied actio, that is, through a highly codified repertory 
of gestures passed down in acting manuals whose similarity to baroque emblem books is 




whether these manuals were inspired by Quintilian and the ancient Galenic theory of humors, or 
by Descartes and the new mechanical philosophy: it is always a matter of quoting one’s gestures. 
On the baroque stage, the gestures seem to arrest as they quote and settle into the gestured 
images prescribed for them by these books. The relationship between the image and its meaning 
is purely conventional: the gesture contains none of its meaning within itself, and as such, each 
gesture takes on the potential to function as an enigmatic hieroglyph to be deciphered. In the epic 
theater, gestic gestures and gestic utterances present themselves as similarly quotable, and just as 
similarly enigmatic: each gesture is a social hieroglyph, like Marx’s commodity, to be 
contemplated.103  
 Does this make Brecht into a baroque dramatist of sorts? Benjamin is not exactly making 
a claim of this form: he is not, as Nietzsche had done earlier with Wagner, describing Brecht as a 
return to the aesthetics of the Counterreformation. Nevertheless, Benjamin’s notion of allegory 
can be seen to respond to Brecht’s notion of epic. As the Ursprung suggests, with its reference to 
German Romantic debates about the connections between the two forms: “Epic is in fact the 
classical form of a history of significant nature just as allegory is its baroque form” (U 145-6).104 
Both epic and allegory introduce an historical dimension into poetry and rhetoric: epic is the way 
natural history enters into poetry under classicism’s influence, allegory is its manifestation under 
the sign of the baroque. If Benjamin’s belief in the impossibility of tragedy within a modern 
context is to be any indication, however, the viability of any normative modern classicism is 
vitiated in the time of the historical baroque: there can be no modern tragedies, only 
Trauerspiele; there can be no modern epics, only allegory. If so, then allegory is Benjamin’s 
name for a properly modern anti-Aristotelian theater, and the name for his decidedly counter-




with obviously instrumental forms of political action that continue to bind the concept of history 
to a notion of narrative progress, but instead, with contemplating everything that has seemingly 
become noninstrumental, useless, defunct—everything mournful and sorrowful and lost to 
history. It favors the action of remembrance—messianic communion with the past, with the 
forgotten history of the oppressed—which raises the dead and seeks to redeem their oblivion by 
the light of learning, just as Benjamin’s own Ursprung had sought to offer the Trauerspiel a 
redemptive reevaluation. More than all this, allegory is resolutely mournful, disabused of any 
naively optimistic views of action. In the time of the baroque, a modern practice of allegory first 
came into its own historical recognizability as a result of the unintended consequences of the 
Protestant Reformation, which had initially been an effort at radically democratizing the sphere 
of religious belief but which had permitted the earliest stirrings of modern capitalism to 
emerge.105 Every action transpires within a context and mobilizes that context in ways that are 
unforeseeable and uncontrollable, especially by the actor, whose stable position with respect to 
the external context can no longer be assured.106 
 All this is not to say that Brecht’s own writing is devoid of baroque characteristics of its 
own. Re-understanding Brecht as an inheritor to the historical legacy of the baroque would 
necessarily require that we rethink the fact that he set so many of his most famous plays within 
the Counterreformation context. If we were to reconsider Brecht from this perspective, how 
might we be forced to rethink plays like Mother Courage and Her Children (set in the Thirty 
Years’ War, and adapted from Grimmelshausen’s picaresques), or his Life of Galileo, both 
written in the last years of Benjamin’s lifetime? How might we need to reevaluate his youthful 
adaptation of Marlowe’s Edward II or his later rewritings of Molière’s Don Juan or Webster’s 




Antigone more closely approximate the conventions of tragedy or allegorical Trauerspiel? These 
sorts of questions go far beyond the space that can be afforded to them by this dissertation. 
However, recent scholarship into Benjamin and Brecht’s relationship has gone so far as to 
identify certain points within Brecht’s body of writings that resonate most vibrantly with the 
form of the Trauerspiel as Benjamin described it. Sean Carney’s Brecht and Critical Theory: 
Dialectics and Contemporary Aesthetics (2005), for example, deploys a vocabulary drawn from 
Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler, to describe the term Trauerspiel as “testif[ying] to the 
performativity that is inherent in acts of mourning. … Mourning is the ambiguously hopeful 
response to a perception of the world as entirely hollow and bereft of authenticity, a response 
that admires this inauthenticity for its own sake. The mourning gaze beholds the world as a 
hollow masquerade, and the melancholic mournful look transforms the universe into a 
performativity, a text, an allegory” (70). Then circling this discourse back around to Brecht, 
Carney focuses upon Brecht and Weill’s 1933 opera-ballet The Seven Deadly Sins of the Petty 
Bourgeoisie as an example of what he calls “Brechtian Trauerspiel.” The Seven Deadly Sins is, 
in his description, “a series of neo-baroque allegories that dramatize the commodification of the 
human being under capitalism,” “a performance of reification,” and “an allegorical journey 
depicting the action of capitalist allegorization itself” (71).  
Brecht’s text follows Anna I and Anna II, two sisters who declare explicitly in the 
drama’s first scene that they are actually one and the same person, an artist who has been sent on 
a mission to labor and raise money for her/their Louisiana family (to be played by an all-male 
control-chorus of thugs that is equal parts Die Maßnahme and oratorio choir in the manner of 
Bach’s mournful passion plays). The drama takes place over seven scenes in seven different 




Brecht inverts ironically to generate a critique of capitalist society. In Carney’s description: 
“Annie I is the seller, Annie II is the object sold; in prostituting herself, Annie depicts the 
paradigmatic action of commodification, such as Benjamin saw in the dialectical image of the 
prostitute, who is simultaneously the labourer and the alienated product of labour” (71–2). Like 
the baroque sovereign of the Trauerspiel plays, Anna is both sadistic tyrant (Anna I) and 
mournful martyr (Anna II): on the baroque stage, as with Brecht’s ironic repetition of its 
conventions, “even the absolutely singular, the individual character, is multiplied in the 
allegorical” (72). Carney’s argument goes a long way to demonstrate the extent to which the 
allegorical-theatrical techniques of Trauerspiel and Brecht’s epic staging practices meet in the 
middle ground of Benjamin’s baroque concept. But even more than what the Trauerspiel legacy 
means for Brecht, we should also briefly pause to imagine what Brecht might mean for the 
baroque stage. If it is possible to understand Brecht’s epic gestus as having a cognate in the 
gestures of baroque allegory, then “Brechtian baroque” does not solely describe a certain 
approach to reading or staging Brecht, but rather, an overhauled way of understanding 
seventeenth century theater through a defamiliarized and vanguardist optic. Through this optic, 
we might question exclusively historicist or antiquarian approaches to early modern theater texts, 
and consider them anew as the shocking, modern, “experimental” works they were originally.  
Here we should conclude briefly by way of a reflection on Benjamin’s view of historical 
time, and to the broader tradition of the baroque this dissertation traces. Although his 
commitment to investigating The Origin of German Trauerspiel owes an explicit debt (claimed 
in the book’s second chapter) to Nietzsche’s influence, and particularly to revisiting Nietzsche’s 
Birth of Tragedy, Benjamin was not one to approach Nietzsche’s writings uncritically. His later 




which he sees Nietzsche as having developed in contradistinction to the nineteenth-century 
bourgeois myth of progressive history, but which Benjamin claims is structured according to the 
logic of a permanent crisis situation (or, seen from another vantage point, the endlessly recurring 
crisis) of modern capitalist economy.107 As a result, Benjamin alleges (in the Arcades’ Project 
Konvolut on “Boredom, Eternal Return”) that Nietzsche’s doctrine of historical recurrence 
knowingly colludes with the most egregious crimes of the prevailing order of things in the 
nineteenth century: “There is a draft [of Thus Spoke Zarathustra] in which Caesar instead of 
Zarathustra is the bearer of Nietzsche’s doctrine. … This is important. It underlines that 
Nietzsche suspected the complicity of his doctrine with imperialism” (D9,5).108 The true order of 
eternal recurrence, which Benjamin’s Trauerspiel book had already named fate, enshrines 
history once again as a melancholy, permanent cycle of catastrophe: just like the despairing 
baroque dramas of Benjamin’s early study, this doctrine resigns itself mournfully to this sense of 
history as an endless, and endlessly repeated crisis. The Arcades suggests that over and against 
this baroque/Nietzschean philosophy of historical cyclicality, Benjamin desires another concept 
of history—a wondrous, non-melancholy, kairotic, or messianic view of history—one that his 
final writings will endeavor to construct.  
But in spite of the manifest differences in their ostensible political orientations and their 
respective philosophies of history, Benjamin shares with Nietzsche a firm commitment to a 
concept of the baroque that cannot be considered as uniformly hegemonic. The force of this 
commitment authorizes Benjamin’s most animating, lifelong concern with baroque theater, 
which consists in nothing less than an attempt to redeem the forgotten, despised, politically-
suspicious baroque for the purposes of a revolutionary way of being in the world. Against those 




ecclesiastic propaganda, Benjamin joins with Nietzsche in insisting upon the baroque as 
composed of its own internal dialectic of immanent polarity (what I have described in chapter 
one as an Apollonian-Dionysian dialectic internal to the baroque concept itself). For every image 
put forward in the baroque period to sanctify power, sovereignty, presence, and the traditional, 
conservative understanding of the subject, there exists another image that can be used to 
deconsecrate these ideologies. Every allegorical image and text can under the sign of the baroque 
be read in either direction, both regressively or progressively; even more problematically for the 
interpreter, gestures made in support of or in opposition to these ideologies can never remain in 
full control of their effects. In Benjamin’s refunctioning of the baroque concept, it now names an 
historical situation in which these images can thenceforth only be understood as undecidable, and 
as such, as always available for being read “against the grain,” for being subjected to a 
revolutionary allegoresis (alternatively: a détournement, gestus, or deconstruction). Actions 
taken in this regard are fraught with peril, and require all the aid that contemplation, 
remembrance, and the tradition of the oppressed past can lend them. The baroque concept and 
the baroque stage itself carry these possibilities virtually within themselves, as potential sources 
of redemption, but not altogether unambiguous ones. 
But the greater affinity between the two thinkers has more to do with the way in which 
both require a decidedly theatrical approach to the act of writing and to this act’s necessary 
performativity. Nietzsche’s writing, however, suggests the theatricality needed to conceptualize 
the baroque is bound inextricably with a sense of sublime affective excess and allegorical mask-
wearing—the legacy of Wagner’s operatic Romanticism and alleged histrionics. Benjamin’s 
writings on the baroque concept, however, unfold in a theatrical manner that is altogether 




and focused even more intently upon its ability to defamiliarize. In the first pages of the 
Ursprung, Benjamin comments upon his own writing style with a phrase that implicates 
Nietzsche, however tacitly, saying that, where philosophical writing is concerned, “its aim is not 
to carry the reader away or inspire him. Only where it forces the reader, by stations, to stop and 
contemplate can it be reliable” (U 11).109 We have already considered the extent to which the 
Trauerspiel book’s paratactic form mimes the discontinuous, disintegrated structure of the 
Trauerspiel itself; the way its two chapters emplot a repeated catastrophe narrative of 
secularization that reproduces the recurrent catastrophes of Trauerspiel form; and the way its 
concluding turn toward the subject of redemption in both chapters recalls the apotheosis of a 
Calderón-esque deus-ex-machina. Beyond these structural affinities Benjamin’s writing has with 
its dramatic subject matter, there is also the matter of the text’s frequent intermediations of text 
and image—which strive repeatedly to incorporate images into its linguistic texture, indeed at 
some moments almost seeming to arrest itself in the linguistic flow and crystallize into an image. 
The mosaic, the eddy, the sovereign gripping his scepter, the El Greco painting with its torn 
banners and weird lighting, the place of the Skull (Calvary), the connector of puzzle pieces, the 
tradition-as-a-stalking-path: Benjamin’s embrace of these emblems to illuminate a dramatic 
tradition that placed a new and philosophically significant emphasis on images can hardly be 
considered accidental. Rather, it suggests a new approach to thinking that is every bit as 
theatrical as it is imagistic: if the study of Trauerspiel can itself be considered a kind of theatrical 
writing, this is in large part due to the way the author gestures repeatedly toward these images, 
making a new kind of theatricality out of the image itself. While the Trauerspiele might indeed 




emblematic images”—something akin to an extended allegorical interlude or masque—that these 
plays find their retroactive actualization in Benjamin’s prose.  
And yet, like Nietzsche, Benjamin was not opposed to casting himself in his own 
theatrical writing. With a closer glimpse, the multifarious figure of the sovereign-intriguer-
student comes into focus as a kind of mask for the author to wear and contemplate, not unlike 
one of Nietzsche’s various masks. The implications of this mask-wearing are too rich and 
complex to be suitably discussed in the space of this conclusion, but it cannot go unobserved just 
the same. At the time as he was writing The Origin of German Trauerspiel, Benjamin was also 
composing his mosaic of aphorisms One Way Street, which includes the following passage near 
its end, conspicuous on numerous levels for the theatricality of its points of reference, its 
imagery, and its self-reflexivity: 
Again and again, in Shakespeare, in Calderón, battles fill the last act, and kings, 
princes, courtiers, and attendants “enter, fleeing.” The very second that they 
become visible to spectators, they come to a halt. The stage commands the arrest 
of the dramatis personae in their flight. Their entry into the visual space of 
nonparticipating and truly contemplative persons allows these unprotected 
unfortunates to breathe, surrounds them with new air. So, the onstage appearance 
of “fleeing” performers has this as its hidden meaning. Into our reading of this 
formula plays the expectation of a place, a light or a footlight, in which our flight 
through life would also take shelter before contemplative strangers.110  
 
In a prophetic voice that seems to anticipate his harrowing, final days fleeing Vichy France, 
Benjamin here seems to imagine the final act of his own Trauerspiel, explicitly taking on the 




irrevocably past, he seems to glance upward, self-consciously from the text, turning his face 
outward to gaze through the proscenium of history and meet the eyes of the future. It is a 
moment of exhausted textual self-exhibition, of profoundly mournful ostentation.111 It is left to 
Benjamin’s interpreters to catch that gaze as it pauses and flashes up in the glare of the 
footlights, to contextualize it amid the light of learning, contemplation, and remembrance of the 
past—and if possible, to act on it, however precariously, bearing in mind the debilities and 
catastrophes that prey upon action in general. 
                                                
In this chapter, all citations to Benjamin’s Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels (U) refer to the Suhrkamp Verlag 
edition edited by Rolf Tiedemann. (Only occasionally do I refer to John Osborne’s English translation, published as 
The Origin of German Tragic Drama, designated here as [O].) In most other cases, except where clearly marked, 
other writings by Benjamin cited above and in the footnotes below refer to the Gesammelte Schriften (GS) edition 
edited by Rolf Tiedemann and Hermann Schweppenhäuser. When referring to passages from the Passagenwerk or 
Arcades Project, I cite them by Benjaimin’s own idiosyncratic Konvolut numbering system. For Benjamin’s 
correspondence, I have consulted the two-volume Briefe, edited by Gershom Scholem and Theodor Adorno. 
 
1 See: Walter Benjamin’s Understanding Brecht (115; NB: This translation is Anna Bostock’s.)  
 
2 The Arcades Project, of course, amounts to Benjamin’s other great book-length study, but was never completed. 
 
3 For three examples of these various approaches to the field’s current interests in Benjamin, see, respectively: 
Auslander 34, 50–55; Reinelt and Roach eds. 192–93; Butler “When Gesture Becomes Event.” 
 
4 See, for example, Caygill on “Walter Benjamin’s Concept of Allegory” (Copeland and Struck, eds. 241–253); 
Cowan “Walter Benjamin’s Theory of Allegory”; Tambling 109–127; Weber “Genealogy of Modernity”. European 
scholars in the field of Theaterwissenschaft have similarly taken up Benjamin’s study of the baroque; see, for 
example Fischer-Lichte “Walter Benjamin’s Allegory.” For a recent analysis of Benjamin’s book by an American 
theater historian, see Blair Hoxby’s (uncharitably titled) essay, “The Function of Allegory in Baroque Tragic Drama: 
What Benjamin Got Wrong” in Machosky, ed. 87–118. 
 
5 Benjamin clearly sees Strindberg and von Hofmannsthal as writing in the baroque tradition of Calderón (On 
Strindberg, see U 94; on Hofmannsthal, see Benjamin’s letter of 11 June 1925). The references to Kafka are more 
dissimulated, but are documented in Weber, Theatricality as Medium 76, 82. Benjamin’s thoughts on Expressionism 
were largely shaped by his exposure to the work of Kandinsky, Chagall, and especially Klee. On this subject, and on 
Benjamin’s wariness of the labels offered by modern artistic schools, see the letter to Scholem 22 October 1917. 
 
6 One example of Kaiser’s baroque vision is his 1920 opera libretto The Protagonist, a bloody Jacobean metadrama. 
The playwright and painter Oskar Kokoschka would later claim kinship with baroque style in his 1942 essay “An 
Approach to the Baroque Art of Czechoslovakia.” Neither author factors significantly into Benjamin’s published or 
unpublished writings. 
 
7  “Frappante Analogien zu dem gegenwärtigen Stande des deutschen Schrifttums haben himmer neuen Anlaß zu 
einer, wenn auch meist sentimentalen so doch positive gerichteten Versenkung ins Barocke gegeben” (U 36). For a 
greater degree of historical background of Expressionism’s influence over early 20th-century German criticism’s 
reappraisals of baroque literature, see Newman 7–8; Wellek “Concept of Baroque” 79–80. See also: Lacis 




                                                                                                                                                       
 
8 “Denn wie der Expressionismus ist das Barock ein Zeitalter weniger der eigentlichen Kunstübung als eines 
unablenkbaren Kunstwollens. … Das Streben nach einem Rustikastil der Sprache, der sie der Wucht des 
Weltgeschehens gewachsen scheinen ließe, kommt hinzu” (U 37). For Nietzsche’s influence on Riegl, see Schwartz, 
The Werkbund, 23-4. 
 
9 Herbert Jhering. “Der Dramatiker Bert Brecht,” quoted in The Weimar Republic Sourcebook (Kaes et al. eds. 534).  
 
10 (It is in this sense that the concept of allegory has become enormously influential to the postwar tradition of 
critical theory, particularly through the writings of Paul de Man, and the form of theatricality that emerges from 
Benjamin’s baroque can also thus be said to stand in a theater-historical genealogy to de Man’s practice of 
deconstruction.) 
 
11 Here, see: Fuchs’s Revolution in the Theater. For Fuchs’s debts to Nietzsche and Wagner, see: Fischer-Lichte’s 
The Transformative Power of Performance (52, 193), and the fourth chapter of Koss’s Modernism After Wagner. 
The avant-garde discourse of re-theatricalization is rich and varied, but across the board stands opposed to a theater 
predicated on the mimetic reproduction of a given and empirically observable external reality—the theater, (and 
increasingly, the cinema) of realism. On this realism/theatricality binary, see Davis and Postlewait 12–13. 
 
12 The relationship between Expressionism and theatricality is substantively taken up in Kracauer 36–39. 
 
13 George Steiner, for example, describes the prologue as “one of the more impenetrable pieces of prose in German 
or, for that matter, in any modern language,” and cites Benjamin’s supposed claim (reported by Scholem) that the 
book’s prologue would be intelligible only to readers familiar with the Kabbalah (Origin, 13-4). Benjamin’s remark 
might have been a joke at his own expense, but several scholars have argued that the theory of language set forward 
by the Trauerspiel book is in fact derived from the Kabbalistic tradition (Kerr-Koch, 64). 
 
14 “Es ist dem philosophischen Schrifttum eigen, mit jeder Wendung von neuem vor der Frage der Darstellung zu 
stehen” (U 10); “Der Begriff des philosophischen Stils ist frei von Paradoxie” (U 14). 
 
15 “His sentences do not seem to be generated in the usual way; they do not entail. Each sentence is written as if it 
were the first, or the last. (‘A writer must stop and restart with every new sentence,’ he says in the Prologue to The 
Origin of German Trauerspiel.) Mental and historical processes are rendered as conceptual tableaux; ideas are 
transcribed in extremis and the intellectual perspectives are vertiginous. His style of thinking and writing, incorrectly 
called aphoristic, might better be called freeze-frame baroque. This style was torture to execute. It was as if each 
sentence had to say everything, before the inward gaze of total concentration dissolved the subject before his eyes” 
(Sontag, “Sign of Saturn” 129).  
 
16 “Die Ideen sind ein Vorgegebenes” (U 12). In terms that are vaguely Platonic, Benjamin describes truth as the 
“realm” (alternatively “das Reich” and “den Kreis”—the empire and the circle) of ideas at several instances (U 12-
13). But the ideas’ pre-given nature should be thought to result not from any transcendent status, but from their 
being supra-individual. That is, Benjamin’s description of ideas can be understood in an historical sense: One is born 
into a world already full of ideas, in which pre-given ideologies and linguistically constructed norms of value that 
are already at work upon the individual subject even prior to its efforts at understanding them. 
 
17 For an example of Benjamin’s Leibnizian cast of mind, privileging monadic particular bound together by a 
principle of harmony, see his claim: “Jede Idee ist ein Sonne und verhält sich zu ihresgleichen wie eben Sonnen 
zueinander sich verhalten. Das tönende Verhältnis solcher Wesenheiten ist die Warheit” (U 20). See also the letter to 
Christian Rang of 9 December 1923, which also declares Benjamin’s debts to Leibniz explicitly.  
 
18 “The idea is a linguistic thing, it is that moment of the symbolic in the essence of each word” “(Die Idee ist ein 
Sprachliches, und zwar im Wesen des Wortes jeweils dasjenige Moment, in welchem es Symbol ist”). (U 18; see 





                                                                                                                                                       
19 “Die Ideen verhalten sich zu den Dingen wie die Sternbilder zu den Sternen. … Die Ideen sind ewige 
Knstellationen und indem die Elemente als Punkte in derartigen Konstellationen erfaßst werden, sind die 
Phänomene aufgeteilt und gerette zugleich” (U 17). 
 
20 This interpretation of the constellation as a construction organizing random phenomena also resonates with the 
repeated image of constellations in Mallarmé’s poetry, particularly the Septentrion [i.e. the constellation Ursa 
Major] at the culmination of A Throw of the Dice. 
 
21 Qtd. in Rosen “Origins.” This definition of idea brings it close, without being identical, to what Levi-Strauss 
describes with the phrase floating signifier. 
 
22 Here it would be useful to consider the similarities between the way Benjamin’s early linguistic writings make use 
of the words brot and pain (German and French for what in in English is called bread) and the way Nietzsche’s 
writings on rhetoric and language make use of the multiplicity of words, across a variety of languages, for what 
English calls snake. Here see Benjamin’s “The Task of the Translator” (GS 4.1 13-4). 
 
23 See also Benjamin’s essay “On Language As Such,” which similarly considers the Biblical Genesis narrative as an 
allegory for the ultimate inefficaciousness of human language to denote what it seeks to designate. 
 
24 Cf. with Elin Diamond’s summary of deconstructive operations, in which “the seemingly stable word is inhabited 
by a signifier that bears the trace of another signifier and another, so that contained within the meaning of any given 
word is the trace of the word it is not” (“Brechtian Theory” 85). 
 
25 For Benjamin’s explicit description of baroque as an idea, see his refutation of Konrad Burdach’s nominalist 
claim that words such as “Humanism,” “Renaissance,” “Gothic,” and “Baroque” are arbitrary, misleading terms 
literary historiography (U 24). As ideas, Benjamin claims, these terms do not average out the diverse historical 
particulars they seek to assemble, but configure them into arrangements marked by their most extreme differences. 
 
26 “The Trauerspiel is an idea, in the sense of the philosophy of art” (“Das Trauerspiel im Sinn der 
kunstphilosophischen Abhandlung ist eine Idee”) (U 20). 
 
27 “Critique is the mortification of the works” (“Kritik ist Mortifikation der Werke”) (U 159). 
 
28 “Ob Wahrheit dem Schönen gerecht zu warden vermag? Diese Frage ist die innerste im »Symposion«. Platon 
beantwortet sie, indem er der Wahrheit es zuweist, dem Schönen das Sein zu verbrügen. In diesem Sinne also 
entwickelt er die Wahrheit als den Gehalt des Schönen. Nicht aber tritt er zutage in der Enthüllung, vielmehr erweist 
er sich in einem Vorgang, den man gleichnisweise bezeichnen dürfte als das Aufflammen der in den Kreis der Ideen 
eintretenden Hülle, als eine Verbrennung des Werkes, in welcher seine Form zum Höhepunkt ihrer Leuchtkraft 
kommt.” 
 
29 This analogy is drawn from Benjamin’s description of Kafka’s parables (GS 2.2 420). 
 
30 “…vom literarischen Barock, in dem das deutsche Trauerspiel entsprungen ist…” (O, 41; U, 23). 
 
31 If we sense within the image of the work catching fire and flaming up a resemblance to the description in 
Benjamin’s much later theses on the concept of history, where a memory or a picture of the past is said to “flash up” 
(here it is aufblitzen) within a moment of danger (GS 1.2 695), we might say, albeit anachronistically, that what 
Benjamin is after in the Trauerspiel book is an attempt to seize a picture of the baroque (as a period of the past) as it 
flashes up to him in a moment of danger, to perceive this flashing up as an opportunity to blast an era out of the 
homogeneous course of history, in order to make it useful for the purposes of revolutionary struggle. 
 
32 Both concepts derive in large part from his dissertation readings in Goethe and from the Goethean concepts of 
“ideals” or “ur-phenomena.” which are in turn Goethe’s attempts at reformulating the Platonic concept of the ideal 




                                                                                                                                                       
 
33 “Ursprung, wiewohl durchaus historische Kategorie, hat mit Entstehung dennoch nichts gemein. Im Ursprung 
wird kein Werden des Entsprungenen, vielmehr dem Werden und Vergehen Entspringendes gemeint. Der Ursprung 
steht im Fluß des Werdens als Strudel und reißt in seine Rhythmik das Entstehungsmaterial hinein. Im nackten 
offenkundigen Bestand des Faktischen gibt das Ursprüngliche sich niemals zu erkennen, und einzig einer 
Doppeleinsicht steht seine Rhythmik offen. Sie will als Restuaration, als Weiderherstellung einerseits, als eben darin 
Unvollendetes, Unabgeschlossenes andererseits erkannt sein. … Also hebt sich der Ursprung aus dem tatsächlichen 
Befunde nicht heraus, sondern er betrifft dessn Vor- und Nachgeschichte. Die Richtlinien der philosophischen 
Betrachtung sind in der Dialektik, die dem Ursprung beiwohnt, aufgezeichnet. Aus ihr erwiest in allem Wesenhaften 
Einmaligkeit und Wiederholung durcheinander sich bedingt.” 
 
34 Benjamin’s notion of origin as a form of reemergence should be considered alongside Nietzsche’s concept of 
eternal recurrence, but also in terms of the messianic structures of Benjamin’s thought—for example as they take 
shape in his parable of a fugitive king who reappears as a beggar in a shabby inn in a Hasidic village (GS 2.2 433). 
 
35 The method of proceeding by immersion in particular details also owes an express debt to Riegl’s studies of 
ornamentation in baroque art and to his preferred method of Sachkultur, which Benjamin much preferred to 
Wölfflin’s methods. 
 
36 English theater conventions were introduced to spectators in the German-speaking world by way of traveling 
groups of actors (the so-called “English Comedians”) that began touring the continent as early as the 1580s and 
whose presence there swelled with the closing of English theaters in 1642. As a result, the Trauerspiel plays of 
Benjamin’s study bear clear resemblances to numerous early modern English plays (e.g. Titus Andronicus, Richard 
II, Richard III, King Lear, Macbeth, The Winter’s Tale), which could be described as Trauerspiele as well. 
  
37 This textual history is more fully elaborated in Newman 126-7. 
  
38 To offer a brief parenthetical clarification here: Although Benjamin introduces these secularization narratives in a 
speculative and hypothetical mood or manner, it is important to note that he does or endorse a grossly secular 
viewpoint in the Trauerspiel study. It is perhaps the case that Benjamin views such disenchantment narratives as 
themselves mythic in form and function, modern analogues to the ancient Christian narrative of the fall from grace. 
 
39 To reformulate this in the terms of psychoanalysis, what makes this situation particularly melancholy is both the 
loss of a relation with transcendent divinity, and that this loss becomes correspondingly un-grievable — or else, as 
Benjamin puts it religious questions linger, but the period forcibly imposes secular solutions upon them (U 60-1). 
Here see Freud’s essay on “Mourning and Melancholia” in General Psychological Theory 161-78. 
 
40 “Die Christenheit oder Europa ist aufeteilt in eine Reihe von europäischen Christentümern, deren geschichtliche 
Aktionen nicht mehr in der Flucht des Heilsprozesses zu verlaufen beanspruchen.” (U 59). 
 
41 “Wie die Benennung »tragisch« heutzutag so — und mit mehr Rehcth — galt das wort »Trauerspiel« im XVII. 
Jahrhundert vom Drama und historischen geschehn gleichermaßen.” (U 45-6). 
 
42 I am indebted my conversations with Judith Butler for this point, and also to her reading of Freudian melancholy 
in “Thresholds of Melancholy” in The Prism of the Self 3–12. 
 
43 Natural history would later become an important concept for Adorno (“The Idea of Natural History” 111–124). 
 
44 See, for example, the passage where Benjamin describes the world-historical feeling, experienced on the part of 
period’s faithful, of being drawn along with the world toward “a cataract,” and his claim that the period was “ (U 





                                                                                                                                                       
45 “Historical life, as that epoch conceived [or staged] it is its content, its real object.” (U 44-5; here, see also the 
subchapter title of the third section in Benjamin’s section chapter: “History as the content of the Trauerspiel” 
(“Geschichte als Gehalt des Trauerspiels”).  
 
46 Here, Benjamin famously makes use of Carl Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty as it was articulated in his Political 
Theology (1922). Samuel Weber has written extensively about the Benjamin-Schmitt relationship, most notably in 
“Taking Exception to Decision: Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt” in Benjamin’s –abilities, 176-194. 
 
47 I am indebted to Henry Turner for this insight that links together Hobbesian sovereignty and the earliest stirrings 
of corporate capitalism in the early modern period. 
 
48 (One might think, in the English tradition of Bolingbroke in Richard II, or Macbeth at the outset of Macbeth. One 
might also think of Hamlet’s Claudius, Othello’s Iago, Titus Andronicus’ Aaron, and so on.) 
 
49 “This typical catastrophe, so unlike the extraordinary catastrophes suffered by the heroes of tragedy, is what the 
dramatists had in view when … they designated a work as Trauerspiel” (U 70). 
 
50 For an extensive, performance-historical discussion of the seventeenth century’s shift away from an humoral 
paradigm of theatrical emotion to a mechanistic one under the influence of the new Carteisan philosophy, see Roach 
Player’s Passion, 58–92. For this double sense of machination, see Beecher and Ciavolella’s “Introduction” to 
Bernini, The Impresario 19. 
 
51 “Denn der ärmliche Affektrest der Spannung, der diesem Typus als einzige Evidenz von Theatralischem geblieben 
ist…” (U 56). 
 
52 Here, see George Steiner’s introduction to the English translation, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (O 18). 
 
53 Elsewhere, Benjamin continues in this vein, suggesting other ways that the Trauerspiel’s baroque theatricality 
amounts primarily to a visual category. Arguing against those who would claim (in keeping perhaps, with Puchner’s 
anti-theatrical tradition) that the baroque Trauerspiel form was intended for reading exclusively, and not for stage 
performance, Benjamin writes: “In violent events whose appeal is emphatically visual, the theatrical speaks with 
particular force.” (“In den heftigen Vorgängen, die die Schaulust herausfordern, spricht gerade das Theatralische mit 
besonderer Gewalt” [U 33]) Amid the chaos of these violent events, language itself can be seen to fragment, 
particularly in the late plays of Gryphius, in a manner that lends itself particularly to theatrical excitement, but that 
has nothing to do with drama. (“So glücklich diese Technik der Darstellung theatralischer Erregungen sich bietet, so 
wenig ist sie auf das Drama angewiesen” [U 185]). 
 
54 “Denn sie sind nicht so sehr das Spiel, das traurig macht, über dem die Trauer ihr Genügen findet: Spiel vor 
Traurigen. Ihnen eignet eine gewisse Ostentation. Ihre Bilder sind gestellt, um gesehen zu werden, angeordent, wie 
sie gesehen werden wollen.” This mournfulness-ostentation dialectic appears at least two other times in the study (U 
121, 163).  
 
55 In the baroque, passions are not reducible to modern psychological motives, Benjamin claims, but are closer to 
real objective presences in the immanent world, like stage props (U 113). 
 
56 “So wie Tyrannen, Teufel oder Juden sich auf der Bühne des Passionstheaters in abgrundtiefer Grausamkeit und 
Bosheit zeigen, ohne irgendwie sich aufklären oder entwickeln, ohne anderes als ihre niederträchtigen Pläne 
bekennen zu dürfen, liebt auch das Drama des Barock den Gegenspielern in grelles Licht gestellte Sonderszenen 
einzuräumen, in denen Motivierung die geringste Rolle zu spielen pflegt.” 
 
57 Here see Benjamin’s remarks on baroque metatheatricality, which concern Life is a Dream and Hamlet especially. 
in his remarks on “Play and Reflection.” (It bears mentioning that this chapter should be read alongside Benjamin’s 
earlier study of the German Romantics: In de Man’s sense, the metatheaters of the baroque may be deemed 




                                                                                                                                                       
that offers the baroque theater its only, limited hope of transcendence, and particularly in Germany. In the dramas of 
Catholic Spain, by contrast, the prince is still able to intercede, like a secular Messiah, in the dramatic events, where 
in Germany, no such hope is to be found. Increasingly, in the baroque Trauerspiel, “the new theater has stage 
machinery as its God.” (“Denn in der Machination hat die neue Bühne den Gott” [U 63].) 
 
58 For Moretti’s readings of baroque tragedy and the role it plays in helping the deconsecration of sovereign power, 
see: Signs Taken For Wonders 45–7.  
 
59 “Das Drama vollends läßt sich angelegen sein, die Geste der Vollstreckung zum Charakteristikum des 
Herrschenden zu machen.” 
 
60 For a theoretical analysis of this historical gesture of commandment see Agamben’s comments in “Gesture or the 
Structure of Art.” 
 
61 Here I am indebted to Jerry Passannate’s reading of Marlowe, and to my many conversations with him about 
performative speech in Tamburlaine.  
 
62 For Benjamin’s own thoughts on what he terms the “magical” dimension of language, a dimension that is 
abundantly relevant to our understanding of the performative domain of speech acts, see his essay “On Language as 
Such and On the Language of Man.” 
 
63 On the conceptual relationship between queering and ruination, see Herring 21. I am indebted to Nick Salvato for 
directing me to Herring’s writing. 
 
64 “Der Fürst, bei dem die Entscheidung über den Ausnahmezustand ruht, erweist in der erstbesten Situation, daß ein 
Enschluß ihm fast unmöglich ist. So wie die Malerei der Manieristen Komposition in ruhiger Belichtung gar nicht 
kennt, so stehen die theatralischen Figuren der Epoche im grellen Scheine ihrer wechselnden Entschließung. In 
ihnen drängt sich nicht sowohl di Souveränität auf, welche die stoischen Redensarten zur Schau stellen, als die jähe 
Willkür eines jederzeit umschlagenden Affektsturms, in dem zumal Lohensteins Gestalten wie zerrißne, flatternde 
Fahnen sich bäumen. Auch sind sie Grecoschen in der Kleinheit des Kopfes, wenn diesen Ausdruck bildlich zu 
verstehen gestattet ist, nicht unähnlich. Denn nicht Gedanken, sondern schwankende physische Impulse bestimmen 
sie.” Benjamin here considers mannerism under the category of the baroque, as Panofsky also does (Three Essays on 
Style 36). See also: Wismer and Scholz-Hänsel, eds. El Greco and Modernism. 
 
65 Cf. With Benjamin’s claim that, unlike tragedy, “The Trauerspiel … knows no heroes, but rather only 
constellations” (U 113). 
 
66 The foundational terms of this monarchical doubleness has been articulated by Benjamin’s contemporary, the 
political and intellectual historian Ernst Kantrowicz. See King’s Two Bodies. In Kantrowicz’s terms, we can say that 
Trauerspiel depicts the agony, the cry of lamentation, as these two bodies are sundered from each other. The locus 
classicus for an awareness of this doubleness during the early modern period is the Prefatory Letter to Sir Walter 
Raleigh that begins Spenser’s Fairie Queene, which poses the notion of the king’s two bodies in allegorical terms. 
See: Tambling 55–6.  
 
67 In this paragraph, and throughout this dissertation, I am indebted to Judith Butler’s views on gesture and speech 
acts, for example in “When Gesture Becomes Event.” 
 
68 The baroque idea of identity that emerges from Trauerspiel is closer to Nietzsche’s Dionysian selfhood than to 
Wagner’s Apollonian self; the baroque idea of a world is something closer to a disordered, Heraclitan chaos than a 
stable substance. 
 
69 Drawing Nietzsche’s philosophy of history into the mix, Benjamin writes in a passing comment that this fate is 





                                                                                                                                                       
70 See: The Theater and Its Double 30. 
 
71 For a useful bibliography documenting the reevaluation of allegory that has taken place since the time of the 
romantics, see Fuchs, Death of Character, 204n20-2. 
  
72 Here one might think of the consecrated (transubstantiated) Eucharistic host in Catholic doctrine. 
 
73 Again, Benjamin is at pains to make clear that allegory is not an ornamental use of language arbitrarily applied 
where one could have more easily spoken in plain terms, but a form of expression in itself, like speech or writing (U 
141). Terry Eagleton underscores the necessity with which allegory asserts itself in Walter Benjamin 6. 
 
74 “[L]iegt in der Allegorie die facies hippocratica der Geschichte als erstarrte Urlandschaft dem Betrachter vor 
Augen. Die Geschichte in allem was sie Unzeitiges, Leidvolles, Verfehltes von Beginn an hat, prägt sich in einem 
Antlitz — nein in einem Totenkopfe aus. … Das ist der Kern der allegorischen Betrachtung, der barocken weltlichen 
Exposition der Geschichte als Leidensgeschichte der Welt; bedeutends ist sie nur in den Stationen ihres Verfalls. 
Soviel Bedeuteung, soviel Todverfallenheit, weil am tiefsten der Tod di zackige Demarkationslinie zwischen Physis 
und Bedeutung eingräbt. Ist aber die Natur von jeher todverfallen, so ist die auch allegorisch von jeher.” 
 
75 “Jede Person, jedwedes Ding, jedes Verhältnis kann ein beliebiges anderes bedeuten. Diese Möglichkeit spricht 
der profanen Welt ein vernichtendes doch gerechtes Urteil … [Jene Requisiten des Bedeutens all emit eben ihrem 
Weisen auf ein anderes eine Mächtigkeit gewinnen, die den prfoanen Dingen inkommensurabel sie erscheinen läßt 
und sie in eine höhere Ebene hebt, ja heiligen kann.” 
 
76 “La Nature est un temple où de vivants piliers / Laissent parfois sortir de confuses paroles; / L’homme y passe à 
travers de forêts de symbols / Qui l’observent avec des regards familiers.” 
 
77 “Als Stückwerk aber starren aus dem allegorischen Gebild die Dinge.” 
 
78 Here I have in mind Benjamin’s notes on aura in the 1940 essay, “Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” where he writes, in 
terms that anticipate Michael Fried: “The experience of the aura is thus based on the transfer of a form of response 
common in human society to the relationship between man and inanimate nature. The person being beheld, or who 
feels he is being beheld, glances back at us. To experience the aura of something we see means to invest it with the 
ability to return our gaze.” “Dle Erfahrung der Aura beruht also auf der übertragung einer in der menschlichen 
Gesellschaft geläufigen Reaktionsform auf das Verhältnis des Unbelebten oder der Natur zum Menschen. Der 
Angesehene oder angesehen sich Glaubende schlägt den Blick auf. Die Aura einer Erscheinung erfahren, heißt, sie 
mit dem Vermögen belehnen, den Blick aufzuschlagen” (GS 1.2 646–47). 
 
79 “Denn gerade in Visionen des Vernichtungsrauschens, in welchen alles Irdische zum Trümmerfeld 
zusammenstürzt, enthüllt sich weniger das Ideal der allegorischen Versenkung den ihre Grenze. Die trostlose 
Verworrenheit der Schädelstätte, wie sie als Schema allegorischer Figuren aus tausend Kupfern und Beschreibungen 
der Zeit herauzulesen ist, ist nicht allein das Sinnbild von der Öder aller Menschenexistenz. Vergänglichkeit ist in 
ihr nicht sowohl bedeutet, allegorisch dargestellt, den, selbst bedeutend, dargeboten als Allegorie. Als die Allegorie 
der Auferstehung. Zuletzt springt in den Todesmalen des Barock—nun erst im rückgewandten größten Bogen und 
erlösend—die allegorische Betrachung um.”  
 
80 That is, in the Trauerspiel book, allegory’s suddenly redemptive capacity appears in the course of Benjamin’s 
narrative accounts of the secularization of the world like a baroque deus-ex-machina. The apotheosis it effects is 
downright Calderón-esque, transforming melancholy and mournfulness into wonder at what Benjamin calls 
(borrowing a phrase from Karl Borinski) ponderación misteriosa, the intervention of a redeeming God into the work 
of art (U 208-11). 
 
81 Allegory, in Jeremy Tambling’s description, “does not work with the sense of an organic, natural relationship 
between things; but…questions such a possibility. … [W]hat the symbol describes [seems] natural, permanent, and 




                                                                                                                                                       
class- or gender-based, which makes much of saying that certain things are natural’. It may be said following 
Benjamin, that ideology controls partly through the power of symbolism, but that allegory disrupts the rule of 
ideology.” (111, 116). 
 
82 “This is, effectively, Susan Buck-Morss’s argument in The Dialectics of Seeing (18). 
 
83 See J66a,6; see also: Benjamin’s letter to Scholem of 18 September 1926. 
 
84 Sontag Under the Sign of Saturn 116. 
 
85 Baudelaire’s debts to the baroque first begin to appear in the Arcades Project at §J53a,1 and extend throughout 
much of the rest of the Konvolut.  
 
86 “Die Warenform tritt als der gesellschaftliche Inhalt der allegorischen Anschauungsform bei Baudelaire zutage…” 
 
87 “Ihr Leitbild, die Allegorie entsprach in der Tat in vollendeter Weise dem Warenfetisch.” 
 
88 “Ebenso aber steht es mit Ware und Preis. Die »metaphysischen Spitzfindigkeiten«, in denen sie sich nach Marx 
gefällt, sind vor allem die Spitzfindigkeiten der Preisgestaltung. Wie die Wate zum Preis kommt, das läßt sich nie 
ganz absehen, weder im Lauf ihrer Herstellung noch später wenn sie sich auf dem Markt befindet. Ganz ebenso 
ergeht es dem Gegenstand in seiner allegorischen Existenz. … In der Tat heißt die Bedeutung der Ware: Preis; eine 
andere hat sie, als Ware, nicht. Darum ist der Allegoriker mit der Ware in seinem Element.”  
89 Here see the notes on allegory’s various progressive and regressive tendencies in §J57,3. 
 
90 On phantasmagoria, see Adorno In Search of Wagner 74-85. 
 
91 “Die Allegorie Baudelaires trägt Spuren der Gewalttätigkeit, welche von nöten war, um die harmonische Fassade 
der ihn umgebenden Welt einzureißen.” Benjamin frequently describes Baudelaire’s use of allegory in violent terms, 
suggesting its splenetic rage in response to his sense of permanent historical catastrophe (J66a4). See also: Buck-
Morss Dialectics of Seeing 182. 
 
92 “Etwas ähnliches hat Brecht vielfach vorgeschwebt. Man kann weitergehen und sagen, daß der Versuch, den 
Denkenden, ja den Weisen zum dramatischen Helden selbst zu machen, von Brecht unternommen wurde. Und man 
kann gerade von hier aus sein Theater als episches definieren”  (GS 2.2, 534). 
93 “Benjamin pointed out that Baroque tragedy and epic theatre were linked by a related anti-Aristotelian aesthetic; 
in both dramatic forms it was rather a question ‘of the social sphere of interaction’ than ‘of individual characters.’ 
Erdmut Wizisla, Story of a Friendship, 109. This is only the beginnings of a much more extensive discussion, 
beyond the scope of this chapter as it is currently conceived, of the similarities in the ways in which both Brechtian 
epic theater and the baroque theater of the Trauerspiel plays depart decisively from the tragic conventions 
articulated by Aristotle in The Poetics. (Benjamin discusses the lack of an Aristotelian influence over Trauerspiel 
extensively in the very beginnings of the Ursprung book’s first chapter, where Brecht describes his self-professedly 
non-Aristotelian theater practices in many places throughout his theoretical writings, as for example in his notes on 
Die Mutter, titled “Indirect Impact of Epic Theatre” in Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic. John 
Willett, ed. and trans. [London: Methuen, 2001], 57-62.) One initial example of this decidedly non-Aristotelian 
character of both baroque Trauerspiel and Brecht’s epic theater: neither observes the (neo-)classical unities of time, 
space, or action. 
 
94 The Trauerspiel form, then, would be a species of philosophical drama akin to the described in Martin Puchner’s 
The Drama of Ideas: Platonic Provocations in Theater and Philosophy, even if it is not ultimately assimilable to the 





                                                                                                                                                       
95 Diese wichtige aber schlecht markierte Straße (die hier als Bild einer Tradition stehen mag) zog sich im 
Mittelalter über Hroswitha und die Mysterien; im Barock über Gryphius und Calderon. Später zeichnete sie sich bei 
Lenz und Grabbe ab und zuletzt bei Strindberg. (GS 2.2, 534). 
 
96 Benjamin discusses baroque medievalism and the Trauerspiel’s inheritance from medieval historiographic 
practices in his discussion of “Christian Chronicle and Trauerspiel” (U 57-9).  
 
97 (Loc. cit.) “Es ist eine europäische, aber auch eine deutsche Straße. Wenn anders von einer Straße die Rede sein 
kann, und nicht vielmehr von einem Pasch- und Schleichpfad, auf dem das Vermächtnis des mittelalterlichen und 
barocken Dramas an uns gelangt ist. Dieser Saumpfad tritt heute, wie struppig und verwildert immer, in den Dramen 
von Brecht zutage.”  
98 “Die Kunst des epischen Theaters ist vielmehr, an der Stelle der Einfühlung das Staunen hervorzurufen. 
Formelhaft ausgedrückt: statt in den Helden sich einzufühlen, soll das Publikum vielmehr das Staunen über die 
Verhältnisse lernen, in denen er sich bewegt.” (GS 2.2 535)  Benjamin offers similar comments in his essay, The 
Author as Producer. Also, one should consider these claims alongside Benjamin’s letter to Adorno of 9 December 
1938, in which he defends wide-eyed astonishment as a primary method and principle of his critical praxis. 
99 “»Gesten zitierbar zu mamen« ist eine der wesentlimen Leistun- gen des epismen Theaters.” (GS 2.2, 536). 
100 (Loc. cit.) “Im übrigen ist das epische Theater per definitionem ein gestisches. Denn Gesten erhalten wir um so 
mehr, je häufiger wir einen Handelnden unterbrechen.” 
101 Brecht (“On Gestic Music”) Brecht on Theatre 104. 
  
102 For a modern study of seventeenth-century techniques of dramatic performance see the first chapter of Joseph 
Roach’s The Player’s Passion of Acting.  
 
103 Yet another way of stating this same similarity; with both the baroque performer and the Brechtian performer, the 
task at hand is to present something to the audience, not represent it before the audience. The porousness of the so-
called fourth wall the separates spectacle from spectator is crucial in each case. Like baroque allegories, Brecht’s 
actors have a tendency to shuttle dialectically between playing the scene absorptively and breaking the illusionistic 
frame of the dramatic performance, thereby returning the audience’s gaze and establishing a relation of irreducibly 
theatrical address. 
 
104 “Das Epos ist in der Tat die klassische Form einer Geschichte der bedeutennden Natur wie die Allegorie ihre 
barocke.” 
 
105 Here see Benjamin’s fragmentary essay, “Capitalism as Religion” (GS 4 100–3). 
 
106 Here I am gratefully indebted to Judith Butler for calling my attention to the affective and temporal nuances that 
suggest Benjamin’s allegory as a counter-Brechtian theoretical practice. To phrase these nuances in terms that echo 
her own, we might say that allegory is full of grief, because it recognizes that we compose ourselves and are 
correspondingly decomposed with every gesture, every action. (See: “When Gesture Becomes Event.”) Here, see 
also Terry Eagleton’s view, that, “What Benjamin discovered in Brecht was precisely how you might do all this [i.e. 
deploy allegorical devices in the theater] and be non-melancholic in the bargain” (23). Eagleton, however, imputes 
to Benjamin a desire to have done with melancholy, where Butler—and Benjamin, it appears—seems less 
unequivocally committed to this desire. 
 
107 For Benjamin’s comments on the structuring of time according to myths of progress and/or to the intuition of 
permanent catastrophe, see Arcades Project, J66a,4. 
 
108 “Es gibt einen Entwurf, in dem Cäsar statt Zarathustra der Träger von Nietzsches Lehre ist. (Löwith p 73) Das ist 




                                                                                                                                                       
175). 
109 “Für sie ist e skein Ziel mitzureißen und zu begeistern. Nur wo sie in Stationen der Berachtung den Leser 
einzuhalten nötigt, ist sie ihrer sicher” 
 
110 “Immer wieder, bei Shakespeare, bei Calderon füllen Kämpfe den letzten Akt und Könige, Prinzen, Knappen und 
Gefolge >treten fliehend auf<. Der Augenblick, da sie Zuschauern sichtbar werden, läßt sie einhalten. Der Flucht der 
dramatischen Personen gebietet die Szene halt. Ihr Eintritt in den Blickraum Unbeteiligter und wahrhaft Überlegener 
läßt die Preisgegebenen aufatmen und umfängt sie mit neuer Luft. Daher hat die Bühnenerscheinung der >fliehend< 
Auftretenden ihre verborgene Bedeutung. In das Lesen dieser Formel spielt die Erwartung von einem Orte, einem 
Licht oder Rampenlicht herein, in welchem auch unsere Flucht durch das Leben vor betrachtenden Fremdlingen ge- 
borgen wäre.” (GS 4.1 143) 




Playfulness and Gaiety 
Unsettling Stein 
 
In attempting to delineate baroque Trauerspiel from ancient tragedy, Benjamin approvingly cites 
Franz Rosenzweig’s claim that the modern tragic drama seeks a dramaturgy of the saint: “The 
tragedy of the saint is the secret desire of the [i.e. modern] tragic dramatist,” writes Rosenzweig, 
to which Benjamin responds: “The Trauerspiel is legitimated as a form of the saintly tragedy by 
means of the martyr drama. And if only one can be trained to recognize the look of its features in 
many different types of drama from Calderón to Strindberg, it will necessarily become evident 
that this form, a form of the mysterium, continues to have an open future” (U 93–4).1 In view of 
these claims, the title alone of Gertrude Stein’s play Four Saints in Three Acts (written 1927, 
premiered 1934) immediately suggests itself as a potential participant in this developing history 
of baroque Trauerspiel that extends through Strindberg into the twentieth century. True to the 
Trauerspiel form, Stein’s play is remarkably devoid of dramatic action—so much so that it 
features no scenes of martyrdom, or for that matter, any traditional plot based in narrative 
causality whatsoever—but it takes for its central figure a saint, Teresa of Ávila, drawn directly 
from the textbook history of baroque aesthetics. As a female intellectual, an object of queer diva 
worship, and crypto-Jewish avatar of early modern mystical experience, Teresa’s life exerted a 
strong attraction upon Stein from a very early age; and her ecstatic visions, recorded in widely 
disseminated works like Interior Castle (1577), also helped bolster the Catholic 
Counterreformation’s use of intoxicating imagery on the part of artists like Bernini. This chapter 
will make clear the intimate relationship between Stein’s miracle play and the baroque as 
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unfolding concept in twentieth-century modernism’s artistic production and aesthetic theory. 
Where the baroque Trauerspiel strove toward a mournful dramaturgy of the saint whose 
singularity could be figured as a modern cognate to that of the ancient tragic hero, Stein’s play 
multiplies its saintly figures almost ad infinitum, and demands a shift in emphasis from 
Trauerspiel’s mournfulness (Trauer-) to its playful character (-spiel).2 It marks an attempt to turn 
away from the negations of Benjamin’s melancholy, and toward the affirmations of Nietzschean 
cheerfulness.3 
Stein could not have known Benjamin’s text while she was writing Four Saints in Three 
Acts: The Origin of German Trauerspiel first appeared in print in January 1928, mere months 
after the writing of Stein’s libretto in June 1927. A copy of the original German text, or of the 
subsequently published and highly regarded French translation, Origine du drame baroque 
allemand, could have come her way in the following months, but Stein seems to have read little 
in her parents’ native German or her adopted city’s French. Nevertheless, numerous aspects of 
Stein’s opera and the theoretical writings she generated to articulate it (her 1934 essay “Plays,” 
specifically) bear striking resemblances to the concept of baroque that emerges from Benjamin’s 
Origin of German Trauerspiel. Drawing on these similarities—to be discussed at length below—
this chapter aims at identifying the most salient points of affinity between Stein and the baroque 
theater. Although recent studies of Stein and Four Saints have focused on her relationship to the 
anti-theatrical prejudice (Puchner) or to closet drama (Puchner, Salvato), her sexuality 
(Blackmer, Salvato), her poetic praxis (Dydo, Bowers), her views on ecology or landscape 
(Bowers, Marranca, Fuchs), the racial politics of the opera’s premiere and its entirely black cast 
of singers (Barg), or Stein’s influential place within the twentieth-century avant-gardes (Bay-
Cheng, Fuchs, Marranca), none has sought to situate Stein with respect to the longue durée of 
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theater and performance history dating back to the early modern period. Can it be we’ve been so 
fascinated with Stein’s cubism and pastoralism that we have somehow managed to overlook her 
relationship to the baroque?4 This would be a serious oversight, since Stein, her collaborators, 
and her audience alike very evidently understood Four Saints in Three Acts to be a play in 
explicit dialogue with the conventions of baroque theatrical representation, even if this dialogue 
has since become inaudible.  
As the opera’s composer, Virgil Thomson, well knew, Four Saints in Three Acts 
mythologizes its historical figures and stages no clear historical events. Nevertheless, the 
question must be raised: what would it meant to regard Four Saints as a kind of history play, not 
unlike the Trauerspiel whose material content is history itself? When Four Saints was staged by 
Robert Wilson in 1996, American critic Bonnie Marranca wrote that Wilson’s production 
amounted to “a virtual casebook, embodying histories of imagery and histories of performance 
style,” and claimed that “The real achievement of this new Four Saints is the way it frames 
performance history to elucidate for its spectators the process through which ideas, art, and style 
are transmitted through artworks. […] What does it mean to imagine and reimagine ‘canon,’ 
‘repertoire,’ ‘classic’?” (Performance Histories 78). But even without Wilson’s intervention, 
Stein’s 1927 libretto and its 1934 premiere were already posing these very questions about the 
way history (and art history) comes to be staged and transmitted in the theater. Like the best 
examples of baroque allegorical theater, Four Saints is both a work of theater and a work of 
historiography: it stages the lives of saints as sacred analogues to the modern, secular life of 
artists, certainly, but it also stages a vision of historical unfolding. It not only put its baroque 
saints into the spotlight: it explicitly cited and iterated baroque gestures, forms, images, thereby 
reenacting theatrically an entire history of baroque theater itself, bodying those gestures, forms, 
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images, and history forward into the production’s modernist moment, and beyond. An allegory 
of canonization, Four Saints in Three Acts used both text and performance alike to reimagine 
both baroque theater and baroque history, staging history as repetition, play, iteration, and 
recursion in which the obscurity of baroque theater forms can be exhumed and re-cited in a new 
(modernist, American) context.5 In Four Saints, the baroque philosophy of historical repetition is 
itself reenacted, and historical “progress” is figured as performative process. While recent 
scholarship has sought to construe this vision of history alongside notions of queer temporality, 
the trace of the early modern in Stein’s Four Saints require that these forms of queer temporality 
be understood with respect to the baroque philosophies of historical untimeliness that this 
dissertation has sought to delineate.6 
Landing almost immediately on Broadway to enormous acclaim after it’s brief premiere 
at a regional art museum in Hartford, Connecticut, Four Saints in Three Acts was the first and 
only play of Stein’s to receive a major production during her lifetime.7 It stands out as a 
landmark of the founding years of American avant-garde theater, perhaps rivaled in significance 
only by the short expressionist dramas of Eugene O’Neill’s early “expressionist” period (1914-
1922), but with much greater popular appeal. Furthermore, Stein is regularly cited as one of the 
ensuing American avant-garde’s greatest influences, inspiring figures as disparate as John Cage, 
Richard Foreman, Elizabeth LeCompte, and many others.8 Given its position at the intersection 
of the U.S. avant-garde theater’s beginnings and the contemporaneous arrival of art-historical 
debates about baroque on American shores, rethinking Four Saints in Three Acts as a 
paradigmatic example of American baroque modernism means rethinking the meaning of the 
baroque to later histories of the American stage as well. This chapter will begin by examining the 
place of the baroque in the historical and performance contexts of Four Saints’ premiere. It will 
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then exhibit the baroque resonances in Stein’s writing, first by considering her 1934 essay plays 
and then her 1927 Four Saints libretto. Along the way, I will also raise a set of questions about 
the baroque’s notional capacity to enfold affective modes of gaiety alongside queer forms of 
sexuality, desire, and affiliation. In so doing, I will argue for rethinking Stein’s miracle play as a 
paradigmatic and uniquely American example of baroque modernism, a pattern of having to look 
back to the past, and to early modernity specifically, in order to advance the pursuit of the new. 
 
4.1 Conceptual and performance contexts 
Upon entering the Wadsworth Atheneum’s newly constructed theater for the 1934 premiere of 
Four Saints in Three Acts, spectators received a printed program; it featured as its frontispiece a 
large-scale, reproduced photograph of Bernini’s Saint Teresa in Ecstasy [Figure 13], even then 
regarded as an apotheosis of baroque sculpture, along with the text of a seventeenth-century 
hymn, “Upon the Book and Picture of the Seraphical Saint Teresa” by the allegedly most 
baroque of the English metaphysical poets, Richard Crashaw (1613-49) [Figure 14].9 The 
inclusion of these two intertexts suggests the extent to which the premiere’s producers conceived 
it as a play on baroque themes, one with a robust relation to the tradition of baroque literary and 
visual culture. It was most likely through the curatorial influence of the Wadsworth Atheneum’s 
young director, Arthur Everett “Chick” Austin (1900-1957) that Stein came to be situated 
alongside Bernini and Crashaw in this way. In the seven years since he was appointed museum 
director at age 27, Austin had sought to focus the museum’s collecting on two then-undervalued 
fields of European painting—the same two art-historical periods that were his lifelong passion, 
namely, modernist and baroque. He had already curated the first major American exhibition of 
Italian baroque paintings in 1930.10 Largely through Austin’s efforts, a new, American awareness  
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FIGURES 13, 14, AND 15: (Above) Bernini and Crashaw’s treatments of Saint Teresa, included in 
Four Saints in Three Acts’ Hartford premiere souvenir program.  (Below) Pietro Francavilla’s 




moment. On the occasion of Four Saints’ premiere, Austin also inaugurated the Atheneum’s 
newly completed Avery Memorial Wing, which he had arranged to be built in the austere 
International Style, and at whose center he had placed an enormous sculpture of a Venus, dated 
1600, by Pietro Francavilla (1548-1615). The opening night audience passed through this space 
while en route to the first American retrospective of Picasso’s paintings, before heading to the 
museum’s auditorium for the opera premiere [Figure 15].11 Austin served not only as Four Saints 
in Three Acts’ host in his capacity as museum director, but also as a financing producer of sorts 
in his role as founder of the Friends and Enemies of Modern Music, a society devoted to 
programming music by composers both modern (Stravinsky, Satie, Schoenberg) and baroque 
(Vivaldi, Couperin, and Scarlatti). By 1934, he had become expert at juxtaposing the early 
modern alongside the modernist.12  
What’s more, the choice to contextualize Four Saints’ premiere within a set of citations 
to baroque cultural production was far from an arbitrary one. Stein and Thomson themselves, as 
the opera’s principal collaborators, had taken for the opera’s main focus Saints Teresa of Avila 
and Ignatius of Loyola, whose ecstatic visions were even then understood to have inspired the 
programmatic use of spectacle as propaganda within the Catholic Counterreformation. In the 
person of Saint Teresa, Stein claims kinship with the baroque as a variety of spiritual 
experience.13 An account by Virgil Thomson in 1966 of how the choice of subjects fell to 
baroque saints is evocative:  
I had asked Miss Stein for an opera libretto, and we had sat together for picking 
out a subject. The theme we chose was of my suggesting; it was the working 
artist’s life, which is to say, the life we both were living. […] I thought we should 
follow overtly, however, the format of classical Italian opera, which carries on the 
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commerce of the play in dry recitative, extending the emotional moments into 
arias and set-pieces. And since the eighteenth-century opera seria, or basic Italian 
opera, required a serious mythological subject with a tragic ending, we agreed to 
follow that convention also, but to consider mythology as including not just Greek 
or Scandinavian legends, of which there were already a great many in operatic 
repertory, but also political history and the lives of saints. Gertrude liked 
American history, but every theme we tried out seemed to have something wrong 
with it. So that after I vetoed George Washington because of the eighteenth 
century costumes (in which everybody looks alike), we gave up history and chose 
saints, sharing a certain reserve toward medieval ones and Italian ones on the 
grounds that both had been overdone in the last century. Eventually our saints 
turned out to be baroque and Spanish, a solution that delighted Gertrude, for she 
loved Spain, and that was far from displeasing to me, since, as I pointed out, 
mass-market Catholic art, the basic living art of Christianity, was still baroque. 
And [Thomson’s lover, the landscape painter, poet, and scenarist for Four Saints] 
Maurice Grosser was later to remind us that musical instruments of the violin 
family still present themselves as functional baroque forms.14 
By this description, then, it is clear that the initial conceptual discussions for the opera had 
centered not only upon the baroque setting of its saintly protagonists, but also on a number of 
ways in which the baroque could make a fortuitous dramaturgical concept for the work. Their 
collaboration together would develop techniques of baroque recitative, elaborate upon the 
structures of eighteenth-century baroque opera seria, reprise the mythological thematics found in 
early opera and in Wagner, and—perhaps most importantly of all—would capitalize upon the 
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variegated and flamboyantly colorful images and costumes of the period, as opposed to the bland 
uniformity of Enlightenment- and Revolutionary-era clothing.15 But it is Grosser’s comment (as 
recollected here by Thomson) on the historical persistence of baroque form within the physical 
bodies of modern string instruments that best informs the opera’s conceptual gambit. The bodies 
of these objects, into which the entire history has sunk or merged, exemplify just one of many 
ways in which the baroque can hardly be considered as something absolutely past, but as 
something materially—indeed continuously present, if in subtly transformed ways.  
For her part, Stein harbored a strong attachment to Spain, due in some measure to her 
close friendship with Picasso and Gris, and to fond memories of her “golden summer of 1912,” 
spent with Alice B. Toklas touring Madrid, Toledo, Barcelona, and Saint Teresa’s hometown of 
Ávila (Watson 44). Making the journey to Teresa’s hometown—like so many pilgrims and 
tourists before her had, and like so many of her own art-world devotees would ultimately visit 
her in the Rue de Fleurus—Stein found the fantasy landscape of Ávila enchanting. Toklas did as 
well. There they had the opportunity to visit an ornate, seventeenth-century shrine dedicated to 
Teresa’s honor in the Saint’s official chapel, an image that doubtlessly returned to Stein during 
her collaboration with Thomson in 1927.16 But she also seems to have drawn some degree of 
inspiration from what Thomson describes as the still-baroque status of “mass-market Catholic 
art.” She would later describe the way she drew inspiration for the opera from her experiences as 
a flâneur in the streets of Paris, encountering objects of Catholic kitsch for sale in various 
vitrines during her walks around the city. A photography studio in the Boulevard Raspail 
exhibiting a series of successive photographs in which a young girl’s street clothes are gradually 
transformed into a nun’s habit became for Stein an inspiration for one of the libretto’s most 
memorable moments (P li). (“Saint Teresa could be photographed having been dressed like a 
 
 247 
lady and then they taking out her head changed it to a nun an a nun a saint an a saint so” [4S3A 
447].) Elsewhere, in the Rue de Rennes, a large group of porcelain statuettes representing a 
young, unhelmeted soldier showing charity to a beggar offered her an image for the militancy 
and grace of Saint Ignatius of Loyola (P li). (“Saint Ignatius could be in porcelain actually. Saint 
Ignatius could be in porcelain actually while he was young and standing” [4S3A 450].) It was 
from these fragmentary allegories of modernity—the architectural remains of baroque church 
architecture in Spain, the trace of baroque emblematics hidden ruinously within commodity 
souvenirs encountered while strolling idly through the streets of Paris—that Stein drew her 
inspiration for Four Saints in Three Acts, her Gesamtkunstwerk of the American modernist 
baroque.17  
But it was to be a baroque Gesamtkunstwerk with a difference. Unlike a Wagner or a 
Bernini, who both sought to consolidate complete artistic control into one sovereign and totalized 
artist figure, a composite dramatist-director-composer-choreographer-architect, both Stein, 
Thomson, Austin and their collaborators pursued another path altogether. Their model of 
collaboration was something more akin to that charted by the Ballets Russes under Sergei 
Diaghilev, in which a multiplicity of artists from a variety of different mediums are brought 
together and each granted relative artistic autonomy from the rest, so that no one centrally 
controlling artistic intelligence can emerge.18 What’s more, Stein and Thomson’s methods as 
musical dramatists would sharply depart from the more straightforwardly representational 
structure of Wagner’s operas, indeed, would contest the relationship between drama and 
representation altogether, taking the theater away from standard forms of dramatic mimesis 
toward more self-reflexive forms of theatricalism and mime. On the spectrum described in this 
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dissertation’s first chapter between Apollonian and Dionysian formulations of the baroque, then, 
Four Saints embodied a more Dionysian, de-centered, nonmimetic set of artistic aspirations.  
 
4.2 “To mount it up” – baroque citationality on stage 
Audience members at any of the productions of Four Saints in 1934 would have been confronted 
with the bizarre spectacle of Florine Stettheimer’s scenery, described by Eugene Gaddis, in terms 
echoed by numerous others (e.g., Watson, Harris, Van Vechten) as having been executed in a 
“whimsical baroque style” (186). A painter, Stettheimer’s involvement was secured early on in 
the collaborative process, in 1929, well before any of the other major players had been drawn in. 
Thomson seized upon her as a potential collaborator after being immediately drawn to her artistic 
work: “Florine’s paintings are very high camp,” he would recall many years later, “and high 
camp is the only thing you can do with a religious subject. Anything else gets sentimental and 
unbelievable, whereas high camp touches religion sincerely and its being at the same time low 
pop.”19 From this nexus of sincerity, religiosity, and campiness, Stettheimer produced one of 
American theater’s most iconic stage images, unquestionably modern while simultaneously 
being evocative of baroque stage practices. She dressed the stage’s overhanging borders, legs, 
and upstage wall with a draping of blue cellophane—still a relatively recent invention, it was 
only patented in 1912—that collected in shimmering folds everywhere. Seen from the audience 
as it formed a background to the symmetrical placement of bodies upon the stage, it drew 
attention to the converging vectors of the theater space itself, recalling the use of forced visual 
perspective and spatial recessiveness that has been the hallmark of baroque stage design at least 
since the construction of the Teatro Olimpico in 1580-5 [Figure 16]. The total design’s effect is 




FIGURE 16: Production photograph from Four Saints in Three Acts’ premiere. 
 
box version of Baroque” (qtd. in Watson 225). As if deliberately citing the scopic vectors of  
Bernini’s Teresa in Ecstasy—in which a pair of the Cornaro family members witness the saint’s 
transverberation from a pair of theatre boxes to the sides of the central sculpture group—
Stettheimer similarly placed an opera box to one side of the stage, allowing two characters (a set 
of narrators, called the Commère and Compère, interpolations of Thomson’s drawn from the 
French music hall tradition) a seat from which to watch the onstage events, thus reinforcing the 
theatricality of the opera’s proceedings.  
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 The costumes Stettheimer designed for Four Saints in Three Acts cited baroque visual 
culture in similar ways, based largely upon Catholic liturgical dress. In one spectator’s 
description, the nearly forty performers depicting the opera’s innumerable saints wore “simple, 
unshaped robes, with wide sleeves and cowl hoods, varied by lace bordered tunics like 
ecclesiastical surplices” (qtd. in Harris 109). Production photographs corroborate this 
description, suggesting a design scheme that might have taken some of its greatest inspiration 
from paintings of seventeenth-century Catholic clergymen, some modern touches 
notwithstanding. The opera’s two Saints Teresa appeared in its opening act wearing matching 
cardinal-red cassocks, with “full-gathered” skirting and shoulder capes, their heads crowned with 
short lace mantillas and rakishly posed, wide-brimmed, straw hats that gave them the appearance 
of wearing haloes. They looked something like a pair of female cardinals who decided to don 
their finest choir dress for the purposes of having a picnic on the lawn [Figure 17]. Other 
costumes were equally suggestive, rich, and strange: Saint Ignatius of Loyola, for example, made 
his first appearance in a cassock of bright green watered silk.20 Almost all the actors changed 
costumes—and colors—at each of the production’s three entr’actes, creating a veritable pageant 
with a constantly shifting color palate, full of blues, greens, whites, reds, and other lavish hues. 
In David Harris’s description,  “The sheer number of costumes—approximately two hundred in 
an opera that ran only one hundred minutes—contributed to the baroque richness of the 
spectacle” (109).  
 Beyond the costumes, the actors’ use of gesture and stage movement also cited visual 
forms of early modern Catholic culture in deliberate and significant ways. Thomson wrote to 
Stein in 1933 of the production team’s intention for the performers’ bodies to conjure “the same 




FIGURE 17: Production photograph from Four Saints in Three Acts’ premiere. 
 
British dancer Frederick Ashton with choreographing a continuous repertoire of gestures for the 
entirety of the spectacle.21 Ashton brought to the task a deep familiarity with Catholic ritual 
attained from having spent his childhood in Lima, Peru, where he served as an acolyte to the 
city’s cardinal archbishop, assisted with masses in its grand cathedral, and witnessed countless 
street processions like the one he staged for the opera’s climax.22 Working with the scenario 
composed by Maurice Grosser to organize Stein’s libretto into “a train of images,” Ashton 
arranged the performers’ bodies into a series of tableaux vivants, alternating between continuity 
of movement and the sort of momentary frozenness that allows a gesture to settle. Eschewing the 
 
 252 
fourth wall almost entirely, he instead opted frequently for the flat, outwardly facing, 
presentational style that we have already seen associated in Benjamin’s writings with the 
frontality of allegorical theater of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.23 At other moments, 
Ashton found further occasions for dancers to contort their bodies into what Harris describes as 
“an almost baroque spiral of a curve,” or in another, as “baroque swirls and convolutions of 
mass” (Harris 125, 128). 
His aims were in no way lost upon the 1934 audience. From the auditorium, Carl Van 
Vechten perceived that Ashton’s choreographed gestures were meant to coordinate with 
Stettheimer’s fancifully baroque scenery, and that they were developed primarily in response to 
the tradition of baroque painting—particularly El Greco, Zurbarán, and Velázquez—and he said 
so in an essay later printed in the New York Times and the Broadway production’s souvenir 
program.24 Another viewer, the Jesuit priest, anti-racist and anti-fascism activist, and sometime 
critic John LaFarge, joined Van Vechten in perceiving baroque culture as a central touchstone 
for Four Saints, and described this aspect of the opera in detail in his 17 February 1934 review of 
it in the Jesuit weekly America. Thomson’s short letter to Stein of 2 March 1934 enjoins her to 
find a copy of La Farge’s review in the American Library, noting briefly and with some evident 
satisfaction that “Fancy high Jesuit Father La Farge[ ]did us proud. He incidentally, was the 
author of the phrase ‘baroque fantasia. Usefully.’”25 La Farge’s review of the production claims 
that the text’s prevailing idea  
seems to be a baroque fantasia. She [i.e. Stein] wishes to convey to the spectator 
and hearer the vague general impression of how baroque appears to her; of what 
she particularly loves in baroque; its contained grandeur; its dignity of high noon 
and blue skies. But this is not done too seriously; It is ironical; seriously ironical 
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or ironically serious. […] She conveys too, in a strange way, the impression that a 
spiritually illiterate person receives from the accidentals of the Catholic liturgy. 
To such a person, the chanted lessons of the Church, the intonations and 
movements, appear solemn yet inconsequential grave announcements of the 
inexplicable. Not that she resents this; she enjoys it, as the most precious element 
in the baroque. Her attitude toward it is of interest; of pleasure; possibly of 
something deeper, a sense that there is something profound and meaningful 
beneath these forms. So with an immense number of moderns; a nostalgia for 
something they have lost. Yet she remains slightly ironical. […] St. Teresa and St. 
Ignatius are but symbols of this something in the baroque which lifts it above a 
gorgeous garden party. They are the foci of baroque dignity, restraint, 
expansiveness. They are vaguely reminiscent of a vaguely apprehended period: 
agreeable figures.26 
La Farge’s comments touch upon some of the most central conceptual problematics in evaluating 
how Four Saints instantiates Stein’s relationship to the vaguely apprehended period of the 
baroque. Four Saints at once evinces a sincere love of the baroque style, enjoyment or interest or 
pleasure in its “grandeur,” “dignity,” “restraint,” “expansiveness;” but there is also something 
“seriously ironical or ironically serious” about the attitude it takes up toward the baroque 
tradition.27 The constellation of these affects—genuine admiration and nostalgia on one hand, 
and a “slightly ironical” stance on the other—reaches what appears as a point of undecidability 
in La Farge’s assessment, which gauges both Stein’s closeness to the baroque, and her apparent 
distance from it.  
 
 254 
Like Thomson, the producers of Four Saints’ later Broadway run the usefulness in La 
Farge’s interpretation of the work as a “baroque fantasia,” and included the phrase in the final 
sentence of their press release.28 Fastening onto this description, Stark Young described the 
quality of the movement quite explicitly in his review of the production as “a baroque 
composition that is sometimes heavy as in sculpture or sculpturesque painting, sometimes as 
light as the air of salon walls.” In Young’s view, Ashton’s recognizable citations to the visual 
culture of the baroque period were decisive in determining the choreography’s reception in 
general; Young continues: “The question is, then, how much does one’s enjoyment of this dance 
design arise from recognition, from the appearance suddenly here, in sum, of tradition? […] 
What is the particular response or emotion that the traditional in itself arouses? Does it give a 
certain dignity to art by achieving a sense of continuity? Is this a sense more of a continuity in art 
or of a continuity in the type of the mind?”29 These are questions that must be asked not only of 
Ashton’s choreography, but of other aspects of the performance concept and context, and of 
Stein’s text not least of all. 
Van Vechten, La Farge, and Young’s responses each record the closeness and the 
distance between Stein’s opera and the visual repertoire of seventeenth-century Europe, and one 
measure of this distance must also be registered in the extent to which Ashton’s choreography 
incorporated into its baroque texture certain elements drawn from African-American forms of 
social dance. For while Ashton’s choreography traced aspects of his childhood encounter with 
forms of Latin American baroque mestizaje, they also drew regularly on numerous contemporary 
social dances from Harlem’s thriving nightlife scene—such as the Charleston, Snake Hips, and 
the Lindy Hop.30 Although Four Saints had ostensibly been written for white performers, 
Thomson had hit upon the idea of an entirely black cast while listening to Jimmie Daniels 
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singing “I’ve Got the World on a String” during a late-night visit to The Hot-Cha Bar and Grill 
in Harlem in 1933.31 By drawing the Lindy Hop and other black dance forms into the mix, 
Ashton developed Four Saints’ choreographic vocabulary at what Fred Moten describes as the 
conjunction of “blackness and the baroque.”32 Even more strikingly, the choreography’s 
numerous citations to baroque religious imagery appear to have been introduced, in part, to lend 
an air of grave respectability to what otherwise might have been seen a salacious and 
objectifying use of black bodies onstage. Thomson’s decision to cast an entirely black group of 
singers—born as much from a spirit of racial fetishism as anything else33—eventually led to 
conflicts about how the performers’ bodies were to appear in performance, with Stettheimer 
initially insisting that their brown skin be painted white (suggesting a kind of Masque of 
Whiteness, à la Jonson and Jones), and Thomson advocating for any design in which this skin 
could appear exposed and unwhitened, even pushing for Stettheimer to design diaphanous 
costumes made of cellophane (Watson 206-8). Stein was unimpressed by this latter proposal, and 
Thomson’s letter to her of 30 May 1933 mentions the spectacle’s planned use of gestures drawn 
from “religious painting and sculpture” as a way to persuade her that the performers’ bodies and 
movements will be full of magnificence, “sedate and prim” rather than “titillating.”34 Although 
both the plans to whiten the performers’ skin and to clothe them in transparent vestments were 
ultimately dropped, the citational use of movements inspired by the baroque period remained, 
intermixed with movements Ashton quoted from the bars and dance halls of Harlem.  
Remarkably enough, the years that saw the development of Four Saints in Three Acts’ 
central production concepts also witnessed the rise of a thriving queer nightlife in Harlem 
(Chauncey 309-10). For this reason, the possibility cannot be discounted that the production’s 
repertoire of social dance forms and frozen baroque poses drew some measure of inspiration 
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from the emerging phenomenon of drag (or “pansy”) balls in Northern Manhattan. Thomson, 
who had attended drag balls in Paris for Mardi Gras, attended at least one of these balls with Carl 
Van Vechten in February 1929 when he was visiting America to drum up initial financial support 
for a production for Four Saints. The event was held at the Rockland Casino in Harlem (later the 
Rockland Palace Ballroom at 155th Street and Frederick Douglass Boulevard), and featured a 
procession of drag kings and queens parading in extraordinary costumes of black lace, canary 
satin, spangles, calla lilies, and other extravagances.35 How are we to interpret the historical 
contemporaneity of Four Saints in Three Acts’ premiere and the thriving drag scene in Harlem 
during the late 1920s and early ’30s, beyond merely observing that Four Saints can be read 
superficially as an elaborate pageant in baroque drag, and that modern drag balls bear within 
themselves a surrogated trace of baroque pageantry?36 Doing so involves recognizing that both 
performance contexts aimed at the project of “making gestures quotable”—as Benjamin claimed 
it was the project of Brecht’s Epic Theater to do—whether this means making quotable the 
gestures that compose the illusion of a stably gendered identity for the purposes of drag 
performance, or whether it means making quotable the repertoire of gestures that compose the 
history of baroque visual representation for the purposes of staging a work of modern opera. 
From this perspective, we might say: if drag theatrically exposes gender as a mythic or 
performative construction, the similarly citable use of baroque gesture in Four Saints has the 
power to theatrically expose as equally mythical those notions of historical progress by which the 
past can come to be considered as irrecoverably past and separate from the present. If Stein’s 
play “synchronizes” the 1920s and the baroque—as Bonnie Marranca has suggested it does37—
its premiere performance worked to bring about this effect with every pose, in which the past 
history of baroque gesture, through reiterated acts of citation, is bodied forth into the modernist 
 
 257 
present. Both the text and the premiere performance of Four Saints produce a concept of 
historical time as performative, constituted by the syncopated and continual action of citation, 
iteration, and repetition.38 But as we have seen already elsewhere in this dissertation, the notion 
of history as repetition also has strong roots in the historical period of the baroque itself.39  
 
4.3 Allegorical temporality and history  
In the year immediately following the production’s premiere and subsequent transfer to 
Broadway, Stein would compose her only lengthy theoretical treatise on the theater, a 1935 
lecture called “Plays.” This essay serves both as an occasion to reflect on the dramaturgy of Four 
Saints, and as a philosophical inquiry into the nature of time itself, commencing from the 
following “fundamental” observation about plays:  
The thing that is fundamental about plays is that the scene as depicted on the stage 
is more often than not one might say it is almost always in syncopated time in 
relation to the emotion of anybody in the audience. […] Your sensation as one in 
the audience in relation to the play played before you your sensation I say your 
emotion concerning that play is always either behind or ahead of the play at which 
you are looking and to which you are listening. So your emotion as a member of 
the audience is never going on at the same time as the action of the play. […] That 
the thing seen and the thing felt about the thing seen not going on at the same 
tempo is what makes the being at the theatre something that makes anybody 
nervous. (P, xxix-xxx) 
Here Stein is referring in large part to the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century traditions 
of realism and melodrama which formed the bases of her theatrical education as a young person, 
 
 258 
in which exciting events, suspense, unexpected plot reversals, and the like can be said to create 
the foundation of an audience’s affective responsiveness. Stein’s essay makes clear that the 
nervousness she feels in being temporally out-of-joint at the theater is part of a larger situation 
that finds her feeling similarly out-of-joint with the temporality of everyday existence. She 
claims that the syncopated rhythm that arises from one’s experiential non-simultaneity to any 
given event in daily life is experienced—not as a nervousness from which one seeks “relief,” as 
in the theater—but as an “excitement” that seems to culminate in a sense of completion (P, xxxii-
xxxiii). But the experience of being absolutely present to an event is crucially just as unavailable 
outside the theater, in everyday life, as it is inside the theater. With exciting events taking place 
outside the theater, claims Stein, “There one progresses forward and back emotionally,” just as 
one might do in a theatrical audience, shuttling back and forth through syncopated time, but “at 
the supreme crisis of the scene the scene in which one takes part, in which one’s hopes and loves 
and fears take part at the extreme crisis of this thing one is almost one with one’s emotions” (P, 
xxxiii, emphasis mine). This almost is an important nuance in Stein’s theory. Things feel more 
immediate and present in everyday life, even if they aren’t actually so, in part because we are 
participants in our lives in ways that we are not participants at the theater. And so if the theatrical 
medium is problematic for Stein, its anxiogenic character owes to the mediated quality of all 
experience, theatrical or otherwise.40  
 For Stein, the anxieties of theatrical spectatorship are exacerbated by the modern drama’s 
mode of presenting characters, who—unlike in most situations drawn from everyday life or from 
novels, in which persons have the benefit of gradual introductions over time—suddenly manifest 
themselves on the stage or the dramatic page in the inexplicable if apparent fullness of their 
presence. To counteract this confusion one must always keep one’s finger tucked into the text’s 
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(or playbill’s) list of dramatis personae to help refamiliarize oneself (P, xxxviii), since the 
modern, secular theater confronts the spectator disorientingly with strangers (unlike the well-
known mythic figures of ancient or medieval theater). Each new physical presence onstage is 
traced by a certain absence; each new identity is, for a confusing amount of time, a mystery or 
nonentity. The actor is there, present, but a full understanding of the character is not there yet and 
takes a frustrating amount of lag time to arrive on the scene. Strangers of course can enter 
suddenly into the flow of one’s everyday life just as they can enter abruptly into the narrative 
flow of a novel, but only in exceptional cases; in theater, on the other hand, sudden appearances 
such as these and all other sorts of “shock effects” are the medium’s stock and trade. And so here 
again, the theater’s anxiogenic quality has something important to do with the way it lays bare 
and magnifies the temporally syncopated character of what is supposedly non-theatrical life. In 
Stein’s theater theory, there is a syncopated rhythm to temporal existence, one in which presence 
is promised but the specter of nonpresence is always haunting. The theater is both defined by this 
syncopation in opposition to everyday life, but it can also be seen as the rebus by which this 
syncopation’s pervasiveness in everyday life is exposed. Or—in the evocative terms offered by 
performance theorist Rebecca Schneider, herself drawing upon Stein’s vocabulary of 
syncopation—in Stein’s view the theater is the mechanism by which the theatricality of time 
itself is touched. If time’s partitioning in the theater is structured around no presence, 
syncopation, rehearsal, reenactment, and repetition (going back again and again to the dramatis 
personae), these principles of temporal theatricality must also be acknowledged in life as it is 
lived outside of the space of the theater as well. 
 There is a baroque philosophy of history implicit in this theory of temporal syncopation 
and theatricality, similar and closely related to the philosophy of history we have already 
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encountered in Nietzsche’s concept of history’s eternal return as a baroque da capo (BGE 56) 
and in Benjamin’s baroque concept of Origin as a process of “restoration and reinstatement” in 
which “singularity and repetition turn out to determine each other in all their essentials mutually” 
(U 28). For Stein—like the authors of the baroque Trauerspiele in Benjamin’s assessment—
events can be said to play out in time with an intrinsic susceptibility to repetition and play, and as 
such, possess a peculiar theatrical quality. But just as Stein shares the baroque’s characteristic 
predisposition toward the cyclicality and theatricality of historical life, so too does her writing 
incorporate the possibility for difference or revision within repetition.41 Stein’s concept of 
repetition-as-insistence, signally articulated in her 1935 essay “Portraits and Repetition,” echoes 
Benjamin’s concept of Origin in which singularity and repetition condition each other mutually. 
There she takes up the eminently philosophical question of whether repetition itself can actually 
be said ever to take place, asserting that what we typically consider repetition must instead be 
understood as insistence, in which each new re/iteration differs slightly from the ones before and 
after.42 It is as a form of emphatic insistence that Stein’s writing (re)turns upon itself so regularly, 
as in the much-parodied line from her 1913 poem Sacred Emily, “Rose is a rose is a rose is a 
rose.” This sentence can hardly be considered a dumb tautology; rather, it is a statement of 
identity that immediately calls into question what identity can be when it is so emphatically 
constituted through repetition and self-difference.43 Stein’s kinship with the allegorists of 
Benjamin’s Trauerspiel study can be gauged in the extent to which self-difference amounts 
always to her point of departure: in Stein, as in the baroque Trauerspiel, the self-sufficient 
wholeness of things has always already been violated.  
But when each new “rose” asserts itself insistently, it was Stein’s belief “that in that line 
the rose is red for the first time in English poetry for a hundred years.”44 In revivifying the rose’s 
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lost redness, Stein’s insistent repetition aims as an almost Shklovskyan defamiliarization, the 
kind that rescues for stone its forgotten stoniness.45 Frequently deploying repetition as a bulwark 
against oblivion in this way, Stein’s writing can thus be said to express an acute awareness of the 
ephemerality of phenomena when they are subject to the anxiogenic ruinations of time. In 
response, Stein’s poetics sought for itself the establishment of what she described as a 
“continuous present.”46 Stein’s concept of presence should not be confused with a more 
traditionally theological concept of Being as eternal presence: rather it is closer to the 
grammatical form of the present continuous tense or the present participle, whose form appears 
repeatedly throughout Four Saints, as in the bizarrely non-sequitur textual fragment, “Saint 
Teresa advancing” (448). In cases such as these, an action becomes an image, a gesture, and a 
figure is caught in the medial no-mans-land between two positions and two moments, unfolding 
as part of a continuous process. This differential and immanent between is where the continuous 
present is to be sought, not in the transcendent realm of sempiternity. Every spatio-temporal 
coordinate in Four Saints exists in a position of differential relationality to some other set of 
coordinates, and indeed, even to its own “self”—as can be seen in the play’s declaration that 
“There is a difference between Barcelona and Avila. / There is a difference between Barcelona” 
(471). Everything in this world mediates everything else and itself as well, and each infinitesimal 
particularity is both separated from and linked to each other, both continuously and 
discontinuously at once, hanging together through a kind of pre-established harmony like threads 
in a textile.47 The temporal unfolding of the continuous present thus takes place as a kind of 
suspension of presence, and it is within this suspendedness that the spectator can seek refuge 
from the torments of being either ahead of or behind theatrically syncopated time, precisely by 
striving becoming both ahead and behind at once.48 What is made most vividly present through 
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this operation is time itself.49 Continual presence—“staying on quite continuously” as one saint 
puts it, with another present participle (446)—entails a dynamic process of continual becoming, 
re-becoming, and intensification, which Stein calls upon to resist the coercive flow of time that 
threatens to carrying things away into nonentity.50  
 For Stein, theatricality is a privileged medium for effecting this paradoxical form of 
presence, and specifically the theatricality of the baroque stage, reconceived anew. However, her 
concern with repetition, ruination, and theatricality are not the only possible point of 
identification between Stein and the baroque concept of history, as it has emerged from our 
readings of Nietzsche and Benjamin. Rather, it is Four Saints’ dramaturgy itself that bespeaks 
the nearest similarity between the two. The theater may well register, like a seismograph, the 
uncanny and theatrical syncopations of time, but for Stein it also offers a means to ameliorate the 
anxieties that these syncopations produce. In terms that strikingly recall Benjamin’s claim that 
the baroque theater witnesses the merging of history into the scene or setting of the natural 
world, Stein’s “Plays” describes how her dramaturgy quite consciously merges theatrical time 
into natural landscape: 
I felt that if a play was exactly like a landscape then there would be no difficulty 
about the emotion of the person looking on at he play being behind or ahead of 
the play because the landscape does not have to make acquaintance. […] The 
landscape has it [sic] formation and as after all a play has to have formation and 
be in relation one thing to the other thing and as the story is not the thing as any 
one is always telling something then the landscape not moving but being always 
in relation, the trees to the hills to the fields the trees to each other any piece of it 
to any sky and then any detail to any other detail [….] And of that relation I 
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wanted to make a play and I did, a great number of plays [….] The only one that 
has been played is Four Saints. In Four Saints I made the Saints the landscape. All 
the saints that I made and I made a number of them because after all a great many 
pieces of things are in a landscape all these saints together made my landscape. 
These attendant saints were the landscape and it the play really is a landscape. A 
landscape does not move nothing really moves in a landscape but things are there, 
and I put into the landscape the things that were there. (P, xlvii – l) 
Scholars have repeatedly contemplated the meanings of this curious passage, particularly 
concerning the relationship of Stein’s landscape concept to ecology or to modern staging 
practices; nowhere, however, has its relationship to Benjamin’s reading of baroque theater yet 
been substantively considered.51 In Stein as in baroque Trauerspiel (as in Parsifal), time becomes 
space, merging uncannily into the setting. A landscape is decentered, multifocal, perspectival, a 
pure immanence. Four Saints is not organized around the Aristotelian criterion of plot as an 
imitation of action, but instead uses the theater to present a plot in the spatio-geographic sense of 
the term: a plot of land.52 Taking place, as it does, in some saintly realm apart from normative 
conceptions of time, events do not progress in any causal manner within this plot. Nothing really 
can be said to “happen” in Four Saints. As drama it takes place in an entirely different way. In 
Stein’s theater each element of the landscape takes its place like a component of a larger 
allegorical vision, in which each object of attention is at least potentially “relatable” to every 
other object (“the trees to the hills to the fields the trees to each other any piece of it to any sky 
and then any detail to any other detail”).53 The landscape of saints hardly moves, but the 
constellation of figures within it does continuously shift positions, just as a breeze through any 
seemingly static natural prospect might be seen to send tree limbs and leaves fluttering.54 Like 
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the emblems of baroque allegory as described by Benjamin, in which the evental movement of 
time appears caught within a static image, Stein’s landscape incorporates into itself an internal 
dialectic of stasis and imminent movement. She underlines this point in her essay by remarking 
that the landscape of Four Saints “moves but it also stays” (P lii).  
The possibility that Ashton’s choreography might have given Stein the idea for this sense 
of stasis-in-movement makes clear the place that gestures must take their place as allegorical 
components of Stein’s landscape.55 Like a landscape, a gesture moves but also stays; it is, as 
Benjamin reminds us, the image of movement interrupted: the more interruptions one has, the 
more gestures that are produced. In a gesture, the movement must compose itself and settle into 
an image, however fleetingly, before continuing. Van Vechten, Young, La Farge, and Harris’s 
various accounts of the premiere production serve as eyewitness testimony to the way it unfolded 
as a landscape of gestures in continual variation. And here it is particularly salient that a viewer 
like John La Farge detected the trace of the baroque inheritance not only in Stein’s text also in 
the production’s obscure and ritualistic use of gesture. With the libretto neatly threading and 
rethreading a needle’s eye between sense and nonsense, a spectator like La Farge is left to focus 
all the more intently upon the stage as a field of gesticulating bodies, like a “spiritually illiterate 
person” observing the arcane and foreign rituals of a Tridentine Mass with all its foreign poses 
and incantations. His experience watching Four Saints is very similar to the experience Stein’s 
“Plays” recalls of a time in her youth when she witnessed Sarah Bernhardt play Racine’s Phèdre 
in a touring production in San Francisco. She writes, “I knew a little french [sic] of course but 
really it did not matter, it was all so foreign and her voice being so varied and it all being so 
french I could rest in it untroubled. And I did […] The manners and customs of the French 
 
 265 
theatre created a thing in itself and it existed in and for itself […] It was for me a very simple 
direct and moving pleasure” (P xlii). 
In both Stein and La Farge’s cases, the incomprehensibility of language functions as yet a 
powerful defamiliarization effect. In each case, the performance’s linguistic elements cannot be 
interpreted for any single or stable “meaning.” Instead, the language and the gestures come 
together to form a larger field of stimulus that can be interpreted in ways not singular but 
multiple, and perhaps infinitely so. In all three cases, the spectator’s attention is turned toward 
the action’s performance components, its manners and customs, its gestures and their uncertain 
significations. These materialities appear as immanent densities unto themselves (Stein calls 
Bernhardt’s French-language performance “a thing in itself”) whose mediating status is 
irreducible. There is not a way to get beyond the performance as a constellation of foreign visual 
and auditory media toward the seemingly transcendent truth-content that lingers tantalizingly 
“behind” it. The only way to feel at-home in an experience of this sort is by accepting the feeling 
of being not-at-home. The performance’s various signifiers all suggest a referent, all flirt with 
mimesis, but that referent has receded to a point of obscure inaccessibility. Mimesis (a gesture 
pointing to a beyond) has become abyssal, and has been replaced with metatheater and mime 
(gestures pointing back inward, self-referentially). In short, whether we are describing young 
Stein watching Bernhardt in a seventeenth-century French tragedy, or La Farge watching Four 
Saints in English, or a “spiritually illiterate person” watching any religious ritual in a language 
not her own, we are describing a situation not unlike that attributed by Benjamin to the 
allegorical spectator of baroque Trauerspiel. In all four cases, the spectator is confronted with a 
crisis of interpretability, in which language, gesture, and every other material element of 
performance are rendered hieroglyphic or hermeneutically opaque, thus becoming objects in 
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themselves for the spectator’s contemplation, even as they still retain a trace of original 
significance that lends them the character of an enigma. A key distinction, however, resides in 
the affective dimension of these various crises of interpretability. Whereas Benjamin’s baroque 
spectator observes the melancholic, allegorical gestures of Trauerspiel with a mixture of 
mournfulness and “satisfaction,” Stein’s spectator is supposed to respond to this crisis with what 
both she and La Farge describe as “pleasure.” And as we shall see in turning now to Stein’s 
libretto, the vision of baroque that Four Saints conjures is one that seeks to transform 
mournfulness miraculously into gaiety.56 
 
4.4 Reading Four Saints with Benjamin, listening with Nietzsche 
Since Bakhtin first articulated his Dionysian concept of the carnivalesque, it has sometimes been 
claimed that early modern festive comedies like Twelfth Night witness the extent to which the 
stage of Shakespeare’s era had effectively transformed the calendrical time of carnival—with all 
its topsy-turvy inversions (supposedly subversions) of ecclesiastical and civil law—into a new 
form of space, namely, the space of the stage. We might say in response that Benjamin describes 
Trauerspiel as bearing witness to a different church holiday’s time becoming space: the 
Trauerspiel form spatializes not Carnival-time, but the time of All Hallow’s Eve, when the 
gateways that separate the living from the dead are horrifyingly thrown open.57 Four Saints in 
Three Acts falls within this tradition of theatricalizing the time of Hallowmas: in it, the time of 
All Saints’ Day merges with the space of the stage.58 The reader or spectator is treated not only to 
four saints, but to possibly as many as forty-four: the opera’s prologue offers a litany of twenty-
one, sometimes fancifully named figures, apparently divided up by gender— 
  Saint Teresa  Saint Ignatius 
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  Saint Martyr  Saint Paul 
  Saint Settlement Saint William 
  Saint Thomasine Saint Gilbert 
  Saint Electra  Saint Settle 
  Saint Wilhelmina Saint Arthur 
  Saint Evelyn  Saint Selmer 
  Saint Pilar  Saint Paul Seize 
  Saint Hillaire  Saint Cardinal 
  Saint Bernadine Saint Plan 
     Saint Giuseppe  (4S3A 444) 
To this list, many others are added throughout the subsequent scenes and acts, forming a 
veritable panorama of saints. Throughout, the question of how many saints appear within the 
piece even becomes a point of self-reflexive fun—“How many saints are there in it. […] There 
are very many saints in it. […] There are as many saints as there are in it. […] There are as many 
saints as there are saints in it.” (4S3A 458)—while the total sum of saints is endlessly deferred in 
favor of the pleasure of counting endlessly without ever reaching a goal.59 Teasingly setting the 
spectator’s expectation for only four saints, the libretto allows the number of figures to 
proliferate over the course of the piece, suggesting a poetic analogue to the baroque concept and 
practice of horror vacui.60 The reader’s ability to enumerate them baffles against passages that 
suggest an unstable or painterly relation between the discrete bodily forms conjured by the text. 
“Can two saints be one” (4S3A 448) the text asks, and elsewhere, one saint seems to become 
two—as in “How many are there halving” (449) and “Saint Teresa with Saint Teresa. […] Saint 
Teresa and Saint Teresa” (457-8)—or even three—“Saint Teresa and Saint Teresa and Saint 
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Teresa” (448). In Thomson’s musical setting, there are two Saints Teresa, in constant dialogue 
and harmony with each other (just as in Crashaw’s hymn, the saint is divided between all that is 
“eagle” and “dove” inside herself).61 The saints merge with one another, or multiply themselves, 
or divide mitotically in ways that are unstageable in traditional theatrical terms.  
The text furthermore gives no clear indications as to who speaks what lines, or how many 
actors would be needed in total. At times the libretto uses the traditional speech prefixes that are 
conventional to printed dramatic literature in a way that seems to indicate that a certain line of 
text is to be uttered by a certain “character,” as for example when a line appears that reads “Saint 
Teresa. Nobody visits more than they do visits them” (4S3A 446). This could be a line designated 
for Saint Teresa to speak, or it could be a line to be spoken by someone else, beginning with an 
invocation to Saint Teresa, or it could be something else altogether: no clear indications are 
given. The matter is complicated by the text’s provocative lack of differentiation between stage 
directions and lines to be spoken: for instance, when the phrase “Saint Teresa. Leave later gaily 
the troubadour plays his guitar” (446) appears on the page without indication as to whether these 
words are meant to indicate an utterance to be spoken or an onstage event to be enacted. 
Frequently, these stage directions take on an expressly metatheatrical character, as in “This is a 
scene where this is seen” (453). For his part, Thomson elected to set the majority of the written 
lines as melodic texts to be sung, and so anything that could be construed as a stage direction is 
given over to explicitly sung utterance when the opera is performed, including the indications for 
each new act and scene. 
As with the opera’s proliferating saints, a similar principal animates the way Stein deals 
with the number of acts in her play. The play’s title promises Four Saints in Three Acts, a phrase 
that itself suggests an irregular, asymmetrical, brocaded structure—every bit as off-center as the 
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non-spheroid baroque pearl. But this promise turns out to be a ruse as well. As the play proceeds, 
the number of acts varies continually along with the constantly shifting quantity of saints, 
sometimes condensing—as in “Could Four Acts be Three. / Saint Teresa.   Could Four Acts be 
three. / Saint Teresa Saint Teresa Saint Teresa Could Four Acts be three Saint Teresa” (462)—
and at other times spiraling outward and expanding almost logarithmically—as in “Could Four 
Acts be when four acts could be ten Saint Teresa. Saint Teresa Saint Teresa Four Acts could be 
four acts could be when when four acts could be ten” (462). Linear chronology no longer serves 
to connect one scene straightforwardly to the next: no sooner is a “Scene II” declared than the 
poem sings back rhymingly, “Would it do if there was a Scene II” (455).  
All this is complicated by the fact that the text’s indications for where each new act 
begins and ends follow no numerically progressive path: the play does not unfold in an initial 
first act followed by a subsequent second, third, or fourth act, in that order. Rather, after a few 
pages of a prologue, the libretto declares “Act I,” only to proceed, some ten or so lines later, to 
the words “Repeat First Act” and, a page or so later, to the words “Enact end of an act.” Some 
pages later, the beginning of “Act Two” is announced, and after just a few more lines, the text 
declares once again “Act One,” and then, another page or so later, “Act Two” once again. Along 
the way, scenes are declared in a way that similarly abolishes any notion of linear or 
chronological progress, in this order “Scene Two” (448), “Scene III” (448), “Scene III” again 
(449), “Scene IV” (450), “Scene II” again (452), “Scene III” again (450), “Scene IV” again 
(452), and so forth. At times, two scenes occur, as it were, simultaneously, as when an indication 
is given (on 455) for “Scene III and Scene IV” to take place. As if in exasperation at all this 
numerical play, the text asks somewhat impatiently, “How much of it is finished” (461) and 
“How many acts are there in it” (478). Virgil Thomson worked with his lover and scenarist 
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Grosser to divide the textual material into large chunks that could be considered acts for the 
simple purpose of dividing up the music and the evening into more manageable bits, but the 
playfulness and repetition of Stein’s text belie this decision-making.62  
 Time does not progress in the world of Four Saints, but neither is it perfectly immobile. 
The saints are idle, leisurely, as at a Parisian salon or a sun-drenched garden party with croquet 
mallets, but they are not entirely static. Rather, they are caught between stasis and flux, they are 
both fixed and in motion, and this in-betweenness, this both/and doubleness, lends them 
something of an iridescent quality. Stein highlights the saints’ liminal or processual nature with 
lines that allude frequently to the characters caught in a state somewhere between two states, as 
in the opera’s central and emblematic opening image of “Saint Teresa half in and half out of 
doors” (445), “Saint Teresa very nearly half inside and half outside outside the house and not 
surrounded” (445-6). For some interpreters, these moments are interpretable as indicating a scene 
in which a figure representing the historical Theresa of Ávila is seen to be entering her convent 
for the first time as a young woman (Dydo 190). What is more important is the literal liminality 
given here, the image of the saint caught in a doorframe, between two states, an image echoed in 
other freeze-frame images-in-motion throughout the text, as in the enigmatic fragments of text 
“Saint Teresa about to be” (446), “Saint Teresa in moving” (447), “Saint Teresa has begun to be 
in act one” (453), or “Saint Teresa in a cart drawn by oxen moving around” (454).  
At other times, the text catches the figures in the fold between two incommensurable 
gestures or positions, as in a long passage near the opera’s beginning that depicts Teresa 
somewhere between sitting and standing and surrounded and not surrounded at various 
sequential instances through a kind of constant process of montage.63 Here the effect is of an 
unsettling—a continuous folding and unfolding, as when a piece of cloth at rest is ruffled 
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violently, or as in Bernini’s ecstatic depiction of the saint—and indeed: “Saint Teresa seated and 
not surrounded might be very well inclined to be settled” (447). Like allegorical emblems and 
the baroque infinitesimal method, these images attempt to incorporate the ambivalence of 
movement and time into the static, spatial frame of single instant. As with the boundaries 
between each saint and each act, the boundaries between one temporal moment and another seem 
to blur together in this allegorical treatment, like a sequence of slowly metamorphosing 
photographs in a flipbook or like frames in a reel of film. Each image appears distinct and 
separate from—while also seeming to merge into—the next.64 Self-dividing, and riven by an 
internal tension between frozenness and fluidity, Stein’s text formally translates into poetic terms 
the experience of the tableau vivant that is Benjamin describes as a hallmark of allegory in 
baroque theatrical performance. 
 Stein’s “presence” as the text’s poet also makes itself felt in the libretto of Four Saints, 
and she too is subject to this same manner of allegorical treatment and this form of self-division. 
Rather than taking the form of a stream-of-consciousness internal monologue, large parts of the 
text unfold as an internal conversation for numerous debating voices, transpiring in counterpoint 
with one another, as the process of writing the text is inscribed into the written text itself. 65 This 
is particularly true of the opera’s prologue, whose discourse suggests the author focusing a 
hermetic consciousness upon the task at hand, to “prepare for saints,” that is, to prepare to write 
the opera itself. That is to say, the opera has already begun, and its beginning is a rumination on 
how to begin. In short, its beginning is already behind itself. Ulla Dydo has effectively described 
this prologue as a meditative act, and as reflecting an author’s struggle to grasp an image that 
could effectively ground an opening scene. The libretto is thus the written record of a form of 
spiritual exercise, based upon the experience of an artistic vision. Just as the opera includes a 
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Saint Plan and a Saint Settlement, much of the action of Four Saints revolves around the author’s 
process of planning the text and settling upon textual decisions. “Imagine four benches 
separately,” a poetic voice or set of poetic voices intones: “One in the sun. / Two in the sun. / 
Three in the sun. / One not in the sun. / Not one not in the sun. / Not one. / Four benches used 
four benches used separately. / Four benches used separately” (4S3A 441). Each possibility is 
considered in its turn. In imagination and in conversation with herself, the author is attempting 
“to mount it up”—that is, she is laboring toward a mental staging of sorts. Should benches 
appear? And if so, how many? And how many illuminated? There seems not to be an internal 
consensus on the poet’s part. Then, after a brief digression of two lines, the question of how 
many benches returns briefly, only to be forcibly set aside in an abrupt self interruption: “Four 
benches with leave it” (4S3A 441). The matter has been settled: four benches, no more, no fewer. 
On to the next passage, on to the next imagistic component.  
The poetic vision approaches like a wonder, as another passage indicates—“It is very 
close close and closed”—and Stein, self-divided, instructs herself in her next plan: “Begin 
suddenly not with sisters” (441). “Imagine imagine it imagine it in it,” (443) the text’s voices 
command themselves, and thereby, the audience. Much of Four Saints unfolds in this way, not a 
single poetic speaker but a multitude in polyphonic responsiveness with itself.66 The overall 
effect is of a radical defamiliarization of the conventions of language use through an emphatic 
break with traditional forms of syntax and punctuation. The text of Four Saints’ libretto is 
always at work exposing the work of writing itself, and making this work into play, thereby 
exposing writing’s own temporal nature as a processual act. Four Saints could, on one hand, be 
considered a form of what Della Pollack has described as performative writing,67 but it might 
better be described as a text that exposes and theatrically stages the performative processuality of 
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all written text in itself.68 Like the two Saints Teresa of Thomson’s musical setting, Stein’s plural 
poetic voice is always in conversation with itself. For Stein, as for the two Saints Teresa, identity 
is always already “dividual,” differential, non-unitary. In the betweenesses of the continual 
present, the author of Four Saints is always in a semi-fixed, semi-fluid state of continual 
becoming (like “St. Teresa about to be,” or “Saint Teresa having not commenced” [447].), 
appearing like an emblematic image divided imminently. In Four Saints, identity is not a matter 
of something being indivisibly itself; rather, it is a function of imminent difference and 
repetition.  
  But it is the markedly imagistic character of Four Saints’ text that suggests its most 
productive affinities with baroque theatrical allegory. In order to make any sense of the work at 
all, one must approach Stein’s libretto the way Benjamin’s baroque allegorist approaches his 
own emblematic puzzle pieces, rummaging “here and there through the disorganized fund that 
his knowledge puts at his disposal, searching for a piece, holding it near another and testing out 
whether they fit together: that meaning to this image or this image to that meaning. The result 
can never be predicted: because there is no natural mediation between the two. (J80,2 / J80a,1).69 
Much the same can be said for a text like Four Saints, whose fragmentary images and meanings 
frequently suggest no necessary connection between and among themselves, therefore 
compelling the creative work of allegorical interpretation on the reader or spectator or stage 
director’s part. “What is the difference between a picture and pictured,” the text asks quizzically, 
then moments later spills forth into a veritable cascade of paratactic images: “One a window. / 
Two a shutter. / Three a palace. / Four a widow. / Five an adopted son. / Six a parlor. / Seven a 
shawl. / Eight an arbor. / Nine a seat. / Ten a retirement” (4S3A 452). What is the relationship 
between any of these images conjured in and through text to any of the others? What meaning 
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might be attached to any of them, or how might they attach meaningfully to any of the other 
countless images the text puts forward, such as the nails that appear abundantly in the text’s 
central section (“How many nails are there in it. / Hard shoe nails and silver nails and silver does 
not sound valuable,” 455)? Interpreters have suggested that these might be the nails of Christ’s 
crucifixion, imagined as in one of Ignatius’ meditative exercises, while Thomson and Grosser’s 
scenario hints that they might be the building implements of a heavenly mansion. But the text 
authorizes neither of these readings singly or fully, and the nails’ meaningfulness is held open as 
an uncertain enigma. At other instances, these thingly images themselves grow almost 
surrealistic, enigmatic within themselves: “Saint Chavez. The envelopes are on all the fruit of the 
fruit trees” (479).  
The sheer number of these surreal and emblematic images produces a direct invitation 
toward a theatrical interpretation heavily invested in spectacle, blurring the disciplinary 
boundaries between theater, performance, poetry, and the visual arts—a challenge met admirably 
by Thomson and his collaborators.70 But it is in the space between images and words that the 
work’s most productive tensions can be located, looking forward to the interdisciplinary 
exchanges of poetry and visual art that would become a hallmark of later twentieth-century 
intermedia arts practice. At times—as in the description of St. Teresa being photographed and 
changed into a nun, the poetic text aspires ekphrastically to the condition of image.71 Text and 
images are repeated mobilized in ways that are discontinuous or temporally differential rather 
than simultaneous: things heard are constantly replacing things seen and things seen replacing 
things heard, over and over again in sequence, with only rare moments in which both go on 
together.72 As an allegory, the relationship between the images of stage spectacle and the text that 
accompany them remain to a great degree arbitrary, like an engraved emblem to its 
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accompanying printed caption. It is therefore emphatically not the case, as Hans-Thies Lehmann 
has claimed, that Stein evinces an early or anticipatory form of some post-dramatic theater—
supposedly unprecedented prior to the late modernist moment—in which the dramatic text is no 
longer thought to govern authoritatively its realization in theatrical performance and staged 
images (49, 62-3). Rather, it is the allegorical dimension of Four Saints’ libretto, which has its 
precedents much earlier in the time of the baroque and which combines images and texts with an 
“almost aleatory manner”, that demands this unusual relationship between text and 
performance.73 Long before the emergence of what Lehmann calls post-dramatic theater in the 
twentieth century, the baroque allegorical stage already functioned in this allegedly 
“postdramatic” manner.74 In its baroque setting, Stein’s libretto both makes clear and embodies 
this historical precedence. Rather than being anti-theatrical closet dramas in any traditional sense 
of the term, as Martin Puchner has claimed (Stage Fright 101–16), her works vigorously redefine 
theatricality altogether, reorienting it along the horizon of baroque allegory. As texts, they defy 
any straightforward manifestation into staged images—almost, as Nick Salvato has argued, with 
a certain queer or sadistic glee, the kind of sadism that Benjamin attributes to allegorists in 
general.75  
 Regardless of how the textual images are to be materialized through performance into 
stage images, the question of vision remains crucial within Four Saints’ libretto. It is through the 
opera’s frequent returns to the subject of visionary experience that Stein comes in closest contact 
with her saintly and baroque protagonists.76 Thomson and Grosser actualized this thematic within 
the text, not only creating a series of so-called “tableaux,” but a number of scenic moments quite 
clearly put forward as sacred visions. For the passage in which the text describes “Pear trees 
cherry blossoms pink blossoms and late apples and surrounded by Spain and lain” and asserts 
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that “There can be no peace on earth with calm with calm” (451), Thomson and Grosser 
envisioned a scene in which one of the Saints Teresas would appear “in ecstasy, seated, with 
angel hovering,” as though in homage to the Bernini sculpture of Teresa’s famous vision, whose 
photograph appeared in that evening’s theatrical program. Near the end of the opera, Thomson 
created an aria for Saint Ignatius and gave it the title “St. Ignatius predicts the Last Judgment.” 
This musical scene has none of the terror-stricken pathos of El Greco’s treatment of St. John 
envisioning the opening of the fifth seal of the apocalypse. Rather it jubilates, and is sung as a 
musical round with a triumphal trumpet fanfare re-sounding back the singer’s melody, both 
rejoicing together in the language’s sonic, playful, echoic nature: “Once in a while and where 
and where around is a sound and around is a sound and around is a sound and around. Around is 
a sound around is a sound around is a sound and around.” (475)77 And then, remarkably, this 
vision of the Last Judgment transitions directly into a linguistic enactment of Stein’s continuous 
present, endlessly punctuating, reiterating, and deferring itself: “Around differing from anointed 
now. Now differing from anointed now. Now differing differing. Now differing from anointed 
now” (475). It is an extraordinary conceptualization of what the end of (progressive) time could 
be. Elsewhere, another more modern apocalyptic vision is dismissed almost casually: in a 
striking and eerie exchange, Thomson sets two saints in idle daytime chitchat. The first: “If it 
were possible to kill five thousand chinamen by pressing a button would it be done.” The second: 
“Saint Teresa not interested.” Here—as in Herbert Jhering’s comments in his review of Brecht’s 
Baal, describing historical life as it was lived in the German baroque—an apocalyptic event is 
encountered as an everyday inconvenience, as a banal obviousness, a subject for polite 
conversation that either elicits one’s interest or doesn’t. It is, in a sense, Stein’s most strikingly 
gestic moment.78 For all the playfulness of Stein’s language games, her saints and her landscape, 
 
 277 
Stein’s world is still haunted by catastrophe, one whose formerly fixed spatio-temporal 
coordinates are becoming unhinged. 
  But if lamentable catastrophe is ultimately ineradicable from Stein’s sundrenched 
landscape, the extent to which Four Saints evinces a shift of emphasis—away from Trauer- and 
mournfulness and toward –spiel and play—must nevertheless be observed. This shift is evident 
in what is undoubtedly the most famous of the opera’s several visionary moments, a passage 
Thomson set as an aria for Ignatius—“Pigeons on the grass alas”—which the composer and 
scenarist conceived, under Stein’s advisement, as a vision of the Holy Ghost (Watson 48). 
Together with a company of saints, Ignatius intones: 
  Pigeons on the grass alas. 
  Pigeons on the grass alas. 
 Short longer grass short longer longer shorter yellow grass Pigeons large 
pigeons on the shorter longer yellow grass alas pigeons on the grass. 
 If they were not pigeons what were they. 
 If they were not pigeons on the grass alas what were they. He had heard of 
a third and he asked about it it was a magpie in the sky. If a magpie in the sky on 
the sky can not cry if the pigeon on the grass alas can alas and to pass the pigeon 
on the grass alas and the magpie in the sky on the sky and to try and to try alas on 
the grass alas the pigeon on the grass the pigeon on the grass and alas. (468) 
As Stein explained in an interview, this moment had its genesis during one of her walks in the 
(baroque) gardens of the (seventeenth-century) Luxembourg Palace in Paris. Stein explains: “It 
was the end of summer the grass was yellow. I was sorry that it was the end of summer and I saw 
the big fat pigeons in the yellow grass and I said to myself, pigeons on the yellow grass, alas, and 
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I kept on writing pigeons on the grass, alas … until I had emptied myself of the emotion.”79 Stein 
initially finds herself within a psychologically mournful situation, observing the seasonal passage 
of time and the ruinations this passage wreaks upon even the most seemingly banal elements of 
the physical landscape: the lawn. This mournful attitude is expressed pithily, almost gesturally, 
in the word, “alas.” (One thinks of the frequency with which the word hélas is intoned in 
seventeenth-century French tragic dramas like Racine’s.) But at this juncture, Stein refuses the 
dwell psychologically within this mournful affect, and undertakes to rid herself of it through a 
process by which the playful use of repetition ultimately effects an experience of semantic 
satiation: that defamiliarizing moment when repeating a word or a phrase effectively divorces it 
from its meaning until it has become a nonsensical sound, laying bare language’s arbitrariness, 
conventionality, and sensuous materiality. (Imagine, for example, saying some banal word, like 
“fork,” repeatedly, until amid all the forks not one of them conjures the mental image of a fork: 
instead the word becomes as odd and meaningless a sound as blork.) Here, unlike with Stein’s 
“Rose is a rose is a rose,” insistent repetition serves not to intensify an image or the poetic 
feeling it embodies, but to heighten the affect of play and redeem the word from its melancholic 
non-identity with its referent. “Pigeons on the grass alas pigeons on the grass alas pigeons on the 
grass alas!” And all of a sudden, a feeling of abject mourning becomes the pleasure of a rhyme—
round sound answering round sound—in the words “grass alas.”  
It is significant that this redemptive moment—in which mourning is cancelled and 
perhaps even sublimated into elation—should occur at the moment of Stein’s vision of the Holy 
Ghost. For, if the pigeons on the grass suggest themselves as a ludicrous allegory of baroque 




Magpies are in the landscape that is they are in the sky of a landscape, they are 
black and white. […] When they are in the sky they do something that I have 
never seen any other bird do they hold themselves up and down and look flat 
against the sky. A very famous French inventor of things that have to do with 
stabilization in aviation told me that what I told him magpies did could not be 
done by any bird but anyway whether the magpies at Avila do do it or do not at 
least they look as if they do do it. They look exactly like the birds in the 
Annunciation pictures the bird which is the Holy Ghost and rest flat against the 
side sky very high.80 
For Stein, all of nature puts itself forward as a baroque text to be read allegorically;81 the magpie 
in/on the sky asserts itself as one example of this kind of reading—its flatness is like that of an 
image on a canvas or on a page—translating imaginatively between physical referents, graphic 
images, textual hieroglyphs, and immanent and transcendental signifiers and signifieds. But 
although the image of the dove suspended flatly against the backdrop of the sky is a familiar icon 
within Christian religious imagery for the representation of a vision of the Holy Spirit, what is 
pictured in such a vision is not a sign but the Holy Spirit itself [Figures 18 and 19]. The flattened 
bird—whether dove or magpie—is thus less an allegorical emblem and more akin to what 
Benjamin describes (in contrast to allegory) as a theological symbol, a prelapsarian logos in 
which word and thing attain a sacred, reparative unity. Stein is unsure whether the magpies in 
physical reality are actually capable of pausing midflight to rest flat in a moment of standstill, 
but it is enough that they look as if they do do it. In this moment, physical reality has become art, 




      
FIGURES 18 AND 19: (Left) Gian Lorenzo Bernini’s Vatican Cathedra Petri sculpture group 





Although Stein and Thomson claimed to have sought the sacred image of the saint as a 
correlative for the modern (i.e., and supposedly secular) figure of the artist, the theological and 
historico-political suggestiveness of this moment cannot be overlooked. The garden setting of 
Four Saints is both a reminder of the hortus conclusus of baroque poetry (for example, the green 
worlds and stately gardens of a Marvell poem) and an almost Edenic “enclosure,” where 
language can be resanctified in a new way.82 But it is also a “garden inside and outside of the 
wall” a space both closed and open to its outside, not self-contained or self-identical, but both 
enclosed and porous simultaneously. Is there an absolute center here? In this paradisiacal space, 
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there is no single Father divinity present, but the space nevertheless teems with a dazzling 
multiplicity of sacred figures—male and female and ambiguously sexed (Saint Answers, Saint 
Two, and Saint Ten!)—and a mysterious winged animal-spirit, a manifestation of an immanent 
sacredness within physical nature. Here nature is depicted not as something fallen, baneful, and 
mundane, but as something extraordinary charged with meaning. Sarah Bay-Cheng has argued 
that Stein’s writing must be understood within the context of the avant-garde’s “negation of 
organized religion and belief in God,” but a different reading more carefully attuned to the layers 
of spiritual reference in Stein might ask whether there is not some other sacred or numinous 
force—one that is radically Other from the anthropomorphic God of the transcendental subject—
at stake within in a play like Four Saints in Three Acts (Bay-Cheng 8). In precisely the moment 
when Stein’s discourse in Four Saints is about to succumb to an attitude of mournfulness of the 
transitory nature of the physical world, the Holy Spirit appears, taking the form of an animal, 
intervening deus-ex-machina style, transforming mournfulness into playfulness and repairing—
however momentarily and provisionally—the broken relationship between language and the 
nature it purports to represent.  
 Music has a role to play, too, in this peculiar spirituality. Where Nietzsche’s writings on 
Wagner express extreme worry over the theological and political regressiveness of subordinating 
music to dramatic text and theatrical gesture, in Thomson’s score these elements are all granted 
an almost unprecedented degree of autonomy from one another.83 For Stein’s dissonant syntax, 
Thomson produced consonant, tuneful harmonies, as Daniel Albright has observed, drawing 
liberally from a musical background heavily influenced by American popular musical forms.84 
As Steven Watson notes, aspects of “neo-baroque recitative” figured into Thomson’s 
compositional thinking, just as the musical dramaturgy of baroque opera seria had offered him 
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some measure of structural and thematic inspiration;85 but Thomson’s melodies depart 
functionally from baroque recitative (or from Wagner’s idea of endless melody, for that matter) 
in a crucial way. Where understood that composers in the early years of the baroque period 
developed monody, stile rapprasentativo, and the predominating melodic line to ensure that the 
librettist’s words would be intelligible over the music, often for persuasive or propagandistic 
purposes, Thomson’s goal was for clarity so Stein’s text could be understood audibly as a 
separate and independent element of the larger work. The music does not so much serve the text, 
just as it does not serve any traditional dramatic plot or action, but rather, seeks to aid its 
intelligibility so that its peculiar formal dynamics can be perceived and contemplated critically.86 
As Thomson observed, “‘Gertrude was wonderful to set to music because there was no 
temptation to illustrate the words. […] For the most part you didn’t know what it meant anyway 
[…] you had to set it for the way the grammar went and for the clarity of the words” (qtd. in 
Watson 38–9).  
But as independent as score and libretto are in Four Saints’ case, the opera can hardly be 
accounted a drily formalistic étude that forecloses any emotional responsiveness. Moments of 
extraordinary sensuousness and affective clarity abound, even if they offer no straightforward 
path to any single, authoritative interpretation. Perhaps the greatest of these moments comes in 
the third act of Thomson’s score, in the saintly procession tableau mentioned earlier 
(choreographed by Ashton). The saints seem to cross the stage while remaining immobile, 
carrying a heavily draped baldacchino over their heads and looking something like a baroque 
trionfo, as the text intones a Dies Irae-like dirge whose words are based on continual 




dead [Figure 20].87 Equal parts wedding and funeral procession, the essential comedic and tragic 
finales conflated into a single moment, the text and music alternate between passages of solemn 
mournfulness and of light frivolity. But then a shift occurs, and singers and orchestra together 
join together in the musically climactic moment of the entire score, a lush maestoso passage that 
along with the staging sought to communicate, in Ashton’s words, something of “the ecstasy of 
ritual” (Quoted in Harris 129). It is a stunning moment, full of strain, sincerity, and blissful 
heartache, soaring to a great crescendo like the culmination of an African American (or “negro”) 
spiritual or protest song that longs for the more just future that will be heaven on earth, and its  
 
 




performance by black singers likely reinforced this association. The strange, seemingly utopian 
longing is all the more striking for the seeming nonsensical quality of Stein’s text at this 
particular moment: “With be there all their all their time there be there vine there be vine time 
there be there time there all their time there” (476). Why Thomson chose to set this passage in 
this way remains an enigma. (Perhaps the inspiration came from Stein’s imagery of vines, and by 
association, from the Christian faith in redemptive wine and blood; or perhaps Thomson was 
moved by this passage’s constant fixation on what sounds like a utopian futurity, somewhere 
“there” but also “all their time.”) But for a moment, as Stein might say, “it all feels abreast.” 
everything seems to be working together simultaneously. But although the audience might feel 
something truly splendid at this moment, the text holds open what that splendid something might 
be. No single interpretation is possible. In short, if there are allegiances to a baroque idea of art 
in this moment, the opera is closer to what we have earlier described as a Dionysian rather than 
an Apollonian, or Wagnerian, idea of baroque. Stein and Thomson are not endeavoring to 
proselytize or propagandize or conscript ideological followers, but to create a space for critical 
contemplation.88 So far, this dissertation has sought to articulate the affective valences of this 
defamiliarized space according to a notion of baroque wonder, and it is in this sublime moment 
and in this sense of the wonder-ful that Four Saints most propitiously occasions what Bonnie 
Marranca has described as “the vernacular marvelous.” (Performance Histories 79). 
 
4.5 Last Act. / Which is a fact? 
Just as Four Saints begins repeatedly once it’s begun, the opera ends just as ambiguously—with, 
ultimately, a fourth act in spite of its title’s promised three. In Thomson’s score, this fourth act 
functions almost as an encore, a short coda to end the piece and upset the audience’s assumption 
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that it had already finished. In the opera’s final moments, the saints line up laterally and exclaim: 
“Last act. / Which is a fact” (480). The blunt, emphatically declarative statement of the last act’s 
factual status is enough on its own to call into question just how final the moment actually is. 
How and when can an opera end when it is so thoroughly preoccupied with repetition? And sure 
enough, Four Saints has gone on to have a storied afterlife, drawing the admiration of John 
Cage, and many of his acolytes in the world of post-War American avant-garde performance, 
and inspiring re-stagings from Robert Wilson and Mark Morris, each in his signature way. 
Stein’s work continues to be cited regularly by artists and critics alike as being germinal to the 
development of a uniquely American vanguardism in late twentieth-century (“postmodern”) 
theater.89 If Four Saints allows us to think Stein as one participating in the tradition of the 
baroque, the question of this tradition’s transmission to her post-War inheritors arises, somewhat 
insistently. Like Stein’s operas and plays, the baroque continues through her influence to find re-
stagings in the post-war period.  
But Stein’s legacy begins much earlier than all that. In November 1934, just months after 
Four Saints’ premiere, Stein had the opportunity to meet the young, Pulitzer Prize-winning 
novelist Thornton Wilder, and the two would go on to become close friends and life-long 
interlocutors. Although Wilder likely missed seeing Four Saints in performance, Stein sent him 
an inscribed copy as a Christmas gift in 1934, and the letters that ensued from this initial gift 
make clear the extent to which he shared her love of baroque art and culture. (At the time, he was 
preparing to stage a production of Handel’s Xerxes at the University of Chicago in honor of the 
composer’s two-hundredth birthday.) During his travels abroad, he would write to Stein and 
Toklas of the baroque art and architecture he encountered, sometimes in an utterly worshipful 
key, as in this letter from Salzburg, dated 28 April 1937: “Pleasure comes in all shapes and sizes 
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and it’s now what I live for. For instance: there are two polychrome baroque archangels on the 
altar of the Peterskirche in poses of flight and ecstasy that no human body could ever assume, 
and as far as I’m concerned they’re my definition of ART.”90 Remarkably enough, it was also 
likely around this time that Wilder composed a sketch of an undated, unpublished essay “On the 
Baroque” in one of his notebooks that today resides in his archive at Yale’s Beinecke Library.91 
The essay is littered with angelic imagery, like the sort Wilder encountered in Salzburg, and even 
includes a reference to Paul Klee: it could productively be read alongside Benjamin’s writing. 
The concluding sentences of this essay take up the question “What is the subject-matter of 
masterpieces?” (echoing the title of Stein’s 1935 essay, “What Are Master-pieces and Why Are 
There So Few of Them?”) and asserts that “the subject-matter of masterpieces is the Action of 
the Poet’s Mind[. …] The hero of every work of art is the mind of its poet: it is that mind we 
watch.” Stein is not named throughout the essay, but these sentences can easily be said to 
describe her approach to composition, especially in the case of a work like Four Saints, which so 
vividly dramatizes the mental processes of writing. But the concept of baroque that emerges 
from Wilder’s fragmentary notes is what most strongly suggests a link to Stein. The baroque, 
Wilder writes, consists in “the art of seeing the supernatural appearing continuously in the daily 
life.”92 His essay’s subtitle is “how to recognize a miracle in the daily life,” and it takes for its 
theoretical basis the quotidian miracle of the Catholic Eucharist, divine presence on earth, as a 
fact of life for the baroque artist. “[I]n the society completely surrounding that artist, the day 
opened with the miracle of Transubstantiation in the Mass. Now when the universal society in 
which one lives believes that God in person becomes literally present in every one of the myriad  
churches of one’s world, then one has introduced the supernatural into daily life and immediately 




Figure 21: Thornton Wilder. Holograph manuscript essay “On the Barock, or how to recognize a 




 Though lengthy, and amazingly erudite about baroque theater history (particularly the 
theater traditions of the Jesuit order founded by St. Ignatius, and their work in the German-
speaking world), Wilder’s essay is largely unsystematic and appears incomplete. Still, it echoes a 
set of positions adopted by Benjamin in the Trauerspiel study by arguing that the baroque 
tradition of theater continues into the present through the work of Mozart, Kleist, Raimund and 
Nestroy, Hölderlin, Goethe and Schiller, Wagner, and even Max Reinhardt. This gesture on 
Wilder’s part raises a host of questions about his own relationship to the baroque. Is Wilder’s 
play Our Town conceivable as a way of seeing the miraculous in everyday life? (The fact that 
one of this notebook’s only other inclusions is the sketch “M Marries N,” the first scene Wilder 
wrote for Our Town, makes this an entirely plausible critical possibility, as does the fact that 
Wilder included a selection from Handel’s Xerxes as the wedding processional in Our Town’s 
second act.) But for the purposes of our investigation here, the most germane questions raised by 
this essay concern whether Wilder and Stein ever exchanged ideas substantively about baroque 
art. On the basis of Four Saints, one can see there is a sympathy between the two thinkers on the 
subject: for Stein, as for Wilder, the baroque can be said to reside in a way of seeing that 
glimpses “the ordinary” as always already extraordinary. Four Saints is nearest to Wilder’s 
conception of baroque in the way that its spiritual-compositional exercises allow the 
extraordinary attributes of a landscape or any other, seemingly unexceptional vision to come 
forward.94 Like any good miracle play, or like one long, extended baroque apotheosis, Four 
Saints suspends the norms of representation and dramaturgical realism, but with Stein this 
suspension serves the purposes of exposing the way the exceptional always already resides 
within the space of the normative.95 Like Brecht (in Benjamin’s reading of him as inheritor to the 
Trauerspiel tradition), Stein is able to present her audience with the ordinary conditions of life in 
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such a way that allows them to be recognized not with complacency, as in naturalism, but with 
astonishment and critical questioning. The historical significance of both Stein and Brecht’s 
various approaches to formalism can found at the juncture of baroque wonder and the modernist 
defamiliarization. And as with Brecht, this capacity for defamiliarization carries with it a 
political potential, one that Elin Diamond has already productively related, by way of a 
Derridean framework, to Stein’s feminism as a prototype for a “gestic feminist criticism,” the 
sort of critical praxis that pleasurably marks sites of indeterminacy and multiple meanings within 
texts in order to contest patriarchal hegemony.96 Surely this political potential can also be 
extended to Stein’s ecological consciousness as well: it might be said that when Stein sees 
glimpses the natural world, she recognizes it as being always already supernatural. 
There is also the matter of a queer politics here as well. In his enthusiasm for Stein and 
the baroque, Wilder was just the latest in a line of gay men to attach themselves to her work—a 
list that also includes Virgil Thomson, Maurice Grosser, Chick Austin, and most of their Harvard 
classmates who collaborated to bring Four Saints’ Hartford premiere off, as well as Frederick 
Ashton97—and this fact suggests that their shared queer identification plays some role in their 
joint affection for baroque style. By the time of the 1970s, a manifest relationship between same-
sex desire and the baroque was already evident in the writings of Severo Sarduy and in Susan 
Sontag’s ability to speak blithely about a category of “homosexual baroque.”98 As Four Saints 
was the brainchild of a pair—a host, really—of gay collaborators, it was well ahead of its time in 
anticipating this relationship, but only if we recognize its participation within a larger modernist 
baroque tradition.99 The (largely still) non-normative situation of not-being-heterosexual entails 
the potential for an outsider position, for a critical potential that—as with baroque ways of 
seeing—begins with the defamiliarized capacity for regarding the ordinary from a distance and 
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perceiving the trace of the extraordinary within it. (As with baroque allegory, this would be a 
defamiliarization that takes place at the level of a non-identity between materiality and meaning, 
in which bodies and the set of meanings culturally assigned to them have no necessary 
relationship. The same is undoubtedly true for work that takes place at the conjunction of “black 
and baroque,” as the premiere of Four Saints in Three Acts undoubtedly did, with its black cast 
in drag as a cabal of European mystics. From this vantage, the baroque functions not as the 
propagandistic style of the absolutist state or Counterreformation church, but as a queer form of 
deconstruction that exposes the highly extraordinary and unusual processes by which the 
ordinary itself comes to be established as such.100 It serves not to disseminate ideology but to 
theatrically expose and call ideology into question, even at the level of discourse.  
This deconstructive concept of the baroque is already at work in Nietzsche, Mallarmé, 
and Benjamin’s writings on the subject; with Stein’s Four Saints in Three Acts its conceptual 
history moves into a new, gayer direction. All four figures call into question the standard 
assumption of history’s progressive character, invoking the similarities between baroque and 
modernism as emblems of a situation in which historical movement has come to appear cyclical 
or static. With Stein’s Four Saints, and with its premiere production especially, this view of 
history appears literally onstage, in theatrical performance. With each insistence and each posed 
gesture, Four Saints exposes and questions an ideology of historical progressivism, demanding 
instead that we notice instead history’s reiterations, citations, and repetitions. 
                                                
All references to Gertrude Stein’s lecture “Plays” (P) and libretto for Four Saints in Three Acts (4S3A) are to the 
texts that appear in Gertrude Stein. Last Operas and Plays, Carl Van Vechten, ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1994) —which contains the 1935 edition of “Plays” originally published in Lectures in America, 
and the 1927 edition of Four Saints published in Last Operas and Plays in 1949. 
 
A note about spelling. Stein’s 1927 text uses the spelling “Therese”—the French version that was also Stein’s 
nickname for Alice Toklas, perhaps inspired by the 1925 canonization of Saint Thérèse of Lisieux—where 
Thomson’s score substituted, with Stein’s approval, the Spanish spelling Teresa for the purposes of euphony, 
gaining an extra vowel, and maintaining a closer relationship to Saint Teresa of Ávila’s Spanish context. See: 
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Thomson and Stein’s Four Saints in Three Acts libretto (American Musicological Society 2008) xxx. Although my 
citations are to Stein’s libretto, because Thomson introduced cuts to it when he composed the score, I have retained 
Thomson’s use of the Spanish spelling to avoid confusing the reader as to the connections between Stein’s Saint 
Therese and the Saint Teresa of Bernini’s imagination.  
 
1 “’Die Heiligentragödie ist die geheime Sehnsucht des Tragikers’ … Das Trauerspiel ist als Form der 
Heiligentragödie durch das Märtyrendrama beglaubigt. Und wofern nur der Blick deren Züge unter mannigfalitgen 
Arten des Dramas von Calderon bis Strindberg zu erkennen sich schult, wird die noch offene Zukunft dieser Form, 
einer Form des Mysteriums, ihm evident warden müssen.” 
 
2 Benjamin also depicts the Trauerspiel’s Saint as one face of the baroque Courtier, the other being the scheming 
Intriguer. This claim on his part recalls us to the fact that Stein’s first youthful attempt at playwriting didn’t get 
beyond the play’s first stage direction: “The courtiers make witty remarks.” In Marc Robinson’s words, Stein 
“couldn’t think of any [witty remarks], though, so she gave up.” See The Other American Drama 11. 
 
3 The Nietzschean playfulness of Stein’s opera owes much, it must be said, to the gaiety of its musical setting by 
Thomson, who was in his early years himself a great reader of Nietzsche. See: Watson Prepare for Saints 26. 
 
4 Here, I am reformulating Elinor Fuchs’s question about Stein in “Another Version of Pastoral”: “Can it be we’ve 
been so fascinated with Stein’s cubism, that we haven’t seen her pastoralism?” in Fuchs Death of Character, 95. The 
one commentator who has scrupulously observed Four Saints’ relationship to the baroque is David Harris, whose 
TDR essay on the opera’s Wadsworth premiere mentions “baroque” eight times, but does not attempt a systematic 
consideration of Stein’s relationship to the concept or to the period’s history. David Harris, “The Original ‘Four 
Saints in Three Acts.’”  
 
5 Blackmer, “Saint as Queer Diva” (in Blackmer ed. et al. En Travesti) 327. See also: Jayne L. Walker. “History as 
Repetition: ‘The Making of Americans’” in Bloom ed. Gertrude Stein 177-200. 
 
6 For an example of an attempt to adduce Stein as an example of queer time (à la J. Halberstam), see the title and 
course description for a seminar on “Queer Becomings” recently co-sponsored by the Brooklyn Institute for Social 
Research and the Barnard Center for Research on Women. “Queer Becomings: Woolf, Stein, and Modernist 
Experiments with Time,” accessed 29 March 2014, http://thebrooklyninstitute.com/bisr_course/queer-becomings-
woolf-stein-and-modernist-experiments-with-time/. 
 
7 Ulla Dydo writes that, for the most part, “Four Saints was the only one of Stein’s eighty plays performed anywhere 
in her lifetime. It was not one success among many but the one success, which puts a different light on it even as it 
enlarges its reputation” (172). 
 
8 For examples of these citations, see: Bay-Cheng 114–41; Fuchs Death of Character 92–107. 
 
9 During Stein’s own lifetime, T. S. Eliot and Mario Praz were already of the view that Richard Crashaw’s work 
showed a clear affinity with Continental and Catholic Counterreformation traditions of poetry. See: T. S. Eliot. “A 
Note on Richard Crashaw” in For Lancelot Andrewes 117-25. For Praz’s comments, see Zamora and Kaup eds., 
Baroque New Worlds 101–32. See also, somewhat later, Austin Warren’s Richard Crashaw: A Study in Baroque 
Sensibility (1939). 
 
10 See: Gaddis Magician of the Modern 4, 132-7. Austin acquired an appreciation for baroque culture early on from 
his travels in Europe and his readings of Osbert Sitwell, whose sister Edith would go on to become an admirer of 
Stein’s. Gaddis claims that throughout his life Chick’s “two passions” were “the baroque and the modern.” (119). 
Prior to Austin’s 1930 baroque exhibition, the Fogg Art Museum at Harvard had already held a smaller show of 
Italian seventeenth-century materials in 1929, produced by Austin’s friend and Harvard classmate Arthur McComb. 
McComb described Austin’s exhibition as “‘more ambitious’ than his own earlier Fogg presentation and declared 
that ‘practically all the examples of Italian painting of this time in America outside of those in larger Museums are 
here assembled to form a most significant showing.” Quoted in Gaddis, (135). These years also saw McComb’s 
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publication of The Baroque Painters of Italy: An Introductory Historical Survey (1934). See also: Watson, Prepare 
for Saints, 111-3. Of Austin’s repeated curatorial efforts at juxtaposing modernist and historical forms, Steven 
Watson writes that Austin “established a pattern: by coupling the social forms of the past with the art of the present, 
he succeeded in slightly defanging modernism’s latent antiestablishment threat” (112).  
 
11 See: Watson Prepare for Saints, 6. Austin’s pioneering efforts at repeatedly juxtaposing modern and baroque 
forms might be seen to have paved the way for later historiographic efforts, like those of Siegfried Giedion (working 
under Heinrich Wölfflin’s influence) at counterposing the reception history of these two periods and styles. For 
example, in Space, Time and Architecture (1941), Giedion was later to juxtapose images of Borromini’s architecture 
and Picasso’s sculpture side by side, comparing the interior of the cupola of Sant’Ivo alla Sapienza in Rome to a 
cubist head from 1910. Giedion writes, in a caption, “The continuous inner surface of the dome is broken up. It is 
made to transmit the movement which runs throughout the whole elevation. […] Borromini’s intersection of the 
continuous inner surface of the dome must have had the same stunning effect upon his contemporaries that 
Picasso’s disintegration of the human face produced” (117). 
 
12 For a description of the Friends and Enemies of Modern Music’s modernist and baroque musical orientation, see 
the brief description of the F.E.M.M.’s activities online, at “National Historic Landmark Nomination: A. Everett 
Austin, Jr. House.”, <http://www.nps.gov/nhl/find/recentdesigs/ct/Austin.pdf> accessed, 30 March 2014. Austin’s 
attraction to the Four Saints project had much to do with this dual orientation, which over his lifetime became his 
area of expertise.  
 
13 Paul Rosenfield’s review of the premiere in the New Republic (21 February 1934) makes clear the degree to which 
Saints Teresa and Ignatius were regarded, even at that time, as baroque figures. He writes: “The opera’s overt 
subject is the figures and careers of certain baroque saints, Teresa of Avila and Ignatius of Loyola in particular.” 
 
14 Quoted in Dydo 176-7. It was Stein’s choice to stage the working artist’s life by using saints (Watson 42). 
 
15 Comically enough, this disagreement would replay itself when Stein and Thomson collaborated again at the very 
end of Stein’s life on The Mother of Us All, an opera based on the life of Susan B. Anthony. In their initial planning 
discussions, “Stein again proposed George Washington as a subject, and again Thomson refused on the grounds that 
everyone in the eighteenth century looked alike” (qtd. in Watson 319). 
 
16 Watson writes that the shrine is “covered in beaten gold and ornamented in coral,” and that Alice was “fascinated” 
by the “fantasy landscape” of Spain and soon declared “I am enraptured with Avila and I propose staying” (44). 
 
17 See the claim that Four Saints in Three Acts amounts to “America’s first grand scale Gesamtkunstwerk,” in 
Watson 76. Elsewhere, Corinne Blackmer makes the claim that much of Four Saints “is an aesthetic-relgious 
pasatiempos, which, in combining Christian symbolism with legend, and with homoerotic and magical elements, 
makes it a quasi-comic version of Wagnerian Bühnenweighfestspiel (a festival of consecration on the stage).” (En 
Travesti 329). 
  
18 Austin and Thomson seemed to have both desired to be the Diaghilev figure in this group (Gaddis 133; Watson 
156-7; Harris 103). 
 
19 Qtd. in Watson 74. Of Stettheimer’s home, Thomson recalled: “It was all a kind of camp on elegant New York 
houses inhabited by artists […] And in their terms it was a kind of joke about the German royal style” (Quoted in 
Watson 71). Presumably Thomson means a kind of joke played upon the sort of Second Empire Kitsch that was the 
object of Wagnerite fascination.  
 
20 At least initially, these costumes were also planned to include “scarves wired to float in fixed folds, reading Gloria 
in Excelsis and similar mottoes” but these touches—which allude to the prevalence of folded or billowing textiles in 




                                                                                                                                                       
21 Thomson envisioned a form of mise-en-scène in which the singers wouldn’t so much “act” as “be moved” and 
drew inspiration from the way gesture and dance had been deployed in in a production he’d seen in Kansas City by 
the Boston Opera Company of Gluck’s Orpheus and Eurydice. It is unclear to what extent this twentieth-century 
production drew upon early modern gestural practices, but the possibility of this influence is nevertheless intriguing 
(Watson 236). 
 
22 Watson writes: “Ashton was, in fact, the only one of Four Saints’ behind-the-scenes collaborators who could 
confront the opera’s Catholic imagery without invoking irony or metaphor. Although he was not Catholic himself, 
the Catholic Church’s rituals were second nature to him. Virgil Thomson was fond of saying that Ashton was the 
perfect choreographer because he know how nuns moved in procession” (238). 
 
23 Harris relates this flat, two-dimensional method of staging to the bas relief approach taken in Nijinsky’s ballet 
L’Après-midi d’un Faune, which Ashton had seen in Europe previously (121, 127), and Nijinsky’s two-dimensional 
configuration of onstage bodies can be said to participate in a longer Symbolist project of reconfiguring stage space 
according to a criterion of flatness, to make the experience of theater spectatorship more akin to that of reading—a 
project that can be understood as having its roots in the allegorical mise-en-scèene of Trauerspiel, as Benjamin 
describes it. One particularly striking production photograph from the opera’s first act shows an unknown saint 
kneeling, glimpsing through a telescope a vision of a Heavenly Mansion projected upstage, potentially Teresa’s 
Interior Castle. At either side of him appear Saint Teresa I and Ignatius, standing, each of their torsos spiraling into a 
baroque contrapposto to allow their faces to point outward toward the audience even as their bodies point upstage: 
they resemble Sibyls and could easily have been influenced by photographs of Michelangelo’s Sistine Chapel 
ceiling, even at a time when Michelangelo was being historicized (by Riegl and others) as the father of the baroque 
style (Riegl 97). 
 
24 See: Vechten. “How I Listen to Four Saints in Three Acts.”  
 
25 See: Stein Letters of Gertrude Stein and Virgil Thomson 227. 
 
26 Qtd. in Stein Letters of Gertrude Stein and Virgil Thomson 227-8. 
 
27 (Stein’s serious irony or ironic seriousness could be considered another facet of a Nietzschean inheritance on her 
part toward the concept of baroque.) 
 
28 This press release reads: “It remained for a priest, Father La Farge, to give it [Four Saints] its most interesting and 
complete appellation. He called it a ‘baroque fantasy’.” See: Moses “Background notes and data.” 
 
29 See: Young “Reading Lesson.” Young’s other essay on Four Saints, “One Moment Alit” published in the New 
Republic 78 (3 July 1934), suggests that the phrase “baroque fantasy” was “passed out by the producer as a hint to 
the wise” and that this phrase “is a good one for this piece of theater art,” also commenting that the production 
design by Stettheimer blended baroque together with “whimsical Victorian coquetry.” There he also acknowledges 
that Stein’s baroque is not one of “solemn magnificence” but rather of “spontaneity” and of “charming and 
capricious flights.”  
 
30 The use of social dance forms imported from Harlem is described in detail in Harris (124–5). He writes: “Just as 
Stein in her libretto had alluded to passages from nursery rhyme and ‘My Country Tis of Thee,” and Thomson had 
quoted them again in the music, Ashton quoted passages from popular dance and from known types. [… These 
allusions] were the only acknowledgment in Four Saints—with the possible exception of the Gospel music quality 
(itself a sort of quotation of style)—of the traditions of the black performers” (124). 
 
31 As Watson records, “By casting black singers in his opera, Virgil Thomson got in the bargain a passel of 
fashionable New Negro stereotypes. Elegant and earthy, sensual and hedonistic, spiritual and authentic, black 




                                                                                                                                                       
32 This phrase is gratefully borrowed from the first sentence of the course description to Moten’s Duke University 
seminar on “Literature, Music and Philosophy 1955-1998,” which reads “In this course we’ll try to construct and 
test a couple of speculative definitions—of blackness and the baroque.” Frederick Moten, “English 271ES: 
Literature, Music and Philosophy” (Syllabus, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, Spring 2008). The subject 
of this conjunction has been treated elsewhere, for example, in Joan Copjec’s essay on “Black Baroque” in Imagine 
There’s No Woman 98-103. This language is also similar to Harris’s way of describing Ashton’s contributions, 
which he claims combined “black and baroque” (qtd. in Harris 130). 
 
33 A certain soft primitivism is evident here: Thomson described the need for a cast composed entirely of black 
performers in this way: “They [i.e. singers of color] alone possess the dignity and the poise, the lack of self-
consciousness that proper interpretation of the opera demands” (qtd. in Watson 200). 
 
34 “The negro bodies, if seen at all, would only be divined vaguely through long dresses. The movements would be 
sedate and prim, and the transparence is aimed […] not at titillating the audience with the sight of a leg but of 
keeping the texture of the stage as light as possible. […] I think the idea is worth trying, however. If it can be 
realized inoffensively, the bodies would merely add to our spectacle the same magnificence they give to classic 
religious painting and sculpture. One could not easily use this effect with white bodies, but I think one might with 
brown. […] My negro singers, after all, are a purely musical desideratum, because of their rhythm, the style and 
especially their diction. Any further use of the racial qualities must be incidental and not of a nature to distract 
attention from the subject-matter. […] Hence the idea of painting their faces white. Nobody wants to put on a nigger 
show.” Stein Letters of Gertrude Stein and Virgil Thomson 208. 
 
35 Watson gives a full description of the event in Prepare for Saints (68). In an appearance on the Joan Rivers show 
in 1991, Pepper La Beija mentions the Rockland Palace as central to her earliest memories of the Harlem drag ball 
world in the 1950s, which suggests a continuity between the time of Thomson’s patronage there in the late twenties 
and early thirties. See “Paris is Burning cast on The Joan Rivers Show: Part One – YouTube” 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GiODKnixXg4> (accessed 30 March 2014).  
 
36 For Joseph Roach’s concept of surrogation, see: Cities of the Dead 1-32. 
 
37 “Stein’s miracle play[ …] synchronizes Paris of the twenties and baroque Spain[…]” (Marranca Performance 
Histories 75). 
 
38 See Tracy Davis’s essay, “Performative Time” in Canning and Postlewait, eds. Representing the Past 142-67. See 
also, Schneider’s discussion of performativity and its relationship to what she describes as “theatrical time” in 
Performing Remains (10, 93). Schneider also links together this performative understanding of history’s temporal 
processes with recent queer theorists’ attempts to articulate non-heteronormative modes of historiography, and 
particularly with the work of Elizabeth Freeman, whose notion of “temporal drag” could certainly be useful in 
considering the relationship of baroque allegorical theater performance to 1920s-era drag ball performance and to 
Four Saints. See also Freeman “Packing History” 727-44. 
 
39 For Jayne L. Walker, writing of The Making of Americans, it is “[r]epetition, not a linear sequence of discrete 
evince linked in a chain of causality that manifests progress, [that] is the form and force of history in Stein’s text.” 
The title of her work as it is excerpted in Harold Bloom’s Modern Critical Views collection of essays on Stein—
“History as Repetition”—offers an elegant and pithy description of the philosophy of history that manifests itself in 
Stein’s reading of the baroque as well (177-200).  
 
40 Here one need only think of the period’s post-Einsteinian milieu—focused as it was with new attentiveness upon 
the speed of light, which can make stars appear as if immediately present even despite the origin of their 
luminousness in the distant past—to make sense of this interest on Stein’s part in the mediatic, temporally 
syncopated, and illusory qualities of everyday experience. 
 
41 A productive analogy could be drawn between Stein’s concept of insistence as a differential form of repetition that 
entails the possibility of revision, on one hand, and the dramaturgical principle that Suzan-Lori Parks would much 
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later come to describe as “Rep & Rev.” (Parks 9-10). Stein’s experience of temporal syncopation was also shaped by 
the experience of jazz music, as she makes clear in her essay “Plays” (xxx). A fruitful connection could be drawn 
between jazz’s “Rep & Rev” and baroque opera’s “Da Capo” structures. 
 
42 “[T]here is also the important question of repetition and is there any such thing. Is there repetition or is there 
insistence. I am inclined to believe there is no such thing as repetition. And really how can there be. [… T]here can 
be no repetition because the essence of that expression is insistence.” Gertrude Stein. “Portraits and Repetition” 
(1935) in Lectures in America 166-7. 
 
43 Stein’s concept of identity appears largely to be based in a kind of etymological literalism. Daniel Mendelsohn 
offers the following gloss on the word’s history: “The English noun identity comes, ultimately from the Latin adverb 
identidem, which means ‘repeatedly.’ The Latin has exactly the same rhythm as the English, buh-BUM-buh-BUM—
a simple iamb, repeated; and identidem is, in fact, noting more than a reduplication of the word idem, “the same”: 
idem(et)idem. Same (and) same. The same, repeated. It is a word that does exactly what it means. It seems odd, at 
first glance, that a noun that we associate with distinctiveness and individuality, with the irreducible uniquenesss of 
each person, should derive from one that denotes (and even sounds like) nothing but mechanical repetition. But one 
you’ve given it some thought, the etymology of identity makes a kind of sense. At least one way of establishing 
what something is, after all, is to see whether it always remains itself, and nothing else, over and over again. This is 
the case, presumably, for people: you are, endlessly and repeatedly, you and not some other” (Mendelsohn 41). 
Stein’s consciousness of this etymology is signaled in the title of a Valentine she wrote to Sherwood Anderson in 
1922, entitled “Idem the Same. A Valentine to Sherwood Anderson,” first published in The Little Review (9:3, 
Spring 1923). See: Stein Writings 1903-1932 475-9. 
 
44 See: Stein Four in America v. In terms similar to Benjamin’s discussion of allegory, T. S. Eliot’s 1921 discussion 
of the seventeenth-century English metaphysical poets had already asserted a modern dissociation of sensibility, in 
which poetic language suffers semantic ruination and becomes alienated from poetic imagery or sensation: by this 
argument, the seventeenth century saw the beginnings of process by which modern poets such as Tennyson or 
Browning no longer “feel their thought as immediately as the odour of a rose.” (Eliot Sacred Wood 125-9). In Stein, 
insistent repetition can be described as playing a salvific role, to rescue the rose itself from oblivion and restore to its 
lost, auratic sensuousness. Stein and Eliot were acquaintances throughout the 1920s: he solicited a piece from her in 
November 1924 during his tenure as editor at Criterion. It seems almost certain that she knew his essay on the 
Metaphysical poets. 
 
45 See Victor Shklovsky’s essay “Art as Technique” (1917) in Lemon and Reis trans. Russian Formalist Criticism 
12. It is doubtful that Stein ever fully succeeds at redeeming for the rose its lost auratic rosiness, the fullness of its 
vanished self-presence. Like a cubist, Stein seeks to restore the object’s immediacy by redoubling mediation upon 
itself. In the words of Marc Robinson, “Her accumulations, her portraits in gesture and sound, her insistent 
questioning of bodies, may ultimately dramatize the need to know more than they dramatize the object of inquiry 
itself. That object remains forever remote and impenetrable” (Other American Drama 19). 
 
46 See: Stein Writings 1903-1932 524. See also, the passage in “Plays” in which she writes that the business of Art is  
“to live in the actual present, that is the complete actual present, and to completely express that complete actual 
present” (P xxxvi). In his reading of the Benjamin’s vision of Trauerspiel, Samuel Weber writes: “Since ‘history,’ 
under the antinomian impact of the Reformation, comes to be understood as the rush of an unredeemed ‘nature’ or 
‘immanence’ toward an end emptied of significance, or at least rendered totally opaque, the only hope available to 
the baroque is to attempt to stem the forward tide by creating a space that, by virtue of its very inauthenticity, might 
slow if not abolish the irresistible pull toward a catastrophic terminus. This inauthentic locale is construed as a 
theatrical stage, a showplace, a Schauplatz.” (Weber Theatricality as Medium 173). 
 
47 Cf. with William James’s essay “The Thing and Its Relations” in Essays in Radical Empiricism.  
 
48  Here I am elaborating upon Samuel Weber’s conception of the present participle as theatricality’s grammatical 
hallmark, which Weber does not connect explicitly to Stein. Weber writes, drawing upon a Derridean vocabulary: 
“A text that does not merely ‘reproduce’ and yet also does not simply ‘create’ or ‘produce.’ Its object is situated in 
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an unusual and complicated relationship to its ‘pretext.’ It is involved in an operation that, like the ‘hymen,’ exposes 
the interval ‘between’ texts and in so doing allows something else to ‘enter’ the stage or scene: a certain 
theatricality, which has as its hallmark the present participle. Why the present participle? For two interrelated 
reasons, at least. First, because its ‘presence’ is suspended, as it were, in and as the interval linking and separating 
that which is presented from the presentation ‘itself.’ The ‘presence’ of the present participle is thus bounded, or 
defined, by the convergence of its articulation with that which it articulates. But in thus being defined by its own 
redoubling—and this is the second reason—it is also constituted by and as a series of repetitions, each of which is 
separated from the others and yet is also bound to them in sequence. […] If theatrical performance does not simply 
reproduce or accomplish something that exists in and of itself or that is at least intrinsically self-contained, the 
reiterative openness of the present participle is always both ahead of and behind itself[…]”(Theatricality as Medium, 
14–5). 
 
49 As Marc Robinson writes, “Stein succeeds at getting an elusive abstraction—time—into her plays, making it as 
vivid a presence as Saint Ignatius or a hilltop in Mexico. [… In Stein’s own words, t]he work should have ‘an 
existence suspended in time’ rather than merely ‘a sense of time.’” (Other American Drama 22). 
 
50 If Stein’s poetics suggest a philosophy of history and a metaphysics, she can hardly be understood as a 
metaphysician of presence in the typical Platonic sense: rather, the concept of presence articulated in her theoretical 
writings is an attenuated one, marked much more by difference and deferral than by identity and self-sameness. 
Even if her plays can never fully succeed at capturing this flow absolutely into a moment of stillness and 
unmitigated metaphysical plenitude, they continue their repeated attempts, despite the relentless specter of perpetual 
failure. 
 
51 See: Fuchs and Chaudhuri eds. Land/Scape/Theater 121-85; Fuchs Death of Character 92-107; Marranca 
Ecologies of Theater 3-24, 49-58. In Land/Scape/Theater, Jane Palatini Bowers discusses Stein’s idea of landscape 
extensively. Although she does acknowledge that the early Italian proscenium stages drew visual inspiration from 
the early modern tradition of landscape painting (during a time that also saw the flourishing of the theatrum mundi 
topos), her analysis is focused most intently upon how Stein’s theory of landscape inflects her poetic praxis (as lang-
scape). See also: Bowers They Watch Me 25-71. 
 
52 It will be remembered that Aristotle’s Poetics figures Plot (mythos), the imitation of action (mimesis praxeos), as 
drama’s “soul”. In the Aristotelian theater, then, plot forms the spiritual substance, center, or kernel of presence by 
and around which the entirety of the drama is thought to be organized. What Stein’s plays effect in transforming plot 
from a spiritual principle to an immanent spatial one is the decentering and deconstructive reconfiguring of this 
kernel of presence. Without a spiritual “center” to organize its various constituent parts, the formerly mimetic play 
becomes a polyfocal field of mimic gestures, choreography, theatricality.  
 
53 Compare Stein’s principle of ecological inter/relationality with Benjamin’s description of the antinomies of 
allegorical interpretation: “Any person, any thing, any relationship can mean anything else. This possibility passes 
an annihilating but just verdict upon the secular world” (U 152). 
 
54 Stein writes that she “wanted it to have the movement of nuns very busy and in continuous movement but placid 
as a landscape has to be” (P lii). 
 
55 David Harris has argued that Stein drew inspiration for this description from seeing Frederick Ashton’s 
choreography in performance, particularly at the production’s climactic moments in Act Three in which the entire 
company of saints appears in an extended triumphal procession, seeming to walk forward while simultaneously 
remaining in place through a marvelous trick of choreography (130). The effect here vividly recalls one later devised 
by Brecht (with the help of a rotating stage) for his production of Mother Courage and Her Children: for a detailed 
philosophical exegesis of which, see Rokem 128. 
 
56 On the relationship of radical lesbian feminist performance in the United States to positive affects such as gaiety, 




                                                                                                                                                       
57 See Benjamin’s discussion of the midnight hour as opening a door upon the realm of the dead in Trauerspiel (U 
115-6). 
 
58 Blackmer 332. The play itself also makes reference to Easter and to April Fools’ Day, both of which could figure 
significantly in the play’s covert theology—the former as a time of resurrection and the latter as a time of jokes, 
deceptions, and ironies. 
 
59 “What is meaningless to Stein is not counting but adding up totals, whether nails, windows or doors in houses, 
followers, acts in a play, all patriarchal activities with numbers substituted for what can only be understood 
qualitatively” (Dydo 192). 
 
60 On the relationship of baroque to the idea of horror vacui, see David Castillo. “Horror (Vacui): The Baroque 
Condition” Spadaccini and Estudillo eds. Hispanic Baroques 87–104. 
 
61 It was Thomson’s choice to split the figure of St. Teresa into two separate roles—St. Teresa I and St. Teresa II (in 
a move that bears a striking resemblance to the allegorically self-divided Anna I and Anna II of Brecht’s modern 
Trauerspiel, The Seven Deadly Sins)—so the character could harmonize with herself. But, as we have seen, the 
libretto itself already suggests this manner of splitting up supposedly individual characters. While the performance’s 
image of two Saints Teresa surrounded by attendant saints at the Ávila convent might have the effect of recalling 
Stein and Toklas holding court at their home at the Rue de Fleurus, the self-divided Teresa is also, in obvious ways, 
an emblem for Stein herself.  
 
62 In the section of text Thomson and Grosser designated as the opera’s second act, a “Scene V” is declared no fewer 
than nine consecutive times in just under the space of a single page of the libretto. For his part, Thomson set all nine 
of these declarations to be sung, and the moment generates a powerful sense of Steinean insistence when the words 
“Scene Five” are sung so frequently in so short a span of time. 
 
63 Shortly after the libretto’s first declaration of “Act I,” Saint Teresa is described, in lines spanning just over two 
pages as “Saint Teresa seated. […] Saint Teresa seated. […] Saint Teresa seated and not surrounded. […] Saint 
Teresa not seated. […] Saint Teresa not seated at once. […] Saint Teresa at once seated. […] Saint Teresa seated and 
not surrounded” (446). Then, as if in a culmination: “Saint Teresa seated and not standing half and half of it and not 
half and half of it seated and not standing surrounded and not seated and not seated and not standing and not 
surrounded and not surrounded and not not not seated not seated not seated not surrounded not seated not 
surrounded not seated and Saint Ignatius standing standing not seated Saint Teresa not standing not standing and 
Saint Ignatius not standing standing surrounded as if in once yesterday” (446-7). 
 
64 On this subject, Marc Robinson has written: “Stein learned her technique from the cinema, then in its fledgling 
days and for her the most intoxicating development in art. A film’s collection of frames—so many nearly identical, 
yet crucially different—is the clearest expression of the present tense in performance. Each frame announces the 
situation, the composition, the characters anew; the ‘story’ starts over each time; only when the parts are taken 
together and followed sequentially does the film move and seem to breathe” (Other American Drama 19). 
 
65 Ulla Dydo observes that Stein herself likened her use of grammar to a kind of contrapuntal fugue (in the manner 
of Bach’s use of polyphony), possibly under the influence of Marcel Brion’s 1930 essay, which Stein and Toklas 
translated, “Le Contrepoint poétique de Gertrude Stein.” (Dydo 209n.72, 405 and 405n.80)  
 
66 Some examples: The poetic discourse emends itself (“Have saints. / Said saints. / As said saints. / And not annoy. / 
Annoint” [442]). It muses over and justifies the decisions it has settled upon (“Why should every one be at home. / 
In idle acts […] There is no parti parti-color in a house there is no parti parti parti color in a house” [443]). It gets 
distracted (“Supposing she said that he had chosen all the miseries that he had observed in fifty of his years what had 
that to do with hats. They had made hats for her. Not really” [443]). It tosses off ideas casually as they arise (“Saint 
Teresa something like that.” [444]). It makes notes to itself, and makes note of writerly uncertainties. (“Saint 
Ignatius not there. Saint Ignatius staying where. Never head them speak speak of it” [445]). It registers the 
extraordinary emotionality of writing (“Come panic come. / Come close” [443]). It poses powerful political 
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questions (“Can women have wishes” [448]). Elsewhere, the reader or spectator is privy to a protracted experiment 
in punning and homophonic ambiguity—in short, wordplay—as in this passage in which to/two and for/four are 
thrown gleefully into semiotic uncertainty: “Two saints. / Four saints. / Two saints prepare for saints it two saints 
prepare for saints in prepare for saints” (440.) 
 
67 See: Della Pollack’s essay “Performing Writing” in Phelan and Lane, eds. The Ends of Performance 73-103. The 
question of textual performativity is also taken up centrally, if less explicitly, in Jerome McGann. The Textual 
Condition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 88-100. 
 
68 Blackmer writes: “[M]uch of the opera is a reenactment of the work of writing an opera” (332). Elsewhere, 
Puchner writes: “a large portion of Stein’s text depicts, not St. Teresa, but the process of writing an opera about 
her.” (Stage Fright 113). Of the landscape/langscape dramaturgy concept, Bowers argues “the plays are not about 
Bilignin nor about any other place. Rather they are about language and its relationship to the performance event; 
they area about writing for the theater, thus, my alteration of the prefix—from ‘land’ to ‘lang’—to give some sense 
of the true subject of these plays” (They Watch Me 25). 
  
69 “Der Allegoriker greift bald da bald dort aus dem wüsten Fundus, den sein Wissen ihm zur Verfügung stellt, ein 
Stück heraus, hält es neben ein anderes und versucht, ob sie zu einander passen: jene Bedeutung zu diesem Bild oder 
dieses Bild zu jener Bedeutung. Vorhersagen läßt das Ergebnis sich nie; denn es gibt keine natürliche Vermittelung 
zwischen den beiden.”  
70 And particularly Stettheimer. David Harris records that Stettheimer’s notes on her experience at Hartford indicate 
that, at a certain point, “she ‘had to insist’ that the sculptural, baroque quality of drapery so essential to her 
conception (and evident in the photographic reproduction of Bernini’s ‘Saint Teresa in Ecstasy’ in the production 
program) be maintained throughout.” (107).  
 
71 Of the intermedial tensions and exchanges between word and image implicit within baroque allegory, see 
Benjamin’s discussion of Harsdörffer and Winckelmann (U 159). 
 
72 For Stein’s musings on the temporal character of vision and audition in spectatorial experience, see P xxxiv. 
 
73 David Harris writes of this “almost aleatory quality of the combination of image and text,” an aspect of the work 
that likely influenced John Cage (111). 
 
74 This is, broadly speaking, the argument put forward in Jerzy Limon’s essay “Performativity of the Court: Stuart 
Masque as Postdramatic Theater” (in Cefalu and Reynolds eds. Return of Theory 258-277). 
 
75 Here, see Nick Salvato’s claim: “Stein’s play so aggressively—so passionately, to return to her word of choice—
violate theatrical norms that they constitute an implicit challenge. ‘Stage this,’ they seem egotistically to dare, 
beckoning an ingenious director to top Stein’s ingenuity” (104-5). Benjamin writes, “Indeed, it is typical of the 
sadist to degrade his object, and thereafter—or thereby—to satisfy it. This is also what the allegorist does in this era 
drunk with acts of savagery both experienced and imagined” (U 162).  
 
76 For Stein’s interest in Saint Theresa, Bernini, baroque art, consciousness, visionary experience, hallucination, 
meditation, and other related topics, see Dydo’s The Langauge That Rises (180-1). Of Four Saints’ vision of the 
Holy Ghost, Dydo asks: “Why a vision? Did Stein believe in visions? The details are not sacred but entirely 
commonplace. Visions are possible for those who are willing to look at the ordinary. To those who are able to see, 
an unexceptional, still, bare landscape offers the possibility of vision that is the essence of Stein’s meditation” (196). 
 
77 Whether Stein meant this moment to be understood as a vision of the last judgment or not is unclear; regardless, 
the passage is fascinating in the questions it raises about how Stein might understand the nature of messianic time—
of time after the end of time—since Ignatius’ discourse immediately proceeds from “around is a sound” to “Around 
differing from anointed now. Now differing from anointed now. Now differing differing. Now differing from 
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anointed now” (445). The end of time is not a static and eternal present, but a multitude of anointed nows, each 
differing from and deferring each other in an endless play. 
 
78 Saint Teresa’s reply, “Not interested,” suggests a world in which—as Judith Butler has written of Kafka (and of 
Kafka’s “Description of a Struggle”)—“the ordinary emphatically seeks to counter a sense of the vanishing 
ordinary. […] Like those who quickly forget that there were dead bodies on the street and now engage in small talk 
about the weather, [Kafka]’s narrator [like Stein’s Saint Teresa] clings to the daily discourse of chatter and 
compliments. Although the story was written in 1904, a decade before World War I, Kafka’s way of registering 
ineffable events such as these proved prescient. On August 2, 1914, he wrote in his diary, ‘Germany declare s war 
on Russia—in the afternoon, swimming lessons.’ In the sudden recourse to the ordinary and obvious has something 
thereby been resolved, or has something jut been covered over? […T]he ordinary exchange, the polite discourse, the 
everyday compliments; they cover over and defer a sense of the world that is losing its stability, pulled into 
oblivion.” (See: “Ordinary, Incredulous” in Brooks and Jewett eds. 25).  
 
79 Qtd. in Bowers, “Composition,” 138. 
 
80 Qtd. in Bowers, “Composition,” 140. 
 
81 Marranca writes: “In the Steinian ecology, language exists everywhere in the landscape, as if all space were 
semantic, the world a book” (Performance Histories 76). As we have seen, the concept of the world as a book has 
connections both to baroque epistemology and to symbolist poetry in the person of Mallarmé. 
 
82 Of the Edenic resonance here, Marranca writes: “What Stein does in Four Saints is transform the idea of 
theological space into a spatial conception of drama. Read as an allegory, the ‘four saints’ of the title act as the four 
pathways of the garden, echoing the biblical four rivers of Eden. (In her autobiography St. Teresa describes the four 
kinds of prayer as four ways to water a garden.) The garden is Stein’s perfect universe, a paradise, a frame. The 
Persian word pairidaeza (paradise) means enclosure, and from this form the cloister garden plan of Catholic 
monasteries took shape as a place of learning and meditation and cosmological principle. In Four Saints the garden 
space is now a performance space, the plot of a garden the plot of a play” (Ecologies of Theater 55). 
 
83 Stein and Thomson worked on the piece’s libretto and score in near total isolation from one another (Watson 54).  
 
84 I gratefully acknowledge Daniel Albright for conceiving of the phrase “Consonant Harmony, Dissonant Syntax” 
as a subtitle for Stein’s opera (343). See also Watson: “[B]anjo dities, parade band tunes, ragtime, the oompah 
sounds of summer band shells, and the lilting melodies of Sunday parlor socials[:] This repertory of indigenous 
Americana would later form the basis of his musical vocabulary” (25). Watson also describes how “Thomson felt 
that modernist music—saturated with dissonance and descended from the pre-World War I triumvirate of 
Stravinsky, Schoenberg, and Debussy—had arrived at its end point. ‘I had this moment of truth if you wish in which 
I said, “This is old-fashioned and there is very little profit to be derived in trying to continue it beyond its recent 
masters.”’ […] Thomson drew on his repertoire of musical associations: the patter of Anglican chant and the 
booming choruses of the Harvard Glee Club, marches and parlor dances, children’s games and Gilbert and Sullivan. 
Most of all he thought of American hymns. [… He] employed what he called ‘plain-as-Dick’s-hat-band harmony,’ 
hymnbook cadences, a single melodic line with plain choral accompaniment” (49-50).  
 
85 “Beneath its apparently simple surface are finely calculated repetitions of musical phrases associated with 
syntactical units, bits of neo-Baroque recitative, and melodic lines that shift as meter shifts” (Watson 50). Watson 
also records that Thomson composed Four Saints almost after the manner of a baroque composer, following the 
technique of “setting down the vocal parts and figured bass lines, leaving harmonies for a later point.” (51). 
 
86 It can thus be said that Thomson’s music privileges a baroque form of monody, while the text itself functions by a 
principle of internal syntactical “counterpoint.” The music thus does not fall into the trap of attempting to illustrate 




                                                                                                                                                       
87 For example: “Letting pin in letting let in let in in in in in let in wet in wed in dead in dead wed led in led wed 
dead in dead in led in wed in said in said led wed dead wed dead said led led said wed dead wed dead led in led in 
wed in wed in said in wed in said in dead in dead wed said led led said wed dead in” (476) 
 
88 Indeed, the distance between Stein and Wagner can be gauged in the way certain moments of Four Saints’ 
premiere performance seemed to parody Wagnerian opera. For example, the final tableau in Grosser’s score, in 
which the Saints appear together in their heavenly mansion and share a quasi-Eucharistic cup while singing “it is 
very nearly ended with bread” and “When this you see remember me” (479-80) could be described as a response to 
the end, either of Das Rheingold or else of Parsifal. 
 
89 Bay-Cheng mentions the following artists as a catalogue of those who have drawn influence from Stein: the 
Living Theatre, the Judson Church Poets’ Theater, Richard Foreman, Robert Wilson, Peter Sellars, the Wooster 
Group, Anne Bogart, Suzan-Lori Parks, Mac Wellman, Laurie Anderson, Karen Finley, Cindy Sherman, Andy 
Warhol, Jack Smith, Michael Snow, Stan Brakhage, Adrienne Kennedy, Maria Irene Fornes, Mark Morris, The 
Wooster Group, and many others (Mama Dada 114–140) 
 
90 See also, 7 October 1935, from Vienna: “Vienna buildings are fine, I kneel to the Baroque” and 8 May 1941, from 
Lima: “A month in Ecuador. Everywhere the noiseless scurry of the long-enduring Indian. Glittering baroque 
churches.” (See: Stein Letters of Gertrude Stein and Thornton Wilder) 
 
91 See Wilder’s undated holograph manuscript essay, “On the Barock, or how to recognize a miracle in the daily 
life.” The essay contains a reference to the 1936 film Green Pastures, which was released on 1 August 1936, and so 
could not have been written prior to this date. 
 
92 It must also be said, some sense of continuousness plays a role in both Stein and Wilder’s understanding of 
baroque. Continuous appearance for Wilder; Continuous presence for Stein. 
 
93 For Wilder, as opposed to Benjamin, the miracle of the baroque is the identity (rather than the alienation) of sign 
and transcendent thing in the material Eucharist. 
 
94 “Why a vision? Did Stein believe in visions? The details are not sacred but entirely commonplace. Visions are 
possible for those who are willing to look at the ordinary. To those who are able to see, an unexceptional, still, bare 
landscape offers the possibility of vision that is the essence of Stein’s meditation.” (Dydo 196). 
 
95 Here, see Corinne Blackmer’s claim: “Since the lives of saints are, by their very nature, miraculous and 
extraordinary, an artistic ‘exact resemblance’ of Teresa and her community of Spanish mystics, such as Stein 
endeavors to body forth in Four Saint, must invariably ‘disrupt’ the conventions of realism and narrative paradigms 
of conflict and resolution” (in Blackmer 326), and her related suggestion that “aesthetic representations of lesbian 
lives are not reducible, without politicized distortion and cloying diminution, to the commonplace private romances 
of bourgeois heterosexuality but discover, rather, their ‘true reflection’ in the resplendent artifice of art forms such 
as opera” (325). In short, neither saints nor queers take well to realism as a strategy for artistic representation. 
 
96 Here see Elin Diamond’s essay “Brechtian Theory/ Feminist Theory.” It is significant that Diamond takes as her 
point of departure another instance in which Stein read landscape allegorically as textuality: “In the 1930s, Gertrude 
Stein and Alice Toklas, on their American lecture tour, were driving in the country in Western Massachusetts. 
Toklas pointed out a batch of clouds. Stein replied, ‘Fresh eggs.’ Toklas insisted that Stein look at the clouds. Stein 
replied again, ‘Fresh eggs.’ Then Toklas asked, ‘Are you making symbolical language?’ ‘No,’ Stein answered, ‘I’m 
reading the signs. I love to read the signs.’” Diamond’s Gestus “marks a site, in the text, of indeterminacy, of 
multiple meanings—a pleasurable moment for reading the clouds.” 
 




                                                                                                                                                       
98 For Sarduy, see Zamora and Kaup, eds 265–315; for Sontag, see “Syberberg’s Hitler.” Originally published in The 
New York Review of Books (21 February 1980), available at: “Susan Sontag: Syberberg’s Hitler” (accessed 1 April 
2014). http://www.syberberg.de/Syberberg4_2010/Susan-Sontag-Syberbergs-Hitler-engl.html 
 
99 For a queer-theoretical reading of the opera, with particular attention to Teresa’s status as a “queer diva” as early 
as the time of Crashaw, see again: Blackmer 325-336.  
 
100 See Butler’s discussion of Althusser and how ideology comes to be established in Butler “Ordinary, Incredulous” 




The Future of the Baroque1 
 
Nearly nine decades have passed since Stein composed Four Saints in Three Acts, and almost as 
long a time since the waning of “modernism” as a cultural constellation, but the concept and 
cultural memory of the baroque continues to inspire modern theater and performance. Numerous 
prominent figures after Stein could be adduced as part of the ongoing modernist tradition of the 
baroque: Antonin Artaud and W. H. Auden for example (to name just two who easily could have 
appeared in this dissertation, but needed to be excluded for reasons of space).2 But for later 
twentieth-century artists too, the concept of baroque has continued to form an enduring subject 
of fascination and identification. Nearly an entire generation of leading avant-garde theater, 
performance, and media artists who came of age under the banner of a new “postmodernism” in 
the arts—beginning perhaps with Jack Smith, but ranging as widely as Yvonne Rainer, Marina 
Abramović, Cindy Sherman, Paul McCarthy, The Wooster Group, Peter Greenaway, Derek 
Jarman, and Richard Foreman—have all at various recent instances claimed themselves or have 
been claimed by others for the category of the baroque.3 Other younger artists, working even 
more recently, could likewise be added to this already expansive group, including Reza Abdoh, 
Ryan Trecartin, My Barbarian, and Andrew Ondrejczak.4 And, in even more mainstream circles, 
contemporary playwrights from Tom Stoppard to Tony Kushner to Caryl Churchill could be 
included in these numbers as well.5 These lists could go on and on: Baroque modernism 
continues to have a clear relevance in our contemporary present, and we have reason to think it 
will continue to have an open future as well, although the question of what form that future will 
take remains unclear. 
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 As early as 1967, when “postmodernism” as such was in its infancy, Guy Debord was 
able to claim in The Society of the Spectacle that “Baroque was the art of a world that had lost its 
center with the collapse of the last mythical order,” and that 1960s-era critical preoccupations 
with the baroque reflected “the awareness that an artistic classicism is no longer possible.”6 
Nietzsche would anticipate Debord in these various claims: perhaps the proliferation of baroque-
identified “postmodern” artists signals a shaken faith in classicism (along with any other 
normative aesthetic standards of representation), a continued sense of exile from “the center,” a 
constant unfolding crisis of doubt and belief, and an intuition that what remains for 
contemporary artists are only baroque and counterbaroque positions. As early as Nietzsche, it 
seems possible to ask the question of whether there is an “outside” to baroque style at all, an 
outside to theatricality, or whether, as Elinor Fuchs has suggested (rewriting Derrida) “Il n’y a 
pas de hors-théâtral” (Death of Character 146). Debord’s central thesis in Society of the 
Spectacle—namely, that late twentieth-century social relations and the modern systems of capital 
supporting them can themselves be seen to have taken on an emphatically spectacular, imagistic 
quality—thus raises additional questions about the relationship between baroque and modernity 
that desire consideration within the sphere of political economy. Is Debord’s “spectacle,” and the 
increasingly theatricalized, “postmodern” (or, now “post- postmodern”) world it stands for, 
simply the latest mutation in a long history of the baroque theatrum mundi?7 There is not the 
space to entertain these questions fully in just a short coda, but they must be noted nonetheless. 
Walter Benjamin’s aid can be called upon, however, to attempt the briefest and most preliminary 
of responses. Near the end of his life, in the Arcades Project, he would describe baroque allegory 
in terms of an “image of petrified unrest [erstarrte Unruhe]” (J78a,2): an image that calls to 
mind the frozen yet undulating folds of fabric common in Bernini’s sculptural work (for 
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example, in the Saint Teresa in Ecstasy sculpture group we have already discussed frequently in 
this dissertation, or in the portrait bust of Louis XIV). This image of petrification allegorizes for 
Benjamin the frozenness of sacred history in its progress toward world redemption during the 
time of the historical baroque (J78a,2), but it also takes on a patently economic meaning as well. 
As Howard Caygill has written, analyzing this chapter of the Arcades, Benjamin’s notion of 
petrified unrest can be called upon “to stand for the stabilized instability of the capitalist 
economy in which values are perpetually being assigned and reassigned.”8   
 Although this dissertation has largely been concerned with depicting the baroque as an 
aesthetic reaction to a sense of semiological and theological crisis in the time of modernity, such 
a crisis necessarily has economic registers as well (which the preceding chapters have sought to 
signal especially with respect to Benjamin and Stéphane Mallarmé). While it sometimes seems 
that modernists called upon the name of the baroque whenever they needed to needed to 
articulate some vision of the new that could not easily be assimilated to the terms and norms of 
their most immediate experience, the concept could similarly be applied to the context of violent 
and incredible market fluctuations that forms their common, fixed, political-economic habitus.9 
In brief, any analysis of the fate of baroque style in the time of twentieth-century 
“postmodernism” would surely need to account for the role played by the increasingly global 
spread of (neo)liberal capital during this time. Perhaps then, the relationship between the 
historical and modernist baroque will amount even more emphatically to a long aesthetic history 
of Western capital, dating from the earliest decades of primitive accumulation and colonialism in 
the early modern period to our present time.  
 But, bracketing economic concerns for just a moment, how might the modernist tradition 
of the baroque continue to take shape in the future? I wish to close by focusing briefly on the 
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most recent contexts of baroque modernism in theater practice, as I see it, by offering some brief, 
concluding remarks on the stage work of the contemporary American avant-garde director 
Robert Wilson.10 As a young artist, Wilson first came to global prominence with the international 
debuts of Deafman Glance (a “silent opera”) in 1970 and Einstein on the Beach, co-created with 
composer Philip Glass, in 1976. Although these premieres came decades after the heyday of 
modernism in the early twentieth century, Wilson’s work as a director and designer owes a 
number of clear and constitutive debts to the baroque modernists considered in this study’s 
preceding chapters. His productions have frequently been cited as inheriting and extending the 
tradition of the Wagnerian Gesamtkunstwerk,11 and they are just as demonstrably indebted to the 
theater practices of the Symbolists, the Expressionists, Brecht, and Stein.12 Perhaps more than in 
any other contemporary artist’s work, all these various baroque modernisms can be said to 
synthesize and interpenetrate one another in Wilson’s signature approach to mise-en-scène. 
When he first appeared on the scene in 1970 with Deafman Glance, his work was hailed by 
Louis Aragon, in an open letter to the then long-dead André Breton, as embodying “what we [the 
Surrealists] dreamed it [Surrealism] might become after us, beyond us” (4). In Aragon’s 
suggestive phrase, the key to the freedom demanded by Wilson for his theater was a “strange 
proximity … of science and art” which Aragon names, “a baroque of the future” (7).13 
Other critics and scholars have historically found similar resonances in Wilson’s work. In 
1977, Bonnie Marranca claimed Wilson for the baroque tradition, perhaps in spite of herself, by 
describing him as “the Inigo Jones of the avant-garde,” hailing Einstein on the Beach as a 
“refunctioned” form of “the concept of the masque” and “a modern allegory.”14 When American 
theater scholar Marc Robinson took to describing Wilson’s strict approach to bodies and gesture 
in space, he found Wilson’s most obvious predecessor to be the seventeenth-century Frenchman 
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Nicolas Poussin, one of the most austere, Apollonian, and neoclassical of baroque landscape 
painters (Fuchs and Chaudhuri, eds. 171–83). And in seeking to claim Wilson as an (perhaps the) 
avatar of the new post-dramatic theater, Hans-Thies Lehmann would write:  
Wilson is part of a long tradition, from the baroque theatre of effects, the 
‘machines’ of the seventeenth century, Jacobean masques, Victorian spectacle 
theatre, down to the variety show and circus in modern times, all of which have 
always irreverently and effectively incorporated the depth of myth as much as the 
attraction of mythical clichés into their repertoire. … This theatre is without tragic 
sentiment or pity, but it does speak to the experience of time, it does testify to 
mourning (Trauer). … It is about the insertion of human actions into the context 
of natural history. (Postdramatic Theater 80–81, emphases in original) 
In all these assessments, Wilson figures preeminently into the tradition of the baroque in ways 
that complicate any simplistic understanding of post-modern and post-dramatic. And he himself 
has at times underscored his participation in this tradition. In describing his approach to images 
to Arthur Holmberg, particularly with respect to Einstein on the Beach, Wilson offered the 
following, richly suggestive thought experiment: “If you place a baroque candelabra [sic] on a 
baroque table, both get lost. You can’t see either. If you place the candelabra on a rock in the 
ocean, you begin to see what it is. Usually in the theater the visual repeats the verbal. The visual 
takes second place to language. I don’t think that way” (qtd. in Holmberg 53). Wilson’s is not 
only a theater of images, but a theater of dialectical or allegorical images like those described by 
Benjamin in the stage practices of the baroque, where heterogeneous ideas and elements (the 
baroque candelabrum, the rock in the middle of the sea) are yoked by violence together. Torn 
from its customary context and recontextualized elsewhere, the candelabrum becomes a fragment 
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or ruin of sorts, one that allows the viewer to see both it and the natural environment that 
threatens to engulf it (as well as the tensions in Wilson’s use of images and texts) in a new, 
emblematic light. But beyond the form this image takes, its way of suggesting Wilson as a 
modern allegorist of sorts, one who pairs images and texts with meanings in a manner at once 
arbitrary, violent, and radical—beyond all this, there is also the sense of desolation the image 
itself carries. A baroque candelabrum on a rock in the middle of the sea; or, as Lehmann writes, 
“The idea of a scenic landscape [in Wilson’s work] therefore also takes on the meaning [of a] 
‘landscape waiting for the gradual disappearance of man’” (Postdramatic Theater 81). 
It is for all these various reasons that Wilson’s directorial approach seems so uniquely 
well suited to the staging of dramatic texts and dramaturgical forms that have their origin in the 
historical baroque. In recent years, he has been called upon to stage Monteverdi’s trio of early 
seventeenth-century operas—L’Orfeo, Il Ritorno d’Ulisse in Patria, and L’Incoronazione di 
Poppea—in gala, season-opening productions cosponsored by the Teatro la Scala in Milan and 
the Paris Opera in 2009, 2011, and 2014 respectively [Figure 22]. Prior to this Monteverdi cycle, 
in 2007, he was invited by Paris’s Théâtre du Châtelet to imagine a staging for Bach’s Saint 
John Passion, an oratorio in which baroque music and the dramatic conventions of baroque 
Trauerspiel come to focus on the suffering and martyrdom of the Christian messiah himself. In a 
similar vein, and much more recently, in 2015, Wilson collaborated with the contemporary 
Estonian composer Arvo Pärt on a large-scale project entitled Adam’s Passion, for which he 
provided a staging of four of Pärt’s classical works, and particularly Pärt’s most recent, large-
scale, choral and orchestral work, entitled Adam’s Lament [Figure 23]. Although the music and 
texts are of much more recent vintage, the dramaturgical and thematic connections with the era 





Figures 22 and 23: (Above) Production photo from Robert Wilson’s L’Incoronazione di Poppea 
(Milan 2014). (Below) Production photo from Robert Wilson’s Adam’s Passion (Tallinn 2015). 
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Adam,” by whose sacrifice mankind is redeemed, Pärt’s writing takes for its subject the original 
Adam, the “Father of Mankind,” whose original sin brings about humanity’s fall from divine 
grace, the same lamentable fall that, according to Benjamin, gives rise to allegory. It is a subject 
uniquely well suited for this composer, and for Wilson as well. Like Bach, Pärt writes from a 
vein of deepest inwardness; his work records the internal drama of a soul striving for communion 
with itself and with a heavenly source from which it has been divided. Echoes of the Lutheran 
Pietism saturating Bach’s Passions are evident in Pärt’s singular musical language—interwoven 
with his characteristic tintinnabuli (gilded, bell-like scintillations, borrowed from Eastern 
Orthodox liturgy and mysticism)—as Pärt returns again and again to meditate on the inherent 
darkness of the human condition and the infinite mystery of grace. In both cases, whether setting 
music by Bach or Pärt, Wilson transforms musical lamentation into visual ostentation, pageant, 
and spectacle. Pärt’s musical language—in which music is figured as prayer, as internal agony, 
as self-communing, as spiritual absorption (to return to Michael Fried’s framework one final 
time) —becomes, in Wilson’s hands, the stuff of (modernist baroque) theatricality. 
What, however, might this point of mutual reflection, when “the baroque of the future” 
and the baroque of the past come to meet face-to-face, mean for the concept’s ongoing history? 
This is, in effect, the sort of question I have hoped to pose at each step of this dissertation, to 
each of its major figures: if we consider Nietzsche—or Wagner, or Mallarmé, or Benjamin, or 
Brecht, or Stein—as having effectively envisioned “the baroque of the future,” what might their 
various visions tell us about this concept, and about history itself? But Wilson’s work raises a 
host of other questions, particularly relating to our contemporary, global economic context. 
Where the historical avant-gardes during the time of modernism once positioned themselves 
against the bourgeois cultural mainstream, Wilson’s work is now part of a rich, bourgeois 
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network of well-funded theaters, producing organizations and major festival circuits. And where 
baroque modernism once exercised a powerful critical potential, which I have hoped to trace in 
this dissertation, it now appears endlessly susceptible to a theatrical culture intent on 
commodifying and deploying it tactically for the reification of bourgeois consumption. Among 
patrons of the avant-garde theater, the baroque seems to be enjoying yet another “renaissance” of 
sorts, another “next wave”—though this may yet just be another moment in which the past 
appears to be “flashing up” to us, in a moment of danger. When Robert Wilson is hired to direct 
a spate of Monteverdi operas at La Scala and the Palais Garnier, with funding from the French 
and Italian states, affluent private investors, and cosmopolitan bourgeois opera-goers or tourists, 
a shift has taken place in the cultural meanings of the avant-garde and the potentials of baroque 
theater as a means to critical or revolutionary thought.  
This question deserves to be considered in in light of what Richard Schechner has 
described as “the conservative avant-garde.” With the term “conservative,” he writes: “I do not 
mean the Tea Party, but something in line with ‘reduce, reuse, recycle,’ ‘sustainability,’ and 
‘make a smaller footprint—respect for and conservation of the planet’s ecosystems and its 
myriad local cultures” (Conservative 895). He continues, getting to some of the extraordinary 
difficulties the avant-garde faces in our contemporary political situation, predicated as it is upon 
neoliberal capital’s almost overwhelming logic of commodification, and in theater, on the global 
festival circuit where Wilson’s work has its home: 
Once the avant-garde was by definition unpredictable, even repulsive—some 
works really were shocking. But today’s avant-garde inhabits the already known, 
marketed as fitting into specific categories or brands. Spectators, scholars, 
funders, and festival bookers know what to expect when they dial the Wooster 
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Group, Lee Breuer, Richard Foreman, Laurie Anderson, Robert Wilson, Anne 
Bogart, Builders Association, Elevator Repair Service, or whomever-whatever. … 
But, in the positive vein, much avant-garde work is at a very high level, both 
conceptually and technically. In my decades of experience, the quality of the 
avant-garde has never been higher. (897) 
It is worth noting, in passing, that in this article, Schechner subscribes to what Rosalind Krauss 
calls the “modernist myth” of the avant-garde’s originality, and seems nostalgic for a time when 
avant-gardists could claim seriously to be making aesthetic in-roads into the absolutely “new” 
(897) or into what Schechner calls “innovation” (899).15 (Never mind that the notions of the 
absolutely “new” and of  “innovation” are themselves crucially tied to temporal structures and 
frameworks based in the very commodity production and branding that Schechner decries. Be 
that as it may.) If modernism and the avant-gardes are to be considered as existing historically 
within a matrix or continuum that stretches back to early modernity and to the tradition of the 
baroque, as this dissertation has argued and as Benjamin would have us believe, this view of 
avant-garde originality should be seen as untenable. The concept of the baroque seems cruelly to 
echo Schechner’s lament over the “already known,” his mournful, defeatist sense that 
“everything—you name it—has been done before” (900). And the baroque tradition of 
modernism I have traced here makes clear that the historical avant-gardes were always more 
fully citational or indebted to the past than Schechner seems able to allow himself to believe 
here. In any case, however, he shifts his attention to the endless violent events of the post-9/11 
world, and our current era’s correspondingly melancholy experience of historical stasis: 
  All this conflict without resolution keeps things moving—not moving forward but  
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around and around. And this is where the avant-garde comes in. Mostly, the 
historical avant-garde was anarchist or on the Left—self-identifying as ‘radical,’ 
‘progressive,’ or ‘alternative’ and fiercely ‘against.’ Today’s avant-gardists are 
not against. … One cannot speak of a radical politics at the level of Robert 
Wilson, the Wooster Group, Elevator Repair Service, Sasha Waltz, Heiner 
Goebbels, Sankai Juku, etc. Many of these artists are on the Left personally, but in 
their artistic practice, in terms of venues, audiences, and effects on the political 
world, this Left is apolitical, a style-left rather than a workers Left. This niche-
garde is what moves around as the circulating stasis. (909) 
Let us set aside, but still note, Schechner’s provocative assumption, echoed at other distinctive 
points throughout this essay (905), that leftisms not focused primarily (or exclusively?) on labor 
politics amount only to “niche” political movements, to apolitical leftisms, or to “a style left.” 
What strikes me more immediately here instead is the rhetoric of “a circulating stasis,” so near to 
the vision of “petrified unrest” that Benjamin sees at the heart of the baroque and of capital. 
Meanwhile, in January 2014, an article on The Huffington Post’s “Front Page” took up the 
question of contemporary economic inequality, focused around a handful of the world’s 
wealthiest individuals: “Richest 85 Wealthier Than Half The World,” proclaimed the article’s 
headline, followed by an eighteenth-century painting of Louis XIV and his family in their 
apartments at the palace of Versailles. Taken together, the image and headline depicted a vision 
of what Debord memorably called the baroque world’s “ornamented poverty” (104). In his 
assessment, the spectacle “may gild poverty, but it cannot transcend it” (30–1).  
So, on one hand, we have Wilson’s avant-garde visions of the Trauerspiel, which tour the 
global festival circuit with the swiftness of luxury goods, and, on the other hand, we have the 
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reinstatement of an oligarchic financial elite, now attaining to an order of magnitude on par with 
a new ancièn-régime, tending increasingly toward disturbing forms of state authoritarianism. 
What this dialectical image reveals to us is that the baroque does haunt us still, and that it 
remains a site of ongoing conceptual and ideological contestation. Keeping this double 
emblematic in mind, we may cast a glance back to the still largely overlooked tradition of the 
baroque past and its animating role in the modernism, while also casting another look forward to 
those spaces of radical alterability that still obtain during a time when neoliberal economy claims 
no space of outside. The baroque’s conceptual history teaches us that there can still be glimmers 
of a revolutionary hope in this Janus-faced gaze that sees both backward and forward at once, if 
only the proper allegorical interpretation can be found. The notion of “tradition” and the 
injunction to “reduce, reuse, and recycle” may sound inherently “conservative” or regressive to 
Schechner, but in times of skyrocketing carbon emissions (among other existential threats to 
human and non-human life alike), they may also hold the only keys to survival. Just as much, 
they may offer time and space to reflect critically without succumbing to despair, and so keys to 
a different new, revivified progressivism in art and politics alike. If so, we might say: faced with 
the all these internal contradictions of the baroque tradition, and with its simultaneous apotheosis 
and catastrophic ruination in the commodification of modern art to the neoliberal project, 
perhaps what is needed most now, perhaps more than ever before, is simply modernism, more 
art, and more of the baroque. 
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1 The title of this coda takes its inspiration from the title and preoccupations of Salvatore Settis’s book, The Future 
of the Classical. 
 
2 In Metatheater and Modernity: Baroque and Neobaroque, Mary Ann Frese Witt also considers Pirandello, Genet, 
Cocteau, Giraudoux, and Ionesco as having debts to the baroque past. And a forthcoming study by Andres Perez-





3 Smith declares himself to be an artist working in the baroque tradition repeatedly in the documentary footage 
sourced for Mary Jordan’s 2006 film, Jack Smith and the Destruction of Atlantis. Rainer was included in a 2001 
Viennese exhibition at the Kunsthalle Wien, entitled “A Baroque Party.” For Abramović, see the title of her 1997 
video and performance work Balkan Baroque. For Sherman and McCarthy, see their inclusion in Curiger, ed. 
Riotous Baroque. For the Wooster Group, see Jakovljevic “Wooster Baroque.” For Greenaway and Jarman, see 
Zamora and Kaup, eds. 31n.27. Foreman’s claimed an allegiance to the baroque in a personal interview with the 
author in 2008. 
 
4 Of Abdoh, Lehmann claims (likely drawing on Benjamin), “His theater was baroque: displaying a brutal direct 
sensuality and the search for transcendence, a lust for life and the confrontation with death” (Postdramatic Theater 
166). Fuchs makes a similar observation by citing Benjamin’s Ursprung to characterize Abdoh’s theater in her 1994 
essay “A Vision of Ruin” (Mufson, ed. 108–9). For Trecartin, see: Curiger, ed. Riotous Baroque. For My Barbarian, 
see the group’s 2009–2012 project, Broke People’s Baroque Peoples’ Theater. For Ondrejczak, see Cermatori You 
Us We All. For contemporary visual artists who have been considered as baroque, see Crowston ed. et al. Misled by 
Nature. See also: Cermatori “Misled by Nature.” 
 
5 Witt claims Stoppard and Kushner as inheritors of the baroque theater in Metatheater and Modernity. For 
Churchill, see Beyad and Rezaei. 
 
6 Debord continues in a polemical vein: “The attempts to establish a normative classicism or neoclassicism during 
the last three centuries have been nothing but short-lived artificial constructs speaking the official language of the 
state, whether of the absolute monarchy or of the revolutionary bourgeoisie draped in Roman togas” (133–4). 
 
7 Elinor Fuchs already anticipates this line of questioning in her essay “Postmodernism and the Scene of Theater,” 
which undertakes to consider the repeated recourse poststructuralist thinkers (Debord, Derrida, Deleuze, Baudrillard, 
Cixous, Irigaray) have to notion of theatricality in order to articulate the scene of postmodernism (Death of 
Character 144–57). Fuchs writes: “For the theater critic contemplating the spectacle of theory, yet another definition 
now presents itself: postmodernism is that moment in culture when the last ontological defenses crumble into theater 
(155). For further readings on this topic, see also the essays collected in Timothy Murray’s anthology, Mimesis 
Masochism and Mime. 
 
8 See: “Walter Benjamin’s Concept of Allegory” in Copeland and Struck eds. 251. 
 
9 Consider, for example, the conceptual resonances between the concept of baroque and the Irish notion of 
G.U.B.U., as articulated here in response to the domino effect of banking collapses in the wake of the 2008 
subprime mortgage crisis: “Daragh Quinn, a banking analyst in London for Nomura, on Monday described the 
Bankia collapse as ‘grotesque, unbelievable, bizarre and unprecedented.’ The phrase was coined as the acronym 
G.U.B.U. in Ireland, where the economy was sunk by the collapse of its banking sector and received an 85 billion 
euro bailout in late 2010 from the European Union, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund” 
(Minder). 
 
10 Here, for simplicity’s sake, I must bracket but also acknowledge the ongoing debates within the field of theater 
and performance criticism about whether experimental work undertaken by members of Wilson’s generation (that is, 
whether experimental work undertaken after the end of early twentieth-century modernism) can be said to constitute 
an avant-garde at all. See Savran “Death of the Avantgarde”; Schechner “Conservative Avant-Garde”; Puchner “The 
Avant-Garde is Dead, Long Live the Avant-Garde!” in Hopkins ed. Neo-Avant-Garde (351–70). 
 
11 See, for example, Arthur Holmberg, who writes:  “Inevitably, the word Gesamtkunstwerk arises when discussing 
Wilson’s multichannel theater” (1).  Mary Lewis Shaw makes a similar connection in Performance in the Texts of 
Mallarmé (1).  
 
12 For discussions of Wilson’s debts to Symbolism, see: Holmberg 162; Marranca “Robert Wilson and the Idea of 
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Theatrewritings 120; For analysis of Stein’s influence over Wilson, see Bay-Cheng 135, and Marranca’s 
Introduction to Stein’s Last Operas and Plays (xxv). 
 
13 On the intersection between science and art as a site where the baroque can come into play, one would need to see 
also the discussion of the Music-Making Socrates that ends Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy, and also in the epigraph 
from Goethe that begins Benjamin’s Trauerspiel study.  
 
14 Theatrewritings 120-21. For Marranca, writing in 1976, these attributes of Wilson’s work suggested his 
involvement with the history of “mannerism” in the arts, one arguably subordinate to the long tradition of the 
baroque. Her description of Wilson’s work as overbrimming with “’quotations’ of art” and as “inorganic, 
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Human, All Too Human – Volume II, Passage 144 
 
144   On the baroque style. – The thinker or writer who knows that he was not born or trained for 
dialectics or the unfolding of ideas will involuntarily grasp at the rhetorical and the dramatic: 
since in the end what matters is to make himself understood and thus to gain power, regardless of 
whether he draws sensibilities to himself along an even path or ambushes them suddenly—
whether as a herdsman or as a brigand. This is equally the case in the visual and the musical arts, 
where the feeling of a lack of dialectics or an incapacity for expression or narration—together 
within an overreaching, urgent impulse in form—brings to light that species of style called the 
baroque. Only the badly educated and pretentious, by the way, will feel immediate contempt for 
this word. The baroque style arises whenever a great art fades from bloom, when the demands in 
the art of classical expression have become too great, as a natural event that can be observed with 
melancholy—because it heralds the night—but also with admiration for its specific 
compensatory arts of expression and narration. These include the choice of material and themes 
of the highest dramatic tension, which can set the heart trembling even without art because they 
bring Heaven and Hell too near to each other in feeling: then the eloquence of powerful affects 
and gestures, of the ugly and the sublime, of great masses, of quantity in itself above all—as this 
was already said of Michelangelo, the father or grandfather of the Italian baroque artists—: the 
lights of twilight, transfiguration, or conflagration on such powerfully made forms: and 
additionally, continual new experiments in mediums and in ends, forcefully underlined by the 
artist for other artists, while the laity are forced to believe they witness the contant involuntary 
overflowing of all the cornucopias of a primeval nature-art: all these characteristics in which this 
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style has its greatness are not possible, not allowed in the earlier, pre-classical and classical 
epochs of an artistic genre: such delicacies hang long like forbidden fruit on the tree. —Just now, 
when music is passing over into this last epoch, we can become acquainted with the phenomenon 
of the baroque style in a particular splendor and learn much about earlier ages in comparison to 
it: because a baroque style has already existed many times since the age of the Greeks, in poetry, 
eloquence, prose style, sculpture, just as in architecture—and, however much it lacks the highest 
nobility of an innocent, unconscious, triumphant perfection, this style has always appealed to 
many of the best and most serious of its time:—which is why, as I said, it is pretentious to judge 
it immediately with disdain, but he whose sensibility for the purer and greater style is not 
deadened by it may consider himself fortunate. 
 
144   Vom Barockstile. — Wer sich als Denker und Schriftsteller zur Dialektik und 
Auseinanderfaltung der Gedanken nicht geboren oder erzogen weiss, wird unwillkürlich nach 
dem Rhetorischen und Dramatischen greifen: denn zuletzt kommt es ihm darauf an, sich 
verständlich zu machen und dadurch Gewalt zu gewinnen, gleichgültig ob er das Gefühl auf 
ebenem Pfade zu sich leitet, oder unversehens überfällt—als Hirt oder als Räuber. Diess gilt auch 
in den bildenden wie musischen Künsten; wo das Gefühl mangelnder Dialektik oder des 
Ungenügens in Ausdruck und Erzählung, zusammen mit einem überreichen, drängenden 
Formentriebe, jene Gattung des Stiles zu Tage fördert, welche man Barockstil nennt. —Nur die 
Schlechtunterrichteten und Anmaassenden werden übrigens bei diesem Worte sogleich eine 
abschätzige Empfindung haben. Der Barockstil entsteht jedesmal beim Abblühen jeder grossen 
Kunst, wenn die Anforderungen in der Kunst des classischen Ausdrucks allzugross geworden 
sind, als ein Natur-Ereigniss, dem man wohl mit Schwermuth—weil es der Nacht voranläuft— 
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zusehen wird, aber zugleich mit Bewunderung für die ihm eigenthümlichen Ersatzkünste des 
Ausdrucks und der Erzählung. Dahin gehört schon die Wahl von Stoffen und Vorwürfen 
höchster dramatischer Spannung, bei denen auch ohne Kunst das Herz zittert, weil Himmel und 
Hölle der Empfindung allzunah sind: dann die Beredtsamkeit der starken Affecte und Gebärden, 
des Hässlich-Erhabenen, der grossen Massen, überhaupt der Quantität an sich—wie diess sich 
schon bei Michelangelo, dem Vater oder Grossvater der italiänischen Barockkünstler, 
ankündigt—: die Dämmerungs-, Verklärungs- oder Feuerbrunstlichter auf so starkgebildeten 
Formen: dazu fortwährend neue Wagnisse in Mitteln und Absichten, vom Künstler für die 
Künstler kräftig unterstrichen, während der Laie wähnen muss, das beständige unfreiwillige 
Ueberströmen aller Füllhörner einer ursprünglichen Natur-Kunst zu sehen: diese Eigenschaften 
alle, in denen jener Stil seine Grösse hat, sind in den früheren, vorclassischen und classischen 
Epochen einer Kunstart nicht möglich, nicht erlaubt: solche Köstlichkeiten hängen lange als 
verbotene Früchte am Baume.—Gerade jetzt, wo die Musik in diese letzte Epoche übergeht, kann 
man das Phänomen des Barockstils in einer besonderen Pracht kennen lernen und Vieles durch 
Vergleichung daraus für frühere Zeiten lernen: denn es hat von den griechischen Zeiten ab schon 
oftmals einen Barockstil gegeben, in der Poesie, Beredtsamkeit, im Prosastile, in der Sculptur 
eben so wohl als bekanntermaassen in der Architektur—und jedesmal hat dieser Stil, ob es ihm 
gleich am höchsten Adel, an dem einer unschuldigen, unbewussten, sieghaften Vollkommenheit, 
gebricht, auch Vielen von den Besten und Ernstesten seiner Zeit wohl gethan: —wesshalb es, 
wie gesagt, anmaassend ist, ohne Weiteres ihn abschätzig zu beurtheilen, so sehr sich Jeder 
glücklich preisen darf, dessen Empfindung durch ihn nicht für den reineren und grösseren Stil 
unempfänglich gemacht wird. 
